World War One - Inevitable?

[DesertFox]

I was watching the History Channel Classroom and there was a pair of shows about the origins of World War One.

To be honest, I have always assumed that World War One was Inevitable.

The Narrator states that it was NOT!

I am wondering what other opinions are, especially those who do not consider it to have been inevitable?

[Archie Pellagio]

The basic nature of it was always gonna happen.

Too much of a tangled web of diplomacy, ethnic/racial tensions, nationalism, politics, hegemony etc.

 

Details may have been different, who did what when, who was on which side (ie Turkey, Italy), the prescence of Neutrals (America, Mexico, Scandinavia etc)

 

That WWI was going to happen as it did was not inevitable - lots of variables.

 

That there was going to be a big war in Europe between Germany & Austria Hungary and France & Britain, was almost guaranteed.

[R011]

That there was going to be a big war in Europe between Germany & Austria Hungary and France & Britain, was almost guaranteed.

 

That there would have been another Balkan War was inevitable. That it (or a subsequent one) would involve Austria-Hungary and Russia was highly likely. That Germany, and thus France, would be involved was not inevitable, nor would war between Germany and the UK be inevitable had Wilhelm been reasonably competent and worked to keep good relations with the British.

 

As Wilhelm seems to have worked assiduously to alienate the British and, once war began, the Americans, WWI did become inevitable, IMO.

[Corinthian]

Funny, I was thinking of posting this topic as well last month but for one reason or the other I deleted it before clicking on the add topic button.

[Archie Pellagio]

That there would have been another Balkan War was inevitable. That it (or a subsequent one) would involve Austria-Hungary and Russia was highly likely. That Germany, and thus France, would be involved was not inevitable, nor would war between Germany and the UK be inevitable had Wilhelm been reasonably competent and worked to keep good relations with the British.

 

As Wilhelm seems to have worked assiduously to alienate the British and, once war began, the Americans, WWI did become inevitable, IMO.

 

...and if Hitler didn't invade Russia...

 

The fact is the Germans spent the better part of two decades directly threatening British naval supremacy.

Alsace was always a sticking point and they were almost guaranteed to go to war with France eventually as well.

If anything I think the war with Russia was probably the most avoidable.

As for the Americans, there was every likelyhood of the US remaining neutral with a lean to the central powers.

 

The simple fact is there was such a sticky weave in Europe at the time, a large European war was inevitable.

Edited January 28, 2008 by Luke_Yaxley

[DesertFox]

As Wilhelm seems to have worked assiduously to alienate the British and, once war began, the Americans, WWI did become inevitable, IMO.

 

Was it Wilhelm or was it that his ministers and military leaders were determined that there would be war.

[swerve]

Was it Wilhelm or was it that his ministers and military leaders were determined that there would be war.

 

Wilhelm seems to have got cold feet when it actually came to war, but too late. I don't think he ever really wanted a war, just the prestige that he imagined a large fleet & strong army gave him.

[Guest aevans]

Was it Wilhelm or was it that his ministers and military leaders were determined that there would be war.

 

It was, IMO, beyond any person's or even faction's control. If you haven't already, read Tuchman's The Proud Tower. People can endlessly debate aobut the particulars of historical analysis, but in the raw data of people's stated opinions and nations' recorded reactions to events, there's a definite undertone of everything building up to The Big One, with nobody trying to escape it.

[Guest aevans]

Wilhelm seems to have got cold feet when it actually came to war, but too late. I don't think he ever really wanted a war, just the prestige that he imagined a large fleet & strong army gave him.

 

He may have gotten cold feet, but he was the freakin' Kaiser after all -- if he really didn't want war, he would have let Bethmann Hollweg talk him out of it.

[RETAC21]

He may have gotten cold feet, but he was the freakin' Kaiser after all -- if he really didn't want war, he would have let Bethmann Hollweg talk him out of it.

 

Probably why Bethmann-Hollweg kept him away. The problem was the Germans did not understood the British at all. Once that got rolling, conflict was inevitable.

[Tomexe]

WWI was inevitable in a practical sense. There was going to be a Balkan War again, and one that included Austria-Hungary. Any war that involved Austria-Hungary against Serbia would involve Russia automtically. The Czar and his administration, while not wanty war by a long shot, were adimant about this. This was the only thing other than a direct attack on Russia itself that Russia really would go to war for given its condition.

 

Any war between big Russia and comparitively little Austria-Hungary would bring in Germany, both because Germany had the same attitude toward the German speeking people outside its borders as Russia had to their co-religionists and co-linguists in Serbia. Germany might bully Austria itself from time to time but would never disown them. And on the side of those who practiced Realpolitk Germany wanted Poland to secure East Prussia.

 

Any war between Russia and Germany would bring a French attack on Alsace. France had been burning to avenge 1870 and recover its lost territory. Yet at the same time there was a deep distrust within France's own goverment and military about how well they would perform against Germany in another one on one struggle. Thus they would not fight without a major power as a ally. Russia new how week they themselves were and so redilly accepted an alliance with France. This was a semi-secret alliance. The details were never made public or acknowldged offically, but both sides made damn sure that everyone knew about it.

 

The problem came when the Bosnian Serbs came to beleve that French and Russian military propaganda was reality and then Germany called the bluff of Russia and France.

 

Now France and England were heavily involved in war plans togeather, because England was worried about Germany's expanding naval power and its attempts at taking over colonies in Africa and Asia. But England was not so agressive as to jump into a Continental war just on a threat that was still at the time mostly a potential one. The one key was the preservation of the territory of Holland and Belgum. Two of Englands biggest and oldest trading partners. England WOULD go to war to protect them. Once France had convinced England that Germany would attack Belgum for certain, and possibly Holland as well.

 

If Germany made a mistake it was invading Belgum instead of following the attack path that they had used in 1870. Why they felt that they could not beat the French along the 1870 rout again, we do not know. The Germans apparently thought that they could beat the British and Belgans before England could mobilize a large enough army. But why they thought that the British would accept such a defeat and not immediately try to liberate Belgum is a mystery. After the Boer War the Germans should of know that England and its Empire could put a million men in the field easily if given just a year. That gave them a increadably narrow time frame in which to beat France.

 

Another thing you have to understand is the importance of personal and national honor in the diplomacy of the time. Countries today throw away clients and Allies right and left but back then it was considered a cornerstone of any goverment administration that if you said "Do not cross this line" you meant it even if it was a hopeless fight. Russia went to war even though it was the absolute LAST thing that country needed at the time. War was the last thing England wanted yet she comitted too. In both cases it was because they had made promises to clients and Allies and the thought of the time demanded that these promises be backed up by force or become a hollow shell of a country.

[Lampshade111]

I imagine that "old Europe" politics would have lead to a war at some point.

[R011]

The fact is the Germans spent the better part of two decades directly threatening British naval supremacy.

Precisely. There was no real reason for the Hohenzollern dynasty to so annoy one of it's traditional allies. It certainly didn't make sense to drive Britain into the arms of it's traditional enemy, France.

 

Wilhelm seems to have got cold feet when it actually came to war, but too late. I don't think he ever really wanted a war, just the prestige that he imagined a large fleet & strong army gave him.

 

That and a history of annoying the Brits, like supporting the Boers. Bismarck would have had more sense.

 

Any war between big Russia and comparitively little Austria-Hungary would bring in Germany,

 

I'm not so sure Germany would automatically come to Austria's defence. Prussia and Austria had been enemies for centuries and a defeat over Serbia doesn't mean that German Austrians would end up being ruled by Russia.

 

See above re Bismarck.

 

I agree that given the situation and people in charge in 1914, war as it happened was inevitable. I'm not so sure that the people in charge necesarily had to make the decisions that got them there.

[KingSargent]

Russia was building her military and industry, especially transportation, and she was doing it with French money. The German General Staff calculated that by 1917 Russia would be able to double the size of her army, mobilize speedily, and most important move the troops on new railways. Most of the buildup was happening on Russia's European frontier, ie on the German and Austrian borders. The Russians were building a powerful war machine and there was no place for them to use it except Eastern Europe.

 

Between the French belligerence and hot language and the French-financed Russian buildup the Central Powers were being caught in a vise, at least as they saw it. From the German Staff's point of view, WW1 was essentially a pre-emption to knock out Russia before she became too powerful. The whole idea of German planning was a fast war to knock France out while the sluggish Russian bear was coming out of hibernation, then move the victorious troops east and make sure Russia would not be a problem in the future. But the longer they delayed their first strike the more ready and the greater threat Russia would be, so by 1914 things were getting tight in the Staff point of view.

 

Also as has been mentioned Germany was being reigned over by an idiot. Russia was little better, while the Third Republic in France gave "asinine self-destructive politics" a whole new dimension. I haven't seen too many signs of intelligence in the British Foreign Office either.

 

In summer 1914 the crisis boiled while everybody was on summer vacation. None of the leadership was watching what was going on. The actual historical events that led to WW1 could have been avoided, but WW1 in some form couldn't. Too many people WANTED war, nobody in power had any idea how expensive and destructive it was going to be or how long it would last.

 

About the only thing that would have helped would have been a plague that targeted politicians. Removing all the people in charge and starting over might have worked.

[jakec]

It is interesting that those "in charge" are largely blamed on this thread. What about the ordinary people? What about the socialists who talked about the common bonds of the working class meaning they would not fight each other, but then marched off to war anyway endorsing nationalism over anything else? What about the financiers and industrialists who said they were all for the new globalising world economy, but did nothing to protect it from war? What about the women's rights campaigners who, like the socialists, forgot the international bonds of their struggle in the face of the appeal of nationalism?

 

It was not just the "idiots" in charge.

[Ken Estes]

It is interesting that those "in charge" are largely blamed on this thread. What about the ordinary people? What about the socialists who talked about the common bonds of the working class meaning they would not fight each other, but then marched off to war anyway endorsing nationalism over anything else? What about the financiers and industrialists who said they were all for the new globalising world economy, but did nothing to protect it from war? What about the women's rights campaigners who, like the socialists, forgot the international bonds of their struggle in the face of the appeal of nationalism?

 

It was not just the "idiots" in charge.

You really are kidding, right? What you wrote remains a clear transport of contemporary notions back to 1914. The governments remained immune to what the 'ordinary people' wished, until 1917. About the only repercussion to the Socialist movement pre-war would be the assassination of Jean Juare at the outbreak.

 

It remains largely correct to comment on the inadequacy of the leaders of the day. The previous Wilhelm, Bismarck, Moltke alone would have made a difference, and that's just one country!

 

I think we did this thread a few months back, eh?

[Hans Engstrom]

The conflict was, perhaps, inevitable (sadly so, the society of the post Victorian, pre Great War era is one to be envied in many parts). However, I remain firmly convinced the actual alliances that fought it were not inevitable.

[Ken Estes]

The conflict was, perhaps, inevitable (sadly so, the society of the post Victorian, pre Great War era is one to be envied in many parts). However, I remain firmly convinced the actual alliances that fought it were not inevitable.

Thanks, Hans, for the perfect setup for one of the best quotes I have encountered:

 

This leads us to conclude that if there was a fatal flaw threaded through this era of confidence -- and this was the great illusion -- it was the humanitarian belief that general war among Europeans was really unthinkable. But while this popular conviction was spreading among the enlightened, the European governments in their international relationships continued to wear the outmoded garments of the nineteenth century. Never were values associated with the nation state so grossly inflated -- and this in a period when interdependence in all vital matters was weaving a girdle around the world. But this new reality was only faintly reflected in the relations of governments. Every country had its contingent of "jump-for-glory" militarists and navalists and second-rate statesmen engrossed in the mechanics of power. In the crisis of 1914 both the men and the mechanism failed. This brings us close to the view prevalent at the time: The war resulted from a series of fateful human decisions -- mostly mistaken and erroneous -- involving risks that decision makers would have avoided had they been endowed with a larger measure of foresight and prudence. Dawning light, rich in promise for a fair day, never became high noon because of the failures and miscalculations of Europe's political and military leaders.

Oron J. Hale, The Great Illusion 1900-1914 (Harper, 1971).