What if the USA enters WW2 in September 1939?

[Jim Martin]

some comments on the discussion:

Or put it diffrently, US Army was probably not that much worse than French or British army of 1939.

 

The US Army WAS far worse than both the Brit and French armies.

 

And we ain't coming in 1939. No way, no how.

 

Nor are we coming through most of 1940. Maybe 1941.

 

Mobilization would not have gone much faster at all. As I noted, throughout 1939, US industry had its "pump primed" due to orders from France and the UK for weapons and materielle. Even without Lend Lease, we were churning out supplies for the Allies, pretty much at the capacity for US industry. UK and French demand helped us to expand our military industrial capacity, thus enabling our faster expansion in 1940 when we finally started conscription. If we went to war in 1939, we would not have had the benefit of a full year of war orders from France and UK.

 

Sorry, the US is constantly accused of "arriving late to the party", but in fact, the US arrived just as soon as it was capable of arriving. US entry into the war in '39 or '40 would not have made any difference, save perhaps for naval presence in the Atlantic--and hey, we were already providing convoy escorts.

[DougRichards]

What about artillery?

 

The USA had sufficient 'spare' 155mm Howitzers M1917 and M1918 so that a number were sent to North Africa in June 1941, for use pending the issue of the British 5.5in gun in May 1942.

 

Various and sundry US manufactured 75mm guns were bought by Britain in 1940.

 

As a what if, if the USA had entered the war in 1939, would it have been possible for the USA to provide some battalion sized anti-tank units, using 75mm guns, for use in North Africa May 1941? Whilst not idea for the AT role due to more limited traverse than desirable in an AT gun, would these have been able to supplant the 2pdr until the 6pdr became available in November 1941?

 

As it was the US 57mm was standardised in May 1941, this could have been much earlier, as the design had actually been settled on, in Britain, in 1938. US factories would have had greater incentive to churn out 57mm guns for US forces, and allies who were sharing the fighting.

[Mk 1]

I think it is hard to compare US strength of 1939 with the world as of September 1939, it is too easy to compare with Germany 1943 or US 1945 since that is what we know from real history.

Agree that we are discussing the realm of "what-if", so it is indeed necessary to shift away from the actual 1939/40 US armed forces strengths to some extent. But there are indeed limits to what could have been achieved under any reasonable scenario.

 

The German army had it's share of ineficiency too that where shown during the early campaigns,

so I think the US disadvantage where less pronounced in 1940 than in 1942-44.

One might suggest this on a qualititative basis. But in total?

 

Indeed the German army of 1942 was one of the best the world has seen in terms of its professionalism at all ranks. But for a comparison we are speaking of the US actually having an army in 1942, versus having only a cadre in 1939. However the Germans improved qualitiatively, how can you judge the relative US disadvantage in 1940 when the US did not have any equivelant scale of forces to compare?

 

Or put it diffrently, US Army was probably not that much worse than French or British army of 1939.

You are suggesting that the US Army was probably not that much worse than a French army that was more than 10 times its size in manpower. I'm not sure how you can arrive at that conclusion.

 

Third, If US enters the war the expansion whould probably have gone faster than in reality, while as long French manpower stood against the Germans the pressing need for imediate manpower reinforcements was secondary to the knowledge of the huge reserves that would come within a few years.

The presumption of this discussion of starting Lend Lease in 1939, is that somehow that would have been a faster path than was actually taken.

 

In fact the French government already sent purchasing commissions to the US in 1939 to buy whatever arms were deemed as combat-worthy. Those purchases included Curtis Hawk 75 (P-36) and 81 (P-40) fighters, and Martin 187 ("Maryland") and Douglas DB-7 ("Boston") bombers, and would likely have included M3 Stuart tanks if the French had lasted through the summer of 1940 until we actually knew how to build them.

 

At the same time the Brits also had a purchasing commission buying whatever they felt was combat-worthy from the US.

 

What else would / could we have sent? As it was, many of the planes we sent were deemed "unfit for action" by the Brits, quite regardless of their dire straights in 1940.

 

Lend/Lease would not have changed any of that in 1939/40. Lend/Lease was a question of who financed the purchases, not whether the purchases were made. Under lend/lease the US Government paid the producing companies for their goods, and then loaned them to the allies. That was not necessary until the Brits (and the Soviets) started having trouble generating the currency to pay for their arms in 1941. Up until that time, the cash of the allies was every bit as much incentive to Curtis, Douglas, Severesky, Ford, GM, etc. as any money that Washington would have come up with. (And Washington WAS coming up with the money too. The allies were limited in what they could buy by what was needed to build up the US military. The US military was already consuming almost all of the available production capacity for the items it wanted.)

 

The problem wasn't whether purchases were being made. The problem was developing items that were really worth purchasing, and then building factories to produce them. That took time. More "push" doesn't change that very much. We are really looking at diminishing returns for pushing any harder. The likelyhood, as others (ie: Rich) have pointed out, is that more push would have probably been detrimental, leading to expanded production on items that were not fit for service.

 

US army was a cadre, with an intent to be expanded.

 

...

 

Then I found this

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-WD...WD-Plans-6.html

How much better off where the British/French/Polish/German divisions mobilizing in September 1939?

I think the key issue is that the European mobilizations (perhaps excluding the British) did not involve raw recruiting / new drafts, as was most of the US mobilization. The standing army in France, in particular, was some 10x the size of the standing army in the US throughout the interwar period. For the French, it was a matter of calling up the reserves -- a body of some millions of soldiers who had served in recent years -- of gathering them in depots and issuing their guns and their ammunition, and marching them off to their assigned units. There was no such body of millions of reservists in the US. For the US it was a matter of drafting new men and putting them into basic training.

 

Here is a passage from the war plans you have linked to, describing the immediate efforts taken in the first week of September, 1939, to expand the US Army:

 

The 17,000-man expansion of the Army that this order permitted was on a scale so modest as to call for scrutiny. Increases to cope with the well-foreseen event of a European war had been contemplated in the General Staff ever since General Craig's instructions of the preceding April. The specific planning of G-3 and WPD, under the eye of the Chief of Staff, had been for a step-by-step development. This was dictated by the paucity of veteran personnel available for training the recruits as well as by the absence of new weapons and other equipment destined for the new units. There had been Staff discussion of whether the first step should be to war strength (12,000 at that time) or peace strength (9,000) for the new triangular divisions, and the persuasive argument of Lt. Col. (later Maj. Gen.) Jonathan W. Anderson of WPD in late August was for an initial increase only to peace strength. He argued that this would "call forth less adverse criticism" and at the same time would avoid flooding the Army's skeletonized divisions with untrained replacements "so seriously . . . as to materially affect their efficiency."

(Highlights are my own. -Mk1)

 

The Army (through the war plans division) was actually lobbying for a reduced growth rate versus what was proposed by Washington. They knew they could not absorb troops any faster.

 

If you read the accounts of units (or individual soldiers) in the US Army of 1940/41/42, you almost always find the story of training-up a unit, splitting-up that unit to form the cadres of 2 other units, and then re-training up all 3 units. Again and again. As soon as a unit was approaching "readiness" it was raided for 2/3rds of its trained personnel, and had to start the whole process over. Even units that were slated for overseas assignments in mid 1942 wound up loosing many of their personnel, and taking in new drafts, sometimes only weeks (or even days!) before shipping out.

 

I still can't see the US making much of a contribution to the land war in 1939 or 1940. The Navy could have made some contribution. But issues where a naval contribution were vital were actually rather rare in 1939/40.

 

I don't see the USN somehow alleviating British fears of invasion -- the RN was enough for that. But the USN might have been able to keep a stronger force on station off of Norway, or in the Med.

 

Maybe the USN's presence would have given the Brits enough confidence in their control of their far-reaching lines of seaborne communications to prevent actions that ultimately poisoned relations with the Vichy French. Not that the Brits and French were on track for any close commeradery after Dunkirk, but things did not need to go as sour as they went IRL. The US was actively working diplomatic channels with Vichy officials, even selling arms and munitions to the French in North Africa through 1941. Weygand, then in French North Africa, was clearly seeking to preserve and train his army for an eventual return to battle against the Germans. But the Brits were openly hostile to Vichy, splitting the loyalties of French forces by backing de Gaule and attacking outlying Vichy bastions throughout Africa and the Middle East.

 

Keeping France's remaining strength unified and sympathetic to the allied side might have provided some strategic benefits particularly in 1941 and 1942.

 

-Mark 1

[Lampshade111]

Good points but do any of you think the United States entering the war at such an early stage would delay the invasion of Russia and most of that huge force to be sent somewhere else?

[Rich]

I think it is hard to compare US strength of 1939 with the world as of September 1939, it is too easy to compare with Germany 1943 or US 1945 since that is what we know from real history.

The German army had it's share of ineficiency too that where shown during the early campaigns,

so I think the US disadvantage where less pronounced in 1940 than in 1942-44.

Or put it diffrently, US Army was probably not that much worse than French or British army of 1939.

 

Sorry, but that is incorrect. As of 1 July 1940 the United States Regular Army consisted of 13,797 officers and an enlisted strength totaling 243,095 (authorized enlisted strength had been expanded from 227,000 to 280,000 on 13 June and to 375,000 on 26 June), including the Army Air Corps. The strength of the National Guard officer corps was about 21,074 (but only 6,800 had received any training in service schools) and enlisted strength was 226,837. There were also approximately 33,000 Reserve officers and 104,228 ROTC (Reserve Officers’ Training Camps) and CMTC (Citizens’ Military Training Camps) graduates in the Organized Reserve Corps. Finally, the CCC (Civilian Conservation Corps), established by President Roosevelt as part of the “New Deal,” had provided a taste of military discipline, barracks and field life to approximately 250,000 young men. It is a measure of the weakness of the Army that the strength of the active combat regiments alone at full strength would have numbered about 300,000 officers and men, in other words about 40,000 more officers and men than were then in the entire Army, without any allowance of strength for the Army Air Corps, combat support and service support units, or overhead for training establishments, casuals, transients, and headquarters personnel.

 

Through July 1940 mobilization was based upon plans formulated by Douglas MacArthur during his tenure as Chief of Staff in 1932 and updated in 1938 by Chief of Staff Malan Craig. Under that plan, mobilization would be accomplished by federalizing the National Guard and by augmenting the force by about 400,000 through voluntary enlistment and conscription, creating an “Initial Protective Force” of about one million men. However, in the wake of the outbreak of the European war in September 1939, and the rising tension with Japan in the Pacific, it was seen that this force would be woefully inadequate to fight a multi-theater war overseas while simultaneously protecting American possessions and the continental United States. Unfortunately there had been little thought given to and no planning exercises carried out (quite simply because no budget had allowed for such) pre-war for any expansion beyond the initial million men. Thus, all mobilization activities in the U.S. Army that occurred after 16 November 1940, when the induction of the National Guard began and the Selective Service Act took effect, occurred extemporaneously. It was this ad hoc nature of the mobilization that led directly to later problems in fielding ground forces adequate to prosecute the war effectively.

 

Between 16 September 1940 and 1 July 1941 the expansion of the Regular Army authorization, the federalization of the National Guard, the recall of Reserve officers, and conscription had increased the size of the Army to 1,326,577 officers and men, including the Army Air Corps. By 7 December 1941 conscription had further increased this total to 1,638,086 officers and men.

 

Secondly, lend-lease from September 1939 would make a tremendous effect on investments in US.

Lend-Lease was a financial burden to the US, since in essence it was a differed interest loan, it's effect on US investments in 1939 - when the country was in the tail end of the "Little Depression" was unlikley to have been tremendously good.

 

The problem would have been what could have made any deliveries before the sitation before May 40?

Motorized part of the French army?

 

Only if France could have footed the bil, in 1939 Detroit was in as poor a financial state as the rest of the country.

 

(snip)Even if they only where 25 000 reserve officers and 10 000 officers thats close to 50% of the Germany army's officer corps as of September 1939.

 

See above for the officer cadre in July 1940, 68,000 of whom 54,000 were trained and about 35,000 were fit for duty. The 104,228 in ROTC were college students like my Dad, who accepted a military obligation in exchange for college funding. He was part of that ROTC in July 1940, but he wasn't commissioned until April 1943.

 

Meanwhile the officer corps of the partly mobilized Heer on 1 September 1939 was 89,075, by the end of 1940 it was over 150,000, which does not include the officer corps of the Luftwaffe. By the end of 1939 the Feldheer numbered about 2.74-million with another 965,000 in the Ersatzheer and there were another 400,000 in the Luftwaffe. By the end of 1940 the Feldheer was 3.65-million with 900 in the Ersatzheer and 1.2-million in the Luftwaffe.

[Ken Estes]

Sorry, but that is incorrect.

So, not for nothing we ranked 22nd in the world, behind...Romania?

[dpapp2]

With the US in the war before France falls... Would Italy even consider declaring war on France in 1940? I don't think so. That would close the possibility of any large war in the Mediterranean.

 

There's a very good chance that Germany and the USSR would go along nicely for a few years.

[Shortround6]

As a small insight into production it has been said that French orders in 1939 paid for Pratt & Whitney to add a 280,000 sq ft wing to their factory. This was followed by 425,000sq ft "British wing" and a further 375,000sq ft from American funds. Ground was broken in Oct-Nov 1940 For the Ford plant to build R-2800s under licence. This plant practicaly duplicated the P&W East Hartford Plant and totaled about 900,000sq Ft. By the enf off the war this plant would total 3,852,273sq ft.

The smaller engines, R-985 and R-1340, were farmed out to Jacobs and Continental to free up production capacity for the larger engines.

Buick wound up building R-1830s and R-2000s.

Nash-Kelvinator built R-2800s starting deliverys in late 1942

Chevrolet came in later.

The East Hartford Plant wound up at over 3 million sq ft with another 2 million sq ft in sattalite plants in Connecticut.

In 1943 P&W built another Plant just outside Kansas City that was larger than the East Hartford Plant.

 

Considering that other engine makers and aircraft manufacturers were undergoing similar expansion the demand for construction workers and material must have been a bit of change after the depression.

 

As far the U.S. doing much more than it was doing, aside from the manpower issues which have already been adressed, all of these factories had to be built or modified, tooling ordered, built and delievered, workers hired and trained. The jigs and fixtures to produce the actual products have to be designed and built and that can only be done after the final specifications are set.

 

THe U.S. ordered a number of planes and other weapons that it knew were not combat ready just to give companies cash flow. Almost 300 Republic P-43s were ordered in 1940 for delivery in 1941-42 to keep production lines open (workers in place and trained) while work procceded on the P-47 which is what the USAAC really wanted.

 

There are any number of similar stories. These not quite up to snuff weapons did allow for expansion of the industrial base as well as giving the expanding armed forces something to actually fly, drive or shoot while giving the troops experience in mantaining and supplying the weapons.

How many air force mechanics do you need for every pilot?

How many fuel trucks per fighter squadron? or for a bomber squadron?

 

Industrial expansion was probably going about as fast as it was going to go. The Ford plant compleated it's first engine Aug 1941, 10 months after foundation work began on the plant . This is WITHOUT the stimulase of Pearl harbor. 900,000 sq ft of fiber board covered with tar paper enclosed the building while it was under construction during the Michigan winter with large charcaol burners providiing heat. Ford had been given $14.3 million from the goverment on Sept 17, 1940 to build and tool up this plant.

[John T]

So, not for nothing we ranked 22nd in the world, behind...Romania?

 

My omission of the word Quality have caused a lot of answers,

sorry for causing that bandwith.

 

I should have refered to the original claim that a American Expeditionary force of aprox 3 infantry divisions(triangual) would have been complete out of the question.

So my line of thought. was that US would have been able to train such a force and field it in Europe during the first month of 1940 with officers and men with a training similar to the European Armies.

That US army as a combat force wasn't big enough to be in quantity compared with the Europeans was to me a foregone conclusion.

 

 

Cheers

/John T.

[Rich]

I should have refered to the original claim that a American Expeditionary force of aprox 3 infantry divisions(triangual) would have been complete out of the question.

So my line of thought. was that US would have been able to train such a force and field it in Europe during the first month of 1940 with officers and men with a training similar to the European Armies.

Cheers

/John T.

 

Hi John,

 

The problem is that the US Army was completely and absolutely unprepared to mobilize any forces for overseas service in 1939-1940. Even after Pearl Harbor, following a year and a half of mobilization, it was hard put to do so. At that point if required the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Division could probably have deployed and the 5th Division was ready to deploy by 22 April 1942, but that's about it, the next wave of divisions weren't ready for deployment until that fall. However, the 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Divisions were all in the midst of reorganization or recovering from providing cadres to the rest of the mobilizing Army, while the National Guard Divisions were just completing their reorganization and integration of cadres, and were also being drawn on for cadres for the mobilizing Reserve and AUS divisions.

 

Again, quite simply the prewar mobilization "planning" had been virtually nonexistant and none of the limited planning in place had ever been tested in exercises. Realistically, with the US Army entering World War II in September 1939, the best that could be expected as available might be a single division....in about four months. After that deployments could be expected about a year after mobilization began.

[DB]

I still think that if the US enters the war in September 1939, one should look back a few years to see how this could have come about, then examine how the US would have reacted to the difference in circumstances.

 

In other words, the "nodal event" for the alternative history wouldn't start with the declaration of war, but would be earlier. Perhaps in 1936, or 1938. If the US became involved earlier, it might trigger earlier action towards mobilization.

 

So, what if Chamberlain had come back from Munich without a piece of paper, and the situation had escalated a year earlier?

 

Obviously, this is a much more difficult thought experiment to consider, and the war may well have started before Sep 1939.

[Shortround6]

Again from an aircraft perspective. The French ordered 100 Curtiss Mohawk Is on on May 13, 1938. This order was completed in "record time" by December 24, 1938. French orders for Curtiss Mohawks totaled 1000 planes between May 13, 1938 and October 1939.

 

Curtiss had built less than 500 fighters total from 1930 (included) to the end of 1938 not including the P-36/Mohawk series.

 

The Curtiss XP-40 was ordered on 7/7/1937. It first flew on 10/14/1938. Production order place for 524 P-40s placed on 4/27/1939, just over 6 months later. first flight of P-40 in April 1940 with first delivery to AAC in June 1940. Last of 199 planes actually built to this specification (others completed as P-40Bs and P-40Cs) delivered 10/15/1940.

 

Unless you start much earlier than 1938 the time it takes to build/enlarge factories, hire/train workers and come up with usable designs ( Curtiss was still delivering biplanes in 1934-36) is going to limit what could actually be changed.

 

Small arms also presents a problem. The M-1 didn't go into production until 1939. Some of the machinery (and workers) to make it had been used to make 1903s. If you are expanding the Army do you delay production of the M-1 to make more 1903s? Or do you go ahead with the change over and hope you can get the guns produced in time to equip the troops who have been drilling with broomsticks? How many months until you can get the other factories tooled up to make either the M-1 or the 1903s?

 

The question is nice historical "what if" but to really have any effect the timing does have to be changed by a number of years.

[Richard Lindquist]

Small arms also presents a problem. The M-1 didn't go into production until 1939. Some of the machinery (and workers) to make it had been used to make 1903s. If you are expanding the Army do you delay production of the M-1 to make more 1903s? Or do you go ahead with the change over and hope you can get the guns produced in time to equip the troops who have been drilling with broomsticks? How many months until you can get the other factories tooled up to make either the M-1 or the 1903s?

 

Between the stocks of the M1903 and the 30-06 M1917 Enfields, there were plenty of small arms available that were the equal of anything the Germans, British, or French had. Converting a small arms production line over from M1903 to M1 was no problem given money.

 

After Dunkirk, the following weapons were being sent to Britain:

 

615,000 M1917 Enfield Rifles

25,000 Browning Auto Rifles

86,000 Machine Guns (mostly Marlin, Vickers, and Lewis)

895 75mm Guns

 

The US still had about 896,000 M1903 Springfield Rifles, 44,000 M1 Rifles, 62,000 M1918A2 BAR, 67,000 machineguns (mix of M1917A1 and M1919A4, 4400 Ma-Deuce, and 1200 3in Stokes mortars

 

The following WWI vintage artillery was on hand after shipments to Britain: 4200 75mm guns, 3000 155mm howitzers, 970 155mm guns, 475 8-inch howitzers, 320 240mm howitzers, and 807 3in AA guns. There were small amounts of modern artillery.

[Shortround6]

It is not the money to change over the rifle production line, it is the time. And the results of such a decision. If the decision is made not to change over in 1939 then M-1 deployment is even later than it was historicly and M-1s were in short supply as it was in 1942.

 

The list of small arms left over from WW I is impressive and much larger than I had realized. No problem arming troops for training.

Arming troops to the same standard as the French isn't hard but then you might get the results the French got. While the Springfield might not give up much if anything to the Mauser the BAR wasn't really in the same class as the MG 34. Proper use of the MA duece might have been a problem. It was refered to at the time as an Antitank Machine Gun.

 

The Artillery might be a little suspect however. One source gives 2971 of the 155 howitzers available in June 1940. That is close enough to 3000 but only 599 had been "high speeded", fitted with brakes and pneumatic tires and wheel bearings to permit towing behind modern tractors and trucks. If you go to war sooner do you continue to convert old guns or do you stop converting and make new ones?

[Richard Lindquist]

It is not the money to change over the rifle production line, it is the time. And the results of such a decision. If the decision is made not to change over in 1939 then M-1 deployment is even later than it was historicly and M-1s were in short supply as it was in 1942.

 

The list of small arms left over from WW I is impressive and much larger than I had realized. No problem arming troops for training.

Arming troops to the same standard as the French isn't hard but then you might get the results the French got. While the Springfield might not give up much if anything to the Mauser the BAR wasn't really in the same class as the MG 34. Proper use of the MA duece might have been a problem. It was refered to at the time as an Antitank Machine Gun.

 

The Artillery might be a little suspect however. One source gives 2971 of the 155 howitzers available in June 1940. That is close enough to 3000 but only 599 had been "high speeded", fitted with brakes and pneumatic tires and wheel bearings to permit towing behind modern tractors and trucks. If you go to war sooner do you continue to convert old guns or do you stop converting and make new ones?

 

The "line" can be changed over rapidly. The lead time is the machine tools and jigs. Once you have those in hand, the line can be changed overnight for something like a rifle.

 

BAR was used right through the war. I agree the BAR wasn't equal to the MG34 or the MG42, but the combo of M1918A2, M1919A4, and M1917A1 did the job in WWII and in Korea. They still were using BAR when I joined the Army in 1961. Should the US have adopted a MG34/MG42/BREN type LMG?? The answer is obviously yes, but they didn't and still got through the war OK. I don't think that being equipped with Springfields and BAR were the problems the US faced in going to war in 1939.

 

M1903 was fully equal to the Mauser and the Enfield which served the Germans and the Brits right through WWII.

 

My source was 2971 as well, I just did some rounding. The ones that weren't "speeded" would be towed by crawler tractors. What a lot of folks don't realize is that most of the US divisions committed to action in italy and the Southwest Pacific used the Schneider 155 hows.

[seahawk]

Hah, we might be able to pull together one full-strength division to send to France by May 1940, but that would mean destroying our ability to form cadres for new divisions forming--which means we wouldn't send them. We'd keep the Regular Army in the States, busily trying to train additional divisions. The US Navy would show up, so England wouldn't have worries about invasion, and Norway probably wouldn't have happened.

 

That is what I was thinking. No Sea Lion, no offensive BoB and no invasion of Norway saves a lot of resources for the Germans. And if Italy stays neutral (imho possible with the US in the war) no war in North Africa and a smaler balkans campaign maybe. All things that would save precious German resources and most importantly take away valuable lessens learned from the allies. So we might be looking at an invasion of France in fall 1942/spring 1943. Considering the shortage of material and the non existant combat experience we might see the allies land with Grants and 2lbs Cruiser tanks, facing a stronger 1942 german army.

[Ken Estes]

A US entry into WWII in Sept39 [why??] leaves us only months to have an effect upon the outcome of June40, without any equivalent benefit of the over two years' preparation and gradual mobilization that barely sufficed for us when we did enter the war.

 

The odds on Sea Lion and BoB do not change with a US entry into the war in 1939, because the US can send nothing to the UK in 1940, except ships that lack AA protection, perhaps even more than those of the RN. The Norway campaign, we ought to recall, was undertaken in its historical case under the very nose of a dominant sea power, taking advantage of neutral Norway, surprise and interior strategic position. Thus the presence of USN units at Scapa Flow, Rosyth, etc. has little immediate effect upon the German plan, already audacious. Navies do not like having their ships bombed and sunk, and having more USN ships at hand would not make the RN any more comfortable facing the Luftwaffe operating out of Trondheim, Stavanger, Oslo.

 

The USN has nothing at hand capable of handling Scharnhort and Gneisenau, unless you think we'd denude the Pacific of the CV force.....

 

Agreed that a 1939 entry keeps Italy out of the war, but it kept itself out of the war until the lure of French booty proved irresistable, and who knows how beguiled Musso would be by a June40 repeat, followed by France continuing to fight from No Africa and a certain offer from Germany to give Italy the No Afr colonies in return for a African joint campaign defending in the east and offensive in the west. This would solve the conundrum of the later desert war vs. UK 8th Army by placing all the French ports at the disposal of the Axis, making Op Torch a bit more difficult as well. In short, a US entry might make the Germans more serious and deliberate about a Med strategy than they in fact were! Stranger ironies did in fact occur.

[seahawk]

Ken,

 

I think that the US Navy in the war so early makes every venture unintersting that requires local Naval superiority for the Germans. Sea Lion is impossible with the combined fleets of the US and british being ready to crush the invasion fleet. When you can´t do Sea Lion, then you do not need to fight the BoB in the way it was fought.

Norway as an invasion might still be possbile, yet keeping the troops in supply there and getting resources home to the Reich, will be harder under that circumstances ,especially if one considers the possibility that the CV force of the Pacific will be around in spring 1940. (I have no doubt about that, as it is the best force the US could sent)

North Africa alos looks much less interesting. Say with the US in the war France does not go Vichy, but does a fighting withdrawl. The troops in Northern Africa could be supplied from the US, while the british,french and US fleets would be available in the med. The Italian fleet would stand no chance against them and with that the Italian campaign in North Africe stands no chance. I doubt Mussolini would risk this. Especially as the air battle situation over the MEd would also be different with the remains fo the French Air Force and the addition of what little the US could sent.

[Ken Estes]

Well, the German Navy never had local naval superiority for any venture. It did manage air superiority at times, such as over the Channel and in the Central Med. The Norway invasion was a coup de main, and once the Luftwaffe was based there, an endgame. Sea Lion defenses would not have been the battle line, which would have remained in Scapa Flow. Anti-invasion duties fell to the little boys. In any case, the BoB required air superiority.

 

The USN still had to watch the Pacific and definite limits remain on what exactly could be sent to the Atlantic, No Sea. I think it unlikely that the CV force would appear in any significant numbers. The USN only planned war vs. the IJN, and the Kriegsmarine scarcely made a blip on its radar.

 

Once France falls, a repeat of June40, the Med option remains to be played or not. It depends not on any US presence in 1940, but rather in how soon Hitler forces the turn to Russia. Not for nothing is the Med called the Middle Sea...it is not the ocean.

 

German power remains at its peak in 1940-41, and there is little the US can change about that.

 

Edit to add: Yorktown, pre-war at Port au Prince, note the powerful air group!

 

Enterprise, October39, one month into the Anglo-German War; ready to face the Luftwaffe??

Edited January 31, 2008 by Ken Estes

[swerve]

Once France falls, a repeat of June40, the Med option remains to be played or not. It depends not on any US presence in 1940, but rather in how soon Hitler forces the turn to Russia. Not for nothing is the Med called the Middle Sea...it is not the ocean.

 

German power remains at its peak in 1940-41, and there is litle the US can change about that.

 

Although I can see Norway succeeding for the Germans even with a US fleet in European waters, I'm not sure they'd risk it. Maybe, maybe not. Where I can't agree is North Africa. Assume everything up to May 1940 is the same: plenty of time for a lot of US shipping to arrive before France falls, assisting in the evacuation of French troops, & a much greater hope for the French of 1) holding North Africa & 2) returning one day. The knowledge that the USA, with its industrial might & large population, was an ally, would influence French thinking.

 

If the French thought they could fight on, they'd try. With the French fleet in Algeria, more French troops, many more French aircraft, the ability to recruit from Morocco, Senegal, Kabylia, etc. & arm, equip, clothe & feed the troops (a use for all the leftover US WW1 equipment!), the aircraft, guns, ammunition etc. ordered from the USA arriving . . . I'm pretty sure they'd decide continued resistance was possible.

 

A heavily armed French North Africa would be a dagger pointed at Mussolinis heart if he joined the war. Either he keeps out, or loses Libya toute suite, with the French revelling in being able to strike back, even if not directly at Germany. It'd be a magnet for French young men, enabling the French to maintain their army & air force, as long as the USA supplied it.

 

I can imagine Hitler turning east without the losses of the BoB & waste of Sealion (the German economy would be in slightly better shape without the transprot disruption caused by assembling the invasion fleet & the loss of some of it), leaving Mussolini (if in the war) to hold the Med., & ignoring it if Italy was neutral. Scenaria A, I can see the Allies practicing on the Italians, & Hitler having to prop them up. Scenario B, air offensive on Germany starting in earnest slightly earlier, an uninterrupted Allied buildup, & an invasion of France before 1944. Not sure where, when, or how it would fare. The Balkans would be interesting in Scenario B. Maybe the Allies would try to get Greece in the war & open up a Balkan front (one of Churchills pet projects) against Bulgaria.

[Ken Estes]

Once the Weygand Line is broken, there remains too little time to move the troops to ports. The decision to fight on in No Africa was well covered in a previous discussion, I thought. The army is trapped by its obligation to fight for France, even if there was any hope of continuing the war from No Africa. What could be brought to NA in late June of 1940 was actually carried out. The French Navy did an excellent job of clearing its merchant shipping [+ the two new BBs] out of the Atlantic ports, taking what civilians, troops were there. Time, not shipping, was in short supply.

 

I find it impossible that the French Army would have disengaged and moved to Africa. By mid-June40, the option no longer remained.

 

Once again, I doubt that the US could have materially changed June40, except I agree with Paul that it might have found the moral support to continue WWII from France Overseas.

 

Could that refugee army have then turned around and attacked the Italian Army in Tripolitania? It made no such effort in the few days left in June40. The control of the Med rested, then as now, on air power, and only one power has it in Europe by June40. Continuing the war from No Africa would have forced the Germans to undertake a serious Middle Sea strategy, unlike the historical case.

[Shortround6]

To Richard.

True it is the design and manufacture of the jigs and fixture that takes time. But these are not CNC machines. Changing from one rifle to another is not an overnight job even if the jigs and fixtures are ready.

 

It was the combination of the M-1 rifle, M-1 carbine and assorted sub-machine guns that allowed the U.S. to get away with using the BAR. That and using 2-3 BARS per squad in some instances. If each rifleman has twice the firepower of the bolt-action rifleman then the "FACT" of the squad automatic having 1/2 the firepower of a true LMG is sort of compensated for;)

Don't hold me to those exact figures;) but you get the idea. Going to war in 1939 using Springfields instead of M-1s lowers the squads/platoons firepower by a significant amount. While the Springfield was fully the equel of the Mauser (not nessacareley the equel of the Enfield) the Germans mad ethe MG the center of the squads effort. The LMG was the reason for the squads existance. The US did not place such emphasis on the BAR.

It is not the only factor as you point out but using troops that are less well trained and not as well armed is not a good combination. In North Africa we had the less well trained troops but they did have, on average, better/more weapons and more ammuntion than the Germans. While we did win, things did not always go the way we would have wanted, and we had air superiority there. A few divisions in France in 1940 with Bolt-action rifles, poor communications, little or no practice in large scale manuevers, a fair part of their artillery park left-overs from WW I and facing an enemy with air superiority doesn't sound like they would have contributed much.

 

The Schneider 155 hows did good work in those campaigns but then again those campaigns were almost positional warfare. It is not just the speed of travel but the time to set up and pack up. This coupled with the limited traverse could cause severe problems in a war of movement. The 155s traverse of 6 degrees ment it could cover a section of "line" about 1000yds long at 10,000yds range.( I am a bit off here but I hope you get the idea.) The later M-1 155mm howitzer had a traverse of 53 degrees which ment it could cover a section of "line" about 8833yds long at 10,000yds. While the older howitzer was much lighter it still weighed over 4 tons so trying to swing it onto a new target that appears outside of it's fireing arc can be a problem. Trying to shift fire to cover an ajacent unit is also a bit more difficult even if the communications system would allow it. Artillery fire control in 1939-40 is vastly different from what was used in 1944-45. Given that most artillery communcations in the early years of the war was by feild-phone a few hasty retreats or moves could wind up with miles of wire left behind. targeting information by carrier pigion might not work against tank columns;)

[seahawk]

Once the Weygand Line is broken, there remains too little time to move the troops to ports. The decision to fight on in No Africa was well covered in a previous discussion, I thought. The army is trapped by its obligation to fight for France, even if there was any hope of continuing the war from No Africa. What could be brought to NA in late June of 1940 was actually carried out. The French Navy did an excellent job of clearing its merchant shipping [+ the two new BBs] out of the Atlantic ports, taking what civilians, troops were there. Time, not shipping, was in short supply.

 

I find it impossible that the French Army would have disengaged and moved to Africa. By mid-June40, the option no longer remained.

 

Once again, I doubt that the US could have materially changed June40, except I agree with Paul that it might have found the moral support to continue WWII from France Overseas.

 

Could that refugee army have then turned around and attacked the Italian Army in Tripolitania? It made no such effort in the few days left in June40. The control of the Med rested, then as now, on air power, and only one power has it in Europe by June40. Continuing the war from No Africa would have forced the Germans to undertake a serious Middle Sea strategy, unlike the historical case.

 

Did they have air superiority ? The Luftwaffe was hard pressed to keep up the pressure in the BoB against the RAF alone. Now we must add the remains of the French Air Force and the little effort the US could make. Surely many of the US planes were outclassed by the Germans top frontline force, they are not really outclassed by the Italians.

[swerve]

Agreed that the number of additional troops that could have been evacuated was limited, & most of the French army would perforce have been lost, as in reality, but more shipping would have enabled some more evacuation (quite a few troops left equipment on the dockside for lack of room on ships), & more aircraft, aircrew & ground crew could have been flown out. If the decision had been taken to continue the fight from abroad, & those units still able to asked to fight on as long as possible to assist it, the resistance might have been stiffened, however briefly, enabling some more evacuation. As it was, the situation seemed so desperate that many must have seen no point in further resistance. France was lost, & no realistic person could have imagined Britain, even with the Empire, capable of ever retaking it. But Britain and America? Hope might have remained.

 

As for the troops in N. Africa attacking Libya - what motive did they have in June 1940? No orders, from a command concerned with the disaster at home, not ready, & by the time they could have begun, it was over. We're postulating a different situation, an attack AFTER the fall of France. And not by the refugee army, but by the forces already in place, which were plenty strong enough.

 

If the Germans had undertaken a serious Middle Sea strategy, how do you see it going? An invasion of Tunisia from Italy, against the French North African army & the remains of the AdlA, stiffened by British troops & aircraft, with US supplies & with the RN, the USN & the MN sinking anything that moved on sea without damn good air cover? Assembling the invasion shipping would have been an interesting task. I would expect Allied submarines to be busy. And all this presumes that Italy would fight, instead of staying on the sidelines.

Edited January 31, 2008 by swerve

[Sailor Lars]

How would Norway be a problem for zee germans? Navy wouldn't bother them much, i'd believe, as they would very likely be able to persuade either swedish and/or finnish to allow passage to Norway via land route, also. In masse. Finland already had some issues with certain freiherrs Molotov und Ribbentropp, so i wouldn't wonder if a deal with the ( three ) countries could be arranged. Yes... this is a very strong what-if, but the thread is about What-if in the beginning!