Red Army after fall of Moscow

[Redbeard]

Steffen,

 

as I see it, you're proposing no Directive 33. A battle for Moscow in August, & Ukraine left for another day.

 

One implication of your proposal is that the Soviet armies in the south would remain relatively intact for longer, & another is that the USSR would keep control of the Donbas & a lot of Ukrainian grain production, offsetting, in material terms, the loss of Moscow. What we're considering is not really a physically weaker USSR in terms of industrial & agricultural production & manpower (indeed, perhaps stronger), but one which has lost the communications hub & national symbol which is Moscow.

 

pji

 

Yes, no diversion to the south.

 

If the Soviet forces there stay put, they can/will be engaged after Moscow is done with. Doubt that will have have the Soviets fare better, but might have Hitler realise in time, that the campaign will continue into 1942.

 

If they counterattack, which, considdering Soviet doctrine, they are likely to, then I seriously doubt if they will achieve much more than own losses - the 1941 Red Army apparently were experts in wasting own troops. If the battle of Moscow is over in short time, the Panzergroups deployed there might even turn south in time to perform great encirclement battles on a scale like in OTL 1941. But seen from the German perspective I might think that this would not be the ideal situation, as it may (again) have them underestimate the Soviets. So better be in control of Moscow by say September-October, but realisng that this will go on into 1942 - and prepare for it.

 

For the Soviets it will be of little comfort if the forces in the south haven't been decimated to the degree of OTL 1941, as they anyway will be badly mauled after the counterattacks. And more importantly, plenty of grain in Ukraine, is no comfort in Gorki, if they are separated by the Germans, as the tanks from the Urals are only fanatsy for the armies in Ukraine having lost theirs in 1941. All in all I doubt if the Soviets will be as strong or stronger than in OTL 1941/42, but I'm sure the Germans will be much better off by 1942, If they can stay in Moscow for the winter.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[yak_v]

Murmansk operation consisted of only two divisions from German side, it's not like it had whole lot of troops to "suck from" to begin with...

 

Right but those two divisions didn't take Murmansk in real life, therefore unless reinforced are unlikely to take it in this alternative and given the need for troops around Moscow that is unlikely therefore Murmansk is likely stays as is.

 

Vladimir

[swerve]

... And more importantly, plenty of grain in Ukraine, is no comfort in Gorki, if they are separated by the Germans, as the tanks from the Urals are only fanatsy for the armies in Ukraine having lost theirs in 1941. All in all I doubt if the Soviets will be as strong or stronger than in OTL 1941/42, but I'm sure the Germans will be much better off by 1942, If they can stay in Moscow for the winter.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

 

Agree with most of your post, but the tanks from the Urals don't have to reach Ukraine - it had its own tank factories, & in this scenario they don't fall to the Germans in summer & autumn 1941 - though tank production does cease in Moscow, so the central front will need more tanks from the Urals. Also, if one checks the rail map, one realises that central as Moscow was, it wasn't necessary to go through it from the Urals to Ukraine. Gorki to Donetsk might involve a much longer route, over overloaded tracks, limiting the value of all that grain in Ukraine to the citizens in the former & to be Nizhni Novgorod, but Tankograd to Donetsk traffic would never have been routed via Moscow anyway, & the Urals needed grub as well.

 

After the fall of Moscow the Germans would have faced a better-armed & better-fed enemy, at least until eastern Ukraine could be taken, so capturing Moscow would not be all gain. But the USSR would have had more difficulty in moving its weapons & troops between fronts, & more localised shortages, because of the removal of the great transport hub. The southern front would probably have been best-off, & the north-west weakest.

[Ken Estes]

....

 

After the fall of Moscow the Germans would have faced a better-armed & better-fed enemy, at least until eastern Ukraine could be taken, so capturing Moscow would not be all gain. But the USSR would have had more difficulty in moving its weapons & troops between fronts, & more localised shortages, because of the removal of the great transport hub. The southern front would probably have been best-off, & the north-west weakest.

Ironically, the same would have obtained for the Germans. It's interesting, but hard to find a different outcome. One should not be sympathetic with the Wehmacht, but the poor Germans had no idea what they were getting into with Fall Barbarossa. Absent the knock-out blow in 1941, time was on the side of the USSR. I always like to point out that this had nothing to do with Lend-Lease, ineffectual until 1943. The Rus saved themselves in 1941-42 and the Germans reaped what they had sown.

[JWB]

Redbeard Posted Tue 12 Feb 2008 1040

By 1942 the Red Army is likely to be weaker and the Wehrmacht stronger than in real 1942 - and that IMHO is likely to make the outcome much different.

 

I find it difficult to believe the Germans would be stronger after taking Moscow than otherwise. Unless you think taking the city would be a walk in the park? IMO the street fighting would be as intense as it was in Stalingrad with the Germans taking proprtionate levels of casualties.

[Redbeard]

I find it difficult to believe the Germans would be stronger after taking Moscow than otherwise. Unless you think taking the city would be a walk in the park? IMO the street fighting would be as intense as it was in Stalingrad with the Germans taking proprtionate levels of casualties.

 

What the Germans first of all avoid by taking Moscow are the huge casualties while freezing on the open ground outside Moscow in winter of 1941/42, that was a defeat at least on par with Stalingrad. Of course taking a major city will mean casulaties, but hardly anything resembling OTL winter 41/42 or the encirclement at Stalingrad in 42/43. If going for Moscow right after Smolensk, there will still be huge concentrations of Soviet troops to fight at Moscow, but they will be far less prepared than by late 41, and I doubt if they will fare better than the forces defeate in the OTL diversion to the south. No triple defensive ring etc., and a lot of the newly raised formations militia or with Rifle Divisions being armed with rifles - and nothing else.

 

After Smolensk there were signs of panic in Moscow, if the Germans keep closing instead of diverting, it might not be as easy to fight the panic and the Germans simultaneously.

 

You could however imagine Hitler deciding to just encircle Moscow (like at Leningrad) and starve it into the even worse follow up*. That would put the Germans in a difficult situation when winter comes. They take the same casualties as historical and Moscow might even be relieved. But the Soviet build-up for 1942 will still be delayed by the months they haven't had control over Moscow.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[swerve]

I find it difficult to believe the Germans would be stronger after taking Moscow than otherwise. Unless you think taking the city would be a walk in the park? IMO the street fighting would be as intense as it was in Stalingrad with the Germans taking proprtionate levels of casualties.

 

Nobody said it'd be a walk in the park, but it shouldn't need Stalingrad-style street fighting. Probably harder than Kiev & Kharkov, but like Kiev, Vyazma, etc., & (this is very important) unlike Stalingrad, it was possible to surround Moscow. Completely cut off, starving, & with (another important factor coming up) the Red Army of summer 1941, not the Red Army of a year later which fought at Stalingrad, the street fighting would not have been at Stalingrad levels. Stalingrad was maintained by a constant feeding-in of troops, into a city which much of the population had fled from, & with artillery support from across the river. Moscow would lack all that, like Kiev, & would have defenders of the same quality. This battle would be fought at the same time as Kiev - the third city of the USSR, much bigger than Stalingrad, & defended by far more troops - fell in our time line.

 

[Edit] Dammit, Steffen, beaten me to it! I see this as more likely to resemble the battle for Kiev - though harder - than Stalingrad. Isolate & storm. If beaten back, settle down in the suburbs & regroup & resupply while the defenders get weaker, then try again.

Edited February 13, 2008 by swerve

[JWB]

Ostheer did lose about 280,000 frostbite casualties but I don't see how they would have lost fewer by fighting their way through Moscow. http://books.google.com/books?id=sY9T_qw-a...uRlgE#PPA206,M1

 

Ostheer did try to encircle Moscow but made it 2/3 the around had to retreat. What difference does it make that civilians were still in Moscow vs. not in Stalingrad? Why would it be impossible for Zhukov to feed troops into Moscow?

 

How many casualties did ostheer lose in Kiev?

[Redbeard]

Ostheer did lose about 280,000 frostbite casualties but I don't see how they would have lost fewer by fighting their way through Moscow. http://books.google.com/books?id=sY9T_qw-a...uRlgE#PPA206,M1

 

Ostheer did try to encircle Moscow but made it 2/3 the around had to retreat. What difference does it make that civilians were still in Moscow vs. not in Stalingrad? Why would it be impossible for Zhukov to feed troops into Moscow?

 

How many casualties did ostheer lose in Kiev?

 

The fighting for Moscow would be well before winter, but if staying in Moscow for the winter, you have much better chances of resisting the cold, even if most of Moscow is ruins. The Moscow roadnet will be decisive in keeping the German fronline units supplied. In OTL the problem of staying outside Moscow much was from supplies, especially arty ammo, not reaching the frontline units in sufficient amounts.

 

The Soviet problem in feeding troops to the battle is that they sans Moscow are short of suitable places to unload troops (and keep them supplied from). Either you spend much time unloading the armies one at a time (and have trouble feeding them) , or they unload dispersed. In each situation they are vulnerable to attack. When winter comes the Soviets they are the ones who have to stay out in the open field. No matter how good winterclothing yoiu have, that will be a seriuos handicap to your combat capacity.

 

I haven't got figures at hand for Kiev, but I will look for them when I get home, right now I have promised wife and kids to join them on a "city-picnic"

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[Detonable]

I think we're taking the combat capanility of the Soviet troops in the south too lightly. While they would be destroyed in attacks against the German front, they're attacking the flanks. Do the Germans string front line troops along their flank to prevent this? As the Germans push further east, the flank gets bigger and bigger and absorbs more troops. If the Germans don't protect the flanks thoroughly, the Soviets are fighting truck drivers and rail workers.

 

So, I think the southern encirclement is necessary. Note that while the battle is going on the Germans can be improving their rail network for the decisive Moscow battle, so the time isn't really wasted.

 

If the Germans start Barbarossa slightly earlier than historically, they can take Moscow before the mud and bad weather arrive, but then they're stuck in the mud while Soviet troops are arriving by rail from all over the Soviet Union, since many rail lines lead to Moscow. I don't think they want to fight a mud battle because it neutralizes the Luftwaffe, as well as the army's mobility.

 

So, the only scenario where the Germans are victorious is:

a. destroy the Soviet armies west of Moscow

b. take Moscow

c. destroy many of the Soviet armies trying to retake Moscow, before the mud arrives.

 

In this scenario, they've destroyed the Soviet field armies, and have control of Moscow over the winter, inhibiting the Soviet effort to raise and equip new armies.

 

The question then becomes how much sooner do they need to start? Obviously they cannot attack Yugoslavia and Greece, which leaves open the possibility that British bombers can be based in Greece. Some political agreement needs to be reached with the Greeks to keep the British out.

[swerve]

...

The question then becomes how much sooner do they need to start? Obviously they cannot attack Yugoslavia and Greece, which leaves open the possibility that British bombers can be based in Greece. Some political agreement needs to be reached with the Greeks to keep the British out.

 

Without Mussolinis invasion of Greece, there would have been no British intervention. The Greeks most definitely did not want to join the war, & inviting the RAF in would get them into it. They accepted British help rather reluctantly, even after Il Duces Epirus fiasco. All that's needed to keep the British out of Greece is to make Mussolini leave Greece well alone, though a few polite assurances about respecting Greek neutrality as long as everyone else does would probably drive the point home.

[yak_v]

The fighting for Moscow would be well before winter, but if staying in Moscow for the winter, you have much better chances of resisting the cold, even if most of Moscow is ruins. The Moscow roadnet will be decisive in keeping the German fronline units supplied. In OTL the problem of staying outside Moscow much was from supplies, especially arty ammo, not reaching the frontline units in sufficient amounts.

 

Well that is the problem in your what-if... You said that Moscow was taken but not how. Now you are assuming the best possible outcome for the Germans and of course in that case you are correct, Russians are probably screwed. However your best possible case scenario is unlikely because you are ignoring the obvious difficulties that Germans would still have to face.

 

1) They still needed to refit after the Battle of Smolensk, so no attack before the beginning of September

2) They would still outrun their supplies.

3) They would have to commit huge number of front line troops to defend their flank from attack from Ukraine that will certainly come. It will most likely be defeated, but given the number of forces that would most likely be committed by the Soviets the offensive will have to slowdown because the parts of the attacking forces will need to turn back to defeat the attacks.

4) Rasputitsa will still start in the beginning of October and will still hamper the German movements, and in this case most of your final offensive will take place in the mud.

5) Because of 4) Germans will still have problems dealing with Soviet air force

6) You will probably complete the encirclement of Moscow by the beginning of December, which means that Moscow will still be in Soviet hands and your lines of supply will be even more overextended, at that time the Siberian divisions will arrive and counter attack. You will probably be able to defeat them, but it will maul your troops pretty badly. Then there will still be street fighting in Moscow, because Soviets will not surrender the city, which will be brutal. So the Germans will probably be able to take the city in the January-February time frame, but the infrastructure will most likely be mostly destroyed and the German army will still face huge casualties and will be in no shape to attack in the next several months, which will give the Soviets time to adjust to the situation.

 

Vladimir

[yak_v]

I think we're taking the combat capanility of the Soviet troops in the south too lightly. While they would be destroyed in attacks against the German front, they're attacking the flanks. Do the Germans string front line troops along their flank to prevent this? As the Germans push further east, the flank gets bigger and bigger and absorbs more troops. If the Germans don't protect the flanks thoroughly, the Soviets are fighting truck drivers and rail workers.

 

They can always put Italians and Romanians on their flanks , after all it worked so well...

 

So, the only scenario where the Germans are victorious is:

a. destroy the Soviet armies west of Moscow

b. take Moscow

c. destroy many of the Soviet armies trying to retake Moscow, before the mud arrives.

 

In this scenario, they've destroyed the Soviet field armies, and have control of Moscow over the winter, inhibiting the Soviet effort to raise and equip new armies.

This is nearly impossible because it requires Soviet army to simply completely fall apart and as we know that didn't happen.

 

The question then becomes how much sooner do they need to start? Obviously they cannot attack Yugoslavia and Greece, which leaves open the possibility that British bombers can be based in Greece. Some political agreement needs to be reached with the Greeks to keep the British out.

 

The ground didn't dry up until mid-May, so at the most Germans could have started a month earlier.

 

Vladimir

[Ken Estes]

After all, the Wehrmacht did defeat the Red Army in the field before Moscow, as Plan Barbarossa called for. Problem is, those defeated units were the only ones the Heer knew about. By the end of the year, Foreign Armies East [Gen Gehlen] had identified 450-500 division size units in a revised Red Army OOB...those were not in the bag at Smolensk, etc. The resilience of the USSR surprised the Germans at nearly every step, every level. Propaganda tried to characterize this as the Asian horde, fooled by the Jewish-Bolshevik World-Enemy into fighting to the death. The reality remained that the Germans knew not what they were getting into, and their preparations for a long campaign proved abysmal, if not absent. We usually credit the Japanese with Victory Disease, but the Germans in September41 are just full of themselves, can't see it coming, despite all the indicators. Just one more surge...sound familiar? - I digress.

 

The lack of clear objective -- and the inability of the German High Command to reconcile these differences -- dooms them. The original planners offered Hitler a choice of three objectives: Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev. Characteristically, he chose all three. The lack of clear direction, added to the logistic impossibility, in a witch's brew of no good intel and a poisonous ideology ... these are things that just do not go away, regardless of evident tactical and even operational successes of the German Army.

 

The ensuing Cold War, especially with our taking in all the German generals and their opinions, have long prevented our understanding the monumental military accomplishments of the USSR [virtually alone] against Germany in 1941-42. Thanks to John Ericson and David Glantz, we have new viewpoints. I am glad I live in our times, was an enthusiastic soldier against the Red Menace in the Cold War, but am also glad that we never came to blows. It would have been a terrible waste.

[JWB]

Population of Kiev in 1940 was about 900,000, Moscow was about 4.5 million. German casualties in Kiev were about 150,000 so German casualties taking Moscow could be 750,000. Add 250,000 from disease and starvation that could not be avoided even if Moscow were taken. How they are to replace them and be able to defend against Red counterattacks from the south remains to be seen.

[Jim Martin]

Population of Kiev in 1940 was about 900,000, Moscow was about 4.5 million. German casualties in Kiev were about 150,000 so German casualties taking Moscow could be 750,000. Add 250,000 from disease and starvation that could not be avoided even if Moscow were taken. How they are to replace them and be able to defend against Red counterattacks from the south remains to be seen.

 

 

Had Moscow been prepared for city fighting a la Stalingrad?

[JWB]

Had Moscow been prepared for city fighting a la Stalingrad?

We are talking about Kiev and Moscow, why do you bring up Stalingrad?

[Jim Martin]

We are talking about Kiev and Moscow, why do you bring up Stalingrad?

 

Can you read?

 

I asked if Moscow had been prepared for fighting within the city. Was the Red Army prepared to fight for it block by block, house by house, as they did in Stalingrad?

[Nobu]

True, there wasn't a lot of mortal danger in China. However, the planes weren't sitting around either. The Soviet Union was actually fairly active in China through 1940, shooting down over 80 Japanese A/C and generating 14 Heroes of the Soviet Union. they were also busily supplying fighters, armaments, and advisors to China through 1943. The Chinese themselves were producing I-16s and their own Zhong 28-Qia fighters and had several active quadrons of fighters and bombers. Could they have won the war if the Japanese A/C were pulled? Probably not. Would they have hurt the Japanese in China? Most likely yes. I have a really dififcult time imaging the Japanese making China more difficult to take a swing at Manchuria.

Agreed on Soviet 1940 air activity in China, although my basic readings show comparable if not heavier Soviet losses in pilots alone (approx 100 in combat, approx 100 more in transport a/c downings) which would logically translate to lost airframes in excess of the combat loss total. Additionally, Chinese produced and piloted Ratas and other types were swept from the skies by JAAF and JNAF airmen in mid-late 1940.

 

Unlikely that the 1941 Chinese would be in a position to take the offensive against Japanese-occupied China regardless of the situation in the air, in any event.

 

Disagreed on the possible motivations for an attack on Russia after the Germans do. No better time in history to evict Russia from its far eastern fleet base and position of influence on Japan's sphere.

Assuming that they decided to, so what? There was still a large fighter, SB-bomber, and AA force waiting for the Japanese to attack. Even when Moscow was fighting for its life they kept the material over there. Admittedly, they took most of their best pilots to the West and put in less experienced ones but they still had an advantage over what the Japanese were fielding in China.

Pitting the worst Soviet aircrew to be spared from action against the Luftwaffe against Japanese aviators in the mid-41' timeframe, combined with factors of attrition, logistics, surprise, numbers, the Germans on the rampage in Europe, etc. all favoring the Japanese, is a recipe for disaster.

[seahawk]

Another interesting question would be, how the Red Army would fight if the leaders have left Moscow.

[swerve]

Population of Kiev in 1940 was about 900,000, Moscow was about 4.5 million. German casualties in Kiev were about 150,000 so German casualties taking Moscow could be 750,000. Add 250,000 from disease and starvation that could not be avoided even if Moscow were taken. How they are to replace them and be able to defend against Red counterattacks from the south remains to be seen.

 

150000 casualties wasn't in the capture of the city, but in the destruction of the Southwestern Front, which had about the same number of troops as those which were mustered for the defence of Moscow, but far more armour and artillery.

[Redbeard]

I think we're taking the combat capanility of the Soviet troops in the south too lightly. While they would be destroyed in attacks against the German front, they're attacking the flanks. Do the Germans string front line troops along their flank to prevent this? As the Germans push further east, the flank gets bigger and bigger and absorbs more troops. If the Germans don't protect the flanks thoroughly, the Soviets are fighting truck drivers and rail workers.

 

So, I think the southern encirclement is necessary. Note that while the battle is going on the Germans can be improving their rail network for the decisive Moscow battle, so the time isn't really wasted.

 

If the Germans start Barbarossa slightly earlier than historically, they can take Moscow before the mud and bad weather arrive, but then they're stuck in the mud while Soviet troops are arriving by rail from all over the Soviet Union, since many rail lines lead to Moscow. I don't think they want to fight a mud battle because it neutralizes the Luftwaffe, as well as the army's mobility.

 

So, the only scenario where the Germans are victorious is:

a. destroy the Soviet armies west of Moscow

b. take Moscow

c. destroy many of the Soviet armies trying to retake Moscow, before the mud arrives.

 

In this scenario, they've destroyed the Soviet field armies, and have control of Moscow over the winter, inhibiting the Soviet effort to raise and equip new armies.

 

The question then becomes how much sooner do they need to start? Obviously they cannot attack Yugoslavia and Greece, which leaves open the possibility that British bombers can be based in Greece. Some political agreement needs to be reached with the Greeks to keep the British out.

 

It is not in question (by me) to shift units from AGS to AGC in order to take Moscow, but to let AGC keep their Panzergroups and have them go for Moscow ASAP. That would most likely have lead to the Soviet forces at Moscow being destroyed and Moscow falling. The Soviet forces in the south would not have been left unattended, but engaged heavily by AGS, and even if some of the Soviet armoured columns achieve somekind of penetration behind the spearheads of AGC - so what - by 1941 they would be able to achieve more than their own encirclement when the mass of AGC infantry steamrolls them over. Next AGS will have a good chance of advancing much further in 1941 than they did historically, simultaneously with the Germans taking Moscow.

 

If we look for points of divergence (PoD) a small one might be a sligthly more realistic German intelligence view of Soviet capacity to mobilise, and how important the Moscow railway hub was - and finally someone lecturing Hitler on what Clausewitz really meant when sayomg you shopuld go for the enemy's main isntrument of war and not his capital (might be the most difficult).

 

But if so, they would have realised that taking the electical controller of the engine, would have been far more effective than here and now destroying a great of number of Divisions that easily could be replaced as along as the enemy still had control over the engine. The Germans/Hitler simply misidentified what and where the Soviet main instrument of war was.

 

BTW concerning mud battles, the only places with a notable concentration of paved roads were the big cities, with Moscow being the most prominent (incl. all weather airfields). AFAIK the Rasputitsa in 1941 started 6th of October, and as Directive no. 33 (the one I'm PoD'ing) was issued on 19th of July, there ought to to be enough time to be in control of the roadnet and airfields around Moscow, even if some uban fighting in the centre is still remaining, before the mud sets in for serious. That would give the Germans a serious advantage in the coming battloes, even if supplies temporaliy will be impaired by penetrating Soviet columns from the south.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[Redbeard]

Well that is the problem in your what-if... You said that Moscow was taken but not how. Now you are assuming the best possible outcome for the Germans and of course in that case you are correct, Russians are probably screwed. However your best possible case scenario is unlikely because you are ignoring the obvious difficulties that Germans would still have to face.

 

1) They still needed to refit after the Battle of Smolensk, so no attack before the beginning of September

2) They would still outrun their supplies.

3) They would have to commit huge number of front line troops to defend their flank from attack from Ukraine that will certainly come. It will most likely be defeated, but given the number of forces that would most likely be committed by the Soviets the offensive will have to slowdown because the parts of the attacking forces will need to turn back to defeat the attacks.

4) Rasputitsa will still start in the beginning of October and will still hamper the German movements, and in this case most of your final offensive will take place in the mud.

5) Because of 4) Germans will still have problems dealing with Soviet air force

6) You will probably complete the encirclement of Moscow by the beginning of December, which means that Moscow will still be in Soviet hands and your lines of supply will be even more overextended, at that time the Siberian divisions will arrive and counter attack. You will probably be able to defeat them, but it will maul your troops pretty badly. Then there will still be street fighting in Moscow, because Soviets will not surrender the city, which will be brutal. So the Germans will probably be able to take the city in the January-February time frame, but the infrastructure will most likely be mostly destroyed and the German army will still face huge casualties and will be in no shape to attack in the next several months, which will give the Soviets time to adjust to the situation.

 

Vladimir

 

The directive diverting the potent Panzergroups to encircle the Soviet armies in the south was issued on 19th of July, and the Panzergroups ought to be able to engage around Moscow at least as fast as they engaged in the south (after a long transport across the front). As the Soviet defences of Moscow by that time were very feeble compared to the historical operation Typhoon the Germans IMHO will have a decent chance of taking Moscow (perhaps with some resistance pockets in the centre) before the rasputitsa sets in in October. If so it will be the Soviets who are first stuck in the mud and next in the frost outside Moscow, and not the Germans - Siberian Divisions or not.

 

The big question for 1941 would be what the Soviet forces in the south does, but I refer to earleir posts, I still don't think any 1941 Red Army force will be able to perform major offensive operations succesfully.

 

For 1942 a larger portion of thye 1941 army MIGHT be vailable to the Soviets, sans the OTL encirclkements in the south, but only provided that they don't loose as much in their counterattacks. Anyway, the Soviet proiblems of rebuidling, deploying and supplying their armies will be much bigger with only a fraction of the infrastructure available, and in that context some southern Divisions surviving is a poor comfort.

 

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[Redbeard]

Can you read?

 

I asked if Moscow had been prepared for fighting within the city. Was the Red Army prepared to fight for it block by block, house by house, as they did in Stalingrad?

 

Stalingrad never was completely cut off, but had a continous stream of reinforcements and supplies sent across the Volga, and even had artillery support from there.

 

Judging from incidents like Brest-Litovsk there would be enough fanatics to make the taking of Moscow anything but a picnic, but it would rather be like the clearing of the Warsaw ghetto or the elimination of the Polish Home army in 1944, than it would be Stalingrad.

 

I doubt if Stalin and the Soviet leaders leaving Moscow would in itself have the regime collapse. After all they had a historical precedent from 1812 of leaving Moscow to the enemy and let King Frost do the dirty work. But of course leaving Moscow could never be turned into a victory, and if the prevalent impression next is chaos in the deep hinterland east of Moscow, as men, equipment and supplies wait (and starve, rust or rot) on the few and overcrowded roads and railways, then trust in the leadership of course will start to serioulsy fail. Stalin will initially react like he usually does - but having the traitors shot, but soon tye number of "trators" are too many to handle, if not for other reasons then because the NKVD also get stuck on the roads. Imagine when the local leaders start realising, that not fulfilling orders does not have consequences any longer?

 

If the winterbattles does not produce decisive victories (like because the German army is comfortably controlling Moscow) and spring of 1942 opens up with the Germans rolling over yet dispersed and disorganised Soviet armies, I think resistance will loose its last Soviet varnish and be purely Russian - but fuelled by incredible German attrocities.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[yak_v]

Can you read?

 

I asked if Moscow had been prepared for fighting within the city. Was the Red Army prepared to fight for it block by block, house by house, as they did in Stalingrad?

 

Yes. Most of the large building and the bridges have been mined. Numerous barricades have been built and many building were turned into defensive bunkers. Soviets had 250,000 civilians working on fortifying Moscow and approaches starting about September.

 

Vladimir