What if the USA enters WW2 in September 1939?

[John Dudek]

Besides the financial situation, the UK had other problems. The long neglect since 1919 had devastated the British armaments industry. Even if they had money to throw at industry, the plant and skilled workers just didn't exist any more.

 

Then there was the peacetime planning that relegated the British Army to the role of Imperial Police Force - "There will never be another BEF." They trained hard, well, and successfully for that role, which was not what was needed once the French informed the UK that there WOULD be another BEF on the Continent, or there would be no French alliance. It was only in February 1939 that Britain began to seriously consider another Continental army. That left about six months to decide what was needed for the expansion, plan to organize for and prepare it, and turn out a combat-ready product. Obviously, not enough.

 

The British Army lacked leadership trained for Continental War and they lacked institutionalized modern military military concepts. There were a few thinkers who now stand out because the were proven right by events but were considered crackpots at the time; the Army as an institution was mired in the days of the Afghan Wars. The British Army did not motorize in 1938 in order to have a modern army for mobile warfare, they motorized because there were not enough horses in the UK anymore to support an expanded Army.*

 

So if the US enters the war in 1939 and starts military expansion only then, they will only be about six months behind the British Army in starting from scratch in physical expansion and they were far ahead conceptually and had expansion planning prepared. Despite lacking numbers the US Army thought long and hard about what would be needed and prepared training programs and developed advanced doctrine (in artillery use for one major example). All they needed to do was plug in the men - the first drafts built the training camps themselves, and the lesson plans were ready to be passed out. The Army even had industrial surveys of the capabilities of every factory in the US, so they could determine what each plant was suited to make when the material expansion began. The FUBARs of WW1 were not going to be repeated if George Marshall and his cronies had any say in the matter.

 

* Separation of the Irish Republic deprived the British of access to the Irish horse-breeding industry - long a major source of mounts. And with civilian society becoming increasingly motorized, no young men wanted to join the Army to become horse grooms, they wanted to be trained as drivers and mechanics. The stock of sturdy farm lads familiar with working with animal draft was no longer as great as it had been before WW1. The British Army bought trucks because it could not get horses and horsemen.

 

One of the few positive things that Neville Chamberlain walked away with from the Munich Conference, whether he realized it or not, was a one year's grace period to light the industrial fires under the British Re-Armament Industry. That was later to prove all conclusive to the British abilities to resist Hitler's war machine from 1940 onward.

[Ken Estes]

One of the few positive things that Neville Chamberlain walked away with from the Munich Conference, whether he realized it or not, was a one year's grace period to light the industrial fires under the British Re-Armament Industry. That was later to prove all conclusive to the British abilities to resist Hitler's war machine from 1940 onward.

 

He had to realize it, for as Exchequer in the early 30s he and other ministers presided over the shadow munitions industry, via the Supply Board, etc. One problem is that the army had last priority until c. 1938 for such planning and the immediate results in bringing factories on line benefited most the navy and RAF.

 

The British experience of WWI propelled such detailed preps [1928-1939] in a way that none of the other allies could have fathomed, as France lost her industrial NW to occupation in 1914 and the US was a very latecomer. The Supply Board considered the US not useful for peacetime development of war potential because of its neutrality legislation. Thus, the UK soundly invested in latent munitions capavcity, not in accumulating stocks of the products in the 1930s that might have become obsolete before use.

 

For one piece of the puzzle, see G.A.H. [Andrew] Gordon, British Seapower and Procurement between the Wars (Annapolis: Naval Inst Press, 1988).

 

BTW, he notes that "Now 85 per cent (net) of British gold and dsollar reserves had been spent....by the middle of December 1940, new British contracting in the United States had practically stopped."

[Rich]

It is often seen as a key performance indicator on the ability to grow,

as most armies belive it take more time to raise officers than soldiers.

And officers and NCO's are often expected to be able to train new recruits.

 

That's all very nice and all that, but it also failed to address my question? And it may be "often seen as" etc., etc., but do you have some proof of that assumption? Pray, please tell me how the higher officer to man ratio in the US Army allowed it to expand so much more quickly than the German....and please don't use manpower as your proof, since that proves nothing except an ability to induct men into service. Just how fast did the American Army expand in terms of deployable divisions? By the "performance indicator" being nearly three times what the German was, I would expect that you should find it easy to show that American Army expansion was much faster?

 

We can expect the US army of 1939 to be able to grow faster in percent than German army of 1944.

Er, we can? And why are we comparing to the German Army of 1944?

 

No you did not but it has been said in this debate.

 

It is a rough measurement of size and capability, which is correct as a snapshot, the difference is that the armies of Portugal and Romania didn't have the capability of expanding much beyond what they were.

 

But about five years after reichwehr ceased to exist Germany had the worlds most potent army,

as US had in 1945.

Cheers

/John T

 

Oh dear, I think you managed to miss the point? As well as ignored the timeline and example of the actual expansion I gave?

[Rich]

Hi Guys

 

Well Hi yourself.

 

 

I like to see leand lease from the British side, rather than from the US as I feel has been done so far in this discussion.

Theres a lot of posts in the previos ten pages, but I rather comment on them as a group rather than repeating the same info. Hope you can bear my laziness

Er, previous seven pages?

 

But your laziness seems to result in everyone being tarred with the same brush by you, it makes it kind of hard to figure out what you mean and who you think you are countering?

 

I do have some serious objections to the way you guys describe Lend lease and the Allied procurements before that.

And you are at least 10 months off the real timeline.

 

I guess I'm one of the "you guys" even though I didn't describe Lend-Lease at all, but did give some details on American procurement? But for the life of me I don't know what "timeline" you think I'm 10 months off of? The figures and dates I gave were pretty simple to understand I thought? Perhaps you need to explain what you mean?

 

Note that Norway, Sweden and Finland received more fighters from US than RAF during the first six months of 1940!Cheers

/John T

 

And your point would be?

 

Cheers,

Rich

[KingSargent]

"Note that Norway, Sweden and Finland received more fighters from US than RAF during the first six months of 1940!Cheers

/John T"

 

And your point would be?

 

Cheers,

Rich

I don't know what point he is trying to make, but THE point is that the RAF didn't order any fighters from the US, the French did. So the RAF didn't get any fighters from the US before 6/40 because they didn't want any.

 

The Scandinavian countries ordered from the US in the late 1930s because the US would sell them airplanes. All three countries had previously looked mostly to British suppliers, but with the British re-arming they had to go to the US to place orders.

[John T]

But your laziness seems to result in everyone being tarred with the same brush by you, it makes it kind of hard to figure out what you mean and who you think you are countering?

I guess I'm one of the "you guys" even though I didn't describe Lend-Lease at all, but did give some details on American procurement?

 

Your original post:

Lend-Lease was a financial burden to the US, since in essence it was a differed interest loan, it's effect on US investments in 1939 - when the country was in the tail end of the "Little Depression" was unlikley to have been tremendously good.

[snip..]

Only if France could have footed the bil, in 1939 Detroit was in as poor a financial state as the rest of the country.

May I make a guess that you mean foot the bill ?

 

So to be explicit and complete in my statement :

A US entry in WW2 in September 1939 would without doubt create a situation where France and UK would be able to make war loans or some sort of Lend-Lease from the outset of the war. This would mean that investments in US arms industries would have been much larger and much earlier that it did in the real world.

As in real life foreign investments in the US where hampered by "Cash and Carry"

 

Thus I can't find much support for your statement:

effect on US investments in 1939 - when the country was in the tail end of the "Little Depression" was unlikley to have been tremendously good

Since you missed the point that these investments would have been financed by US war loans to France and UK.

 

 

But for the life of me I don't know what "timeline" you think I'm 10 months off of? The figures and dates I gave were pretty simple to understand I thought? Perhaps you need to explain what you mean?

And your point would be?

Even if you didn't like it I did address all references to Lend-Lease.

Note that I do understands that it was not your post I refered to, see the list of post links in my earlier post.

 

My point was:

US did later on benefit from these allied orders but it could have been far bigger if the currency problem had been overcome.

And at least ten months where the ten months between war started and the collapse of France when UK tried ot change policy and order more from the US, but still hampered by lack of Dollars.

 

And that was my response to you and

Mobilization would not have gone much faster at all. As I noted, throughout 1939, US industry had its "pump primed" due to orders from France and the UK for weapons and materielle. Even without Lend Lease, we were churning out supplies for the Allies, pretty much at the capacity for US industry.

 

and

 

The presumption of this discussion of starting Lend Lease in 1939, is that somehow that would have been a faster path than was actually taken.

[snip]

In fact the French government already sent purchasing commissions to the US in 1939 to buy whatever arms were deemed as combat-worthy.

[snip]

At the same time the Brits also had a purchasing commission buying whatever they felt was combat-worthy from the US.

[snip]

 

To say that in real life US potential was not called up before Q3 1940 is at least more correct than saying that US potential was used by the allies and made it much harder for US to expand her own army during the first year of WW2.

Lead times in production and design of arms worth producing would been more of the problem.

 

 

Cheers

/John T

[a77]

Note that Norway, Sweden and Finland received more fighters from US than RAF during the first six months of 1940!

 

You do know that US did confiscate (or steal ) the fighter the swedich goverment did order and pay fore...... Hurray fore the 2 who did get deliverd.....

[John T]

You do know that US did confiscate (or steal ) the fighter the swedich goverment did order and pay fore...... Hurray fore the 2 who did get deliverd.....

 

Well, Sort of.

But the point I tried to make in this discission where understood by KingSargent.

Sweden had ordered 120 P-35, 144 P-66 fighters and 52 Republic 2P-A Guardsman light bombers, before April 1940 as well as engines and other parts for licence production of Northop A8 and SAAB's own designs.

Of these 60 P-35 and 2 Guardsmen where delivered between December 39 and July 1940.

 

In July 40 US did deny further export permits and late 1940 the remaining aircrafts where confiscated by US,

but Sweden got the money back with some interest.

 

the legal business was between Vultee and Swedish Government as Vultee sold the production of P-66's to another customer while they legaly still where Swedish property (but not allowed to leave US territory)

 

 

Cheers

/John T

[Rich]

May I make a guess that you mean foot the bill ?

 

Yes, slippery thing that L key.

 

So to be explicit and complete in my statement :

A US entry in WW2 in September 1939 would without doubt create a situation where France and UK would be able to make war loans or some sort of Lend-Lease from the outset of the war. This would mean that investments in US arms industries would have been much larger and much earlier that it did in the real world.

As in real life foreign investments in the US where hampered by "Cash and Carry"

Thanks, that's somewhat more understandable. But if UK specie was so limited, why could the UK afford war loans to the US as investments in US arms industry? Which if I read it right is what you are trying to say? And Lend-Lease constituted a loan from the US to the UK, not the other way around, so how is that supposed to work? But yes, a US entry into the war in September 1939 - although I still have no clue how that might occur - would have changed the economic dynamic, but I'm not sure given the economic condition of the US then how effective a chnage it would have been?

 

Since you missed the point that these investments would have been financed by US war loans to France and UK.

 

Okay, no I guess you do mean US loans to France and the UK? But again I'm afraid I don't see how the finances were to work? In 1939 the US was in the tailend of a major recession, I'm not sure that the country was capable of making such loans then?

 

Even if you didn't like it I did address all references to Lend-Lease.

Note that I do understands that it was not your post I refered to, see the list of post links in my earlier post.

It's not that I didn't like it, I didn't understand it. And if it wasn't my post refered to in your list, then why did you include,

 

"QUOTE(Rich @ Tue 29 Jan 2008 0601)"?

 

My point was:

US did later on benefit from these allied orders but it could have been far bigger if the currency problem had been overcome.

And at least ten months where the ten months between war started and the collapse of France when UK tried ot change policy and order more from the US, but still hampered by lack of Dollars.

 

But I don't see how the currency problem gets overcome in 1939? And the driving force behind the Lend-Lease act was a solution for Britian's lack of specie, where is the incentive for the US to dispense such largess before it was required?

[KingSargent]

King,

 

I used to think that Franco was doing the balancing act, keeping H at arms length, but the evidence from Tussel, inter alia, is that it was the reverse. H. had it in mind to co-opt the French, honor the Armistice terms, and could not pay Paco's price.

Not the same situation. If France was still fighting on there would be no Armistice terms to honor. And if Franco brought Spain into the war while France was fighting on from NA what do you think happens? Spain is closer to any retaliation the Allies might scrape up than Germany or even South France, and would be likely to end up the major theater of the war - Franco would not risk that.

 

My notion of H. foregoing Barbarossa [for a year] and settling the hash of a France continuing the war from NA is maybe specious, but I think H had it in mind to humble the French to the utmost, being a WWI vet. The Bolsheviks would wait their turn. Stranger things occurred in WWII, as you know.

My point is that Hitler's objective all along was the USSR. What did an African campaign offer Germany that would be an asset instead of a detriment when Russia's turn came? H. could well have delayed BARBAROSSA while he built up his forces, but that does not translate into a 180 degree detour from the Russian objective.

 

What bomber from Crete? How would Crete have been a safe air base for the RAF? Did the RAF even have bombs of weight in 1940?

No, but in 1940-41 everybody was still under the Douhetian Spell that the Bomber Would Conquer All. Do not forget the British quite seriously contemplated depriving Germany of Soviet oil by bombing the Caucasus oilfields using Wellesleys flying from the Middle East, ferGawd'ssake! If they could be serious about that then Hitler could rightly fear raids on Romania from Crete.

 

Hitler's wars may have been less about resources than race, hegemony. The resources of the USSR would have only come into play for the long war vs. the USA after Eurasia had been conquered. These are Blitzkrieg campaigns, not total war.

Hitler's stated goals were Lebensraum in the east with Germans lording it over the conquered muzhiks on their vast Russian estates. Race, hegemony, and/or resources, they all fell into place with a Russian adventure.

 

The USN acting against the Meuse crossings remains humorous. The French did not know the Meuse was in danger until too late. Who knew where the German advance columns were? The USN had no idea what the Meuse was, let alone what to do about it. It remains difficult to underestimate admirals in a land war. Let's see, Scouting 3, you look for PzGruppe Kleist, Scouting 5, you look for.....

Of course it is good for a giggle and I have said so. But the challenge was "What could the US have brought to bear that might have changed things?" It would take miracles for everything to work out so that USN airgroups could affect the Panzer drive, but miracles were what France needed and they sure didn't happen on HTL. The US being in the war at least raises the possibility of USN power (about the only power the US actually had at the time) being somehow in a position to affect things.

This truly be a weak straw, but 'tis the only straw available, sirrah.

[KingSargent]

Uh oh... Time to correct an oopsie. Just read a bit more on the French 1940 air activity:

 

I can find no record of French Attack sorties until the campaign after Dunkirk. The Breguet 691/693 had not reached operational status in time to delay the Germans in the Ardennes (a terrain intended by the Creator for road-blocks) or at the Meuse crossings. Low-level attacks by bombers not designed or trained for such work were sent against the Meuse bridges, but the Germans had ther own built by then. MOF, the Germans had a bridge across the Meuse east of Sedan before the far bank was occupied by German troops; the engineers didn't know they were getting ahead of things, so the bridge went in with French outposts watching and unable to notify anyone.

In any case French attack-bomber useage and losses came AFTER the critical point when they might have done some good.

The French AF had two Attack groups, the Groupement de Bombardement d'Assauts 18 and 19, equipped with Bre691/693s (the difference between the 1 and the 3 was engine make). The 19th GBA was not operational until June, I was correct there, but the 18th DBA fought hard against the Panzer advance. They flew 500 sorties and lost 47 planes (most of the Groupemente) for an unsustainable 9.4% loss/sortie rate. The 19th GBA was delayed getting into operation because it was raided for pilots and a/c to keep the 18th operating.

MOST of the French "light bombers" slaughtered in the effort to delay the Germans were not attack-bombers but Potez 63.11 reconaissance planes that could carry a whole 200kg of bombs when they were not scouting and observing. They took lots of gas no matter what their mission was.

 

So the French did use what Attack bombers they had available in May 1940.

[Shortround6]

Thank you King Sargent.

 

I agree with your previous post. The US navy airgroups were about the only thing the US could have contributed. I was pointing out that with numbers and types available the the "expected" results probably wouldn't have been much different than was achieved by the French and British bombers but "One never knows do one?" The cost would ahve been considerable in any case and with US production what it was at the time, replacements would have been a long time coming.

 

All credit to the crews that flew those machines trying for the miracle the ground troops needed and the generals didn't deserve.

 

By the way, not directed at KS, I understand the British ordered 200-250 Lockheed Hudsons in 1938-39. Not fighters but not zero american aircraft ordered either.

[KingSargent]

By the way, not directed at KS, I understand the British ordered 200-250 Lockheed Hudsons in 1938-39. Not fighters but not zero american aircraft ordered either.

Ah, but the RAF had the world-beating Hurricane and Spitfire, with the wonderplane Defiant coming along nicely, besides a nice backup of Gladiators and Gauntlets. Let the poor benighted Frogs have crummy American planes, anything would be better than what they had.

 

Besides, Fighter Command was a big waste of time and money anyway, just a distraction from the war-winning (with no help from anyone) BOMBER COMMAND!

 

Indeed, if not for Hugh Dowding the RAF would not have had the Fighter Command they needed in 1940 - and the Air Minstery and Staff tried several times to boot him into retirement, and did just as soon as he'd won the BoB for them.

[swerve]

... with the wonderplane Defiant coming along nicely, ...

 

[KingSargent]

For anyone still interested, I just got a little book called The Road To Rainbow: Army Planning For Global War, 1934-1940, Henry G. Gole, ISBN 1-55750-409-1.

 

It's a history of the studies by the Army War College, of the possibilities and the realities Before the War. Remarkably prescient. Most of the AWC grads ended up wearing stars in WW2, many went right from AWC to the War Planning Board. USian attitudes to Coalition Warfare received special attention, and it is easy to see where the US plans and attitudes during the war came from. The generals opposing the Mediterranean Strategy at Casablanca opposed it because it had been extensively studied and found unworkable at the AWC. The exact problems that arose 1943-45 were predicted, as was the UK's propensity for screwing Allies and being ever ready to fight to the last Ally, whoever it may be. hey didn't exactly predict the fall of France, but they outlined circumstances under which it could happen - precisely what happened in May-June 1940 - the political situaton of the collapse of France, not the military aspects of the 1940 campaign.

 

So far, verrry interrrestink!

[JWB]

KingSargent Posted Sat 16 Feb 2008 0640

The generals opposing the Mediterranean Strategy at Casablanca opposed it because it had been extensively studied and found unworkable at the AWC. The exact problems that arose 1943-45 were predicted, ...

 

In your book is there any mention of how those problems could have been solved?

[Sardaukar]

Med strategy was basicly unworkable because of geographical realities. Look what happened to Italian Campaign in 1943. There is no workaround for such things like mountainous terrain. So much for "soft underbelly".

[KingSargent]

In your book is there any mention of how those problems could have been solved?

Like Sardukar said. The research done was considerable, and by pretty smart people. The AWC was actually the unofficial "conceptualization" branch of the War Planning Board, the 'Think Tank.' Many of the 'problems' studied at the AWC came from the CoS of the Army - two of the CoSs at this period went to the CoS slot straight from being Commandant of the AWC. The WPB was tiny and had too much on its plate for 'what if' explorations. When the AWC was closed during Mobilization the staff and many students went straight to WPB duty.

 

If there had been a workable Med Strategy, they would have found it. They concluded that ORANGE was unworkable and that the Philippines would have to be written off if war came - to bad FDR didn't listen that time. They also predicted the shift in close alliance of Australia and New Zealand from dependency on the Empire to dependency on the US.*

 

They examined US Mobilization plans and updated them every three years after 1930. They had served through the fiasco of WW1 mobilization and were determined to avoid it.

 

 

* I find it intriguing that they predicted the US buildup in OZ and the advance north from there, but they made no mention of campaigns in New Guinea and the Solomons, other than dismissing them as nonsensical.

[John T]

Okay, no I guess you do mean US loans to France and the UK? But again I'm afraid I don't see how the finances were to work? In 1939 the US was in the tailend of a major recession, I'm not sure that the country was capable of making such loans then?

[snip..]

But I don't see how the currency problem gets overcome in 1939? And the driving force behind the Lend-Lease act was a solution for Britian's lack of specie, where is the incentive for the US to dispense such largess before it was required?

 

As I gather, The basis for this WI is that US without any preparations jumps into the European war,

Unspecified cause.

What about SS United States sunk by German sub and when USS Rueben James tries to save women and children,

the brutal German sinks her too?

 

Anyhow, cash and production facilities is obviously was US has to offer at this stage.

 

The Depression did lower US's financial Strength but from a very high level in 1928,

"Weaker than before but still stronger than anyone else"

Havn't found any truly good comparison data, but in short, US had the financial strenght of the other combatants combined.

(Got GNP in "million 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars" from Maddison, A. (2007), Historical Statistics for the World Economy: 1-2003 AD.

http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/Historical_St...ile_03-2007.xls

The measure seems to be more based on ability to feed your population than comparing industrial growth,

So I expects the potental for making arms even more in favour of the US.

 

)

And the difference in US financial strength wasn't that big between September 39, July 40 and March 41

but FDR's political freedom of action grew.

 

Found some nice articles at

http://library.bea.gov/cdm4/browse.php?CIS...;CISOSTART=1,21

 

esp:

http://library.bea.gov/cdm4/document.php?C...=3457&REC=4

 

Cheers

/John T

[Shortround6]

thank you.

 

Looking at the articale that you posted second seems to reinforce the idea that there wasn't much the US was going to to right away in 1939. While we may have had the finiancial strength it still needed time to be put to work. Even if the US had appropreated the $1,900 million for plant construction, enlargement and equipment in the fall of 1939 instead of from June '40 to March '41 the factories wouldn't have been up and running by the summer/fall of 1940. 1941 may have been a bit different though.

[John T]

Well, anyhow I couldn’t leave the subject without making a scenario out of it and it goes like this:

 

The US Force that lands in France in 39 will be welcomed by cheering crowds in Cherbourg, and expected to defend Maginot line. Not to be met by Germans at Omaha beach.

The requirements for these troops must have been much lower than expected after 1941. And intended as an addition to french forces the speed of build up could have been balanced toward a smaller force earlier rather than the quantities needed after 1941.

 

 

As far as I understand the situation, these are the wish lists from US allies.

What did France want in September 1939?

- Manpower, the memories from the Great Wars attrition battles, little UK or US could do in a hurry but both could ensure that replacements would come.

- Credits in Dollar

- Modern Aircrafts and aircraft engines.

- Then comes a long list of things wanted and I have no

- Further construction of Magniot line, a surprisingly large part of the British engagement in France where construction workers. Could US send construction workers and machinery like excavators and crawlers. It would help, at least in the perception of the French high command.

 

What did UK want of the US in September 1939?

- Credits in Dollar.

- Shipping and Shipbuilding.

- IRL UK had to balance trade with the US by producing civilian goods for export to the US. This could be reduced and the capacity been spent on UK rearmament.

- It wasn’t much US could do to speed up British army’s expansion, possibly M1928 Thompson’s rather than wasting resources on the Lanchester and early delivery surplus guns for training.

 

 

What US could do to affect the situation in May 40?

 

Send 2 Sqn P-35 and a Sqn each of B-17 and Catalinas to defend Scotland / Scapa Flow/ patrol North sea.

These squadrons would need to be good at navigation over sea but otherwise they would not meet any serious opposition. This would free up two Hurricane Sqns from the North and if sent to France they add 20% to RAF fighter strength in France.

This and the promise of further units would make Downing more confident on replacements to defend the British Islands and thus allowing for more British fighters in France in general.

 

Send a Naval detachment to the Med to show the flag, both to impress Italy and for French domestic use. It looks like most thinks Italy would stay out with a US presence in the Med.

 

The American Expeditionary force in France would start as an Infantry division with two proper Infantry regiments and a construction “regiment” supported by full divisional artillery, a tank Bn and a cadre of Corps troops arriving in France during November 1939 and by Christmas 1939 they are dug in a calm region close to Sedan. Three months later next division arrives.

In spring 1940 the Air component consisting of 3 Sqn P-36, 3 sqn B-18 and 3 Sqn A-17A

The tank battalion’s heavy tanks are twelve British Cruisers mk I while waiting for deliveries of M2A4. The force is planned to expand to four Divs and a tank Bde during the summer of 1940.

 

Would that force give the French high command more or less time to react than the French B divisions manning the line IRL?

 

They would probably not make a significant difference but what would?

(less than sending the whole French High command to German military schools?)

 

 

Then we have two other sides where US could have used her economical might

 

US Support with war materials:

Motor vehicles could give the France army an operational mobility they lacked.

 

Modern Aircrafts to France, to speed up deliveries further than in IRL would not been without problems but it was the kind of problems that where solved. Say France would receive a handful more P-36 and Douglas DB-7squadrons. Maybe not much given what would stream out of US later but compared with what was available IRL it does adds upp.

20 more planes per month adds 10% to front line strength and as France had more pilots than modern planes they could have been used.

 

A funny thing is that US built naval dive bombers (Vought 156 F – Vindicators) where used in France. The French carrier was not combat ready so the air component where shore based and fought in northern France.

 

 

US financial might be able to pre-empt German purchases of raw materials.

That is the Allies outbid Germany at the producers. Either blocking Germany totally or at least making the price higher and limiting the quantities.

 

Rumanian Oil, any limitation would pay off and be cheaper than the Ploesti raids.

(Sweden did manage to get a contract of oil deliveries out of Rumania 1940-41, so Germany did not get all just most of the oil.)

 

Swedish Iron ore, If half the German import from Sweden could be sold to US instead German iron production would drop by 25%

 

 

 

Cheers

/John T.

[KingSargent]

Well, anyhow I couldn’t leave the subject without making a scenario out of it and it goes like this:

 

The US Force that lands in France in 39 will be welcomed by cheering crowds in Cherbourg, and expected to defend Maginot line. Not to be met by Germans at Omaha beach.

The requirements for these troops must have been much lower than expected after 1941. And intended as an addition to french forces the speed of build up could have been balanced toward a smaller force earlier rather than the quantities needed after 1941.

As far as I understand the situation, these are the wish lists from US allies.

What did France want in September 1939?

- Manpower, the memories from the Great Wars attrition battles, little UK or US could do in a hurry but both could ensure that replacements would come.

- Credits in Dollar

- Modern Aircrafts and aircraft engines.

- Then comes a long list of things wanted and I have no

- Further construction of Magniot line, a surprisingly large part of the British engagement in France where construction workers. Could US send construction workers and machinery like excavators and crawlers. It would help, at least in the perception of the French high command.

 

What did UK want of the US in September 1939?

- Credits in Dollar.

- Shipping and Shipbuilding.

- IRL UK had to balance trade with the US by producing civilian goods for export to the US. This could be reduced and the capacity been spent on UK rearmament.

- It wasn’t much US could do to speed up British army’s expansion, possibly M1928 Thompson’s rather than wasting resources on the Lanchester and early delivery surplus guns for training.

What US could do to affect the situation in May 40?

 

Send 2 Sqn P-35 and a Sqn each of B-17 and Catalinas to defend Scotland / Scapa Flow/ patrol North sea.

These squadrons would need to be good at navigation over sea but otherwise they would not meet any serious opposition. This would free up two Hurricane Sqns from the North and if sent to France they add 20% to RAF fighter strength in France.

This and the promise of further units would make Downing more confident on replacements to defend the British Islands and thus allowing for more British fighters in France in general.

 

Send a Naval detachment to the Med to show the flag, both to impress Italy and for French domestic use. It looks like most thinks Italy would stay out with a US presence in the Med.

 

The American Expeditionary force in France would start as an Infantry division with two proper Infantry regiments and a construction “regiment” supported by full divisional artillery, a tank Bn and a cadre of Corps troops arriving in France during November 1939 and by Christmas 1939 they are dug in a calm region close to Sedan. Three months later next division arrives.

In spring 1940 the Air component consisting of 3 Sqn P-36, 3 sqn B-18 and 3 Sqn A-17A

The tank battalion’s heavy tanks are twelve British Cruisers mk I while waiting for deliveries of M2A4. The force is planned to expand to four Divs and a tank Bde during the summer of 1940.

 

Would that force give the French high command more or less time to react than the French B divisions manning the line IRL?

 

They would probably not make a significant difference but what would?

(less than sending the whole French High command to German military schools?)

Then we have two other sides where US could have used her economical might

 

US Support with war materials:

Motor vehicles could give the France army an operational mobility they lacked.

 

Modern Aircrafts to France, to speed up deliveries further than in IRL would not been without problems but it was the kind of problems that where solved. Say France would receive a handful more P-36 and Douglas DB-7squadrons. Maybe not much given what would stream out of US later but compared with what was available IRL it does adds upp.

20 more planes per month adds 10% to front line strength and as France had more pilots than modern planes they could have been used.

 

A funny thing is that US built naval dive bombers (Vought 156 F – Vindicators) where used in France. The French carrier was not combat ready so the air component where shore based and fought in northern France.

US financial might be able to pre-empt German purchases of raw materials.

That is the Allies outbid Germany at the producers. Either blocking Germany totally or at least making the price higher and limiting the quantities.

 

Rumanian Oil, any limitation would pay off and be cheaper than the Ploesti raids.

(Sweden did manage to get a contract of oil deliveries out of Rumania 1940-41, so Germany did not get all just most of the oil.)

 

Swedish Iron ore, If half the German import from Sweden could be sold to US instead German iron production would drop by 25%

Cheers

/John T.

A couple of minor nitpicks, the US didn't HAVE a tank bn to send to France in 1939. I don't think they had fully-operational B-17 squadron either, they had a bunch of guys who flew around getting their pictures taken flying over the Sugarloaf at Rio de Janiero.

 

US response depends entirely on politics. As soon as the leadership (FDR) can get Congress and the American people to agree, US Mobilization starts. What was available on M+180 historically pretty much matched the predictions and planning. So don't count on ANYTHING except the US Navy (the Ready Response team) the instant the US decides to act.

 

Do not count on dollar credits getting you a whole lot of production if the US is mobilizing. The situation actually skewed the Mobilization curve, since US aero-industry started mobilizing itself to sell planes before actual US Mob. started. The reason we could keep sending planes to Allies is because we didn't have trained crews for them anyway. If the US is mobilizing aircrew training from the same start point as airframe production, the percentage of planes available to give away will be much less.

 

Do not count on the few squadrons the USAAC has being sent, that would be "eating our seed corn." The pre-war AAC was needed to train the wartime AAC. Ditto for the regiments of the US Army. Each pre-war US formation "spawned" a whole bunch new formations that in turn spawned others. Send the available US Army anywhere in 1939 and you do not get the US Army of 1943.

[Shortround6]

KingSargent is correct on the B-17s. there were 12 Y1B-17s or later called B-17s. these had 930HP engines and no turbo chargers. There was 1 Y1B-17-A with turbos, later called the B-17A. The First B-17B does not fly until june 27, 1939 and it takes until March 30, 1940 to complete the 39 plane order. While 7 B-17Bs did fly to Reo in Nov 1939 that may still be a far cry from squadron strength. The orginal 12 Y1B-17s had over 9,293 hours between them in 1938. I doubt anybody would want such high time airframes in combat.

[GdG**]

What did France want in September 1939?

- Further construction of Magniot line, a surprisingly large part of the British engagement in France where construction workers. Could US send construction workers and machinery like excavators and crawlers. It would help, at least in the perception of the French high command.

 

Not really. The Maginot Line was finished in 1939 except for a few details. The units stationing in specific areas (where they were expected to remain after Day 1) as well a ex-Spanish republicans were already building pillboxes where needed.

 

OTOH, France was lurking on the US ammo stocks (8, 37, 75, 155 mm). The domestic production was too low during the winter.

 

BTW I just learned from Stephane Ferrard who is a French army specialist from 1914 to 1940, that UK & France had a much deeper industrial collaboration that I thought;

 

It was planned that France (he didn't tell much about what was planned in the other direction) would deliver UK by the fall 1940:

 

-7.5 mm FM 24/29

-B1 bis

-H-39 was to become the common light tank for both countries, France providing the hulls and UK 1/3 rd of the turrets

-The 13.2 mm Browning (originally produced in Belgium) was to become the standard HMG for both air forces.

Edited March 13, 2008 by GdG**

[Sardaukar]

It was planned that France (he didn't tell much about what was planned in the other direction) would deliver UK by the fall 1940:

 

-7.5 mm FM 24/29

-B1 bis

-H-39 was to become the common light tank for both countries, France providing the hulls and UK 1/3 rd of the turrets

-The 13.2 mm Browning (originally produced in Belgium) was to become the standard HMG for both air forces.

 

I think UK would not benefit from that much ! B1bis in desert ! H-39 as common tank !