What if the USA enters WW2 in September 1939?

[Richard Lindquist]

I am just wondering how well the "black shoe" admirals commanding the carrier units would have done planning and executing an interdiction campaign aginst German lines of communication/routes of advance. The designation "CV" stands for "Cruiser, Aviation" and the CVs were part of the "scouting" element of the fleet. I don't think the US Navy was trained for or inclined toward ground support in 1940.

[Ken Estes]

As Richard points out, the ground support potential of the USN aviation [or any other navy] is to be scoffed; it remains more likely they would not even find the right targets or refrain from bombing Allied troops in error. Also, the operating range of those a/c would not place the CVs out of Luftwaffe range if they tried to support the allied armies not evacuating ports. Nor is USN AAW and ASW likely to be very good at the outset.

 

You are right, King, I consider France 40 still a goner, playing out about as the historical case, unaffected by the US involvement in WWII from Sept39. Thus, no BoB, no SeaLion, and they are free to turn their considerable energies and military power to solving the Med, to include bringing Spain into the war: Franco historically was closest to this in late40, wanted the French colonies and German armaments; With the need to settle the hash of the French rump republic in NA, no reason Hitler would not go for it. The Italians can be brought in after the fall of European France [can't say 'Metropolitan, cuz that includes Algeria], for the usual reasons, booty and self-inflation.

 

So, we can consider an Axis Med strategy that seeks to take Gibraltar, Malta, placing German armored corps under Hoth, Guderian, Kleist ashore in Morocco, later in Tunisia. The Italians can fall back on Benghazi and even Tripoli if the British become active, a delay/econ of force.

 

I also see no Fall Barbarossa while the war in the West continues unabated. I would not see the Germans conducting the desert war as the historical case, where OKH considered it a sideshow [not a job anymore for the CO of Hitler's army bodyguard regt either] .

[Shortround6]

Grumman had built 54 of the F3F-1s with 650hp P&W R-1535s. Top speed 231mph. The Later F3F-2s and F3F-3s with their 850hp Wright Cyclones would be a better match but only 108 total of these aircraft were built.

 

Using Vought Vindicators and Douglas Devastators over France might have ment perfectly good carriers floating around with about dozen planes apiece.

 

With 76 Vindicators built in '38, 70 in '39 including 24 for the French, 50 in '40 (all for the British) and 57 in '41 for the Marines and a total of 129 Devastators built and out of production by 1939-40 I think we can see that the U.S. Navy had no real capacity for sustained operatons at this time.

 

I doubt that these bomber aircraft would have survived any better than the Fairly battles and other Aircraft that tried to stop the Germans in France in 1940.

 

Douglas doesn't deliver the First SBD Dauntless until when, May of 1940? Even speeding things up by a couple of months might not get an operational squadron into service in time.

 

Commiting US Naval Forces in Norway might have achieved something. But with so much depending on luck the risks were also very great. Just how good was the US anti-sub capability in 1939-40 vrs summer of 1941?

 

Commiting US Naval air power to the Battle of France will mean some more wrecked trucks for the Germans. Maybe a blown bridge or two and the elimination of US Naval Air power for a number of months.

 

going against the Italians in the Med again turns into a crap shoot. One bomb or one torpedo could turn a whole battle. With no real superiority in aircraft vrs the Italians and going against land based aircraft of greater numbers (and flown by veterans) things might get ugly real quick. Any ship losses won't be made good until 1942 at best.

[swerve]

.... and they are free to turn their considerable energies and military power to solving the Med, to include bringing Spain into the war: Franco historically was closest to this in late40, wanted the French colonies and German armaments; ...

 

Yes, but he was also concerned about food supplies. The US navy hostile, as well as the RN, would guarantee complete interdiction of Spanish food imports from the Americas. He resisted German pressure to attack Gibraltar in 1940 when he had only us to contend with. With a still militarily weak but rapidly arming USA looming, & WW1 as evidence for how quickly the USA could ramp up its military, would he want to risk it?

 

If the Germans don't give him a choice, what use will Spain be, militarily, except as a base?

 

Of course, Spain joining the war would give the UK & USA practice in amphibious landings. Sure to knock off the Canaries.

 

And I'm still not convinced Mussolini would join in. He waited until he thought it was all over in 1940, sure that Britain would make peace & wanting a slice of the loot. With the USA still in the war, would he risk it?

[Rich]

Douglas doesn't deliver the First SBD Dauntless until when, May of 1940? Even speeding things up by a couple of months might not get an operational squadron into service in time.

 

Do you have a good set of data for aircraft production pre-July 1940? If so I would be interested in it, since I do have the data from the War Production Administration by month, but starting in July 1940. Maybe we could share?

 

For example, production of naval attack aircraft in July 1940 consisted of one SBD and one SBC. And total production for the last six months was 62 SBD, one SBC, and one SBN. Did I hear someone say something about "sustainable"?

[KingSargent]

This is something I hadn't thought of. Makes sense. But even so, assuming Italy did join in (I have my doubts there), I would expect the British forces in Egypt to at least make a show of force on the border to force the Italians to keep substantial forces there, in order to aid an offensive from Tunisia.

 

I don't see Tripolitania & Cyrenaica lasting long. It would give the Allies a chance for a victory, and politicians would be desperate for one after the fall of France. Never underestimate political imperatives.

I have no doubt that the British would have gotten around to Libya ASAP. But it wasn't possible in 1940, the forces just weren't there. As mentioned COMPASS was supposed to a raid, and 4th Indian Division was pulled out after the initial actions to go to the "main effort," East Africa.

 

Of course if the US is in the war as of 1939 the British might be inclined to strengthen their Imperial forces which they definitely considered inadequate. We'll never know.

[KingSargent]

As Richard points out, the ground support potential of the USN aviation [or any other navy] is to be scoffed; it remains more likely they would not even find the right targets or refrain from bombing Allied troops in error.

The USN ground attack potential would be much better than that of the French who didn't have much (ca. 50 LN40s) and the RAF who didn't have any. In any case the USN had trained to find and attack land targets (and did a pretty good job in early 1942) and support the Marines.

 

Also, the operating range of those a/c would not place the CVs out of Luftwaffe range if they tried to support the allied armies not evacuating ports. Nor is USN AAW and ASW likely to be very good at the outset.

The operating range would be better than a Ju87, and the Ju87s had to fly from Germany until they had captured French/Belgian bases.

USN ASW patrols over the North Sea don't have to sink U-boats, locating them and forcing them to submerge would do the job. Of course sinking the subs is the best way to do this, but just bottling them up in the North Sea protects the Atlantic trade routes.

Of course you are correct that such "what is the object of the exercize?" conceptualization would be unheard of in 1939. Nevertheless, if we assume the US is smart/prescient enough to go to war in 1939, there is no reason to assume that they will not figure out how to do it well; both ideas (overcoming Isolationism and smart flag officers) are unlikely.

 

You are right, King, I consider France 40 still a goner, playing out about as the historical case, unaffected by the US involvement in WWII from Sept39.

However in the historical case in June Reynaud and about half his Ministers wanted to fight on until it became quite clear that there would be no US intervention. Had the US been in the war from 1939 the question might not even have arisen. The point is that we can't assume historical performance in what was for all practical purposes a lucky fluke, unanticipated even by the Germans; especially if we change as big a factor as US involvement.

FTM, US involvement in 1939 (which must involve some diplomatic posturing like "stay out of Poland or we'll go to war") might keep Hitler from starting his war (planned for 1944) early. He only went into Poland because he was sure no one would fight for Poland.

 

Thus, no BoB, no SeaLion, and they are free to turn their considerable energies and military power to solving the Med, to include bringing Spain into the war: Franco historically was closest to this in late40, wanted the French colonies and German armaments; With the need to settle the hash of the French rump republic in NA, no reason Hitler would not go for it. The Italians can be brought in after the fall of European France [can't say 'Metropolitan, cuz that includes Algeria], for the usual reasons, booty and self-inflation.

The scenario as you give it (a collapse of France) could work out as you say, but the Germans would be starting from scratch in formulating a new strategy in a totally unfamiliar area. I doubt you could even find a pre- 6/40 German General Staff study for a Mediterranean strategy. Raeder suggested it after June 1940, but he didn't have any actual plans either.

Besides, Germany wasn't interested in "solving the Med," in 1940 there was nothing for them to solve. Italy was expected to handle it, and if Italy didn't come in there was no way for the Germans to get to Africa - and not much chance of the Allies getting back to the Continent via that route either.

We only think of the Med as being vital because the way things worked out the Allies expended a lot of effort there. The only effort Germany ever expended there before 1943 was in response to British/Allied moves and/or to bail out Italy (which amounts to the same thing).

Hitler couldn't get Franco to come in after France fell, why would he be able to if the French were still fighting? Getting involved in a big war right after being devastated in the Spanish Civil War was not something that Franco was keen on. Spain stood to lose her Atlantic islands right off the bat, lose her US food relief, and if the Allies wanted to come back to the Continent Spain had the longest coastline in Europe. Another Peninsular War was something else Franco had no desire for.

So, we can consider an Axis Med strategy that seeks to take Gibraltar, Malta, placing German armored corps under Hoth, Guderian, Kleist ashore in Morocco, later in Tunisia.

WE can consider such a strategy, why would the Germans in 1940? How are they going to fuel and supply those PzKps? What is the point from their perspective? What Hitler wanted in June 1940 was for the British to seek terms and for the war in the West to be over; then he could recoup and expand his forces to go after the USSR.

 

The Italians can fall back on Benghazi and even Tripoli if the British become active, a delay/econ of force.

And why should the Italians abandon their African Breadbasket (the Cyrenaican bulge) to facilitate a strategy that would only benefit Germany and Spain (Spain must be in or the Germans couldn't even get their armored armies to Norhern Africa)? They didn't come into the war to be German puppets/cannon fodder.

 

I also see no Fall Barbarossa while the war in the West continues unabated.

Why not? Hitler actually did do Barbarossa while the war was still on in the West. WE know it was a mistake, but it probably seemed a good idea at the time.

 

I would not see the Germans conducting the desert war as the historical case, where OKH considered it a sideshow [not a job anymore for the CO of Hitler's army bodyguard regt either] .

If you mean that OKH would conduct a major campaign in Africa, how are they going to support it logistically? Rommel was only sent to Afrca to be roadblock to keep the British from getting to Tripoli.

What makes you think OKH and/or OKW will have a coherent hindsight-based African/Desert strategy in 1940 when they did not have a coherent Med one? They had never even thought about either. With France and the Low Countries to absorb, why would they be tempted to futz around in Africa? What's in it for them?

[KingSargent]

Grumman had built 54 of the F3F-1s with 650hp P&W R-1535s. Top speed 231mph. The Later F3F-2s and F3F-3s with their 850hp Wright Cyclones would be a better match but only 108 total of these aircraft were built. That is six fighter squadrons, a lot more than the RN had.

 

Using Vought Vindicators and Douglas Devastators over France might have ment perfectly good carriers floating around with about dozen planes apiece. Maybe, maybe not. The Devastator was at least as good as a Battle, and the crews were trained for support ops, and had bigger (and newer) bombs. 'As good as a Battle' is not much recommendation, I admit.

With 76 Vindicators built in '38, 70 in '39 including 24 for the French, 50 in '40 (all for the British) and 57 in '41 for the Marines and a total of 129 Devastators built and out of production by 1939-40

Vindicators and Devastators weren't the only USN planes. There were Northrop BTs (plane the Dauntless developed from), Curtiss SBCs, and Vought SBUs in the Reserves/Marines. The last were biplanes, but combat-capable, at least as much as a monoplane with no armor and self-sealing tanks (which is what everybody had in 1940). There is no reason Douglas could not have a run of TBD-2s, with improvements. Had the US been at war in 1939 they probably would have.

I agree that the US would not have ramped up to 1943 production levels yet, but they wold not have been in the peacetime doldrums if they were at war. IOW, not floods of planes but more than there were.

 

I think we can see that the U.S. Navy had no real capacity for sustained operatons at this time.

The USN doesn't have to carry out sustained operations, we are talking about possibly being a turning influence in one campaign to prevent the quick collapse of France. The RAF and FAF were not exactly geared up for the long haul yet either; Germany was in a slightly better state, but lacked reserves and ammunition for a long fight.

[Ken Estes]

King, When I said I consider the June1940 scenario unlikely to be altered by the US, I mean the German conquest of European France. I presume that the French might try to continue from Algeria and France Overseas, and that is what comes next on the OKW/OKH agenda, IMO. They would have worked from scratch? Yes, but no more than the scratch effort that was Fall Barbarossa.

 

Paul, I remain amazed that Franco gave any consideration to joining Hitler even in the apparently favorable circumstances of Oct-Nov40, because of the very points you made. But the inalterable evidence that he did, makes me think that the Germans might enlist both Franco and Musso in a Middle Sea campaign.

 

We can also recall that the main impetus for Fall Barbarossa was the continuation of the UK/CW in the West war, leading H to call for the invasion in order to get the Brits to the peace table; there was little consideration that the USSR would be tough...German victory disease and then some.

 

An army that can send 150 divisions into the USSR, with few roads worthy of the name and a wrong-gauge rail system can certainly undertake the subjugation of French North Africa, placing the Cyreanica zone on hold until it is done, then continuing to Suez and beyond later. I still insist that the Germans are met with weakness everywhere in 1940, most of 1941.

 

We would be surprised to see what the German Navy was willing to plan: things such as Azores in 1940, etc. Most of it was megalomaniac, of course.

[KingSargent]

King, When I said I consider the June1940 scenario unlikely to be altered by the US, I mean the German conquest of European France. I presume that the French might try to continue from Algeria and France Overseas, and that is what comes next on the OKW/OKH agenda, IMO. They would have worked from scratch? Yes, but no more than the scratch effort that was Fall Barbarossa.

At least they had a year to come up with that scratch effort, rather than no time at all for a Med adventure. They only had a couple of months to bring Spain in, arrange suitable bribes for Franco, figure out how to get past Gib and across the Strait, fight out of mountainous and roadless Spanish Morocco into French Morocco and Algeria (against presumably greater opposition than TORCH met), and get it all done before the winter rains. If TORCH got stuck in the mud, so would the Germans.

 

Paul, I remain amazed that Franco gave any consideration to joining Hitler even in the apparently favorable circumstances of Oct-Nov40, because of the very points you made. But the inalterable evidence that he did, makes me think that the Germans might enlist both Franco and Musso in a Middle Sea campaign.

What evidence might that be? I realize you know a lot more about Spain at the time than I do, but my impression is that Franco was never enthusiastic about entering the war (especially after Hitler cozied up to Stalin with the 1939 Non-Aggression Pact and carving up Poland) and only met with Hitler to discuss the idea to keep the German diplomatic heat off by making the price for Spain's entry so high Hitler could not meet his demands. By the same token the threat of Spain actively in the Axis ensured good Allied treatment like food shipments from the US. IOW he used the prospect of Spain's entry to play off both sides and came out with one of the few European counties that was not devastated by WW2 (Spain was devastated enough by the Civil War).

 

We can also recall that the main impetus for Fall Barbarossa was the continuation of the UK/CW in the West war, leading H to call for the invasion in order to get the Brits to the peace table; there was little consideration that the USSR would be tough...German victory disease and then some.

I tend to disagree with that. Hitler saw little chance of Britain giving up and no way to force her to once the US started bankrolling her. At the same time Britain could do no more than nibble at Germany, she could not help the USSR, and there was no particular reason to anticipate that the US would quickly number the Communist USSR as one of the "Democracies" that the US was to be Arsenal for.

Hitlerian Hubris and Victory Disease led H to overestimate his chances in Russia, you are quite right about that. However H's MO was to get a lighting victory that would psychologically devastate the victim and make him give up. He didn't expect to have to physically conquer the entire USSR, and he made no plans to do so - he didn't expect to do it in France in one campaign either FTM, that was a fluke. He thought he could knock the USSR out (not physically overrun it) in one campaign and then be so powerful the UK would have to make peace.

Hitler was going to go after the USSR eventually; he was puzzled by Britain's unreasonable continuation of the fight, but Russia was always his goal, not African sand dunes and mountains. And the Communist's Caucasus oilfields were a lot closer to Germany than Britain's Persian ones.

 

An army that can send 150 divisions into the USSR, with few roads worthy of the name and a wrong-gauge rail system can certainly undertake the subjugation of French North Africa,

So they go across a sea to conquer territory that has ONE road, NO railroads, a more distant objective, and absolutely no resources Germany needs until they get all the way to Persia? That really makes sense.

 

placing the Cyreanica zone on hold until it is done, then continuing to Suez and beyond later.

Be a lot shorter in distance and time to knock the USSR out and take her oil, besides keeping Germany's army between the Red Army and Germany.

 

I still insist that the Germans are met with weakness everywhere in 1940, most of 1941.

Oh, I'll agree with that. Germany had nothing to worry about in the West (in the form of an Allied riposte) for years. But Germany was in no position to bring her advantages in strength and mobility to bear anywhere worthwhile in the West - and trying to would weaken her defense against a hostile USSR. Being strong doesn't help if you can't get to where you can use the strength profitably.

 

We would be surprised to see what the German Navy was willing to plan: things such as Azores in 1940, etc. Most of it was megalomaniac, of course.

Hey, anything to get out of trying SeaLion, right?

[Ken Estes]

Tsk! King, if any of that were to happen, it would involve putting troops and planes into Spain, taking Gibraltar [the two German plans for that [Felix and one other] are done quickly and very well - they are not slouches in territory they know [unlike USSR]] and once on the other side, the occupied ports of NA can easily be reinforced by sea. With Gib and Malta gone, WTF is the RN? Air rules the Med, then as now. Remember, this is the army that took Norway, under the very noses of the RN and Winston!

 

As to Paco Franco, viz:

Franco’s Spain had proved to be a difficult friend ever since the Anti-Comintern Pact, of which Spain was a member, had been distorted by the 1939 Russo-German Non-aggression Pact.

Although Spain never entered the Second World War, it approached that possibility repeatedly on its own terms, and steered far from strict neutrality. Franco would not enter the war for free, however, and maintained a high price for Spanish participation in the Axis Alliance. The greatest temptation for the Generalissimo came with the fall of France following the summer of 1940. The prospect of acquiring French holdings in Africa and the possibility of an early German peace with Britain brought Franco to the bargaining table. Hitler, who exercised the real choice in the matter, would not meet Spanish demands. Astoundingly, Franco kept toying with the prospect through the end of 1942. Spain had been weakened by the devastation of the Spanish Civil War and by shortages of critical food and fuel; for both of these, Spain depended upon trade with the United States and Britain. Despite the continual urgings of his Germanophile Foreign Minister, Serrano, Franco opted to preserve technical neutrality. He agreed to German requests for naval provisioning in Spain and the Canary Islands, and planned joint operations against Gibraltar with the Germans, as well as cooperation in economic matters and intelligence assistance. Whenever he considered a formal declaration of war, however, it was on the basis of Germany meeting his own totally unrealistic demands for huge quantities of arms, food, and fuel, along with territorial expansion in North Africa at the expense of Vichy France

[The most authoritative analysis is Javier Tussel, Franco, España y la II Guerra Mundial: entre el Eje y la neutralidad. (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1995); see especially 13–16, 83ff.]

 

There, you now know as much as I do about it!

 

Again, if France remained at war, H would have pursued vice launching BoB, Sea Lion, Barbarossa, inter alia. There is little the allies, even with the vaunted USN Atl Fleet could have done to significantly retard this. Of course, there is always the chance that H would have ingored all this and simply exploited the entire continenatal zone of France. Yet, he was willing to postpone the invasion of the USSR [fatally?] for...wait for it...Greece??

[swerve]

... Of course, there is always the chance that H would have ingored all this and simply exploited the entire continenatal zone of France. Yet, he was willing to postpone the invasion of the USSR [fatally?] for...wait for it...Greece??

 

Unwillingly, because Mussoline dragged him into it, & Hitler had to get Il Duce out of the hole he'd dug them both into. By invading Greece, Mussolini got British forces back onto the European mainland. They couldn't be left there while the Wehrmacht moved into the USSR.

[Shortround6]

King Sargent:

 

Yes there were other aircraft ,like 55 of the Northrop BTs, but not enough. When one reads of of 40 out of 71 Battles being shot down in one attack I think we can see just how little time the US Naval air groups might have lasted. Even if they had done better or with better fighter escort lasted a few attacks more things are stacked too heavily against them. Sustained operations in this case is just a matter of a week or two not months. Most Carrier actions were 1-2 days with months inbetween. Exceptions being the NorthAfrica and Sicilian invasions but even then the some of the planes got used up pretty quick.

 

Considering the numbers of French light bombers that were also lost (most powered by twin 700hp engines) without slowing the Germans to any great degree I really can't see a few hundred more slow, single engine, light bombers (1000lb or under payload) making a big difference. Buy a couple of days? or 4? at the cost of half of the US Naval Airgroup? again who is left to train replacements. How many months until the losses can be made good.

[Ken Estes]

Unwillingly, because Mussoline dragged him into it, & Hitler had to get Il Duce out of the hole he'd dug them both into. By invading Greece, Mussolini got British forces back onto the European mainland. They couldn't be left there while the Wehrmacht moved into the USSR.

True, Paul, but the devil in me makes me think of Salonika, 1915, and how clever the Wehrmacht might heve been to keep an active UK/CW bridgehead for them to struggle to maintain in one place where it could never hurt them!

[KingSargent]

King Sargent:

 

Yes there were other aircraft ,like 55 of the Northrop BTs, but not enough. When one reads of of 40 out of 71 Battles being shot down in one attack I think we can see just how little time the US Naval air groups might have lasted. Even if they had done better or with better fighter escort lasted a few attacks more things are stacked too heavily against them. Sustained operations in this case is just a matter of a week or two not months. Most Carrier actions were 1-2 days with months inbetween. Exceptions being the NorthAfrica and Sicilian invasions but even then the some of the planes got used up pretty quick.

 

Considering the numbers of French light bombers that were also lost (most powered by twin 700hp engines) without slowing the Germans to any great degree I really can't see a few hundred more slow, single engine, light bombers (1000lb or under payload) making a big difference. Buy a couple of days? or 4? at the cost of half of the US Naval Airgroup? again who is left to train replacements. How many months until the losses can be made good.

That is the point. The critical part of the battle (drive to the Channel) was over in a couple of weeks. The critical time for the bombers to do good (cutting Meuse crossings) was a matter of days. I am not talking about the USN fighting a months-long campaign, I am talking about doing critical damage once, at a critical time. A check in the Panzer advance might have given the French time to get their ponderous act together. There is no guarantee it would change anything given the state of the French command and staff at the time, but there was certainly no time for the Allies to play catch-up in the HTL, so any delay would almost have to be some improvement.

 

I can find no record of French Attack sorties until the campaign after Dunkirk. The Breguet 691/693 had not reached operational status in time to delay the Germans in the Ardennes (a terrain intended by the Creator for road-blocks) or at the Meuse crossings. Low-level attacks by bombers not designed or trained for such work were sent against the Meuse bridges, but the Germans had ther own built by then. MOF, the Germans had a bridge across the Meuse east of Sedan before the far bank was occupied by German troops; the engineers didn't know they were getting ahead of things, so the bridge went in with French outposts watching and unable to notify anyone.

In any case French attack-bomber useage and losses came AFTER the critical point when they might have done some good.

 

The Battles attacked late (and the 40 of 71 losses were totals for all missions that day, not one attack) after the Germans had set up flak screens. In fact even if they had hit the bridges it might have been too late.

 

Now there is a better chance that USN CVs would not be in a position to intervene than that they would be. All I am saying is if they HAD been there, their airgroups would have provided the Allies with a close-support strike capability they completely lacked. Used properly (fat chance of telling the Almighty Frog how to do it), they might have turned the tide. It was a cinch no one and/or nothing on the HTL would.

 

As for replacing the losses they would not matter much if they kept France in the war. If France stayed in the war the sacrifice of the USN aircrews would be seen as heroic and glorious feats of arms; if France fell anyway they would b a tragic blunder. That's how it goes.

[KingSargent]

True, Paul, but the devil in me makes me think of Salonika, 1915, and how clever the Wehrmacht might heve been to keep an active UK/CW bridgehead for them to struggle to maintain in one place where it could never hurt them!

The problem with that is Hitler was afraid of British airfields in Greece or on Crete because they were within range of the Romanian oilfields. In that sense Crete was THE strategic island in the Med. Not taking Malta handicapped a few Axis troops in a minor sideshow (the whole Desert War wouldn't have even made headlines in Russia). A successful bomber offensive from Crete against the Romanian oilfields could have hobbled the whole Wehrmacht.

 

All an invasion of North Africa is going to do is use up German mobile troops and fuel needed in Russia. Just bribing Franco to bring Spain in and fueling the Italian Navy would have denied BARBAROSSA the fuel it needed, not to mention the mobile troops. And for what? An advance of a few hundred miles into Russia would net Germany more resources than exist in all of North Africa (at least resouces known in 1940. North African oil would change things.).

 

And an invasion of North Africa through Spain leaves Germany vulnerable to a Stalinist stab in the back. Bringing Spain in opens up the longest coastline in Europe to Allied adventures. Wanna bet TORCH doesn't go to Spain and start another Penisular War?

 

 

Ken, your cut-and-paste on Spain is pretty much what I was saying. Franco was never thrilled with the idea of entering a World War and played off Hitler by setting the price of Spain's participation so high Hitler could not afford to pay the piper. At th same time he limited Spain's "pro-German Neutrality" to a level that the Alliees could live with and not endanger trade or food relief from the Allies. An outstanding balancing act, and a successful one.

[Ken Estes]

King,

 

I used to think that Franco was doing the balancing act, keeping H at arms length, but the evidence from Tussel, inter alia, is that it was the reverse. H. had it in mind to co-opt the French, honor the Armistice terms, and could not pay Paco's price.

 

My notion of H. foregoing Barbarossa [for a year] and settling the hash of a France continuing the war from NA is maybe specious, but I think H had it in mind to humble the French to the utmost, being a WWI vet. The Bolsheviks would wait their turn. Stranger things occurred in WWII, as you know.

 

What bomber from Crete? How would Crete have been a safe air base for the RAF? Did the RAF even have bombs of weight in 1940?

 

Hitler's wars may have been less about resources than race, hegemony. The resources of the USSR would have only come into play for the long war vs. the USA after Eurasia had been conquered. These are Blitzkrieg campaigns, not total war.

 

The USN acting against the Meuse crossings remains humorous. The French did not know the Meuse was in danger until too late. Who knew where the German advance columns were? The USN had no idea what the Meuse was, let alone what to do about it. It remains difficult to underestimate admirals in a land war. Let's see, Scouting 3, you look for PzGruppe Kleist, Scouting 5, you look for.....

[Sardaukar]

I don't think there is even snowball's chance in hell that Franco would have gotten Spain into war if USA was in it. He was way smarter than that.

 

War might have gone quite similarly to history, I think. Mussolini had ambitions in Balkans and would have dragged Germans in sooner or later. Ditto with North Africa. Plus there was always the H. with idea to knock our USSR out of war before West can build up.

 

Only thing that Germany might have not risked was Norway campaign with USN present..unless forced into it by Allies invading and threatening Swedish mines. That would have become interesting twist to war, since if Allies would invade Norway and Germany would have been unable to respond there, their only viable option would have been to invade Sweden to secure resources.

Edited February 9, 2008 by Sardaukar

[KingSargent]

I don't think there is even snowball's chance in hell that Franco would have gotten Spain into war if USA was in it. He was way smarter than that.

 

War might have gone quite similarly to history, I think. Mussolini had ambitions in Balkans and would have dragged Germans in sooner or later. Ditto with North Africa. Plus there was always the H. with idea to knock our USSR out of war before West can build up.

 

Only thing that Germany might have not risked was Norway campaign with USN present..unless forced into it by Allies invading and threatening Swedish mines. That would have become interesting twist to war, since if Allies would invade Norway and Germany would have been unable to respond there, their only viable option would have been to invade Sweden to secure resources.

Besides the iron business, Hitler wanted Norwegian bases for his U-boats so they wouldn't have to sneak through the North Sea past the RN and RAF. At the time he invaded he had no idea he was about to gain access to all the French Atlantic ports.

 

The 'Rapid Response Time' of the Allies to the German landings in Norway came because the ships and soldiers were at sea heading to invade Norway. Except for French waffling the Allies would have invaded Norway first; it was only a matter of a day or two. And I don't think that anybody who studies the events of 1940 can thhink that if the Allies had NOT already been on their way it would have been at least July before the French politicians, British politicians, and both Staffs had formulated a response plan to the German invasion. Quick-witted they were not. :rolleyes:

[Sardaukar]

True that.

 

I think we could think that in response of Allied landing to Norway, Germany just would have to respond. It'd be either in way of "historical-type" operation...or invasion of Sweden to directly take control of resources. I think that presence of USN (especially if with fleet carriers) might have made Kriegsmarine very cautious about trying direct invasion of Norway. On the other hand, Baltic Sea was German pond..so landings on Swedish coasts and Ahvenanmaa (Aland..that was demilitarized by treaty and did not possess any coastal forts) would have been very difficult to stop.

 

I think Scandinavia would have interesting times... Not to mention both Germany and USSR also coveted Finnish nickel mines in Petsamo. That was one reason Hitler did not allow USSR to try to occupy Finland in 1940-41.

Edited February 9, 2008 by Sardaukar

[seahawk]

I think we are too stuck in the real history. With the US joining the war and staying closely by the brits and remaining French, victory in the west is impossible to gain for the Axis. Franco would stay out of this one, Mussolini most likely, as he strategy was set on a quick end of the war and he just tried to take what was there to get easily.

 

Historically the Axis felt so secure of the victory in the West, that they opened up many unnecessary sideshows. With the US in the war already, it will become more pressing to achieve the final goal, which was "Lebensraum im Osten" aka the campaign against the Soviet Union. The campaign now has to be won before US forces start to arrive in Europe in numbers large enough, that the pose a serious threat. In that regard, Ithink Italy stay out of the war, no war in NA then. Norway will happen, it is important to interdict shipping to the Soviet Ports in the norths. The rest of the German resources will be pooled and pushed into the war in the east. They might start even a little earlier.

Edited February 9, 2008 by seahawk*

[Sardaukar]

I think we are too stuck in the real history. With the US joining the war and staying closely by the brits and remaining French, victory in the west is impossible to gain for the Axis. Franco would stay out of this one, Mussolini most likely, as he strategy was set on a quick end of the war and he just tried to take what was there to get easily.

 

Historically the Axis felt so secure of the victory in the West, that they opened up many unnecessary sideshows. With the US in the war already, it will become more pressing to achieve the final goal, which was "Lebensraum im Osten" aka the campaign against the Soviet Union. The campaign now has to be won before US forces start to arrive in Europe in numbers large enough, that the pose a serious threat. In that regard, Ithink Italy stay out of the war, no war in NA then. Norway will happen, it is important to interdict shipping to the Soviet Ports in the norths. The rest of the German resources will be pooled and pushed into the war in the east. They might start even a little earlier.

 

 

Well..if you browse bit back and study statistics given by our US contributors, anything USA did would not matter for land war in mainland Europe in 1939-40. Troops needed just would not be there.

[John T]

Sorry, haven't had the time to come back to this for a while.

Same Same

 

What is a "good officers per men quota? In CONUS including AAC it was 10,055 to 137,891, roughly 1-to-13.7. Is that "good"? Anyway, the Wehrmacht wasn't very officer rich, on 1 January 1944 the Heer numbered a reported 8,255,063, but included only 237,186 officers as of 1 February 1944, roughly 1-to-34.1. Is that "bad"?

It is often seen as a key performance indicator on the ability to grow,

as most armies belive it take more time to raise officers than soldiers.

And officers and NCO's are often expected to be able to train new recruits.

We can expect the US army of 1939 to be able to grow faster in percent than German army of 1944.

 

 

BTW, where did I ever bring in Portugal or Romania?

I'm not sure what you're trying to say, since I made no mention of the Portuguese Army?

 

No you did not but it has been said in this debate.

 

 

Er, why, the Reichswehr ceased to exist in 1933. But if you like, we could compare what the Germans could do that the Americans could not, because the Germans had more time to do it.

But about five years after reichwehr ceased to exist Germany had the worlds most potent army,

as US had in 1945.

 

 

Cheers

/John T

[John T]

Hi Guys

I like to see leand lease from the British side, rather than from the US as I feel has been done so far in this discussion.

Theres a lot of posts in the previos ten pages, but I rather comment on them as a group rather than repeating the same info. Hope you can bear my laziness

 

I do have some serious objections to the way you guys describe Lend lease and the Allied procurements before that.

And you are at least 10 months off the real timeline.

 

To quote the official British history "North American Supply" by Hall:

Procurements in the United States was slowed down more or less to a snail's pace by the decision of the Government to treat the American potential as marginal and not to commit for the time being the main part of the financial reserves.

 

When war started the Allies went for a strategy to blockade Germany to submission and planned for a three year war.

UK did not have a lot of free currencies or assets in the US and US did only accepted cash.

So the available funds had to last for three years, causing UK to limit orders to be paid in dollar, concentrating at the most important commodities as machinery tools from the US. (There where also an explosives plant built in the US, that blew up within the first months of production but in general UK made few investments in the US.)

 

France had a more aggressive approach from the beginning, placing big orders for aircrafts and engines in the US. In May 40 the UK strategy where revised as UK understood that the next day might be the last, but still the orders had to be paid cash and when France fell the financial burden of French orders also came on UK.

US did later on benefit from these allied orders but it could have been far bigger if the currency problem had been overcome.

 

Note that Norway, Sweden and Finland received more fighters from US than RAF during the first six months of 1940!

 

For more info on the British financial perspective see http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-C...Econ/index.html

 

 

All in all this would not make much difference on the ground in May 40,

possibly adding trucks, radios and M2 .50 HMG's to French army.

 

 

Cheers

/John T

[KingSargent]

Besides the financial situation, the UK had other problems. The long neglect since 1919 had devastated the British armaments industry. Even if they had money to throw at industry, the plant and skilled workers just didn't exist any more.

 

Then there was the peacetime planning that relegated the British Army to the role of Imperial Police Force - "There will never be another BEF." They trained hard, well, and successfully for that role, which was not what was needed once the French informed the UK that there WOULD be another BEF on the Continent, or there would be no French alliance. It was only in February 1939 that Britain began to seriously consider another Continental army. That left about six months to decide what was needed for the expansion, plan to organize for and prepare it, and turn out a combat-ready product. Obviously, not enough.

 

The British Army lacked leadership trained for Continental War and they lacked institutionalized modern military military concepts. There were a few thinkers who now stand out because the were proven right by events but were considered crackpots at the time; the Army as an institution was mired in the days of the Afghan Wars. The British Army did not motorize in 1938 in order to have a modern army for mobile warfare, they motorized because there were not enough horses in the UK anymore to support an expanded Army.*

 

So if the US enters the war in 1939 and starts military expansion only then, they will only be about six months behind the British Army in starting from scratch in physical expansion and they were far ahead conceptually and had expansion planning prepared. Despite lacking numbers the US Army thought long and hard about what would be needed and prepared training programs and developed advanced doctrine (in artillery use for one major example). All they needed to do was plug in the men - the first drafts built the training camps themselves, and the lesson plans were ready to be passed out. The Army even had industrial surveys of the capabilities of every factory in the US, so they could determine what each plant was suited to make when the material expansion began. The FUBARs of WW1 were not going to be repeated if George Marshall and his cronies had any say in the matter.

 

* Separation of the Irish Republic deprived the British of access to the Irish horse-breeding industry - long a major source of mounts. And with civilian society becoming increasingly motorized, no young men wanted to join the Army to become horse grooms, they wanted to be trained as drivers and mechanics. The stock of sturdy farm lads familiar with working with animal draft was no longer as great as it had been before WW1. The British Army bought trucks because it could not get horses and horsemen.