Red Army after fall of Moscow

[yak_v]

Another interesting question would be, how the Red Army would fight if the leaders have left Moscow.

 

Stalin did say that he will stay in Moscow until the end, and given that a regular Soviet soldier never saw him personally, there is nothing that stops the Soviet propaganda that has always been pretty good from claiming that Comrade Stalin is with us. And there was an order given to NKVD in about mid October that anyone who spread rumors of defeat or panic was to be executed without trial, which seems to have worked pretty well.

 

Vladimir

[Redbeard]

Yes. Most of the large building and the bridges have been mined. Numerous barricades have been built and many building were turned into defensive bunkers. Soviets had 250,000 civilians working on fortifying Moscow and approaches starting about September.

 

Vladimir

 

Which by the time the Germans are likely to reach Moscow in this timeline means no, as they have just started on the fortyfications. That makes a big contrast to both Stalingrad by late 42 and Moscow by December 41.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[Gregory]

Which by the time the Germans are likely to reach Moscow in this timeline means no, as they have just started on the fortyfications. That makes a big contrast to both Stalingrad by late 42 and Moscow by December 41.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

The ability to start fortifying Moscow earlier was there, it was not utilized since it was not believed that Germans will reach Moscow. In situation where Germans are making faster advance, the fortification would start earlier as well.

[Mk 1]

The ability to start fortifying Moscow earlier was there, it was not utilized since it was not believed that Germans will reach Moscow. In situation where Germans are making faster advance, the fortification would start earlier as well.

I have followed this discussion closely, and seen much interesting information and perspective offered.

 

But this comment, I think, fails to recognize the essential position as it was "on the ground" in mid-July, 1941.

 

The Germans were already at about the same place that they were in October, when they actually kicked-off their drive on Moscow. If the Soviets found that the Germans were close enough in September to pose a threat to Moscow, then they were certainly close enough in July. Yet the Soviets did not start fortifying the road(s) to Moscow.

 

Why?

 

Because, one of the essential qualities of the "Blitzkrieg" that the Germans practiced in the early part of the war, was that the adversaries were seldom able to keep up with the advances of the German armies. They very often arrived on their objectives before any defenses had been organized. This was one of the key reasons operational results were so lop-sided. It was not just the German's ability to out-fight their opponents on the battlefield, but their ability to put the battlefield where the opponent had not expected it to be.

 

Given the state of the Red Army and Stavka in July of 1941, I expect that the Germans could have driven half-way from Smolensk to Moscow before the Soviets even figured out that they had kicked-off the next operational campaign. At that point, the only defenses would consist of cannon-fodder thrown at the spearheads in an attempt to buy time ... a tactic that had produced no useful results up to that point.

 

-Mark 1

[nitflegal]

Disagreed on the possible motivations for an attack on Russia after the Germans do. No better time in history to evict Russia from its far eastern fleet base and position of influence on Japan's sphere.

 

Pitting the worst Soviet aircrew to be spared from action against the Luftwaffe against Japanese aviators in the mid-41' timeframe, combined with factors of attrition, logistics, surprise, numbers, the Germans on the rampage in Europe, etc. all favoring the Japanese, is a recipe for disaster.

 

Japan desperately needed a source of immediate fuel supply. Nothing else came close. The Soviets were a concern but they didn't seem to have much drive to take the war to the Japanese except by proxy. I'm sure the Japanese would have loved to attack th Soviet Union with overwhelming force and still take the Pacific oil fields. I'm sure they would have liked to start the war with 12 additional Shokaku carriers as well. The problem for them is that they were stretched way too thin to do both. So, if the Japanese attack the Soviet Union and hurt them they start to run out of gas while the SU can still fight back with the forces that were historically retained in the region. The Japanese have blown their resources so they can't make the attempt to take the oil fields later, so the Japanese sit there and then get slaughtered.

 

As to the latter, there are enough reports of generals on the Western front complaining about good pilots, troops, and tank crews left in the far east to indicate that while the Soviets in the East weren't the best, they weren't the dregs either. In addition, the Japanese stripped their better pilots for the island campaigns at the same time the Soviets were starting to pull some of their best away. If the Japanese leave those pilots in place the USA and UK are fighting against the Japanese second string and they do better against Japan.

 

Japan simply didn't have enough planes, troops, transports, warships, or pilots for the war they did fight. Adding additional fronts to their plan would just put them in an even worse position.

 

Matt

[Jim Martin]

The wild card in this was the Kwantung Army, which was virtually a satrapy unto itself. Even as late as 1945, the officers of the Kwantung Army seem to have had little concern for how poorly the Pacific War was proceeding. What was the likelihood of Kwantung "going rogue" and attempting to rip off a chunk of Siberia for itself?

[JWB]

Can you read?

 

I asked if Moscow had been prepared for fighting within the city. Was the Red Army prepared to fight for it block by block, house by house, as they did in Stalingrad?

Psychologically yes. Physically no. But the Germans weren't exactly prepared either. Ostheer was built for high speed battles of maneuver not low speed positional battles of attrition. In fact the Germans had not done any MOUT fightng at all. Paris, Warsaw, Kiev were taken in a walk thorugh after surrendering.

Edited February 16, 2008 by JWB

[Mk 1]

Even as late as 1945, the officers of the Kwantung Army seem to have had little concern for how poorly the Pacific War was proceeding.

Until the B-29s started showing up regularly over the home islands, the same can be said for much of the population of Japan, including many high-placed political leaders.

 

The Japanese military had a real aversion to sharing bad news. Many of their massive defeats in the Pacific were not understood well beyond those involved, or those responsible for tracking availability of the units involved.

 

What was the likelihood of Kwantung "going rogue" and attempting to rip off a chunk of Siberia for itself?

Pretty high, actually. It is my understanding that "going rogue" is, for the most part, how the whole Nomonhan (Khalkin Gol) incident developed.

 

-Mark 1

[swerve]

Psychologically yes. Physically no. But the Germans weren't exactly prepared either. Ostheer was built for high speed battles of maneuver not low speed positional battles of attrition. In fact the Germans had not done any MOUT fightng at all. Paris, Warsaw, Kiev were taken in a walk thorugh after surrendering.

 

Wrong, I'm afraid. There was heavy street fighting in Warsaw. The city eventually capitulated, but there were a number of German assaults first, spread over almost 3 weeks. Lvov held out for a week.

 

In 1941, some smaller Soviet cities were defended fiercely, e.g. Brest. The old fortress wasn't cleared of Soviet troops until late July. There had been street fighting in the same city in 1939, when the Germans captured it from the Poles. Etc., etc. The Germans had done some urban fighting.

[JWB]

Wrong, I'm afraid. There was heavy street fighting in Warsaw. The city eventually capitulated, but there were a number of German assaults first, spread over almost 3 weeks. Lvov held out for a week.

 

In 1941, some smaller Soviet cities were defended fiercely, e.g. Brest. The old fortress wasn't cleared of Soviet troops until late July. There had been street fighting in the same city in 1939, when the Germans captured it from the Poles. Etc., etc. The Germans had done some urban fighting.

Not much of a siege. It lasted 10 days and had only 120,000 Poles involved. A siege against Moscow would have several times that many Ivans and the German supply lines would be stretched to the breaking point at a time when supply requirements were at their highest.

 

Taking Moscow would have had little effect on the course of the war anyway. In modern warfare victory is not acheived by conquering spots on a map. Victory is about destroying a nation's ability to wage war. In the era of Clausewitz armies were almost self supporting. Food was had by forage. Gun powder was produced by fermenting a mixture of human wastes, wood ash, lime, etc. In modern war armies are totally dependant on an industrial base. The Allies won the war not by exterminating the Wehrmacht but by occupying Germany's industrial cities. So Hitler would have been more likely to win the war in the east by going after Stalingrad in 1941. Moscow had little in the way of industry but Stalingrad and the oil fields in the Caucasus had an entire energy/industrial complex. If the Germans had taken all of that intact the course of the war would have changed radically. Hitler would have been able to use Soviet industry against the USSR.

[swerve]

Not much of a siege. It lasted 10 days and had only 120,000 Poles involved. A siege against Moscow would have several times that many Ivans and the German supply lines would be stretched to the breaking point at a time when supply requirements were at their highest.

 

Taking Moscow would have had little effect on the course of the war anyway. In modern warfare victory is not acheived by conquering spots on a map. Victory is about destroying a nation's ability to wage war. In the era of Clausewitz armies were almost self supporting. Food was had by forage. Gun powder was produced by fermenting a mixture of human wastes, wood ash, lime, etc. In modern war armies are totally dependant on an industrial base. The Allies won the war not by exterminating the Wehrmacht but by occupying Germany's industrial cities. So Hitler would have been more likely to win the war in the east by going after Stalingrad in 1941. Moscow had little in the way of industry but Stalingrad and the oil fields in the Caucasus had an entire energy/industrial complex. If the Germans had taken all of that intact the course of the war would have changed radically. Hitler would have been able to use Soviet industry against the USSR.

 

Your original statement was "In fact the Germans had not done any MOUT fightng at all." That was false. Claiming that one of the many occasions on which they did was "Not much of a siege" doesn't make your original statement any truer.

 

It's been explained several times how, because of its enormous importance as a transport hub, taking Moscow would have affected the Soviet ability to move industrial products, raw materials, & manpower around. Clearly, this would affect the Soviet ability to wage war. It was more than a "spot on a map": it was a central part of the Soviet industrial system. This was described early in this thread. Moscow had significant industry: 4.5 million people weren't all, or mostly, involved in administration. It had tank and aircraft factories, for a start. Whether the combination of its transport & industrial significance made it more or less valuable than the industry taken in Ukraine as a result of Directive 33 is largely what's being debated here.

 

Stalinggrad & the Caucasus oilfields aren't relevant to this discussion. They could not be attacked as an alternative to attacking Moscow. Most of Ukraine was in the way. Capturing that - Kiev, Kharkov, Donetsk, etc - was the alternative to attacking Moscow. Also, Stalingrad was not part of an industrial complex with the Caucasus oilfields. It was hundreds of kilometres away, & a medium-size industrial city with a tenth of the population of Moscow, & a fraction of the amount of industry.

 

"If the Germans had taken all of that intact" - well, as I said, Stalingrad wasn't of great industrial importance, & in any case, they never took a Soviet industrial city intact: factories were mostly evacuated if possible & destroyed if not. The oilfields were of more importance, but even if captured intact, they'd have been very difficult for the Germans to exploit. The main gain would have been depriving the USSR of their output.

[JWB]

swerve Posted Sat 16 Feb 2008 2028

Your original statement was "In fact the Germans had not done any MOUT fightng at all." That was false. Claiming that one of the many occasions on which they did was "Not much of a siege" doesn't make your original statement any truer.

The German effort against Warsaw amounted to a relatively small infantry assault which was thrown back and followed by a massive fire assault forcing the defenders to give up is really no example of MOUT.

 

It's been explained several times how, because of its enormous importance as a transport hub, taking Moscow would have affected the Soviet ability to move industrial products, raw materials, & manpower around. Clearly, this would affect the Soviet ability to wage war. It was more than a "spot on a map": it was a central part of the Soviet industrial system. This was described early in this thread. Moscow had significant industry: 4.5 million people weren't all, or mostly, involved in administration. It had tank and aircraft factories, for a start. Whether the combination of its transport & industrial significance made it more or less valuable than the industry taken in Ukraine as a result of Directive 33 is largely what's being debated here.

 

Not much in the way of tanks. Actually none after 1941.> http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/weapons...n.htm#tspplants

 

Stalingrad wasn't of great industrial importance

 

factories were mostly evacuated if possible & destroyed if not

 

Well, in that case the aircraft factories in Moscow would be evacuated to the east just like the tank factories in Stalingrad were.

So taking Moscow would cost Hitler a hell of a lot of manpower, would let the Soviet armies in Ukraine get away, and would do little to diminish Soviet war production.

[Redbeard]

The German effort against Warsaw amounted to a relatively small infantry assault which was thrown back and followed by a massive fire assault forcing the defenders to give up is really no example of MOUT.

Not much in the way of tanks. Actually none after 1941.> http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/weapons...n.htm#tspplants

 

Well, in that case the aircraft factories in Moscow would be evacuated to the east just like the tank factories in Stalingrad were.

So taking Moscow would cost Hitler a hell of a lot of manpower, would let the Soviet armies in Ukraine get away, and would do little to diminish Soviet war production.

 

Evacuated along the same crowded railroads on which the Red Army is to be rebulit at? If Moscow is assaulted after a "No Directive no. 33 of 19th of July) the encirclement of Moscow will take place in the middle of the evacuation, and even those sent to the Urals in OTL (Our Time Line) will be late in this ATL (Alternative Time Line). Adding all the Moscow industry to the evacuation burden is hardly gpoing to easen the logistic situation and on top of that the goods produced by the Moscow industry in OTL 1941 and until it might be ready in the Urals somewhen in 1942, will be absent from the Red Army units to do the fighting in first half of 1942.

 

The more we dive into this the more it becomes obvious (at least to me), that the 1942 Red Army will be much weaker. Not necessarily in number of men, but in equipment, cohesion and command.

 

Concering German capacity to assault fortified positions you just need to see how German pioneers literally swept the French pillboxes at the Meuse crossing in 1940. By early WWII you probably won't find anybody on the planet better in asaaulting fortifications and cities. When studying various combat accounts of WWII it is astonshing what a German regimantal commander often achieved with the Pioneer platoon organic in an Infantry Regiment.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[JWB]

But there just wasn't that much to be evacuated from Moscow. > http://www.ordersofbattle.darkscape.net/si...vFactories.html

 

Examination of Soviet production>

http://www.ordersofbattle.darkscape.net/si...SovWarProd.html

 

The following is a link to a book about German aircraft production during the war. Not exactly pertinent but it shows how aircraft production is really light industry as compared to tank production which is some of the heaviest industry that exists. The Karkov factory was relocated in only six weeks. An airplane factory can be moved in a matter of days. Tank factories use huge foundries requiring huge cranes and multiple railroad trips. Airplane factories use light sheet metal bending machines and drill presses that can be lifted by men and carried by pickup trucks. It's even easier than that because Soviet aircraft utilized considerable amounts of wood fabricated using various saws and glues. The production of small aircraft in WW2 was labor intensive and not requiring giant industrial machinery.

http://books.google.com/books?id=Elfmh6eJF...vgVOTI#PPA65,M1

 

The more we dive into this the more it becomes obvious (at least to me), that the 1942 Red Army will be much weaker. Not necessarily in number of men, but in equipment, cohesion and command.

Red Army would certainly be weaker in the C3. But the 5 armies in Ukraine that would escape to Stalingrad would be able to protect Soviet industry there and eliminate the need for its relocation. Which means production in Stalingrad would not be disrupted and probably increased.

 

I still don't understand why people think the Germans would take Moscow with less than several hundred thousand casualties of their own. The conquest of Warsaw was made possible by the massive use of artillery and Luftwaffe bombers. That couldn't be done against Moscow because Ostheer supply lines were beyond the breaking point.

[Ken Estes]

I still don't understand why people think the Germans would take Moscow with less than several hundred thousand casualties of their own. The conquest of Warsaw was made possible by the massive use of artillery and Luftwaffe bombers. That couldn't be done against Moscow because Ostheer supply lines were beyond the breaking point.

Indeed you are right. A reading of the war diaries of the units and surviving personal accounts makes it clear that the Germans were reduced to crawling, clawing their war forward. There was little combat power left forward and it almost seemed as if they wanted to will the enemy [the Rus] to give up, for they lacked the force to throw them back. The recce unit that made it to the outermost stop of the Moscow Metro would have been in a halucinatory state, same for the arty FOs able to see the onion-shaped tops of the Moscow churches through their scopes. By then, 5 December41, the time came for the long walk, back to Berlin.

 

Not for nothing was Zhukov conserving his forces.

[JWB]

Zhukov was also correct in describing Hitler's reason for consolidating Ukraine:

 

As far as the temporary halt of the drive toward Moscow in August is concerned, the Germans had no choise but to divert part of their forces to the operations in the Ukraine. Without those operations, the central group of the German forces might have been in an even less favorable situation: the Soviet Supreme Headquarters reserves that were thrown into operational gaps in the southwest in september would otherwise have been used against the flank and rear of army group center during its drive against Moscow.....

 

From that information I take it that Zhukov was fully confident that the Soviet armies in not in action at that time would have been able cut off AGC's supply lines and then force it to surrender. The ramifications of that result would make for an interesting speculative thread of its own!

[Nobu]

Japan desperately needed a source of immediate fuel supply. Nothing else came close. The Soviets were a concern but they didn't seem to have much drive to take the war to the Japanese except by proxy.

Already established earlier in this thread that Japan was more than willing - mistakenly IMHO - to wage war on land in this timeframe for ends other than securing a source of immediate fuel supply. Interestingly, before the oil embargo of July 25, 1941, Japan did have a source of immediate fuel supply at the onset of the discussion at hand: Barbarossa, June 22. At the time a decision was to be made whether to enter the war against the USSR, the event making the seizure of Dutch colonial possessions in the S. China Sea imperative had not yet occurred.

 

Agreed that the Soviets were a concern and the Soviet naval threat negligible at the time. On land, however, the defeats engineered by Zhukov in 1939 demonstrated a threat that was quite real, should the Russians decide to concentrate their efforts there. Additionally, Japanese expansionist goals of the time were not dependent on an opponent's ability to take the war to Japanese soil or into Japanese waters, China again being the prime example.

 

The Japanese concern with Russia, as ever, was over it's ability to meddle in Japan's perceived sphere, as illustrated by the 14 Heroes of the Soviet Union awarded and Russia's willingness to provide massive support to one of history's most avid anti-communists, Chiang, to combat Japanese attempts to expand that sphere. Clearly war by proxy, but also showing the nature of Russo-Japanese relations dating back to 1904 and the continuing Russian threat to Japanese interests. No better time to address that threat then with the Wehrmacht unleashed and Zhukov having his hands full trying to stop Guderian's drive on Moscow in high summer assuming no Directive 33.

[zraver]

I think you are reaching... First of all I don't think Murmansk falls since the need to take Moscow will suck in a lot of troops from the outlying fronts (I know we are not debating taking Moscow, but realistically Germans will need to have a mot more troops than historically to do that and the only place to get it is from the periphery) so if anything the situation in the edges will me better than in real life. Second, the central government will not collapse, as Stalin will evacuate from Moscow and will continue to rule from Kuibyshev, the phone, telegraph and radio will continue to work and the NKVD will still be there. The only problem will be the rail lines, but the Soviets were pretty good in laying down emergency track. They laid track around the penetration on the Murmansk line, they laid track across the frozen Lake Ladoga and so on. So it all depends on how big of a chunk of land the Germans have captured and how fast the Soviets can lay emergency rails around the salient. Given that the Germans will be exhausted, Soviets will have until May to finish the track, which will give them 5-6 months to do it (depending on how early they realize that the Moscow will fall and start working on the track). Therefore the results may not be all that bad.

 

Vladimir

 

Without Moscow the Soviet Union is in deep trouble, thier only winter reserves now have to stage out of the Gorky reaches and so lack the range for a deep penetration or even sustained efforts as the whole offensive only had 30 days of supplies in December and that was staging directly from Moscow. This then begs the question of what do the Germans do in the spring? Without Moscow, Leningrad is doomed its just not sustainable. This is going to free up troops and supplies for use in a double spring time offensive by both AGC and AGS. AGC towards the Gorky reaches and then SW around the Volga to isolate Stalingrad. AGS along the historical axis. This is a serious problem for the Soviets who lack tanks in early 1942. Given thier tactical inefficency, low numbers and scrambled supply lines there sin't really anythign to stop them until fall when Zukov builds up his reserve used historically during Mars and Uranus- about 1.3 million troops and 2000 tanks. Soviet production didn't really hit its stride until the summer of 43. The Germans might well seize the Baku oil fields.

[Kit Hildreth]

In contrafactual history writing Barbarossa is a popular subject, and especially what if (how) Moscow had fallen.

 

I would like some ideas from the esteemed Ladies and Gentlemen of the board on not how the Germans could have taken Moscow, leave that to another thread, but on what would have happened after? Let's say that Armeegruppe Centre keeps up momentum (and support) in autumn and takes Moscow, and the expected Soviet counterattack from the large forces to the south is stopped or thrown back before 1941 ends - what next?

 

How much will the Germans possessing Moscow ease their winterproblems?

 

From map studying it appears like most heavy railway lines went around Moscow, how much would that influence the rebuilding of the Red Army? I guess there is a high risk of the rifles ending up in one place, ammo in another and personell at a third location.

 

How much would the industry relocation programme be influenced by Moscow falling in 1941?

 

In short, would the fightings of 1942 involve the Red Army fighting/counterattacking as a regular army or will it mainly be a partisan like war?

 

Any oppinions or suggestions on litterature?

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

 

Actually the momentum you refer to should have applied to July-August of 1941 when the Soviets were in some dissarray, Zhukov was tied up elsewhere, and Moscow lay quite undefended. Had the post-Smolensk German offensives not been internally dissipated and then deflected, Moscow could have been taken, the only T34 factory captured, and the Soviet gov't either captured or - more likely - forced to flee ignomously leaving the Soviets in a mess until the their military became the dominant member of the Party-NKVD-Army triumvirate. That mess could have then have been effectivly exploited enough for the Germans to achieve the majority of their goals well before the severe fall/winter, and materiel to deal with same, brought up in good time. More important the decimating of the Wehrmacht dring the latter period would have been significantly lessand the Siberian divisions would have had a far less easy time of it: perhaps even being decimated in turn.

[Kit Hildreth]

Actually the momentum you refer to should have applied to July-August of 1941 when the Soviets were in some dissarray, Zhukov was tied up elsewhere, and Moscow lay quite undefended. Had the post-Smolensk German offensives not been internally dissipated and then deflected, Moscow could have been taken, the only T34 factory captured, and the Soviet gov't either captured or - more likely - forced to flee ignomously leaving the Soviets in a mess until the their military became the dominant member of the Party-NKVD-Army triumvirate. That mess could have then have been effectivly exploited enough for the Germans to achieve the majority of their goals well before the severe fall/winter, and materiel to deal with same, brought up in good time. More important the decimating of the Wehrmacht dring the latter period would have been significantly less and the Siberian divisions would have had a far less easy time of it: perhaps even being decimated in turn.