What happened to French tank manufacturing post-1940?

[Gregory]

I'm rather surprised that the Germans didn't use the existing plants to turn out some SPGs on H39 chassis, for example.

[Ken Estes]

One of the amazing facets of III Reich Germany is that commercial patents remained honored, to the extent that

German manufacturers remained reluctant to share technical details with the foreign competition. As totalitarian as

the ideology tended, the business practices of III Reich remained strictly Wilhelmine. Thus I suspect that Krupp, Henschel,

and the rest would not share with the French producers. I suppose the German factories might have lost some steel and other allocations as well. I wonder how Dassault did so well with aircraft work, and then there is the Heinkel 177/274 production undertaken by Farman, called "German-controlled" in some sources, and I know no details of that either.

[irregularmedic]

IIRC in some cases some of the plant machinery was removed to Germany leaving the French factories incomplete.

[dpapp2]

IIRC someone mentioned on this grate site that the increase of German tank production during 1941 relied heavily on machinery stripped from French factories, e.g. the tooling for the Panther.

[cbo]

I'm rather surprised that the Germans didn't use the existing plants to turn out some SPGs on H39 chassis, for example.

 

They did, to some extent at least.

 

French companies like Berliet, Citroen, Renault and others continued to make trucks for the German army, Elmag made German 12t halftracks, Ford in France made trucks and half-tracks (Maultier). Those and many others made parts for German vehicles, like Talbot making transmissions for the Pz 38t and Simca making tracks for German half-tracks. Simca also got an order for 2500 Kettenkrads, but I dont know if they were ever made.

 

I dont think they continued any tank production, probably for the simple reason that French tanks were not really suited for the way the Germans used armour. The basic designs could perhaps have been redesigned, but it probably wasn't worth the bother. Better to get the French producing spares for what was already captured and German vehicles or shift production to trucks, which many of the companies were making anyway. Also, machinery seems to have been a bottlneck for much production in Germany, so it probably made sense to move some of it to Germany and use it to make German designs

 

cbo

Edited January 15, 2008 by cbo

[thekirk]

I think you will have to search long and hard to find what few isolated examples there are of rational decisions made by Nazi Germany, in any area, let alone military production. I've read everything I could get my hands on, over the years, and I've yet to find anything that didn't make me wonder how that crew wound up almost taking over the world. The only thing saving the Germans was that their enemies were even more incompetent, at least at the beginning.

[Mikel2]

I think you will have to search long and hard to find what few isolated examples there are of rational decisions made by Nazi Germany, in any area, let alone military production. I've read everything I could get my hands on, over the years, and I've yet to find anything that didn't make me wonder how that crew wound up almost taking over the world. The only thing saving the Germans was that their enemies were even more incompetent, at least at the beginning.

 

Considering that they controlled a very good chunk of the industrialized world, it is amazing how poorly they used those industrial resources. Luckily for us.

[Detonable]

I don't think the production force in France would be enormously enthusiastic about making weapons for their recent, and also traditional, enemy. There was Czech tank production but I also think there was considerable sabotage in the factories at one point.

 

I've read the French made steel for Germany. I don't think the Germans would want the French to have the specs for a Panther tank. And, early in the war, it didn't seem necessary to have massive French weapons production. I am surprised they didn't buy more French trucks.

[Guest JamesG123]

One of the amazing facets of III Reich Germany is that commercial patents remained honored, to the extent that

German manufacturers remained reluctant to share technical details with the foreign competition.

 

Either a pragmatic awareness that the then current geopolitical "disagreement" was a temporary condition (and that they might be on the short end of the stick again).

Or, gentlemanly honoring buisness ethics (while the World went mad) and not will to accept that the "world order" had radically changed.

 

?

[DougRichards]

Either a pragmatic awareness that the then current geopolitical "disagreement" was a temporary condition (and that they might be on the short end of the stick again).

Or, gentlemanly honoring buisness ethics (while the World went mad) and not will to accept that the "world order" had radically changed.

 

?

You have to remember that post "the War to End All Wars", in which the Brits copied German designs for clockwork time fuzed AA shells, the Brits were forced to pay royalties to the German patent holder by an international tribunal.

 

That is right, the Brits paid the Germans for the designs to defend themselves and shoot down German aircraft.

 

It should be remembered:

 

"The past is a foreign country; they do things differently there.” (Leslie Poles Hartley).

 

I am looking forward to the day when Russia pays royalties for the designs of nuclear devices based on stolen late 1940s technology.....

[Ken Estes]

...

 

I am looking forward to the day when Russia pays royalties for the designs of nuclear devices based on stolen late 1940s technology.....

Good work, Doug, for we may have to earn our way as a 3rd/5th world country in the future....

[GdG**]

They did, to some extent at least.

 

French companies like Berliet, Citroen, Renault and others continued to make trucks for the German army, Elmag made German 12t halftracks, Ford in France made trucks and half-tracks (Maultier). Those and many others made parts for German vehicles, like Talbot making transmissions for the Pz 38t and Simca making tracks for German half-tracks. Simca also got an order for 2500 Kettenkrads, but I dont know if they were ever made.

 

I dont think they continued any tank production, probably for the simple reason that French tanks were not really suited for the way the Germans used armour. The basic designs could perhaps have been redesigned, but it probably wasn't worth the bother. Better to get the French producing spares for what was already captured and German vehicles or shift production to trucks, which many of the companies were making anyway. Also, machinery seems to have been a bottlneck for much production in Germany, so it probably made sense to move some of it to Germany and use it to make German designs

 

cbo

 

Excellent post, which sums it up pretty.

 

Anyway, remember that each country had its own way to produce steel & produce tanks (and the French were more keen on producing cast steel, unlike the Germans). It was easier for the French aeronautic industry to produce German planes because it required way less heavy structural changes.

 

Also keep in mind, that, just like the other belligerents, tank production replaced locomotives and a part of the naval production during 1939-40 (Five-Lilles which produced B1 bis for example, or FCM which main activity was naval).

 

OTOH, the Germans were glad to get their hand on the French automobile industry (which was, for the main part, located in the occupied zone). Since the French automobile production was larger than the German one by then, it was their real booty. Car, trucks, half tracks require way less strategic resources, can be transformed rather easily to fit the German requests, even if, unlike the tanks, they adopted ad-hoc (and apparently were very satisfied with them) 4x4 or 6x6 vehicles.

 

Renault, for example, was reluctant to produce tanks for the Army in 1936-40 because it used too many resources, while the automobile was beginning to become affordable and the mass-market was a near term goal for the company (the VW Beetle, just like the 2CV were already on the drawing boards before WW2). Once the Germans won in 1940, Renault was happy enough to see the tank purchases stopped, while the huge automobile markets passed by the Army in 1939-40 were maintained and profited to the Germans.

[Marek Tucan]

There was Czech tank production but I also think there was considerable sabotage in the factories at one point.

 

Less than in Germany in fact, had to do for sure with less Totaleinsatzed workers and also with a clever carrot-and-stick politics set up in factories by Heydrich.

[Rich]

OTOH, the Germans were glad to get their hand on the French automobile industry (which was, for the main part, located in the occupied zone). Since the French automobile production was larger than the German one by then, it was their real booty. Car, trucks, half tracks require way less strategic resources, can be transformed rather easily to fit the German requests, even if, unlike the tanks, they adopted ad-hoc (and apparently were very satisfied with them) 4x4 or 6x6 vehicles.

 

Renault, for example, was reluctant to produce tanks for the Army in 1936-40 because it used too many resources, while the automobile was beginning to become affordable and the mass-market was a near term goal for the company (the VW Beetle, just like the 2CV were already on the drawing boards before WW2). Once the Germans won in 1940, Renault was happy enough to see the tank purchases stopped, while the huge automobile markets passed by the Army in 1939-40 were maintained and profited to the Germans.

 

This is actually where the lack of German prewar planning gets interesting - and also where a lot of people seem to confuse a lack of prewar planning for a lack of mobilization. In fact, the German automotive industrry was heavily subsidized prewar and expanded massively (truck manufacture expanded 363% in the five years 1934-1939, auto manufacture 200% to 1938, before slipping behind in 1939 to 174%, while motorcycle production expanded 276%). But problems began cropping up in 1938-1939, the government reduced the amount of steel allocated to the industry, then on mobilization civilian production was nearly eliminated, but no plans were in place to convert the production capacity available into military use, beyond the minor contracts for military vehicles (trucks, cars, and motorcycles) that were in place and it wasn't until 1942 that contracts for specialized military vehicles began to be let, for RSO and Maultier and other halftracks. Worse, a lot of personnel were evidently drafted into the Wehrmacht without thought - a general problem and the upshot was that output stagnated, there was actually more productive capacity available than there was material and personnel to run the production lines.

 

Instead, the capacity of the automotive industry was slowly switched over to component manufacture, aircraft engines, tank engines, subcomponents and the like (it wasn't even until 1942-1943 that some plants were converted to final assembly plants for tanks).

 

Which left automotive production in a muddle and made the aquisition of French production and inventory so convenient.