What if the USA enters WW2 in September 1939?

[Marek Tucan]

Didn't Brits get also 25mm ATG's? The Czechoslovakian Infantry Bde formed hastily in the UK after evacuation of remnants of Czechoslovakian Division from France was armed with French 75's and 25's and I doubt these were evacuated from France along the soldiers.

[Marek Tucan]

I think UK would not benefit from that much ! B1bis in desert ! H-39 as common tank !

 

About the only B-1bis and H-39 benefit in the desert I can see would be 75mm in the first case and HE for 37mm in the second. Would complicate things for Axis AT gunners a bit.

[DougRichards]

What about keping the two US aeronautical engineers, in the mid-1930s, who designed the Ju-88, at home, by force if necessary?

 

How about not letting BMW licence produce the Pratt and Whitney Hornet, which eventually resulted in the the BMW 132, and then the BMW 139?

 

The BMW 132, a virtual copy of the Hornet, powered the following:

 

Arado Ar 196

Arado Ar 197

Blohm & Voss BV 141

Heinkel He 114

Heinkel He 115

Henschel Hs 123

Junkers Ju 160

Junkers Ju 52

Junkers Ju 86

Junkers W34

 

The BMW 139 powered:

 

Dornier Do 217

Focke-Wulf Fw 190 (some)

Junkers Ju 88

Junkers Ju 188

Junkers Ju 290

Junkers Ju 388

Junkers Ju 390

Messerschmitt Me 264

 

The essence being, if you want to stay out of European conflict, don't sell military technology to Europeans.

 

Or did 'commercial imperatives' take precedence over foreign policy?

[DougRichards]

Didn't Brits get also 25mm ATG's? The Czechoslovakian Infantry Bde formed hastily in the UK after evacuation of remnants of Czechoslovakian Division from France was armed with French 75's and 25's and I doubt these were evacuated from France along the soldiers.

Did they get their French 75s from US sources? If it was to equip a Brigade's artillery (in British service artillery was a divisional asset often parcelled out to brigades, but available for divisional fire missions) this would have been a Regiment of three batteries each of 8 guns, in other words 24 guns to support the Brigade.

 

24 guns from the the guns supplied by the USA to Britain in 1940 would not be a stretch, and as much as I hate to admit it, the US 75/97 guns on modern carriages would have been useful guns, with around the same range as the 25pdr, and a shell with similar HE filling, even though they could not function as gun-howitzers in higher elevations.

 

Some 25mm guns were left in Britain, issued to the Territorials, and probably thence to the Czechs when the Territorials got their 2pdrs, and they only lasted as long as their ammunition supplies.- gone by mid 1941. I mean the alternative was the Smith gun (hahahaha) and the Bates bottle thrower.

[GdG**]

I think UK would not benefit from that much ! B1bis in desert ! H-39 as common tank !

 

I don't see where the Allies could have employed B1 bis' outside of Europe in the case of France not being defeated! B1 bis' would have been an overkill in 1940 against what the Italians had in Libya (and keep in mind that it's very likely that the capture of Libya would have been achieved in 1940, with the RN and MN controlling the Med and 650,000 french troops in North Africa + the help from sub-saharian garrisons (something like 100,000 men IIRC) and from Djibouti & Madagascar for Ethiopia/Somalia.

 

As for the H-39, I agree, although it was slightly better protected than the Pz III and had a gun with similar performances to the Pak 36 (to which it was not immune under 400 m).

 

The H-39 was an intermediary tank for both the Cavalry (DLMs with S-35) (DCrs with B1 bis). It was here to fill the gap. The Calvary would have found itself with S-40's later, and BCC (infantry) would have gotten G1's and B1 bis' would have been replaced by the B1 Ter.

 

I think the deal was that UK would get H-39's to answer the need for infantry tanks. The production of Cruisers growing nicely, but tanks such as Matilda I's were not really what was needed in 1940.

 

AFAIK, during WWI, UK was given 75 mm CA Mle 1913's which were SPAA on a Dedion-Bouton chassis. AFAIK they still existed in 1940. OTOH, I think the US 75's were the ones which were requested by France in May-June 1940 but which arrived too late and were diverted to UK.

Edited March 15, 2008 by GdG**

[KingSargent]

Didn't Brits get also 25mm ATG's? The Czechoslovakian Infantry Bde formed hastily in the UK after evacuation of remnants of Czechoslovakian Division from France was armed with French 75's and 25's and I doubt these were evacuated from France along the soldiers.

The British received French 25mm guns, they were issued to infantry AT sections as the 2pdrs were dedicated to the RA/RHA. The presence of these 25mm guns has caused some people of limited comprehension skills to believe that British infantry bns had organic 25-PDR guns in TOE in 1940.

 

About the only reports of service I have seen for the 25mm in British service in France '40 dwelt on their fragility. Designed for slow horse traction they fell apart under the battering of faster towing behind British trucks - a serious drawback to motorized armies!

 

There were a few 25mm in the UK for training purposes, I haven't heard of anyone bothering to evacuate one from France.

 

Incidentally the Germans rated the 25mm as excellent and effective in 1940.

 

A lot of the US 75mm guns sent to the UK had not been modified for motor traction. The British re-developed the 'portee' technique to move them.

[DougRichards]

At least one source quotes the 25mm Hotchkiss guns as the first WW2 application of the portee idea for guns, as, as King has stated, they were two flimsy for motorised traction. At 25mm it was a cannon rather than a gun and could be considered as nothing much more than a very heavy anti-tank rifle on a wheeled mounting.

 

In terms of usefulness as an anti-tank weapon, it weighed about the same as the Bohler 4.7cm gun (the Hotchkiss25mm 310kg, the Bohler 277kg both in action), had similar armour penetration but obviously had negligible, if any, HE capability.

[GdG**]

At least one source quotes the 25mm Hotchkiss guns as the first WW2 application of the portee idea for guns, as, as King has stated, they were two flimsy for motorised traction. At 25mm it was a cannon rather than a gun and could be considered as nothing much more than a very heavy anti-tank rifle on a wheeled mounting.

 

In terms of usefulness as an anti-tank weapon, it weighed about the same as the Bohler 4.7cm gun (the Hotchkiss25mm 310kg, the Bohler 277kg both in action), had similar armour penetration but obviously had negligible, if any, HE capability.

 

The 25 mm SA Mle 1934 was intended to be used as portee right from the beginning. They were carried this way by Citröen-Kégresse P17s since 1934. That's as well because it was not ment to be towed at more than 25 kph, since most of the units that would have used them were still hippomobile. However, the motorized units were issued a special carriage which allowed fast traction.

 

As for the performances, it was considered adequate to penetrate the front armor of the Pz I and II from long range (for 1940: 800+ meters) and Pz III and IV from medium range (400 meters). It was to be replaced by the 20/29 Gerlich AT gun (which the Germans will copy and modify) which could penetrate IIRC ~55 mm @ 500 m @ 30° (with a 1,200 m/s muzzle velocity). It seems that a few of them were issued before the armistice, but it is certain a hundred of these guns were close from being delivered when the armistice happened.

[Mk 1]

How about not letting BMW licence produce the Pratt and Whitney Hornet, which eventually resulted in the the BMW 132, and then the BMW 139?

 

The BMW 132, a virtual copy of the Hornet, powered the following:

 

Arado Ar 196

Arado Ar 197

Blohm & Voss BV 141

Heinkel He 114

Heinkel He 115

Henschel Hs 123

Wow, quite a collection of war-winners there!

 

If only we could have figured out how to keep the Germans reliant on their "U.S. technologies"!

 

Junkers Ju 52

Junkers Ju 86

Both notable civilian aircraft, that were seen in Luftansa colors before they were pressed into service by the Luftwaffe as dual-use airframes.

 

Gotta give those Germans credit for their re-use and further development, though. On the Ju 86 it seems they managed to turn a US built gasoline-powered radial engine into a diesel-powered opposing-dual-cylinder-single-floating-piston inline engine! Now that is some trick!

 

(Yes, I know that the BMW132 was also used in later marks of the Ju 86. But that was long after the aircraft was in production and service. There would have been Ju 86s in the skies over Europe with, or without, BMW132 engines.)

 

The essence being, if you want to stay out of European conflict, don't sell military technology to Europeans.

 

Or did 'commercial imperatives' take precedence over foreign policy?

'Commercial imperatives' were the essence of US foreign policy for the majority of the nation's history. The US sought trade relations across the world, and engaged in almost no other forms of international "entanglements", most notably NO military alliances. The US was a non-militarized society, with virtually no standing army, until the post-WW2 era.

 

Yet here Mr. Richards is proposing that the US should not have engaged in trade of "military technology" to Europeans, criticizing the sale of a commercial engine to the German aircraft industry, presumably because it is a dual-use technology. So how do we determine what trade items can NOT serve a foriegn military? Food is, after all, a dual-use product -- as demonstrated by the the amount of SPAM consumed by any and all of the allied armies in WW2. Boots, too, are dual-use, and so we might also describe cloth in any form. And raw materials like petroleum, iron or steel. Don't forget railroad rolling stock, or automobiles and trucks (the Ford Model AA truck was, after all, the Red Army's most common medium truck).

 

So, what was left for a nation to use to build friendly trade relations? Flowers, maybe? No wait, Chrysanthemums were used in the distilation of Sarin. Oooh, evil EVIL flower-mongers!

 

It seems odd to propose such a trade embargo, as in past posts Mr. Richards has described the US Government's embargo on shipments of dual-use trade items to Japan in 1941 as a de facto act of war. Yet now we find that he suggests that such a step be taken (starting in the mid-1930's?) against the whole of Europe.

 

-Mark 1

[seahawk]

Would the allied side not be equally hit by an US embargo ? Otherwise one would have to believe that the US should have known that the Germans will go on a rampage again in 1939 already in the early 1930.

[Shortround6]

Well, Wright also licenced the R-1820 Cyclone to the Soviets so maybe we were equel oppertunity?

 

Bristol licenced the Pegasus to Alfa Romeo.

 

Bristol also licenced the older Jupiter all over the world and the Mercury to a number of nations.

 

Junkers licenced the diesel to a british company who didn't do much with it.

 

Gnome-Rhone licenced their engines to a number of countries including Hungary, and maybe Japan.

 

The Germans managed to turn the Hornet into a water-cooled diesel so lack of inventivness doesn't seem to ba problem;)

[Meyer]

What about keping the two US aeronautical engineers, in the mid-1930s, who designed the Ju-88, at home, by force if necessary?

 

FWIW, Alfred Gassner was a native Austrian, and Heinrich Evers a German with US nationality. And it's more accurate to say that they "helped" in the design, they were not working alone, nor in charge of the design team

 

The BMW 139 powered:

 

Dornier Do 217

Focke-Wulf Fw 190 (some)

Junkers Ju 88

Junkers Ju 188

Junkers Ju 290

Junkers Ju 388

Junkers Ju 390

Messerschmitt Me 264

 

Actually, it powered none of those aircraft (only a few prototypes), since it was abandoned in favour of the BMW 801. Also, most of the JU88s, and some of the Do 217, Ju 188, and Ju 388 had Jumo V12 engines.

 

And finally, it is worth mention that only one Me 264, two Ju 390 and sixty-five Ju 390 were built

[KingSargent]

Would the allied side not be equally hit by an US embargo ? Otherwise one would have to believe that the US should have known that the Germans will go on a rampage again in 1939 already in the early 1930.

That was predicted by many in the US and Europe as soon as Versailles was signed. One senior French diplomat said, well, we have a 20-year cease-fire.

 

The US knew quite well what was going on in Europe - precisely the same thing as during the last 400+ years. From the US POV we had been conned into WW1 by lying Allied propaganda, we had expended treasure and blood and gotten nothing but sneers and bad debts for our trouble, and the Yurruppeens were totally uninterested in mending their 'major war every generation' ways.

 

This feeling of disgust for the Yurruppeens for their "business as usual" ways combined with disgust at ourselves for being conned by the Allies was what fuelled the "Never Again!" Isolationist movement.

[swerve]

...

This hypocritical [my edit] feeling of disgust for the Yurruppeens for their "business as usual" ways combined with disgust at ourselves for being conned by the Allies was what fuelled the "Never Again!" Isolationist movement.

 

After all, it was the same game the USA had been playing in Central America, the Caribbean, the Pacific islands & the Philippines, & had played in Florida & Mexico . . . .

[seahawk]

That was predicted by many in the US and Europe as soon as Versailles was signed. One senior French diplomat said, well, we have a 20-year cease-fire.

 

The US knew quite well what was going on in Europe - precisely the same thing as during the last 400+ years. From the US POV we had been conned into WW1 by lying Allied propaganda, we had expended treasure and blood and gotten nothing but sneers and bad debts for our trouble, and the Yurruppeens were totally uninterested in mending their 'major war every generation' ways.

 

This feeling of disgust for the Yurruppeens for their "business as usual" ways combined with disgust at ourselves for being conned by the Allies was what fuelled the "Never Again!" Isolationist movement.

 

I do agree on this. But keeping Germany isolated would not avoid the war, at best it would happen later.

[KingSargent]

I do agree on this. But keeping Germany isolated would not avoid the war, at best it would happen later.

The US didn't care about keeping Germany isolated, they isolated themselves. "A Plague on ALL your houses!" pretty much sums up the US attitude.

 

The US knew that nothing would avoid another Yurruppeen war, they just wanted to stay out of it.

[Mk 1]

After all, it was the same game the USA had been playing in Central America, the Caribbean, the Pacific islands & the Philippines, & had played in Florida & Mexico . . . .

Ah, but you miss the US approach entirely. The game the USA had been playing was nothing at all like the game played in Europe.

 

The USA had an army that was about big enough to "police the natives". Not much more. And a navy that was big enough to "secure the nation's coastlines" through about the end of the 1800s, although it had pretentions and eventually grew to a size to "secure free navigation of the seas for the nation's commercial interests".

 

Our involvements in Central America, the Caribbean, the Pacific, were all along this line. You might portray them as "imperialistic", but even US imperialism was not so much on the European model -- building a political empire, as it was on a different model -- building an economic empire. (The US did venture into "political empire" briefly with the Phillipines, but found it profoundly distasteful and sought a path out almost as soon as it had gotten in.) But the US activities in those regions bore almost no similarity to what had been going on between European powers for several centuries, in part because there was no long term tensions between relatively equal powers sharing common borders.

 

The wars againt Mexico and Spain (1840s and 1890s) were anomolous to this description. But just because they were anomolous doesn't mean they don't count. As we judge US history also on these events though, we should see that these were again not on the European model. Neither of these wars were the second, third, fifth, or seventeeth war against an old rival. Neither of these wars involved a complex web of alliances and international intrigues. We had no national rivals. We had no allies. In both cases the US somehow managed to get itself worked up into a frenzy, it went to war, it won quickly, it made peace with its now sorely beaten adversary, and then displayed no further hostile intent towards said country.

 

I'm not excusing these wars. Just highlighting the essential nature of the US approach to the other nations of the world through most of its history, which was more or less: "Wanna buy or sell something? If not, don't bother me. I'm busy buying and selling stuff."

 

Compare this to the history between France and Britain. Or France and Prussia. Or Austria and the Netherlands. Or Sweden and Russia. Or ...

 

-Mark 1

[KingSargent]

US "Imperialism" in the Americas was also a product of the Monroe Doctrine, which forbade non-American powers from messing in American affairs.

 

That meant that when outside intervention was necessary the US had to do it. The Monroe Doctrine could be flexible. If your 'cause was just' in USian eyes (ie, you were trying to collect on bad debts) the US generally winked.

 

Our most "Imperialistic" war, the Mexican War started out to collect on defaulted Mexican loans that were threatening to wreck US banks. The US offered to swap the present SW US for the enormous debts the Mexicans had run up, but a new revolving-door Mexican gov't refused so we went to war and took the land. However we still paid Mexico compensation for the land to boot.

 

Defaulting debts were a prime cause of "foreign intervention" in Spanish America. One time the Royal Navy was sent to reposess a Navy that had been been built in British yards and not paid for.

[seahawk]

The US didn't care about keeping Germany isolated, they isolated themselves. "A Plague on ALL your houses!" pretty much sums up the US attitude.

 

The US knew that nothing would avoid another Yurruppeen war, they just wanted to stay out of it.

 

 

Certainly. I was thinking of the orignal idea that the US should have sold nothing of military value to the Germans and should have kept Gemrany more isloated form wolrd trade, together with the rest of the allies.

[KingSargent]

Certainly. I was thinking of the orignal idea that the US should have sold nothing of military value to the Germans and should have kept Gemrany more isloated form wolrd trade, together with the rest of the allies.

The Allies were selling stuff to Germany in the 1930s, too. So were the Soviets, coal and iron and oil.

[Shortround6]

Seeing as how P & W sold the licence for the Hornet engine to the Germans in 1929, about 4 years before Hitler comes to power, just how isolated were the allies supposed to keep Germany?

Edited March 20, 2008 by Shortround6

[Mote]

Do you have a good source on the Mexican-American War being due to bad debts? I've never heard that before.

[Mk 1]

Certainly. I was thinking of the orignal idea that the US should have sold nothing of military value to the Germans and should have kept Gemrany more isloated form wolrd trade, together with the rest of the allies.

The problem here is twofold.

 

First, and most obviously again, is what do you define as items "of military value"? Engines? Trucks? Oil? Coal? Iron ore? Food? Cloth?

 

What was left for the US to trade in, if none of these "dual use" products were to be sold?

 

Second, and somewhat less obviously to those who only observe post-war US foriegn policy, is how one might define "the rest of the allies" in the context of the pre-WW2 world. The US had no allies. The US wanted no allies. Reaching all the way back to the nation's first president, US foriegn policy detested and rejected the formation of alliances, most notably the formation of alliances with European powers. World War 1 was the first case of the US becoming involved in a war with "allies", and the immediate post-war gamesmanship of the British and the French convinced most in the US that it was a process the nation should not repeat. So who were these "allies" that the US might have gone along with?

 

-Mark 1

[Meyer]

The US knew that nothing would avoid another Yurruppeen war, they just wanted to stay out of it.

 

The US wanted no allies. Reaching all the way back to the nation's first president, US foriegn policy detested and rejected the formation of alliances, most notably the formation of alliances with European powers. World War 1 was the first case of the US becoming involved in a war with "allies", and the immediate post-war gamesmanship of the British and the French convinced most in the US that it was a process the nation should not repeat. So who were these "allies" that the US might have gone along with?

 

Very nice, but eventually did the exact opposite of that...

[Mk 1]

Very nice, but eventually did the exact opposite of that...

Indeed.

 

The British came to recognize the failures of appeasement. Americans came to recognize the failures of isolationism. Niether policy were practiced by those nations in the post-war era, although both get brought back into the political discussion more and more often as time roles on.

 

-Mark 1