WW2 IJN Shore Bombardment Info ?

[robdab]

My early war understanding is that Japan reserved her battleline for ship-to-ship combat but did train her battleship gunners for very long range shoots. Spotting out to 40,000 yds with first shots at 34,000 yds is what I have found so far as part of their planned "decisive battle" naval doctrine.

 

I believe that it was their 8" gunnned heavy cruisers that carried the burden of the early war "softening up" shore bombardment missions but I search for confirmation/detail on this ? I know that Japanese battlecruisers did participate in close range airfield shelling at Guadalcanal but my interest lies more in the time period prior to those mid '42 events.

 

My readings indicate that light cruiser and destroyer gunfire was the type mostly used by the Japanese to provide direct fire support for their troop landings rather than battleship or heavy cruiser support but I hope for further enlightenment from posters here.

 

I would apreciate any sources (both URL and book/magazine) that you could provide that detail the Japanese use/training of 18" thru 8" gunnery for shore bombardments from 1935 to mid-1942. Their efforts in China are certainly of interest, if available.

[KingSargent]

The only time I can find when the IJN used CAs to cover an opposed landing was the second attempt at Wake Island in 1941. CruDiv 6 - the Kinugasas was sent up, but I don't know if they actually fired in support or if they were a covering force.

 

The IJN avoided opposed assault landings. Wake and Kota Bharu were the only* seriously opposed landings (ie, defended beaches) in the expansion campaign.

 

Most IJN fire support was by CLs and DDs at close range.

 

 

 

 

* Lingayan might have been a third; does anybody know if the Japanese assaulted defended beaches there?

[JOE BRENNAN]

I don't know if I can suggest any specific bombardment references. Here are some general ones you've likely already heard of:

-Dull's "Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy"

-LaCroix/Wells "Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War" (a design history, but with pretty complete operational records of each cruiser)

-Campbell's "Naval Weapons of WWII"

-Kaigun site: check the Tabular Record of Movement of individual ships

http://www.combinedfleet.com/

 

IJN heavy ships did little in the way of shore bombardment in the Pacific War, either BB's or cruisers. The bombardments of Henderson Field, by BB's October 13, 1942 and by CA's a handful of other times (with less effect) are the major exception. And Campbell notes that the ammo expenditure of BB's v Henderson was Kongo: 104 Type 3/331 AP; Haruna 189 HE/294 AP. The Type 3 (officially, ie. 1943, so evidently quite early examples) was the incendiary cluster type designed and later used for main battery AA fire by Japanese BB's. The HE, Type 0, was also envisioned in part as AA ammo of max fragmentation and had a smaller burster charge (~4.2%) than most HE (USN was around twice that).

 

The only other case I can think of, of BB bombardments, was Kongo and Haruna bombarded Christmas Island in the Indian Ocean in March 1942. And there weren't a lot more even including cruisers. The cruiser/DD's bombardment of Wake December 11, 1941 was notable as one of the relatively more costly for bombarding ships in WWII (one DD sunk by 5" shore batteries, one by bombing/strafing F4F's and others damaged). Another surprisingly late one was the cruiser bombardment of the US beachhead on Mindoro in the the Philippines in December 1944. In most of the initial landing ops by the Japanese December 1941-end of February 1942 landings weren't against prepared Allied positions and only lighter ships, it any, conducted bombardments.

 

The IJN did a lot of work supporting their ground forces in the 'China Incident' (2nd Sino Japanese War) but it didn't much resemble common US shore borbardments of WWII either. Most of it was on the Yangtze, where oceangoing vessels could navigate as far as Hankow several 100 miles inland, when river levels were favorable. Those vessels included obsolete armored cruisers in the Shanghai area and DD's and light cruisers further upriver, though not IIRC the modern treaty cruisers, nor any BB's.

 

Maybe this relates to ongoing discussions elsewhere, 'what if' the Japanese BB's bombard Oahu? Some of the issues implied above, relative lack of really suitable ammo or any evidence of specific training, could have been overcome at least to some degree if that had been the plan (eg. the Japanese didn't have standard aerial torpedoes for shallow water use or specific training in that either until they decided that was the plan, then they modified materials and trained for the mission). But the relative lack of really suitable ammo could have been a longer term issue, and in any case a BB had to carry a significant % of AP if enemy BB's might be met. And as USS Massachusetts showed off Casablanca in November 1942, large caliber AP shells were not effective in destroying or even supressing modern coast defences within a single shipload of ammo, while trying to destroy targets in a defended harbor at the same time; and those were far less threatening CD's to a BB than those near PH.

 

And the Japanese themselves had experience failing to neutralize an enemy sdn in a heavy CD protected base with bombardment raids by ships, Port Arthur 1904-5. Besides the initial surprise torpedo attack (of Russian ships left in a an outer roadstead) several subsequent bombardments (and further torpedo attempts) achieved almost nothing beside the loss of 2 Japanese BB's on mines. In such a situation the lesson was to either draw out that enemy fleet by tightening the noose with land operations (as in Battle of the Yellow Sea, but the Russian sdn managed to retreat again to Port Arthur), or else continue the land ops and lay siege directly to the base, with land siege arty to reduce the CD's and/or attack the ships directly (siege of Port Arthur and eventual destruction of the Russian sdn by 11" howitzers taken out of Japanese CD's). Shore bombardments by ships wouldn't be the central element of effective operations of that kind; the Japanese already knew that. Carrier air groups by their stage of development in late 1941 were a new tool offering a way around many of the previous limitations to hit and run naval bombardment raids v defended bases.

 

Joe

Edited January 31, 2008 by JOE BRENNAN

[robdab]

Gents,

 

Many thanks for the information.

 

I wasn't aware of the Christmas Island bombardment and must admit to still being mystified that two battleships would open up with main guns on an island worthy only of a garrison of 30+/- men ??

 

I have found the book "Kaigun" by Evans & Peattie which does detail some of the pre-Pearl Harbor bombardment training undertaken by IJN battleships and which suggests an amazing 12% hits against stationary targets, at 34,000 yards, via the aid of spotter planes. I would be amazed to find this degree of accuracy to be true for that range but so far, that is all that I have been able to find.

[Corinthian]

The only time I can find when the IJN used CAs to cover an opposed landing was the second attempt at Wake Island in 1941. CruDiv 6 - the Kinugasas was sent up, but I don't know if they actually fired in support or if they were a covering force.

 

The IJN avoided opposed assault landings. Wake and Kota Bharu were the only* seriously opposed landings (ie, defended beaches) in the expansion campaign.

 

Most IJN fire support was by CLs and DDs at close range.

* Lingayan might have been a third; does anybody know if the Japanese assaulted defended beaches there?

 

ISTR USAFFE had defenses near or on the beach, but it was air support that routed the defenders.

[p620346]

I once read, possibly in one of Prange's book, that following the loss of the IJN carriers at Midway an IJN junior officer suggested that the BBs and CAs be formed into a bombardment group to attack Midway island. IJN senior officers were reportedly "horrified" saying that "warships are meant to fight other warships not islands".

[Ken Estes]

I once read, possibly in one of Prange's book, that following the loss of the IJN carriers at Midway an IJN junior officer suggested that the BBs and CAs be formed into a bombardment group to attack Midway island. IJN senior officers were reportedly "horrified" saying that "warships are meant to fight other warships not islands".

Prior to 1944, that conversation might have occurred in any navy in the world.

[dpapp2]

"I once read, possibly in one of Prange's book, that following the loss of the IJN carriers at Midway an IJN junior officer suggested that the BBs and CAs be formed into a bombardment group to attack Midway island. IJN senior officers were reportedly "horrified" saying that "warships are meant to fight other warships not islands"."

 

Prior to 1944, that conversation might have occurred in any navy in the world.

The KuK army might disagree - the bombardment of Italian towns on the Adriatic coast right after the Italian entry to the Great War delayed troop deployment by crucial weeks. But, indeed.

Edited February 13, 2008 by dpapp2

[Ken Estes]

The KuK army might disagree - the bombardment of Italian towns on the Adriatic coast right after the Italian entry to the Great War delayed troop deployment by crucial weeks. But, indeed.

Uh, delayed Italian deployment to do what, pray tell? The world held its breath, perhaps??

[dpapp2]

Uh, delayed Italian deployment to do what, pray tell? The world held its breath, perhaps??

Judged by how overstretched the AH armies were , I'd say important. What about breaking through at Montfalcone and getting into artillery distance from Trieste?

[John Dudek]

I once read, possibly in one of Prange's book, that following the loss of the IJN carriers at Midway an IJN junior officer suggested that the BBs and CAs be formed into a bombardment group to attack Midway island. IJN senior officers were reportedly "horrified" saying that "warships are meant to fight other warships not islands".

 

They were probably worried about getting their paint scratched. IIRC, it was against official IJN doctrine to "waste" the resources of capital ships upon "lowly" shore bombardment duties. It wasn't until Guadalcanal that this official behavior was changed.

[p620346]

They were probably worried about getting their paint scratched. IIRC, it was against official IJN doctrine to "waste" the resources of capital ships upon "lowly" shore bombardment duties. It wasn't until Guadalcanal that this official behavior was changed.

 

Just like the IJN did not want the "waste" the resources of their submarines on "lowly" merchant ships because there was no "honor" in doing so.

[robdab]

If "Prior to 1944, that conversation might have occurred in any navy in the world." is true then how is it that a German battleship started WW2 in Europe by bombarding a Polish coastal fortress (at Danzig IIRC) ?

 

And how is the Japanese BB bombardment of Christmas Island in 1942 (as listed just earlier in this very thread) then explained ? Granted I believe that Christmas Island had no coastal artillery emplacements so that there would have been no chance of any Japanese battleship "getting its paint scratched" there but its difficult to imply that IJN doctrine prevented shore bombardments when such did clearly happen.

 

I am now thoroughly confused.

[Ken Estes]

....

 

I am now thoroughly confused.

No need to be. The Brits bombarderd Gallipolli forts in 1915 with battleships and battlecruisers, including their newest, HMS Queen Elizabeth. The effects were 'not necessarily to their advantage.'

 

These things happen.

 

What is important is what the soldiers & sailors think they are doing, not what was tried from time to time, in absence of doctrine.

 

 

"Only a fool will fight a fort" -- Nelson

[KingSargent]

No need to be. The Brits bombarderd Gallipolli forts in 1915 with battleships and battlecruisers, including their newest, HMS Queen Elizabeth. The effects were 'not necessarily to their advantage.'

 

These things happen.

 

What is important is what the soldiers & sailors think they are doing, not what was tried from time to time, in absence of doctrine.

"Only a fool will fight a fort" -- Nelson

Slightly unfair. The ships at Gallipoli silenced the forts (running them out of ammo helped) without taking much damage, then ran into a minefield. The mines did the damage, not the forts.

[capt_starlight]

Slightly unfair. The ships at Gallipoli silenced the forts (running them out of ammo helped) without taking much damage, then ran into a minefield. The mines did the damage, not the forts.

The mines did the damage because the forts had deterred the civilian manned minesweepers from their job. Even when they were mobilised they were so slow they could not stay ahead of the line of battle and so were left behind with the inevitable result......

[KingSargent]

The mines did the damage because the forts had deterred the civilian manned minesweepers from their job. Even when they were mobilised they were so slow they could not stay ahead of the line of battle and so were left behind with the inevitable result......

Not really true, the forts had little effect on the minesweepers, the problem was mobile Turkish fieldgun batteries.

 

Of course the guns of the forts might have deterred close gunnery support of the sweepers by smaller warships, but AIUI the problem was getting the hired civvie MS crews (what a brilliant idea.... ) to function under any kind of fire, even smallarms.

 

One would be correct to say that the whole Turkish defensive system defeated the Allied Navies (that and their own less than aggressive leadership), but not the forts alone, which was the gist of Ken's comment. If Ken says that what he typed was not precisely what he meant, I will of course accept that. My comments are more in the line of nit-picking...

 

Still the reference to Nelson's dogmas is not quite apropos to the myriad of changes brought about by steam propulsion and longer-ranging gunnery.

[Ken Estes]

King, my tale relates to the notion that sailors did not like facing forts and were loathe to risk their ships to the same extent that we accept losses on land to achieve results. The forts were broken [i did not claim otherwise] at Gallipoli, but the navies present had already taken losses and knew not what further awaited...hence an abortive expedition. Robdab said he was confused because ships had done bombardments in 1939ff. I was reiterating that such events did not prove a change in sailor mindset, harkening back to Nelson himself, who had faced a fort or two.

 

We can all find exceptions, including several Federal successes in the US Civil War, thr RN at Aboukir Bay, the Rus in the Aegean, but the fact remained that until 1944, one could not find the kinds of specialists willing to drill the ships and crews and make the changes necessary to obtain the results you are saying had become possible because of the technology. Technology matters less than what was in the minds of the soldiers and sailors of the day.

[John Dudek]

The only time I can find when the IJN used CAs to cover an opposed landing was the second attempt at Wake Island in 1941. CruDiv 6 - the Kinugasas was sent up, but I don't know if they actually fired in support or if they were a covering force.

 

The IJN avoided opposed assault landings. Wake and Kota Bharu were the only* seriously opposed landings (ie, defended beaches) in the expansion campaign.

 

Most IJN fire support was by CLs and DDs at close range.

* Lingayan might have been a third; does anybody know if the Japanese assaulted defended beaches there?

 

 

There was a battery of 155mm's, two guns at San Fabian and two guns at Dagupan that took the rear of the invasion convoy under fire as it entered the Gulf but scored no hits, although they claimed 3 ships sunk.

Edited February 23, 2008 by John Dudek

[robdab]

Why did the monitor concept for shore bombardment seem to die out ?

 

A couple of really big guns in a strongly armored turret, mounted on a shallow draft armored hull seems ideal for getting in nice and close to deal with a coastal artillery battery or two.

 

They seemed popular around the time of WW1 but was it the rise of airpower that doomed them to the scrap heap of history ? Or could they historically just not do the job required against fortified shore batteries ?

[KingSargent]

Why did the monitor concept for shore bombardment seem to die out ?

 

A couple of really big guns in a strongly armored turret, mounted on a shallow draft armored hull seems ideal for getting in nice and close to deal with a coastal artillery battery or two.

 

They seemed popular around the time of WW1 but was it the rise of airpower that doomed them to the scrap heap of history ? Or could they historically just not do the job required against fortified shore batteries ?

To be economical, monitors rely on a supply of redundant guns/turrets for arming them. In WW1 there were lots of spare turrets and guns available for one reason or another that could be used on monitors. The monitors the RN built in WW2 used the turrets of clapped-out WW1 ones.

 

They don't really have a peacetime role, and they require rather special circumstances to be useful in wartime (a campaign fought next to a shoreline that needs support).

[robdab]

"The monitors the RN built in WW2 used the turrets of clapped-out WW1 ones."

 

I'm surprised then that Japan didn't build a few between the World Wars. Or buy some from Britain.

 

Japan had to know that the coastal artillery fortifications at Singapore, Hong Kong and Manila could prove to be "tough nuts to crack" where a monitor or two might prove to be useful. Surely she had some large calibre turrets/guns laying about due to the scapping that went on to meet the Washington Naval Treaty limitations ?

 

Or, were there limitations on new Japanese monitors included in that treaty ?

[Ken Estes]

Don't confuse 20th century monitors with those used in the Crimea and US Civil Wars. The 20th C monitors are useful by virtue of their shallow draft. They are not armored with the intention of taking on modern forts, let alone coast defenses the likes of Singapore, Manila, which are after all fortresses, not separate works.

 

Viz. the damage control career of HMS Terror, one of the more capable of these ships (Erebus Class):

 

Terror joined the Dover Patrol in August 1916 and operated against German forces on the coast of occupied Belgium. On 19 October 1917 she was torpedoed by German motor torpedo boats off Dunkirk. There were no casulties and the ship was beached before being towed back to Portsmouth. The damage took three months to repair.

....

HMS Terror was subjected to diving attacks by German Junkers Ju 88 bombers on 22 February 1941 after leaving Benghazi. She was badly damaged by near misses and abandoned by her crew. Although taken under tow, she sank off Darnah, Libya before reaching the Royal Navy's Mediterranean Fleet base at Alexandria, Egypt.

[JOE BRENNAN]

1. Japan had to know that the coastal artillery fortifications at Singapore, Hong Kong and Manila could prove to be "tough nuts to crack" where a monitor or two might prove to be useful.

 

2. Surely she had some large calibre turrets/guns laying about due to the scapping that went on to meet the Washington Naval Treaty limitations ?

 

3. Or, were there limitations on new Japanese monitors included in that treaty ?

1. Fun scenario's of the Japanese attacking coast defenses directly (those places, Oahu etc) ignore the lesson that you don't attack strong coast defenses from the sea unless they are on a landmass you don't have the land strength to seize and so don't intend to, or they cover all the landing areas from which you could then overrun them on land or set up siege artillery against them. The Japanese had learned the lesson first hand at Port Arthur in 1904-5, and run through the exercise again at Tsingtao in 1914. They were never going to attack those Allied defenses from seaward in a campaign where they intended to, and had the sea control and land force strength to, seize the whole landmass.

 

2. Some went into coast defenses in (home islands and Korea), as US also did with Treaty surplus 16" guns (some interwar US 16" batteries were purpose built Army M1919's but most were surplus USN); except in the Japanese case it was turrets and all.

 

3. The Washington Treaty defined any warship with guns >8" as a capital ship, so the whole monitor point was moot until Japan dropped out of the treaties in late 30's and by then plenty of other priorities. The Sri Ayuthiya class coast defense ships built in Japan for Thailand in the 1930's were an example of what could be achieved in a treaty compliant 'monitor' type if desired, but not a vessel to take on heavy coast defense guns (4*8" main battery, limited armor; the pair didn't fare well in a battle with a French CL and colonial 'aviso' at Koh Chang in 1941).

 

Joe

[KingSargent]

1. Fun scenario's of the Japanese attacking coast defenses directly (those places, Oahu etc) ignore the lesson that you don't attack strong coast defenses from the sea unless they are on a landmass you don't have the land strength to seize and so don't intend to, or they cover all the landing areas from which you could then overrun them on land or set up siege artillery against them. The Japanese had learned the lesson first hand at Port Arthur in 1904-5, and run through the exercise again at Tsingtao in 1914. They were never going to attack those Allied defenses from seaward in a campaign where they intended to, and had the sea control and land force strength to, seize the whole landmass.

I think you could say the Japanese already knew the lesson at Port Arthur. They did, after all, land up the peninsula and conduct a seige. They never really attacked the forts by sea, they made raids on the fleet moored there, which is a different mission.

 

2. Some went into coast defenses in (home islands and Korea), as US also did with Treaty surplus 16" guns (some interwar US 16" batteries were purpose built Army M1919's but most were surplus USN); except in the Japanese case it was turrets and all.

The Japanese made much more use of older guns and turrets in their coast defenses than the US did ("more" is more than none ). 12" and 10" turrets from scrapped older ships were used as well as new 16" ones.

 

One of the installations at Tokyo Bay rather puzzled Hogg, who pointed out that it wouldn't bear on an attacking ship unless the ship had already entered the bay and was steaming away from it. I thought it rather obvious myself - the guns bore on the Japanese parliament. A rather unsubtle hint to the civilian officials as to who was in charge. One wonders if Congress would have been more forthcoming with military appropriations in the 1930s if the Capitol Buiding had 16" guns aimed at it.....