Indian Cold Start strategy

[jakec]

Interesting article by Pravin Sawhney and Ghazala Wahab: "Punching Hard" from Force

 

Learning from Operation Parakram, the army sharpens its pro-active strategy

 

The Indian Army's new war-fighting doctrine that owes itself to the lessons learnt from Operation Parakram has been termed as the Cold Start strategy by the media. While it sounds good, the implication is that the moment the balloon goes up, the Army will immediately launch its offensive forces into enemy territory, which is not correct. The army instead calls its new doctrine as the 'pro-active strategy' which is deliberate, offensive and echeloned involving operationally essential preparatory work.

 

To appreciate how the 'pro-active strategy' evolved, it will be relevant to run through the landmark events of Operation Parakram. After the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001, the government ordered the army to mobilise on December 18. The mobilisation for war (as the armed forces understood) was termed Operation Parakram and was total. It was unlike the earlier Operation Vijay (the 1999 Kargil war) when a few defensive and strike formations were mobilised to discourage Pakistan from leading an offensive inside Indian territory. Up to three mountains divisions (dual-use formations) and a controlling corps tactical headquarters were moved from the Chinese front to Jammu and Kashmir against Pakistan. It was assessed that as these dual-use formations could take up to eight weeks of re-orientation training for conversion to viable infantry divisions, they would best be used in the mountains and semi-plains in J&K. Moreover, war-wastage reserves were taken out of depots and moved to forward locations to replace damaged equipment and quick cannibalisation and improvisations were made to ensure that maximum equipment was war-worthy.

 

By the first week of January 2002, the additional forces from the eastern front to J&K were in place, the offensive strike formations were in varying stages of operational preparedness, and the pivot corps (holding formations) had mobilised completely. The military strategy was to make multiple ingresses into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir to straighten all disadvantageous tactical bulges on the LC as well as to go for the army's Northern Command objectives like Lipa Valley, Bugina bulge and Haji Pir pass while keeping an eye on the battlefield between Chhamb and Sialkot where Pakistan was expected to launch its Army Reserve North (1 corps centred around its 6 armoured division at Kharian). The Indian Air Force was to provide the needed deterrence on the border until the army's strike corps (1, 2 and 21) were in place in respective concentration areas for break-out. At this moment, Pakistan was at its military weakest. Its troops of 11 and 12 corps that have an operational role on the eastern front against India were committed in the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. On the night of January 5, India's 2 corps (strike formation poised against Pakistan's Fort Abbas in Rajasthan) was in its concentration area and its forward reconnaissance elements were spotted virtually on the border by US satellites. Within hours, the Bush administration put enormous pressure and brought the Vajpayee government to its knees. The 2 corps commander, Lt Gen. Kapil Vij was replaced the next day on January 6 and the war drums were ordered silent by the Vajpayee government without consultation with the military leadership. In what was unprecedented, on January 11, a day before the much hyped televised address of Gen. Pervez Musharraf declaring that terrorists would not be allowed to use Pakistan's soil, the Indian Army Chief, Gen. S. Padmanabhan told an unsuspecting media that the army was ready for war awaiting the government's nod. The announcement was timed to indicate that Gen. Musharraf made his speech under threat of India's war preparedness. The truth was that the Vajpayee government had no understanding or stomach for war, and little faith in its own military leadership (Prime Minister Vajpayee late r regretted having lost a good opportunity for war in January 2002). Pakistan, meanwhile, started reinforcing troops and heavy-calibre weapons close to the LC, and reportedly activated its range of ballistic missiles for use with conventional weapons. In the coming weeks, up to 60 per cent of the Pakistan Army and air force was deployed north of the Shakargarh bulge and it strengthened layered defences in POK to thwart Indian offensive across the LC. It was clear that having lost the element of surprise, India would need a new war strategy once Pakistan's counter-mobilisation was accomplished.

 

Indian military leadership decided to utilise its three-fold military advantage: its three strike corps against Pakistan's two, the IAF's edge over the PAF, and the fact that the mountain divisions moved from the Chinese front were operationally re-oriented and ready for war. The Indian Army had all its three strike corps poised in the Thar desert. The new thinking was that instead of seeking multiple thrusts in POK, the army would cross the border boldly into the Thar desert. Sooner rather than later, Pakistan would move Army Reserve South (centred around 2 corps with 1 armoured division in Multan) to check the Indian advance. Considering that India would have had all three strike formations in the Thar, Pakistan would have been compelled to move ARN also southward to meet the growing Indian threat.

 

An ensuring attrition battle would end to India's advantage. While the Indian plan was good, it simply overlooked plenty of surprises that the Pakistan Army could spring. These included nuclear sabre-rattling that would beget enormous international pressure on India to end the war at the earliest without getting the desired results, the use of ballistic missiles with conventional warheads to supplement the PAF effort, and in any case, in a compressed war time frame, Pakistan may have taken the risk of employing its strike formations differently to what was envisaged by the Indian Army. Thus while the second opportunity to go to war came in May following the May 14 terrorist attack on soldier's families in Kaluchak (Jammu), this time around, even the military leadership was not fully confident of achieving war aims. Though it was formally called off on 16 October 2002, Operation Parakram was virtually over for the Indian military by June when the Vajpayee government claimed that Gen. Musharraf's second televised speech on May 27 was made under Indian war duress. Meanwhile, the Indian Army learnt many operational lessons from Operation Parakram that resulted in the crafting of its new pro-active strategy.

 

Pro-Active Strategy

 

The strategy is predicated on three terms of reference: reduce mobilisation time, cater for delay in political decision-making both before and during the war, and seize and maintain surprise and momentum throughout, in all theatres. This, the army believes would produce the results in terms of territory, attrition and prisoners while keeping the war within the nuclear threshold level. What the strategy involves is having enough combat potential in forward deployed formations like pivot corps and battle groups (BG). The term pivot corps is not new and was coined to replace the term holding corps on the border in the nineties. The earlier holding corps was purely defensive in nature with limited offensive capabilities and could not be employed for initial built up of assault troops. This is no longer the case with pivot corps that is capable of providing launch pads for offensive (strike) formations. The strike formation concept has undergone a conceptual change with the aim to maintain surprise through operational flexibility. As a strike corps is huge and unwieldy, certain elements of the strike corps will be centred around a number of divisional size (with armour brigade) all arms integrated BGs located close to the border, which can be launched offensively within 72 hours. This will nullify the mobilisation advantage of the Pakistan Arm y that operates on interior lines of communications. The Pakistan Army can mobilise its holding as well as strike formations in 96 hours. The Indian Army can also mobilise its holding (pivot) formations within 96 hours, but mobilisation of the strike formations along with the accompanying logistics build-up located in the hinterland earlier took between 10 to 14 days. This time frame is unacceptable as the war duration is envisaged to be between two to three weeks only.

 

The answer found has been in the early launch of BGs that will be utilised two folds: One, these will force the tempo of operations started by pivot corps and assist in attacking the enemy's first and second defence lines simultaneously. And two, they will allow time for the build up of other elements of the strike corps and assist in the break out of these forces against an opposition to enemy's operational depth. About eight to 10 BGs, on the lines of the Soviet Union's Operational Manoeuvre Group have been formed. The remaining elements of the strike corps could be mobilised within seven days to then breakout (without going to concentration area) from the bridgehead created by the BG. In short, the mobilisation time of offensive formations has been reduced by two methods: suitable forward location of certain portions of reserves called BGs, and a review of the Operational Rail Move Plan (ORMP) to move the remaining elements of the strike corps faster. Incidentally, the ORMP were tested for the first time after the 1971 war during Operation Parakram. The BGs is a good concept as it will add depth to the battlefield.

 

But to have a successful BG, problems of command and control, operational logistics, and air defence will need to be overcome. If the BG is to move rapidly it must not carry a great deal of baggage or elaborate overhead structure that might otherwise be desirable for the management of an organisation of its size. For this reason, and to exploit the military options on the LC, the redrawing of command boundaries for better command and control has been done.

 

The raising of the south western command and 9 corps has resulted in the redrawing of command boundaries against Pakistan. By creation of 9 corps, the northern command (responsible for J&K) has been relieved of its responsibilities in the plains sector in the Jammu division. The job of 16 corps has become more focused such that its 10 division at Akhnoor, a mostly defensive formation, now has the capability to seriously threaten the southern flank of Pakistan's 10 corps (at Rawalpindi responsible for Kashmir). Similarly, the operationally important Shakargarh bulge that earlier was the responsibility of two army commands is now with the single western command. With the raising of south western command, while retaining the flexibility in the form of attachments and detachments, the three strike corps have been tasked with three army command; 2 corps with western command, 1 corps with south western command, and 21 corps with southern command. Moreover, up to three acclimatised mountain divisions with an ad hoc corps headquarters that was moved during Operation Parakram from the Chinese front to Jammu and Kashmir against Pakistan will now be available at short notice for tasking in the Jammu region.

 

The operational shift is also reflected in continuous day and night operations and close synergy between all arms within the army as also the air force and the navy. Operational objectives of the pro-active strategy relate to multiple shallow thrusts of up to 30 to 50 km to breach the operational depths of holding formations of the enemy and pose direct threat to its hinterland. The simple idea will be that forces on the LC remain self sufficient, and different contingencies are available all along the border, where whoever achieves results is backed. This will allow the army to exercise a range of options to be adopted in any given provocations rather than an all or nothing approach. In turn, this will allow time and flexibility for shaping the response at the p olitical level as also the desired end state. After all, multiple divisional sized thrusts stand a better change of quick penetration and of upsetting the enemy's organic cohesion through surprise, speed and decision dilemma, quite like the 1940 German blitzkrieg. Another important element of the pro-active strategy will be to shape the non-linear battlefield in depth by firepower (artillery and air force) and Special Forces. The name of the game will be fire-strikes instead of troops strike in depth. By the raising of the artillery division, an 'anvil of fire' is expected to replace the traditional anvil formed by the pivot of manoeuvre, freeing strike forces to punch hard.

 

There are many advantages in the new strategy. First, the quick massing of firepower together with deep air and naval strikes will deliver a punishing blow to the enemy and degrade its war waging potential without damage to population and other civilian centres. Second, given the force structures, the operations are likely to remain shallow and within the perceived nuclear thresholds, thus denying any credible justification for nuclear sabre rattling. Third, the multiple thrusts are likely to significantly enhance the challenge for the enemy's limited intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets to pinpoint Indian offensives thereby increasing the chances of tactical and operational level surprises. And lastly, with increasing effect based capabilities, it will be possible to degrade the enemy's centre of gravity through what the Chinese call key point strikes. To validate the broad conceptual framework of the doctrine and to test its functional efficacy, the army, since 2004, has held four exercises of varying force levels in different terrain. The first, exercise Divya Astra, held in May 2004 was based on launching mechanised assault against fixed defences employing integrated combined arms and air power. The second exercise, named Vajra Shakti was held in May 2005 in the developed Punjab terrain to exercise pivot formations to undertake offensive operations at short notice during the opening phases of hostilities. The third exercise called Desert Strike was held in November-December 2005 under Lt Gen. H.S. Panag (the present army commander, northern command). It was held in Rajasthan with the started purpose of testing the ability of strike corps in the desert to conduct joint operations with the air force, aimed at examining the ability of the Indian military to cause psychological chaos by pre-emption, dislocation and disruption. Units were tested for their ability to undertake operational manoeuvres in a predominantly electronic and information warfare environment.

 

This was the largest exercise conducted by the army since exercise Brasstacks in 1987 (interview with Lt Gen. H.S. Panag, FORCE December 2005 issue). The fourth exercise in the series was Sanghe Shakti conducted in the plains of Punjab and was meant to test offensive formations (2 corps) (see details in FORCE June 2006). It entailed participation by mechanised and re-organised plains infantry division, in a blitzkrieg type armoured incursion emphasising rapid penetration including flank security by attack helicopters. Effective offensive operations were supported by air power employed both in counter air and supportive role.

 

While the army continues to fine-tune its pro-active strategy, it is necessary that the needed capabilities and certain essential imponderables are acquired as well. On the issue of modernisation, in the next three defence plans, the major focus areas will be artillery, air defence systems, communications and all-weather armoured fighting vehicles. In addition, the army will increasingly concentrate on introducing sensors and their connectivity with command and control elements, including integration with Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to create increased battlefield awareness. Internally, the army has launched several studies aimed at force rationalisation to restructure the balance between its unit s, with an aim to create additional Special Forces and Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) similar to those possessed by the PLA.

 

By the end of the 11th defence plan (2007-2012), the army expects its SF to form a part of tri-service functional command equipped with substantial state-of-the-art equipment. This plan is in agreement with the army's new pro-active strategy that stresses the role of SF supported by utility and attack helicopter units. The raising of the RRF over the next three defence plans will result in an incremental increase in tactical airlift capability and the induction of light weight assault and support equipment. This equipment includes light tanks, light artillery and air defence apart from other combat support resources including unmanned air vehicles.

 

Yet another focus area is the future infantry soldier (F-INSAS) as a system programme envisioning a fully networked all-terrain, all-weather personnel equipment platform, enhanced firepower, and mobility for the digitalised battlefield of the future. A key imponderable for the success of the pro-active strategy is the appreciation of the directive style of command. The latter implies that subordinate commanders are provided with a full and clear concept of operations, the required resources and statement of any limitations which apply to the completion of their task. The subordinate commanders complete their tasks relying on their own initiative without detailed and restrictive orders. Considering that the new army strategy is dynamic and relies on the progress of various operational contingencies as well as the political understanding of the evolving situation, top operational commanders would feel compelled to tinker with lower formations at the contact battle bypassing the designated chain of command.

 

Such a situation would be anathema to the directive style of command and may create confusion in the army that in the past has not shown much ability to rapidly switch forces. This of course is not something that will happen; but it is what needs to be avoided with regular practice and respect for the chain of command in war as much as exists in peacetime. The army understands this challenge well and would ensure that it does not jeopardise its well crafted proactive strategy.

 

Crux 1: While the army continues to fine-tune its pro-active strategy, it is necessary that the needed capabilities and certain essential imponderables are acquired as well. On the issue of modernisation, in the next three defence plans, the major focus areas will be artillery, air defence systems, communications and all-weather armoured fighting vehicles.

 

Crux 2: A key imponderable for the success of the pro-active strategy is the appreciation of the directive style of command. The latter implies that subordinate commanders are provided with a full and clear concept of operations, the required resources and statement of any limitations which apply to the completion of their task.

 

Crux 3: The name of the game will be fire-strikes instead of troops strike in depth. By the raising of the artillery division, an 'anvil of fire' is expected to replace the traditional anvil formed by the pivot of manoeuvre, freeing strike forces to punch hard.

Edited January 5, 2008 by jakec

[Cookie Monster]

I would be skeptical of anything written by Pravin Sawhney. He is what people at BR call a classic DDM. Anything that is written by him and printed on paper is only fit for toilet paper. ACIG and BR have a long standing running issue with Force over copyright violations and other things.

[jakec]

I would be skeptical of anything written by Pravin Sawhney. He is what people at BR call a classic DDM. Anything that is written by him and printed on paper is only fit for toilet paper. ACIG and BR have a long standing running issue with Force over copyright violations and other things.

Thanks for the information. Should I delete this post then?

[Guest aevans]

I would be skeptical of anything written by Pravin Sawhney. He is what people at BR call a classic DDM. Anything that is written by him and printed on paper is only fit for toilet paper. ACIG and BR have a long standing running issue with Force over copyright violations and other things.

 

I wouldn't be so smug, if by "BR" you mean Bharat-Rakshak. That site is little more than an electronic propaganda sheet.

[Gunguy]

That article is seriously whacked. The reference to the nuclear threshold is pretty much useless. In a perfect world, if India could pull it off as stated, the Pakistan military would not know what is going on except that they are losing across a broad front. This perception of losing the war, and not being able to get any good intelligence on what is happening, is exactly what would make them go nuclear. I could go on, but I would have to disect it line by line and it is too much work! Needless to say it reminds me of the old 70s and 80s US nuclear war stuff written by academics. Interesting to read, but no basis in reality.

[Guest aevans]

That article is seriously whacked. The reference to the nuclear threshold is pretty much useless. In a perfect world, if India could pull it off as stated, the Pakistan military would not know what is going on except that they are losing across a broad front. This perception of losing the war, and not being able to get any good intelligence on what is happening, is exactly what would make them go nuclear. I could go on, but I would have to disect it line by line and it is too much work! Needless to say it reminds me of the old 70s and 80s US nuclear war stuff written by academics. Interesting to read, but no basis in reality.

 

That was always the problem with onventional warfighting between nuclear powers -- if you don't want to go nuclear, you have to advertise limited objectives that won't trigger a nuclear response, and your advertisement has to be credible to people who already have their thumbs mashed down on the panic button with white knuckle force.

[Cookie Monster]

I wouldn't be so smug, if by "BR" you mean Bharat-Rakshak. That site is little more than an electronic propaganda sheet.

 

And what evidence do you have to support this allegation? I can understand if you were to say a site full of jingiosm. The forum do have posters that are far from reality. But visiting the main website aside from the forums, their order of battle information is pretty up to date.

Edited January 7, 2008 by Cookie Monster

[Guest aevans]

And what evidence do you have to support this allegation? I can understand if you were to say a site full of jingiosm. The forum do have posters that are far from reality. But visiting the main website aside from the forums, their order of battle information is pretty up to date.

 

It's ridiculously chauvinistic BS.

 

Printed in large, bold type at the top of the index page of the Army subsite:

 

The Indian Army has proved that the regimental colours its Jawans carry are still a matter of honour. The many wars it faced, have ensured that those traditions would be carried on by many generations of fighting Jawans in the years to come. Most of all, the Jawans have learnt that after all was said and done, honour in battle meant standing one's ground and fighting - even to the last man or tank if necessary. Jai Hind!! Jai Jawan!!

 

Give me a break!

[Cookie Monster]

It's ridiculously chauvinistic BS.

 

Printed in large, bold type at the top of the index page of the Army subsite:

 

The Indian Army has proved that the regimental colours its Jawans carry are still a matter of honour. The many wars it faced, have ensured that those traditions would be carried on by many generations of fighting Jawans in the years to come. Most of all, the Jawans have learnt that after all was said and done, honour in battle meant standing one's ground and fighting - even to the last man or tank if necessary. Jai Hind!! Jai Jawan!!

 

Give me a break!

 

How is it any different from any other sayings in support of their armies all over the world? The above statement is not saying stand your ground till you are wiped out. It says "If necessary, stand to the last man" which means in a do or die situation where you need to stand against the enemy to buy time or save your army from being flanked or ambushed.

[Guest aevans]

How is it any different from any other sayings in support of their armies all over the world? The above statement is not saying stand your ground till you are wiped out. It says "If necessary, stand to the last man" which means in a do or die situation where you need to stand against the enemy to buy time or save your army from being flanked or ambushed.

 

You've never done any professional work involving information branding, have you? It's over-the-top hyperbole such as the quoted text that totally discredits the web site as a source of reliable information. (And if you think that references to "fighting Jawans" and exclamations like "Jai Hind!! Jai Jawan!!" aren't hyperbolic, you really need to study up on quality standards for informational web sites.)

[Gunguy]

That was always the problem with onventional warfighting between nuclear powers -- if you don't want to go nuclear, you have to advertise limited objectives that won't trigger a nuclear response, and your advertisement has to be credible to people who already have their thumbs mashed down on the panic button with white knuckle force.

 

Awesome post! As we both know, if even those" limited objectives" are unacceptable to the other party, then it still goes nuclear. The nuclear issue changes everything. War becomes "almost" impossible between two nuclear powers. When Iran goes Nuclear, Israel and others will have their hands full.

[Cookie Monster]

(And if you think that references to "fighting Jawans" and exclamations like "Jai Hind!! Jai Jawan!!" aren't hyperbolic, you really need to study up on quality standards for informational web sites.)

 

How is it different from "Semper Fi!" or "The few, the proud". "Jai Hind! Jai Jawan" is a battlecry uttered by the soldiers of IA when going on an offensive or withstanding assaults. It is a morale booster used by NCOs to ready the men up for battle and get the adrenaline get going.

 

I think your comments are coming from a lack of understanding of the Indian military culture and ethos. You will see those comments on the regimental plaques on the Regimental headquarters in varous regiments around India. FYI, the website is manned and administered by people that has several members who have formerly served in the Indian military for a significant period of time. IIRC, if you check out the Indian Army website, that site is manned by a former IA soldier who served in the IA for over 10 years.

[Guest aevans]

How is it different from "Semper Fi!" or "The few, the proud". "Jai Hind! Jai Jawan" is a battlecry uttered by the soldiers of IA when going on an offensive or withstanding assaults. It is a morale booster used by NCOs to ready the men up for battle and get the adrenaline get going.

 

I think your comments are coming from a lack of understanding of the Indian military culture and ethos. You will see those comments on the regimental plaques on the Regimental headquarters in varous regiments around India. FYI, the website is manned and administered by people that has several members who have formerly served in the Indian military for a significant period of time. IIRC, if you check out the Indian Army website, that site is manned by a former IA soldier who served in the IA for over 10 years.

 

So? They may know what they're talking about, but they frame it in uncritical editorial commentary. That signals to the reader that no matter how extensive and authoritative-seeming the site may be, it's neutrality and reliability is questionable.

 

BTW, USMC sites that feature such childish chest thumping aren't considered reliable either.

 

Also, you're misinformed if you think "Semper Fidelis" and "The Few. The Proud" are considered battle cries or salutations. At best, "Semper Fidelis" is a simple mission statement for individual Marines. At worst, it's considered just another silly throw away exclamation used by fanatics. "The Few. The Proud" is considered by most Marines to be nothing but institutional propaganda, not to be taken seriously.

Edited January 8, 2008 by aevans