How long do you think that MacArthur could have held out in the Philippines?

[John Dudek]

How long do you think that MacArthur could have held out in the Philippines?

 

 

Best case scenerio. Had MacArthur not tried to be a modern day Caesar, but instead heeded to the dictates of War Plan Orange III and immediately withdrawn his forces into Bataan along with all of his Quartermaster Stores, ammunition, weapons, medicine, fuel and other logistical necessaries with him, how long could he have held out against the Japanese and how long before the profound embarrassment of the US not going to the USAFFE Forces relief would begin to sink in to the American public? I wonder if, had the Philippines Islands held out well into 1942, would the US War strategy have been changed, with a much more aggressive war policy towards the seizure of Japanese bases leading up towards the PI, using Army Divisions originally slated for North Africa?

 

I read that millions of pounds of harvested rice were sitting idly in railroad cars throughout Luzon, but were prevented from moving into Bataan because of Philippine Governmental restrictions prohibitting the shipment of rice from one provence to another. Had they been sent into Bataan, those rations could have kept the USAFFE troops there much more well fed, battle fit and for a much longer period of time

[JWB]

Not much longer than they did. One million pounds isn't that much as it is a starvation diet for one million for one day. How many people were at Bataan that had to be fed? When the surrender happened they had already eaten the cavalry horses, artillery mules, and stripped the jungle of all edible life.

[KingSargent]

Following the War Plan Orange planning was senseless after 7/12/41. What's the point of hiding in Bataan waiting for a Fleet that isn't there anymore? WPO sucked anyway, but relief by the Fleet had been impossible since FDR sent 25% of it to the Atlantic for 'Neutrality Patrol.' The WPO planners had envisaged a war with Japan, not a Global War where most American assets had already been dedicated to a 'Germany First' strategy.

 

Most here know that I loathe Big Mac, but in fairness he did not have a choice except to try open-field combat. Heading straight to Bataan meant NO hope, fighting in the open offered SOME small hope. On 8/12/41 the Japanese had not shown how good they really were to the West. They couldn't even defeat CHINA in four years for Gawd's sake, and China was the laughingstock of Western Imperialism!

 

So there was a slim hope that maybe Big Mac's untrained Filipino troops could pull a Bunker Hill or two on the IJA. And the effect on the Filipinos if the Americans had just run and hid without making any effort to defend the PI was incalculable. Piss them off enough and it could be Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere time.

 

That said, Big Mac and his staff totally FUBARed the whole thing. Brereton FUBARed his whole Far East Air Force into extinction in days (half of it on the first day of attacks), Supplies were not picked up at the docks and depots, and they were not delivered either to Bataan or the 'Field Army.' Civilians were allowed to pour into Bataan instead of being evacuated :rolleyes:; really, Rule #1 in the Assyrian Handbook of Siege Warfare is "Get rid of useless mouths in a fortress before you have a seige."

 

Realistically all a longer hold-out on Bataan could do would be to make Homma commit Honorable Seppuku to atone for his failure. The Pacific War had passed the PI by May 1942, and given the global situation in 1942 a relief expedition was just impossible no matter what USian public opinion said.

[Tim the Tank Nut]

The bigger fool was Brereton. MacArthur made his share of mistakes but they were the same mistakes all the US forces were making at war's beginning. The US wasn't mentally prepared for war. Brereton didn't disperse the aircraft when ordered and neglected his duties so thoroughly as to get the Far East Air Force completeley destroyed.

 

After that he went to Europe to help kill Paratroopers

[BillB]

The bigger fool was Brereton. MacArthur made his share of mistakes but they were the same mistakes all the US forces were making at war's beginning. The US wasn't mentally prepared for war. Brereton didn't disperse the aircraft when ordered and neglected his duties so thoroughly as to get the Far East Air Force completeley destroyed.

 

After that he went to Europe to help kill Paratroopers

 

BillB

[John Dudek]

Following the War Plan Orange planning was senseless after 7/12/41. What's the point of hiding in Bataan waiting for a Fleet that isn't there anymore? WPO sucked anyway, but relief by the Fleet had been impossible since FDR sent 25% of it to the Atlantic for 'Neutrality Patrol.' The WPO planners had envisaged a war with Japan, not a Global War where most American assets had already been dedicated to a 'Germany First' strategy.

 

Most here know that I loathe Big Mac, but in fairness he did not have a choice except to try open-field combat. Heading straight to Bataan meant NO hope, fighting in the open offered SOME small hope. On 8/12/41 the Japanese had not shown how good they really were to the West. They couldn't even defeat CHINA in four years for Gawd's sake, and China was the laughingstock of Western Imperialism!

 

So there was a slim hope that maybe Big Mac's untrained Filipino troops could pull a Bunker Hill or two on the IJA. And the effect on the Filipinos if the Americans had just run and hid without making any effort to defend the PI was incalculable. Piss them off enough and it could be Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere time.

 

That said, Big Mac and his staff totally FUBARed the whole thing. Brereton FUBARed his whole Far East Air Force into extinction in days (half of it on the first day of attacks), Supplies were not picked up at the docks and depots, and they were not delivered either to Bataan or the 'Field Army.' Civilians were allowed to pour into Bataan instead of being evacuated :rolleyes:; really, Rule #1 in the Assyrian Handbook of Siege Warfare is "Get rid of useless mouths in a fortress before you have a seige."

 

Realistically all a longer hold-out on Bataan could do would be to make Homma commit Honorable Seppuku to atone for his failure. The Pacific War had passed the PI by May 1942, and given the global situation in 1942 a relief expedition was just impossible no matter what USian public opinion said.

 

I wonder though what might have happened had MacArthur had a Quartermaster General imbued with the powers to overcome Philippine Governmental restrictions, to seize and commandeer all wheeled transport and supply ships in the same fashion that a Canadian Transport full of Bren Gun Carriers meant for Hong Kong was taken and its cargo made part of MacArthur's mobile force TOE. A Vichy French freighter that was loaded to the gunwhales with wheat flour and bound for French Indo China was sunk by Japanese aircraft while fleeing Manila Bay. All of these lost and wasted opportunities meant empty bellies for the USAFFE Forces on Bataan.

[KingSargent]

I wonder though what might have happened had MacArthur had a Quartermaster General imbued with the powers to overcome Philippine Governmental restrictions, to seize and commandeer all wheeled transport and supply ships in the same fashion that a Canadian Transport full of Bren Gun Carriers meant for Hong Kong was taken and its cargo made part of MacArthur's mobile force TOE. A Vichy French freighter that was loaded to the gunwhales with wheat flour and bound for French Indo China was sunk by Japanese aircraft while fleeing Manila Bay. All of these lost and wasted opportunities meant empty bellies for the USAFFE Forces on Bataan.

I don't think it would have changed much really. If Big Mac had done everything right the Japanese would have replaced Homma with someone more competent. The PI were going to fall anyway since FDR was more interested in Europe. The 'Philippines Relief Expeditionary Force' was headed east, not west, and nothing was going to change that.

[John Dudek]

I don't think it would have changed much really. If Big Mac had done everything right the Japanese would have replaced Homma with someone more competent. The PI were going to fall anyway since FDR was more interested in Europe. The 'Philippines Relief Expeditionary Force' was headed east, not west, and nothing was going to change that.

 

The Japanese did so when they replaced Homma with the more competant Yamashita. Had MacArthur's troops been sitting on a six month plus, supply of food, munitions and fuel, the war in the Pacific could have taken a whole new turn. It was possible to fly medium bombers nonstop from Darwin Australia to Mindanao, PI. "Pappy Gunn" and a number of other US pilots perfected that flight route. It's not too far of a turn to see that the Philippine Islands could have continued to gain some small increments of friendly air support, well after April of 1942, had the wherewithal support have been in existance.

[KingSargent]

The Japanese did so when they replaced Homma with the more competant Yamashita. Had MacArthur's troops been sitting on a six month plus, supply of food, munitions and fuel, the war in the Pacific could have taken a whole new turn. It was possible to fly medium bombers nonstop from Darwin Australia to Mindanao, PI. "Pappy Gunn" and a number of other US pilots perfected that flight route. It's not too far of a turn to see that the Philippine Islands could have continued to gain some small increments of friendly air support, well after April of 1942, had the wherewithal support have been in existance.

Yamashita didn't go to the PI until 1944, so that's a straw man in the context of this thread.

 

OK, US medium bombers could fly from Darwin to Mindanao. So Effing What?

Question 1: WHAT medium bombers are we talking about here? The USAAC did not have medium bomber groups laying around in early 1942.

 

Question 2: How are they going to get to Darwin? The ferry chain of bases across the Pacific had not been set up yet, so they weren't going to fly. Shipping them would take months.

 

Question 3: OK, they get to Mindanao. What do they use for avgas? FTM where does the avgas in Darwin for them to ferry to Mindanao come from? FTM#2 what do they do for bombs, bullets, and spare parts? Presumably the air and ground crews could sleep under the balmy tropical skies and pick fruit for rations.

 

The "wherewithal support" was NOT in existence and it is total fantasy to assume that it could have been.

[irregularmedic]

Following the War Plan Orange planning was senseless after 7/12/41. What's the point of hiding in Bataan waiting for a Fleet that isn't there anymore? WPO sucked anyway, but relief by the Fleet had been impossible since FDR sent 25% of it to the Atlantic for 'Neutrality Patrol.' The WPO planners had envisaged a war with Japan, not a Global War where most American assets had already been dedicated to a 'Germany First' strategy.

 

Most here know that I loathe Big Mac, but in fairness he did not have a choice except to try open-field combat. Heading straight to Bataan meant NO hope, fighting in the open offered SOME small hope. On 8/12/41 the Japanese had not shown how good they really were to the West. They couldn't even defeat CHINA in four years for Gawd's sake, and China was the laughingstock of Western Imperialism!

 

So there was a slim hope that maybe Big Mac's untrained Filipino troops could pull a Bunker Hill or two on the IJA. And the effect on the Filipinos if the Americans had just run and hid without making any effort to defend the PI was incalculable. Piss them off enough and it could be Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere time.

 

That said, Big Mac and his staff totally FUBARed the whole thing. Brereton FUBARed his whole Far East Air Force into extinction in days (half of it on the first day of attacks), Supplies were not picked up at the docks and depots, and they were not delivered either to Bataan or the 'Field Army.' Civilians were allowed to pour into Bataan instead of being evacuated :rolleyes:; really, Rule #1 in the Assyrian Handbook of Siege Warfare is "Get rid of useless mouths in a fortress before you have a seige."

 

Realistically all a longer hold-out on Bataan could do would be to make Homma commit Honorable Seppuku to atone for his failure. The Pacific War had passed the PI by May 1942, and given the global situation in 1942 a relief expedition was just impossible no matter what USian public opinion said.

 

 

Is this not the bane of civilized nations though?* Can MacArthur (I hate him too) or anyone else for that matter, truly be expected to somehow turn away allied women and children seeking safety and succor?

 

*Is it better to lose battles due to such principles but have stood by them?

Not to derail the thread, but what about the UK trying to help Greece in WWII? Isn't this a similar scenario? Yes, it's a bad idea, and some can foresee it's doomed to failure, but besides being somewhat neccessary for the UK to prove something to the US to ensure Lend-Lease happens, it's probably the right thing to do, despite the fact that it's just about guaranteed to be a losing proposition.

[John Dudek]

[/color]

Yamashita didn't go to the PI until 1944, so that's a straw man in the context of this thread.

 

OK, US medium bombers could fly from Darwin to Mindanao. So Effing What?

Question 1: WHAT medium bombers are we talking about here? The USAAC did not have medium bomber groups laying around in early 1942.

 

Question 2: How are they going to get to Darwin? The ferry chain of bases across the Pacific had not been set up yet, so they weren't going to fly. Shipping them would take months.

 

Question 3: OK, they get to Mindanao. What do they use for avgas? FTM where does the avgas in Darwin for them to ferry to Mindanao come from? FTM#2 what do they do for bombs, bullets, and spare parts? Presumably the air and ground crews could sleep under the balmy tropical skies and pick fruit for rations.

 

The "wherewithal support" was NOT in existence and it is total fantasy to assume that it could have been.

 

 

Question 1. B-25 Mitchells and a handful of B-17's, the same planes that flew the "Royce Raid" from Mindanao over a three day period in April,1942. They all flew nonstop from Darwin.

 

Question 2. There were already a large number of aircraft in Australia. Pappy Gunn and a number of other 5th Airforce Pilots later seized a number of B-25's that were originally destined for the DEI but never delivered for lack of Dutch Pilots. They flew the Mitchells to Darwin.

 

Question 3. They used the same avgas and munitions that were available at Del Monte airfield for the Royce Raid.

[KingSargent]

Is this not the bane of civilized nations though?* Can MacArthur (I hate him too) or anyone else for that matter, truly be expected to somehow turn away allied women and children seeking safety and succor?

If there had been safety and succor, that would be one thing. But it does not strike me as a good idea to pack women and children into a tight (comparatively) area that will be bombed, shelled, and quite possibly gassed. Especially when there are inadequate rations, shelter, and medical facilities. All it did was speed the fall of Bataan and the civilians were in poor shape when it fell. Better to stash them somewhere away from the fighting. After all, 99+% of Filipinos were healthier after the fall of Bataan than those who had been in Bataan were.

 

*Is it better to lose battles due to such principles but have stood by them?

Not to derail the thread, but what about the UK trying to help Greece in WWII? Isn't this a similar scenario? Yes, it's a bad idea, and some can foresee it's doomed to failure, but besides being somewhat neccessary for the UK to prove something to the US to ensure Lend-Lease happens, it's probably the right thing to do, despite the fact that it's just about guaranteed to be a losing proposition.

Aside from Churchill being hung up on proving that an "Eastern Strategy" could work (See? I was right to go to Gallipoli last War..."), I think the idea was not so much to 'Help Greece' (who didn't need help as long as it was only Italians they faced) as to get within striking range of the Ploesti oilfields. The British realized from the start that Germany's Achilles Heel was oil. Certainly Hitler didn't want the British within easy bomber range of his POL supplier.

 

The UK could have been just as much 'help' to Greece against the Italians by sending arms and ammunition (I know they were in short supply, but equipped troops were in shorter supply), and without the risk of triggering German intervention.

 

After the UK had committed to help Greece they had to be seen to try or lose their last credibility in the diplomatic arena. But the Greeks didn't WANT British help, having a much better idea of what would happen than 'Pie-In-The-Sky' Churchill. The UK had to force them to accept 'aid.' So the question of honoring commitments to Greece would not have arisen had the UK not shoved the commitments down Greece's throat.

 

I seriously doubt that Hitler would have done his Balkan thing just to bail Mussolini out of a jam, he did it to keep British bombers away from Romania.

 

And of course Churchill's sniveling that Greece was a good idea because it delayed BARBAROSSA a month is both untrue and a prime example of hindsighted special pleading.

[KingSargent]

Question 1. B-25 Mitchells and a handful of B-17's, the same planes that flew the "Royce Raid" from Mindanao over a three day period in April,1942. They all flew nonstop from Darwin.

Bataan fell in April 1942, so what happens at that time is irrelevant in the context of delaying the fall of Bataan.

 

Question 2. There were already a large number of aircraft in Australia. Pappy Gunn and a number of other 5th Airforce Pilots later seized a number of B-25's that were originally destined for the DEI but never delivered for lack of Dutch Pilots. They flew the Mitchells to Darwin.

Yes there were eventually a large number of planes in Oz. But they certainly were not there in Dec 1941-Feb 1942 when they might have done some good in the PI.

In 12/41 the last planes in the SE Asia pipeline were the 12 B-17s that ferried themselves into the middle of the Pearl Harbor Raid and 50 A-24s (Army Dauntlesses) that were en route to Luzon.

 

Question 3. They used the same avgas and munitions that were available at Del Monte airfield for the Royce Raid.

And when did that avgas and munitions become available? How were supplies necessary for sustained flight operations going to get to Mindanao? A three-day raid is one thing, a prolonged operation to reinforce the PI is quite something else.

 

You are saying that because a raid could be made, a campaign could be fought. That is akin to saying that a Strategic Bombing Offensive against Japan could have been conducted in April 1942 from the deck of the Hornet.

[John Dudek]

Question 1. B-25 Mitchells and a handful of B-17's, the same planes that flew the "Royce Raid" from Mindanao over a three day period in April,1942. They all flew nonstop from Darwin.

Bataan fell in April 1942, so what happens at that time is irrelevant in the context of delaying the fall of Bataan.

 

Question 2. There were already a large number of aircraft in Australia. Pappy Gunn and a number of other 5th Airforce Pilots later seized a number of B-25's that were originally destined for the DEI but never delivered for lack of Dutch Pilots. They flew the Mitchells to Darwin.

Yes there were eventually a large number of planes in Oz. But they certainly were not there in Dec 1941-Feb 1942 when they might have done some good in the PI.

In 12/41 the last planes in the SE Asia pipeline were the 12 B-17s that ferried themselves into the middle of the Pearl Harbor Raid and 50 A-24s (Army Dauntlesses) that were en route to Luzon.

 

Question 3. They used the same avgas and munitions that were available at Del Monte airfield for the Royce Raid.

And when did that avgas and munitions become available? How were supplies necessary for sustained flight operations going to get to Mindanao? A three-day raid is one thing, a prolonged operation to reinforce the PI is quite something else.

 

You are saying that because a raid could be made, a campaign could be fought. That is akin to saying that a Strategic Bombing Offensive against Japan could have been conducted in April 1942 from the deck of the Hornet.

 

RE: Question 2 The three surviving B-17's of the Philippine Airforce accompanied seven B-25's back to Mindanao to stage three day's worth of air raids against the Japapese.

 

This was a "what if" thread remember? It was all predicated upon the theory that had MacArthur somehow managed to ship a year's worth of military supplies into Bataan, then maybe the entire conduct of the war in the South Pacific would have somehow been changed. The air raids staged from Mindanao were but an actual historical offshoot from this plan.

[KingSargent]

RE: Question 2 The three surviving B-17's of the Philippine Airforce accompanied seven B-25's back to Mindanao to stage three day's worth of air raids against the Japapese.

 

This was a "what if" thread remember? It was all predicated upon the theory that had MacArthur somehow managed to ship a year's worth of military supplies into Bataan, then maybe the entire conduct of the war in the South Pacific would have somehow been changed. The air raids staged from Mindanao were but an actual historical offshoot from this plan.

1. 3 B-17s and 7 B-25s are hardly the "large number of aircraft" you claimed were in Oz. At least they were hardly enough to have a meaningful effect on the campaign on Luzon. The raid proves that aircraft could be staged through Oz to reach the PI IF they and the supplies, personnel, and accoutrements were available. But they were NOT available in 1941-early 1942.

 

2. My understanding of the initial premise was that it was the historical situation (especially availability of assets) and the change would involve better handling of the available resources by Big Mac & Minions.

 

That is a good 'what if,' since it involves no change in the historical situation except better performance by the individuals involved. And considering that any officer cadet would be bounced for such classroom incompetence as was demonstrated in the PI, better performance was definitely a possibility - almost anything would have been an improvement.

 

You are changing it (or wasn't clear at first) to add non-existant supplies and aerial reinforcement being brought in from outside the PI. Naturally if TF 58 and the trained and equipped divisions that 'returned' to the PI in 1944 had been available in Feb 1942 the fall of Bataan could have been greatly delayed or prevented. But that change takes us from the realm of "What if So-And-So hadn't FUBARed?" to outright fantasy like giving Lee armored divisions at Gettysburg.

 

As it is this thread has been in interesting and informative as to the actual problems and conditions at the time; for example I had no idea of the Philippine laws preventing food shipments between provinces. Speculation that Big Mac might have said "Screw the laws, move the food!" is valid because it was a possibility. The food was there, armed men with trucks could have moved it. Bringing in reinforcements from outside the PI that were NOT historically available is modifying the historical situation.

[Guest bojan]

...The UK could have been just as much 'help' to Greece against the Italians by sending arms and ammunition (I know they were in short supply, but equipped troops were in shorter supply), and without the risk of triggering German intervention...

 

They did. On the local forums long time ago someone found an order to the YRAF in case od flyovers of the 3rd party planes:

To confirm by visual or radio ID is it a British plane;

Let any British transport plane "violating territory" while flying for Greece go w/o interception;

To escort British fighters or Bombers to Greece in case of them becoming lost;

To intercept and prevent flyover of any Italian ones, especially if flying for Greece.

 

I seriously doubt that Hitler would have done his Balkan thing just to bail Mussolini out of a jam, he did it to keep British bombers away from Romania.

Most definitely he would not, at least in 1941.

[Rich]

1. 3 B-17s and 7 B-25s are hardly the "large number of aircraft" you claimed were in Oz. At least they were hardly enough to have a meaningful effect on the campaign on Luzon. The raid proves that aircraft could be staged through Oz to reach the PI IF they and the supplies, personnel, and accoutrements were available. But they were NOT available in 1941-early 1942.

 

Hi King, not arguing against your premise, but just adding some facts to the brew. According to the USAAF Statistical Digest the numbers of aircraft available in the FEAF were:

 

1 January - 27 B-17 and 4 2nd Line HB, 0 B-25 and 4 2nd Line MB, 0 LB, 216 1st Line (P-39 and P-40) Fighters

1 February - 23 B-17 and 5 2nd Line HB, 0 B-25 and 3 2nd Line MB, 0 LB, 490 1st Line Fighters

1 March - 27 B-17 and 3 2nd Line HB, 18 B-25, 18 other 1st Line MB, 1 2nd Line MB, 0 LB, 423 1st Line Fighters

1 April - 45 B-17 and 3 2nd Line HB, 31 B-25, 51 other 1st Line MB, 1 2nd Line MB, 14 A-20 LB, 503 1st Line Fighters

 

Of course only a small fraction of these were based in the Philippines by 1 January, the rest were mostly in Australia. So hardly a significant striking force.

 

2. My understanding of the initial premise was that it was the historical situation (especially availability of assets) and the change would involve better handling of the available resources by Big Mac & Minions.

 

The main problem is that a rational defense of Bataan was certainly possible, but it lacked facilities for an airfield capable of defending the area against the massive Japanese air bombardments, and there was alo insufficient antiaircraft capability to deter them. OTOH basing air forces in Mindanao was only posible so long as the Japanese chose not to utilize their amphibious and land forces capabilities to eliminate them since there were few forces to defend those bases.

[stimson47]

One thing to consider is how this would have effected other Japanese operations. When the Philippines did not fall quickly in January 1942, the Japanese were in fact forced to withdraw forces from China & the DEI in order to finish off the garrison on Bataan & Corregidor. Let's say the American garrison does blunt the initial January probing attacks, what happens if a stronger (from a food/medicine) American-Filipino garrison launches some minor offensive strokes in order to keep the Japanese off balance. Does this effect the Singapore-Burma operations? Do the Japanese suspend offensive operations, in order to concentrate on a thorn in their side? My guess is probably not in Singapore, they were already fairly well along there. But what about Burma? The Japanese had two divisions moving into Burma from Thailand, I think it's possible they would've halted these formations and sent one of them into the Philippines. This certainly would've changed the equation in Burma in the long run. The reinforcements that were arriving would not have been committed piecemail, but rather the British might have had the chance to organize a defense.

 

Now what if the Japanese still aren't able to overcome the garrison after an additional push in March/April 1942? Does this effect in any way the Japanese move against New Guinea that developed in May/June 1942? When you look at the Japanese plan for the Southern operation it was much contingent on a very rigid time-table. I think the effect of Bataan holding out longer (which is a distinct possibility if MacArthur followed WPO-3 from the beginning) is more about long-term consequences from the Japanese strategy. Eventually, the Japanese would have ground the American garrison down and won. But, at what cost to the Japanese grand strategy?

[KingSargent]

One thing to consider is how this would have effected other Japanese operations. When the Philippines did not fall quickly in January 1942, the Japanese were in fact forced to withdraw forces from China & the DEI in order to finish off the garrison on Bataan & Corregidor. Let's say the American garrison does blunt the initial January probing attacks, what happens if a stronger (from a food/medicine) American-Filipino garrison launches some minor offensive strokes in order to keep the Japanese off balance. Does this effect the Singapore-Burma operations? Do the Japanese suspend offensive operations, in order to concentrate on a thorn in their side? My guess is probably not in Singapore, they were already fairly well along there. But what about Burma? The Japanese had two divisions moving into Burma from Thailand, I think it's possible they would've halted these formations and sent one of them into the Philippines. This certainly would've changed the equation in Burma in the long run. The reinforcements that were arriving would not have been committed piecemail, but rather the British might have had the chance to organize a defense.

 

Now what if the Japanese still aren't able to overcome the garrison after an additional push in March/April 1942? Does this effect in any way the Japanese move against New Guinea that developed in May/June 1942? When you look at the Japanese plan for the Southern operation it was much contingent on a very rigid time-table. I think the effect of Bataan holding out longer (which is a distinct possibility if MacArthur followed WPO-3 from the beginning) is more about long-term consequences from the Japanese strategy. Eventually, the Japanese would have ground the American garrison down and won. But, at what cost to the Japanese grand strategy?

 

The 56th Division was withdrawn from Yamashia's 25th Army in Malaya and placed in Southern Area reserve, eventually going to Burma. Actually Yamashita refused the division, claiming that his three divisions were all that Southern Area HQ were competent to handle logistically and a fourth division would just bog operations down. So 25% of Yamashita's potential troops had already been withdrawn or refused.

 

IMHO, holding out longer in the PI would not delay the rest of the Southern Area operations at all. Unless Big Mac could assemble a larger air component under a competent commander (ie, anyone but Brereton) and keep it supplied, there was nothing the PI could do to affect other operations. USAFFE forces crawling around Luzon aren't blocking traffic to Java.

 

To my strategically-twisted mind, leaving Bataan alone would be a wise Japanese move. Any relief attempts would just be sailing into a Japanese trap, and anything trying to smuggle supplies to Luzon was not doing anything else that might hurt the Japanese. The submarines smugging supplies to Corregidor were not torpedoing Japanese ships headed for Java.* The 'starving Battling Bastards of Bataan' would keep the US distracted while the Japanese did what they wanted in the Pacific. It worked, in that the US buildup in Oz would not have been as quick or as massive - most of the early US arrivals were supposed to be strengthening the PI, not defending Oz.

 

As for delaying the Japanese advance into New Guinea, I still do not know why ANYONE wanted New Guinea. Those here familiar (to gagging) with Sargent's Strategy for the Pacific War know that I consider the whole New Guinea - Bismarcks - Solomons campaign a criminal waste of lives and assets for both sides.

 

So any hold-out in the PI works to Japan's advantage by distracting the Americans - and if it delayed going to New Guinea, so much the better.

 

* Okay, they wouldn't have been torpedoing the Japanese ships anyway given the torpedo problems, but the Japanese almost assuredly did not know about the USN submariners' problems. All they knew was that the US Asiatic Fleet contained most of the USN's post-1930 submarine construction and was potentially a very powerful force.

[swerve]

The 56th Division was withdrawn from Yamashia's 25th Army in Malaya and placed in Southern Area reserve, eventually going to Burma. Actually Yamashita refused the division, claiming that his three divisions were all that Southern Area HQ were competent to handle logistically and a fourth division would just bog operations down. So 25% of Yamashita's potential troops had already been withdrawn or refused....

 

What, a general who refused troops on logistical grounds? Damn, now I know why he won campaigns!

[Delta tank 6]

To all,

 

I read the thread and I did not see it mentioned, but two really good books on the Philippines at the start of World War II are; The Fall of the Philippines and Command Decisions. Both are in the "Army Green" series on World War II even though Command Decisions is in a brown cover. You can find them both here: http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/5-2/5-2_Contents.htm and here for Command Decisions: http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_0.htm

 

I don't have my reference materials in front of me, but IIRC the plan was to have 40,000 soldiers withdraw into Bataan and to hold out for 6 months and by that time the US Navy with ground troops would come and relieve the garrison, IIRC there were about 20,000 more soldiers and 26,000 civilians, so instead of 40,000 in the perimeter we now had 86,000. And they almost held for 6 months the only problem was it took the fleet and the ground troops about 2 1/2 years to come relieve the garrison.

 

Mike

[binder001]

I agree that the mishandling of the campaign was amateurish at best and almost downright criminal.

 

OK, there's an active garrison on Bataan and therefore the forts across Manila Bay are probably intact. Now you have the US forces sitting on the bullseye for every Japanese aviator who needs bombing practice. Our ability to supply them with decent fighters would be negated, so no air cover and a dwindling supply of AA ammo means that Bataan is the new live-fire training area for Japanese bomber crews. Further having 40-80,000 troops stuck out there certainly mean that the US will bend every effort to relieve them. Knowing where your enemy is heading for certainly beats having to garrison and patrol the entire Pacific. Would it have been several small battles of supply/reinforcement convoys eating up the available US naval strength or would we have fallen for the "one big battle" that the Japanese planned and trained for? Either scenario puts the US in a poor naval position by late 1942-early 43. Instead of the new ships of 1943-44 reinforcing survivors of the Solomons battles, they are needed to replace the ships lost in trying to break through to the PI.

 

Just one path of thought.

[John Dudek]

A number of fast freighters were enlisted by the Allies to run the blockade from Australia to Mindanao, whereupon the supplies would be loaded into smaller boats and ferried through to Bataan. The fast freighters were loaded with food, fuel and munitions. A few of them actually made successful supply runs, although they were all eventually sunk by Japanese aircraft and ships. In the end, only about a four day's supply of food ever made it to Bataan.

[JOE BRENNAN]

USAAF Statistical Digest the numbers of aircraft available in the FEAF were:

 

1 January - 27 B-17 and 4 2nd Line HB, 0 B-25 and 4 2nd Line MB, 0 LB, 216 1st Line (P-39 and P-40) Fighters

1 February - 23 B-17 and 5 2nd Line HB, 0 B-25 and 3 2nd Line MB, 0 LB, 490 1st Line Fighters

1 March - 27 B-17 and 3 2nd Line HB, 18 B-25, 18 other 1st Line MB, 1 2nd Line MB, 0 LB, 423 1st Line Fighters

1 April - 45 B-17 and 3 2nd Line HB, 31 B-25, 51 other 1st Line MB, 1 2nd Line MB, 14 A-20 LB, 503 1st Line Fighters

 

Of course only a small fraction of these were based in the Philippines by 1 January, the rest were mostly in Australia. So hardly a significant striking force.

The broad point about bombers is clear from those numbers, but the numbers do look a little strange. The fighter numbers look high if excluding those in Hawaii or even still in CONUS committed to HI and the Pacific. I also wonder if they might reflect the destruction of most of the PI fighter force even by Jan 1, or if there was some paperwork write-off lag? The USAAC/F had very few fighters in actual contact with the Japanese in Feb '42, 2 sdns in DEI and one northern Australia plus the P-35/40 remnant on Bataan, so several 100 seems a lot even including those being shipped to DEI a lot of which were lost, see below. Yet the B-17 numbers seem too low excluding those in Hawaii, seem about right for the force just in the DEI and Australia in that period (example, the force on Java Feb 3 was 16 operational a/c per Salecker "Fortress Against the Sun"). I don't doubt what you posted is what the Stats Digest says, but I've found some other numbers in there for early war also hard to explain.

 

The Japanese were very force economical in what they committed to containing and taking Bataan after early January. In land forces as we know the offensive force for their first Bataan offensive was too small, but also in air and sea assets. The JAAF had just one squadron of Type 97 Fighters (Ki-27 later 'Nate') to hold air superiority on the Bataan front after early Jan, and the JNAF fighter force was removed entirely (there were also JAAF divebomber and close support a/c, plus substantial JAAF and JNAF twin bomber units were sent back later for unescorted bombing of Corregidor). The remnant of P-35's and P-40's on Bataan was barely if at all outnumbered by opposing fighters after early January.

 

On US bomber operations to the Philippines from Australia, they were difficult but not quite Doolittle Raid gimmick type missions, since the Mindanao fields (mainly Del Monte) were secure till the end at Bataan and could provide some support. After the very beginning of the war the B-17 ops over Luzon by the ~1/2 of the original force that survived the first raids flew from Mindanao, that leg of the mission was quite practical. So, there may have been some potential to exploit the weak air force the Japanese left on the Bataan front, but the Japanese were pushing ahead on other fronts (like DEI) and not being stopped as it was, so it was natural that's where the air effort went. Although US bombers did fly into Mindanao from Australia before April. Also a few crated P-40's reached Mindanao by blockade runner and were reassembled, a couple were used on Bataan then flown back south when Bataan fell. Two P-40's at Mindanao were the first captured intact by the Japanese; they are believed to have reconditioned a number of crated ones on a ship sunk in port in DEI because the JAAF later constituted a small operational unit of P-40's in Burma.

 

Joe

Edited February 21, 2008 by JOE BRENNAN

[KingSargent]

Hi King, not arguing against your premise, but just adding some facts to the brew. According to the USAAF Statistical Digest the numbers of aircraft available in the FEAF were:

 

1 January - 27 B-17 and 4 2nd Line HB, 0 B-25 and 4 2nd Line MB, 0 LB, 216 1st Line (P-39 and P-40) Fighters

1 February - 23 B-17 and 5 2nd Line HB, 0 B-25 and 3 2nd Line MB, 0 LB, 490 1st Line Fighters

1 March - 27 B-17 and 3 2nd Line HB, 18 B-25, 18 other 1st Line MB, 1 2nd Line MB, 0 LB, 423 1st Line Fighters

1 April - 45 B-17 and 3 2nd Line HB, 31 B-25, 51 other 1st Line MB, 1 2nd Line MB, 14 A-20 LB, 503 1st Line Fighters

 

Of course only a small fraction of these were based in the Philippines by 1 January, the rest were mostly in Australia. So hardly a significant striking force.

The main problem is that a rational defense of Bataan was certainly possible, but it lacked facilities for an airfield capable of defending the area against the massive Japanese air bombardments, and there was alo insufficient antiaircraft capability to deter them. OTOH basing air forces in Mindanao was only posible so long as the Japanese chose not to utilize their amphibious and land forces capabilities to eliminate them since there were few forces to defend those bases.

Since Joe called 'foul on this just above, I'll comment on something that slipped by me:

 

Just WTF is a "2nd Line HB"? The USAAC didn't HAVE any Heavy Bombers except the B-17 operational on 1/1/42. All the B-17Cs had been upgraded to Ds, and almost all of them were in or enroute to the PI.

 

As for "2nd Line MBs," I suppose those would be B-10/12s or B-18s. Although calling the B-18 "2nd Line" is like saying the whole USAAC was 2nd Line - there wasn't anything newer in service yet.

 

As for "1st Line Fighters," there damn sure weren't any P-39s in FEAF, and I doubt the whole Air Corps had 503 P-9s and P-40s operational by April Fool's Day.