Why didn't the Soviets react during Pershing 2 deployment?

[demosthenes]

When the U.S deployed their intermediate range Pershing 2 missiles and GLCMs, the Soviets did not do anything unusual as far as an immediate political/military action. For the first time, the Soviet's capital was within range of ground launched intermediate range missiles. Yet back in 1962 when the Soviet union attempted to place their own intermediate range missiles in Cuba to place Washington within their range, the U.S had an extreme response.

 

So why didn't the Soviet Union react like the Americans did in 62?

[Archie Pellagio]

When the U.S deployed their intermediate range Pershing 2 missiles and GLCMs, the Soviets did not do anything unusual as far as an immediate political/military action. For the first time, the Soviet's capital was within range of ground launched intermediate range missiles. Yet back in 1962 when the Soviet union attempted to place their own intermediate range missiles in Cuba to place Washington within their range, the U.S had an extreme response.

 

So why didn't the Soviet Union react like the Americans did in 62?

 

They did - sort of.

 

They became very agitated in the early 80's to the point of almost rash action in the 82/83 period being very afraid of Reagan.

 

Things cooled a little thanks to diplomatic manouverings, and while agitated, things were'a'changin'.

[Gregory]

When the U.S deployed their intermediate range Pershing 2 missiles and GLCMs, the Soviets did not do anything unusual as far as an immediate political/military action. For the first time, the Soviet's capital was within range of ground launched intermediate range missiles. Yet back in 1962 when the Soviet union attempted to place their own intermediate range missiles in Cuba to place Washington within their range, the U.S had an extreme response.

 

So why didn't the Soviet Union react like the Americans did in 62?

 

Because the Soviet navy couldn't block the missiles from reaching their launch positions in Western Europe.

Edited February 12, 2008 by Gregory

[DKTanker]

When the U.S deployed their intermediate range Pershing 2 missiles and GLCMs, the Soviets did not do anything unusual as far as an immediate political/military action. For the first time, the Soviet's capital was within range of ground launched intermediate range missiles. Yet back in 1962 when the Soviet union attempted to place their own intermediate range missiles in Cuba to place Washington within their range, the U.S had an extreme response.

 

So why didn't the Soviet Union react like the Americans did in 62?

In range of Moscow if parked in Berlin. As it was Pershing IIs were kept mostly west of the Rhine and thus about 160 km-200 km short of Moscow. Moreover, why would the soviets be more worried about losing Moscow to a Pershing II when there were Minutemen I,II, and III that could do the job just as well?

 

Actually the Pershing II, a response to the much more powerful SS-20, was a bargaining chip, and it worked. The Soviets agreed to and signed the INF treaty in 1987. Said treaty eliminating both the PII and the more powerful and much longer ranged SS-20.

 

GLCMs, mostly based in the UK and Benelux had about a 1/3 greater range than the PII and did put it within range of Moscow though it had an extremely long flight time, some 2 1/2 hours to reach its max range.

 

As for politics, the Soviets most certainly mobilized their useful idiots in western Europe, though with the triumvirate of Reagan, Thatcher, and Kohl, that tactic was a non-starter.

[shep854]

As for politics, the Soviets most mobilized their useful idiots in western Europe, though with the triumvirate of Reagan, Thatcher, and Kohl, that tactic was a non-starter. And boy, did those idiots howl!

Edited February 12, 2008 by shep854

[demosthenes]

In range of Moscow if parked in Berlin. As it was Pershing IIs were kept mostly west of the Rhine and thus about 160 km-200 km short of Moscow. Moreover, why would the soviets be more worried about losing Moscow to a Pershing II when there were Minutemen I,II, and III that could do the job just as well?

 

 

The Issue of Pershing 2 targeting is debatable.

 

http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/documents/ZB79_000.pdf

 

GLCMs, mostly based in the UK and Benelux had about a 1/3 greater range than the PII and did put it within range of Moscow though it had an extremely long flight time, some 2 1/2 hours to reach its max range.

 

They had the relative stealth advantage.

 

In any case, this is only partially relevant to the question at hand as to why Soviets didn't respond in a manner akin to the Americans in the Cuban Missile crisis.

[Archie Pellagio]

In range of Moscow if parked in Berlin. As it was Pershing IIs were kept mostly west of the Rhine and thus about 160 km-200 km short of Moscow. Moreover, why would the soviets be more worried about losing Moscow to a Pershing II when there were Minutemen I,II, and III that could do the job just as well?

 

Wasn't the big two things with Pershing's and SS20's etc that a) they were mobile which jeopardized the whole idea of MAD, SALT (and later START) observation etc, and b ) that there was a lot less warning time if the ball did drop...

[DKTanker]

The Issue of Pershing 2 targeting is debatable.

 

http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/documents/ZB79_000.pdf

Not really. A couple of points.

 

1)I scanned that link and there were no hard facts. The one real reference was that statement that the PII and GLCM were deemed theater defensive weapons and the reply was, "Where's your proof?" IOW, it didn't matter what was said, the questioner had already made up their mind.

 

2)There were three flavors of the PII

a. Enhanced radiation, never deployed such was the howling by the Soviet useful idiots

b. Penetrating warhead, never deployed and the missile with the greatest range...likely the missile to which you refer.

c. Single warhead W85 with variable yield 5-50kt. This was the only weapon deployed. I'm guessing it was easier for the useful idiots to stomach complete destruction instead of the limited destruction of enhanced radiation.

 

They had the relative stealth advantage.

While they maybe relatively stealthy, their launch would hardly go unnoticed. Given that, the Soviets had gobs of time to retaliate even before the first GLCM a)Crossed the Channel or b)Crossed into E. Germany.

 

In any case, this is only partially relevant to the question at hand as to why Soviets didn't respond in a manner akin to the Americans in the Cuban Missile crisis.

Asked and answered. Just what were the Soviets going to do, blockade Western Europe? If the systems were deployed in Berlin, then yes, a blockade would have been effective. But they weren't so any blockade was out of the question. That said, the ultimate result of the 1962 crisis was both the removal of missiles from Cuba and missiles deployed in Turkey. Pretty much what happened with the deployment of the IRBMs in western Europe. They were removed as were the SS-20s with the 1987 INF treaty.

 

More than that, perhaps you could explain why the Soviets didn't do more.

[KingSargent]

The Issue of Pershing 2 targeting is debatable.

 

http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/documents/ZB79_000.pdf

They had the relative stealth advantage.

 

In any case, this is only partially relevant to the question at hand as to why Soviets didn't respond in a manner akin to the Americans in the Cuban Missile crisis.

Cuba was a big sore point in the US at the time. First Castro (popular in the US in the mid-50s) turned to the USSR, then there was the Bay Of Pigs fiasco. Cuba was in the news, and Soviet missiles there a little more than a year into the Kennedy Presidency were letting Creeping Communism move a bit too fast.

 

In contrast, PII deployment to Germany was just another weapon that could not rachet pre--existing tensions too much higher. For one thing the Soviet citizenry was not screaming in the media for something to be done.

[Special-K]

My understanding of the Pershing was that it could be launched and in Moscow before the Soviets would be able to react at all. This would allow for a swift decapitation strike that would be very difficult to react to in time.

 

Of course I may be wrong on this.

 

 

 

 

 

-K

[John T]

So why didn't the Soviet Union react like the Americans did in 62?

 

Two simple ideas.

 

1. Mutual assured Destruction, where in effect since the seventies while Cuba was first real threat to US.

One bomb more or less did little difference while for the US in 1962 it was the first bomb.

 

2. Cuba was on US backyard, FRG wasn't USSR's backyard.

If US had tried to place Pershings in Poland under a Solidarity government, I think Cuban crisis had been bleak in comparison.

 

Cheers

John T.

[demosthenes]

Asked and answered. Just what were the Soviets going to do, blockade Western Europe? If the systems were deployed in Berlin, then yes, a blockade would have been effective. But they weren't so any blockade was out of the question. That said, the ultimate result of the 1962 crisis was both the removal of missiles from Cuba and missiles deployed in Turkey. Pretty much what happened with the deployment of the IRBMs in western Europe. They were removed as were the SS-20s with the 1987 INF treaty.

 

More than that, perhaps you could explain why the Soviets didn't do more.

 

 

I would not say that the Cuban/Turkish withdrawals are comparable to what happened in 1987 due to the fact that the SS-20 was never deployed against the United states. If the U.S.S.R had deployed SS-20s in Cuba then I would agree.

 

By the way, how would you have expected the United States to react, had the Soviet Union placed SS-20s in Cuba?

[demosthenes]

They may have believed that, certainly they said just that in 'Whence the threat to peace'. On the other hand, just because one side believes it is possible, doesnt mean its possible. The US also believed the TU22M3 was a strategic bomber, which also seemed to be baseless. Everything ive read suggests in reality neither of the pershings could reach Moscow from Nato territory. Unless you put them on Bornholm anyway...

 

In short, dont automatically believe what the cold war Kremlin believed. I think their ideas have long since been discredited.

 

I'm looking to western sources:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/cat-house.htm

 

In any event, the topic at hand rests on what Capabilities the Soviets thought the Pershing had and their reaction, regardless if whether or not their estimate coincided with reality.

 

I'd rather move on from discussing the weapons systems at this point.

Edited February 12, 2008 by demosthenes

[jakec]

As was discussed here before in the Cuban Missile Crisis topic, the US had publicly and privately warned the USSR several times prior to October 1962 that placing "offensive missiles" in Cuba would be a casus belli. When Khrushchev went ahead in defiance of those warnings then the US admittedly had a choice - look impotent or stand firm behind the already issued warning. You know the rest...

[DKTanker]

I'd rather move on from discussing the weapons systems at this point.

 

You could start by opining why you believe the Soviets did little. You apparently don't like the answers you're getting, perhaps you might share your personal beliefs in this matter.

Edited February 13, 2008 by DKTanker

[philgollin]

As was discussed here before in the Cuban Missile Crisis topic, the US had publicly and privately warned the USSR several times prior to October 1962 that placing "offensive missiles" in Cuba would be a casus belli. When Khrushchev went ahead in defiance of those warnings then the US admittedly had a choice - look impotent or stand firm behind the already issued warning. You know the rest...

 

Cuba was the last gasp of US nuclear dominance "diplomacy" and meant that the illegal blockade was partly successful.

 

Any time after about 1964 the USSR wouldn't have been in such a poor strategic position. The mythical "missile gap" (which followed the equally mythical "bomber gap") had actually become a more strategically level situation - partly caused by the Cuban crisis.

 

The SS-20/Pershing 2/Cruise Missile debate was sort-of covered by that startegic discussion paper posted as a link here about three weeks ago. The USSR did "feel" very threatened and reacted accordingly.

 

It would therefore seem that the "useful idiots" did have a case.

 

.

[KingSargent]

Cuba was the last gasp of US nuclear dominance "diplomacy" and meant that the illegal blockade was partly successful.

 

Any time after about 1964 the USSR wouldn't have been in such a poor strategic position. The mythical "missile gap" (which followed the equally mythical "bomber gap") had actually become a more strategically level situation - partly caused by the Cuban crisis.

 

The SS-20/Pershing 2/Cruise Missile debate was sort-of covered by that startegic discussion paper posted as a link here about three weeks ago. The USSR did "feel" very threatened and reacted accordingly.

 

It would therefore seem that the "useful idiots" did have a case.

 

.

<sigh> Gollum's back, there goes the neighborhood..... :rolleyes:

[jakec]

When the U.S deployed their intermediate range Pershing 2 missiles and GLCMs, the Soviets did not do anything unusual as far as an immediate political/military action. For the first time, the Soviet's capital was within range of ground launched intermediate range missiles. Yet back in 1962 when the Soviet union attempted to place their own intermediate range missiles in Cuba to place Washington within their range, the U.S had an extreme response.

 

So why didn't the Soviet Union react like the Americans did in 62?

According to the Mitrokhin Archive Vol 1, what could be broadly classed as Soviet reactions to Pershing (although perhaps more accurately described as reactions to the generally less compliant stance of the new Reagan administration) included:

(p.511) using, or conniving in the use of, terrorism against NATO and the US - this included allowing the DDR to become "an Eldorado for terrorists" and launching a terrorist campaign against targets throughout Western Europe and the UK;

(p.565 and others) the launch of KGB Operation RYAN to discover (non-existent) NATO plans for a nuclear first strike on the USSR;

(p.596, 631 and others) KGB cooperation with the 'peace movements' in Europe to oppose Pershing and cruise;

(p.316) using KGB 'active measures' to ensure that Reagan would not get a second term, the top priority of Service A at the time;

(p.374) according to Soviet archives seized by Yeltsin, distributing over 200 million dollars to non-Soviet bloc Communist parties during the 1980s, especially the French PCF and Italian PCI, and the CPUSA (subsidies of 2 million dollars a year for most of the 1980s because the leader of the CPUSA told the CPSU Int'l Dept chief that he would be instrumental in "stopping and reversing the present reactionary policies of the Reagan administration");

(p.595) KGB 'active measures' to undermine conservative opponents of German chancellor Schmidt in 1980

(p.286) tasking technical collection services to obtain specifications of new US and NATO nuclear weapons.

[DKTanker]

Cuba was the last gasp of US nuclear dominance "diplomacy" and meant that the illegal blockade was partly successful.

 

Any time after about 1964 the USSR wouldn't have been in such a poor strategic position. The mythical "missile gap" (which followed the equally mythical "bomber gap") had actually become a more strategically level situation - partly caused by the Cuban crisis.

 

The SS-20/Pershing 2/Cruise Missile debate was sort-of covered by that startegic discussion paper posted as a link here about three weeks ago. The USSR did "feel" very threatened and reacted accordingly.

 

It would therefore seem that the "useful idiots" did have a case.

How is any of that topical to the discussion about your Soviets doing relatively little with the regards to the PII and GLCM deployment?

Edited February 13, 2008 by DKTanker

[DKTanker]

Yes its often forgotten now how successful KGB disinformation efforts actually were during the cold war. Best example of their kind of operation is the campaign against the Neutron bomb.

Had to love the "logic" that it was unfair to use nukes that caused limited physical damage while inflicting human casualties because...well, because it wouldn't do to have undamaged cities devoid of life. If you're going to kill people, by gawd you have to destroy the cities and equipment that surrounds the people.

[philgollin]

How is any of that topical to the discussion about your Soviets doing relatively little with the regards to the PII and GLCM deployment?

 

Let's see - ah yes - it directly answers the original question - Maybe that is why it is "topical"

 

Strange how people can't seem to read the original question.

 

.

[shep854]

I believe that the idiots' main argument against enhanced radiation warheads was that they undermined MAD, and made nuclear war more likely. The Sovs cooperated by announcing that since ERWs were in fact nuclear weapons, their use would be answered with conventional nukes.

 

PS: Wasn't the WARPAC introducing some advanced missiles at about the same time?

Edited February 14, 2008 by shep854

[DKTanker]

PS: Wasn't the WARPAC introducing some advanced missiles at about the same time?

The sovs were extending the range of the SS-20, sometimes refered to as SS-28, but primarily they deployed more SS-20s in response to the PII, which itself was a response to the SS-20.

[Ken Estes]

I thought the Sovs were at their best vs. the neutron bomb. Remember that? They claimed it was the ultimate Capitalist weapon, killing the people, but leaving the property undamaged.....

[bigfngun]

Two simple ideas.

 

1. Mutual assured Destruction, where in effect since the seventies while Cuba was first real threat to US.

 

 

Cheers

John T.

 

Just like to interject that MAD was NEVER, EVER, EVER the official policy/strategy of the US. Deterrence or Assured Destruction of the "enemy" was/is the policy. MAD was forced on the US by the Soviet nuclear build up from the mid-60s onwards. AFAIK, the US (and I assume the Soviets) never wanted to be in a mutual suicide pact.

 

Thread hijacking over.