What if the USA enters WW2 in September 1939?

[shep854]

Anyone have idea how many fighter pilots USAAF could have "volunteered" for RAF if RAF Fighter Command started to run bit short in 1940 ? Even 100 would have been decent reinforcement (planes were not a big problem, there was quite good production of Spits and Hurris), considering casualty figures.

 

Americans were, in fact, encouraged to travel to Canada to enlist in Commonwealth forces. Quite a few of them became aircrew. Had the US entered the war in '39, they would have been kept home for American service.

[Sardaukar]

Well, my question is more of how much USAAF could have helped officially ?

[shep854]

Well, my question is more of how much USAAF could have helped officially ?

 

Read post #2. The USAAC had nothing to contribute to combat in 1939, except possibly acting as bait and becoming posthumous heroes. That's not a knock on the professionalism of the Air Corps, they had nothing to work with at that time.

[Sardaukar]

Read post #2. The USAAC had nothing to contribute to combat in 1939, except possibly acting as bait and becoming posthumous heroes. That's not a knock on the professionalism of the Air Corps, they had nothing to work with at that time.

 

I'd expect them to fly Spitfires and Hurricanes, not P-35/36 in that case, since there was no real shortage of planes, just pilots.

Edited January 13, 2008 by Sardaukar

[Mk 1]

I'd expect them to fly Spitfires and Hurricanes, not P-35/36 in that case, since there was no real shortage of planes, just pilots.

The problem wasn't a shortage of pilots, it was a shortage of trained pilots. There was no shortage of manpower, but a shortage of training time, facilities, and throughput.

 

Putting untrained Americans into Spitfires or Hurricanes would not have produced any better results than putting untrained Brits into them.

 

America had a desperately small airforce in 1939, by comparison with the European land powers. By 1940 it was quickly growing to only tiny. And America needed the few trained pilots it had ... to train more pilots. That's how you grow a force, you keep your better graduates at school become teachers.

 

-Mark 1

[Sardaukar]

Well..if USA could spare pilots to AVG, I bet they could spare few for RAF in 1940. But does anyone have figure of USAAF fighter pilot numbers in 1940 ?

[Richard Lindquist]

Well..if USA could spare pilots to AVG, I bet they could spare few for RAF in 1940. But does anyone have figure of USAAF fighter pilot numbers in 1940 ?

 

 

September 1939:

 

Qualified Pilots (not all serving in Air Corps units)

 

Regular: 2007

Reserve: 2187

National Guard: 308

 

Airplanes (including depot stocks)

 

Heavy Bomber: 39

Medium and Light Bomber: 738

Fighter: 492

Observation: 378

Transport: 131

Trainer: 761

[Mk 1]

Well..if USA could spare pilots to AVG, I bet they could spare few for RAF in 1940.

Well, yes, but ...

 

1 ) The AVG was how many planes and pilots? Three squadrons of 2 dozen pilots each, plus or minus. I can hardly image another three squadrons making a significant dent in the European actions. And the AVG did not manage to become operational until December of 1941. Even the organizing of the unit (selecting pilots and getting them shipped out) took place mostly in the spring and summer of 1941. So not much help for the Brits in 1939/40.

 

2 ) None of the pilots that Richard so graciously counted (from his personal notes of that time, I expect) were trained in the Spit or the Hurricane. Unless we are looking at P-26s, P-35s, or P-36s in ol' blighty, those boys that might have shipped over would not have had any planes they knew how to fly in 1939. If we started shipping them over in '39, much as with the Poles there would have been a flow of pilots "converted" to type by the time of the historical BoB. But by that time they might just as well have been equipped with P-40s, as the Tomahawk I (French-order H-81s redirected after the fall of France) were arriving by that time.

 

However, the British, needs as may be, rejected the Tomahawk I as a combat fighter, and even the later Tomahawk II was deamed unsuitable for fighting in Europe and was seconded-off to the Middle East.

 

-Mark 1

[DB]

Well, yes, but ...

 

1 ) The AVG was how many planes and pilots? Three squadrons of 2 dozen pilots each, plus or minus. I can hardly image another three squadrons making a significant dent in the European actions. And the AVG did not manage to become operational until December of 1941. Even the organizing of the unit (selecting pilots and getting them shipped out) took place mostly in the spring and summer of 1941. So not much help for the Brits in 1939/40.

 

2 ) None of the pilots that Richard so graciously counted (from his personal notes of that time, I expect) were trained in the Spit or the Hurricane. Unless we are looking at P-26s, P-35s, or P-36s in ol' blighty, those boys that might have shipped over would not have had any planes they knew how to fly in 1939. If we started shipping them over in '39, much as with the Poles there would have been a flow of pilots "converted" to type by the time of the historical BoB. But by that time they might just as well have been equipped with P-40s, as the Tomahawk I (French-order H-81s redirected after the fall of France) were arriving by that time.

 

However, the British, needs as may be, rejected the Tomahawk I as a combat fighter, and even the later Tomahawk II was deamed unsuitable for fighting in Europe and was seconded-off to the Middle East.

 

-Mark 1

Towards the end of the BoB, pilots were transitioning to active service with as little as 10 hours on type. If pilots had arrived with basic flight skills , then they could have spent their shortened training time on type.

 

Mind you, the RAF was still training bomber pilots at this time - skewed priorities as ever.

[Sardaukar]

Well, yes, but ...

 

1 ) The AVG was how many planes and pilots? Three squadrons of 2 dozen pilots each, plus or minus. I can hardly image another three squadrons making a significant dent in the European actions. And the AVG did not manage to become operational until December of 1941. Even the organizing of the unit (selecting pilots and getting them shipped out) took place mostly in the spring and summer of 1941. So not much help for the Brits in 1939/40.

 

2 ) None of the pilots that Richard so graciously counted (from his personal notes of that time, I expect) were trained in the Spit or the Hurricane. Unless we are looking at P-26s, P-35s, or P-36s in ol' blighty, those boys that might have shipped over would not have had any planes they knew how to fly in 1939. If we started shipping them over in '39, much as with the Poles there would have been a flow of pilots "converted" to type by the time of the historical BoB. But by that time they might just as well have been equipped with P-40s, as the Tomahawk I (French-order H-81s redirected after the fall of France) were arriving by that time.

 

However, the British, needs as may be, rejected the Tomahawk I as a combat fighter, and even the later Tomahawk II was deamed unsuitable for fighting in Europe and was seconded-off to the Middle East.

 

-Mark 1

 

Well, I think that even 100 fighter pilots sent to reinforce RAF if needed in 1940 would have helped quite a bit considering the historical BoB and Luftwaffe capabilities. I don't think USA would ship anything over in 1939 except materiel and maybe few small land units, main contribution would be naval power. Maybe one Marine regiment would take part of operation in Norway in 1940 (USN would make German invasion of Norway very difficult anyway). Maybe 2 infantry divisions would reinforce the defense of UK in 1940. But every bit would count.

 

If US went for wartime build-up in Sept. 1939, they could have some extra land forces to send in during summer of 1940 too, but it'd be very difficult.

 

Based on Richard Lindquist's numbers (thanks a lot, was looking for that info), I'd deduct that there was about 400-500 *trained regular service fighter pilots* in USA in September 1939 (my interpretation, actual figures might be something else, but based on plane and pilot numbers). I think that if everything went reasonably historically (since USA contribution would not make any difference in land war in 1939-40 except Norway), even about 100 trained (we are talking about regular service and maybe partly reserve pilots) fighter pilots would make a difference when RAF was running short. Month of training in Spitfire or Hurricane and they'd be very useful, we are not talking about guys just fresh out of flight school. USAAF just might be able to do that in Summer 1940 but maybe not more.

 

Still, it'd be significant reinforcement for RAF Fighter Command if they had need it, I think.

Edited January 19, 2008 by Sardaukar

[Jim Martin]

Well, I think that even 100 fighter pilots sent to reinforce RAF if needed in 1940 would have helped quite a bit considering the historical BoB and Luftwaffe capabilities. I don't think USA would ship anything over in 1939 except materiel and maybe few small land units, main contribution would be naval power. Maybe one Marine regiment would take part of operation in Norway in 1940 (USN would make German invasion of Norway very difficult anyway). Maybe 2 infantry divisions would reinforce the defense of UK in 1940. But every bit would count.

 

If US went for wartime build-up in Sept. 1939, they could have some extra land forces to send in during summer of 1940 too, but it'd be very difficult.

 

Actually, we kicked off the draft in Sept 1940, granted a year later, but even with us starting a near-wartime level of expansion, we didn't have significant numbers of troops to send anywhere until Nov of 1942 (okay, 1st MarDiv attacked Guadalcanal in August), and even waiting until Nov of 1942, the TORCH assault troops were miserably undertrained. For an idea of how much of a cluster was the expansion of the Army of the United States, read The Gi Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945. Mansoor does a good job explaining how the mobilization process went. Even if we'd begun mobilization in Sept 1939, We'd not have had anything ready to go until maybe late 1941. As for equipment...FDR had already been "covertly" ramping up production of war materielle in 1939. Industry simply would not have been able to support a large army in 1939. Even by 1941, it wasn't all that impressive, and as for equipment, heck, the USMC assaulted Guadalcanal with Springfield '03 rifles. US forces landed in N Africa in 1942 equipped with M3 medium tanks. How do you think our equipment would have looked 2 years, or even a year earlier?

[seahawk]

Another thing to consider. Would Germany fight the BoB and hope for Sea Lion to happen, when the US Navy is in the war ?

[swerve]

... and as for equipment, heck, the USMC assaulted Guadalcanal with Springfield '03 rifles. US forces landed in N Africa in 1942 equipped with M3 medium tanks. How do you think our equipment would have looked 2 years, or even a year earlier?

 

Compared to the PzKw II which were the majority of the German tanks used in the invasion of France in May 1940? Pretty good, probably.

[Rich]

Compared to the PzKw II which were the majority of the German tanks used in the invasion of France in May 1940? Pretty good, probably.

 

Really? In terms of standardized procurement the US Army since 1934 had completed by 1 September 1939:

 

19 Light Tanks M2A1

237 Light Tanks M2A2

73 Light Tanks M2A3

1 Light Tank M2A4

89 Combat Car M1

17 Combat Cars M1A1E1

7 Combat Car M1A1

 

No Medium Tanks had been standardized and the only prototypes completed in the same timeframe were:

 

16 Medium Tanks T4 (Ordnance design, Christie patents)

5 Medium Tanks T3E3 (rebuilt T3E2 - a 1932 design)

2 Medium Tanks T5 and T5E1 (the T5E1 was also rebuilt as the T5E2)

 

A total of 442 MG-armed light tanks, 1 37mm-armed light tank, 16 MG-armed medium tanks, and 7 37mm-armed medium tanks, a grand total of 466 tanks.

 

In roughly the same period the Germans had completed 1,800 Panzer I, 1,223 Panzer II, 176 Panzer III and 270 Panzer IV, and had built or aquired 368 Czech Panzer 35 and Panzer 38, as well as 245 command tanks and other specialty armored vehicles, a total of 4,082.

 

Then, from 1 September to 30 June 1940 standardized production consisted of:

 

18 Medium Tanks M2

45 Light Tanks M2A4

34 Combat Cars M2

 

While for the rest of the year production was:

 

6 Medium Tanks M2A1

280 Light Tanks M2A4

 

So 34 MG-armed light tanks, 325 37mm-armed light tanks, and 24 37mm-armed medium tanks, a grand total of 383 from the start of the war to the end of 1940.

 

Compared to German production of about 1,788 for 1940 alone (99 Panzer II, 367 Panzer 38 (t), 1,054 Panzer III, and 268 Panzer IV).

 

Basically, the comparison by the end of 1940 was roughly 357 "modern" cannon-armed US tanks versus at least 2,431 German ones. And 492 MG-armed US tanks versus 3,230 German ones. (Notice the proprtion of the MG to cannon-armed in the two tank fleets is roughly the same, about 72 percent for the US and about 75 percent for the German.

[GdG**]

Really? In terms of standardized procurement the US Army since 1934 had completed by 1 September 1939:

 

19 Light Tanks M2A1

237 Light Tanks M2A2

73 Light Tanks M2A3

1 Light Tank M2A4

89 Combat Car M1

17 Combat Cars M1A1E1

7 Combat Car M1A1

 

No Medium Tanks had been standardized and the only prototypes completed in the same timeframe were:

 

16 Medium Tanks T4 (Ordnance design, Christie patents)

5 Medium Tanks T3E3 (rebuilt T3E2 - a 1932 design)

2 Medium Tanks T5 and T5E1 (the T5E1 was also rebuilt as the T5E2)

 

A total of 442 MG-armed light tanks, 1 37mm-armed light tank, 16 MG-armed medium tanks, and 7 37mm-armed medium tanks, a grand total of 466 tanks.

 

In roughly the same period the Germans had completed 1,800 Panzer I, 1,223 Panzer II, 176 Panzer III and 270 Panzer IV, and had built or aquired 368 Czech Panzer 35 and Panzer 38, as well as 245 command tanks and other specialty armored vehicles, a total of 4,082.

 

Then, from 1 September to 30 June 1940 standardized production consisted of:

 

18 Medium Tanks M2

45 Light Tanks M2A4

34 Combat Cars M2

 

While for the rest of the year production was:

 

6 Medium Tanks M2A1

280 Light Tanks M2A4

 

So 34 MG-armed light tanks, 325 37mm-armed light tanks, and 24 37mm-armed medium tanks, a grand total of 383 from the start of the war to the end of 1940.

 

Compared to German production of about 1,788 for 1940 alone (99 Panzer II, 367 Panzer 38 (t), 1,054 Panzer III, and 268 Panzer IV).

 

Basically, the comparison by the end of 1940 was roughly 357 "modern" cannon-armed US tanks versus at least 2,431 German ones. And 492 MG-armed US tanks versus 3,230 German ones. (Notice the proprtion of the MG to cannon-armed in the two tank fleets is roughly the same, about 72 percent for the US and about 75 percent for the German.

 

But some of these tanks would have been in reinforcement of the 3,500 French and 250 British tanks available against Germany. Anyway, I doubt they'd have been shipped to Europe. They'd have been probably used for training on the American soil. Providing tanks to US troops would not have been a problem in 1940. R-35, R-40's and H-39 were rolling out of the factories pretty quickly by the spring of 1940. The Free Poles were given R-40's. There had plans to give 10% of the B1 Bis production to the British in exchange of the production of H-39's in UK. There had plans to produce S-35's in the US.

[Rich]

But some of these tanks would have been in reinforcement of the 3,500 French and 250 British tanks available against Germany. Anyway, I doubt they'd have been shipped to Europe. They'd have been probably used for training on the American soil. Providing tanks to US troops would not have been a problem in 1940. R-35, R-40's and H-39 were rolling out of the factories pretty quickly by the spring of 1940. The Free Poles were given R-40's. There had plans to give 10% of the B1 Bis production to the British in exchange of the production of H-39's in UK. There had plans to produce S-35's in the US.

 

Er, all well and good, but the design of French tanks no more met American doctrinal requirements than they did German or British. And, after the debacle in the Great War resulting from the decision to accept and produce foreign designs in replacement of domestic designs, the US military was not going to do the same in World War II. The British Tank Commision was told they could accept US designs or nothing at all and Soviet designs were examined and found wanting; there is simply no evidence that anything different would have occured with regards to French designs.

 

And anyway, that rather ignores the whole point of my illustration anyway.

[a77]

Do not forget the huge psychological impakt. Then US join the english and french "know" they will win and they know they will get reinforcement, hence they will be more active. Ther is a point to hold Narvik, ther is a point to fight to fight on in french insteed of frow in the towel, etc

[swerve]

Hmm. I didn't realise the USA had quite so few tanks.

 

As far as quality, they don't look too bad against the Wehrmacht of 1939-40, but with those numbers, probably better held back for training the armoured divisions of 1942.

 

The USA started building up its army rather quickly when WW2 began. What scope was there for doing it even faster? Not enough to make any difference in 1940, I would think, but by 1941?

 

Ditto air forces. Pilot training was an obvious bottleneck, but could it have been done faster than it was?

[Rich]

Hmm. I didn't realise the USA had quite so few tanks.

 

As far as quality, they don't look too bad against the Wehrmacht of 1939-40, but with those numbers, probably better held back for training the armoured divisions of 1942.

 

Hi Swerve,

 

Er, all the Light Tanks and Combat Cars, except for the M2A4, were about on par with the Panzer I at best, but were outclassed by everything else. The few M2A4 Light Tanks were a reasonable match to the Panzer III with 37mm, the M2A1 Medium Tank - what few there were - was an oversized houseboat with lots of machineguns, but otherwise identical in capability to the M2A4. There was nothing comparable to the Panzer IV or the Panzer III 50mm L/42, which was just coming available in spring 1940.

 

The USA started building up its army rather quickly when WW2 began. What scope was there for doing it even faster? Not enough to make any difference in 1940, I would think, but by 1941?

 

Ditto air forces. Pilot training was an obvious bottleneck, but could it have been done faster than it was?

 

The first major contract for a modern tank was let in October 1939 after the German invasion of Poland, when American Car and Foundry Company of Berwick, Pennsylvania was granted an award to build 329 M2A4 Light Tanks, with first delivery in April 1940. Prior to that all major tank manufacture had been done at the Rock Island Arsenal since 1932, when the last of the Christie-patent tanks built by America LaFrance had been completed. The next key point was 30 June 1940 when the National Munitions Program was enacted, which among other authorizations approved the building of 1,741 M2A1 Medium Tanks, the project to be completed by 31 December 1941. Initial contracts were issued to American Locomotive Company and Baldwin Locomotive Company. However in June a member of the National Defense Advisory Commission, William S. Knudsen, President of General Motors, argued that the automobile manufacturers also had the capability of producing tanks (in Germany Daimler-Benz was already proving this was true). Between 17 June and 17 July 1940 negotiations went on that resulted in a contract to build a Chrysler Tank Arsenal at Detroit, Michigan for a projected cost of $21-million and an output of 10 tanks per day (roughly 220 per month based upon the then still standard five-day work week). The contract was signed on 15 August, with the intention of building 1,000 M2A1 Medium Tanks, the remaining 741 to be built by American and Baldwin.

 

Now the spur for that legislation was the fall of France, but assuming that the US enters the war in September 1939, there could be about a 10-month lead-time on that, which would imply that the contract of 15 August 1940 might be completed 15 November 1939 and the completion date would be set for 28 February 1941.

 

Fo M2A1 Medium Tanks. So where then is the incentive generated by the fall of France - and the hordes of heavy German tanks with 75mm guns that thirteen days after the contract was signed resulted in the redesign of the M2A1 as the M3? To me it sounds like by June 1940 when France comes crashing down, the US tank production would be firmly headed down a blind alley? It seems quite plausible that what would result would be a delay in development and production of the M3 and M4 that could result in their appearance occuring about the same time as historically - or even possibly later?

 

And it's even unlikely, given the actual shipping lead times, that any M2A1 produced would be able to make it to France to equip any units anyway, so they certainly wouldn't affect events. Nor is it likely that the US would commit any forces to the continent in 1940, so no manpower additions either. Nor, if the US Army was mobilizing under wartime footing, would there have been much likelihood of the US surplusing the 1,100-odd 75mm guns to France and England in June 1940 that made up a large part of the British artillery defenses against a German invasion in August and September 1940.

 

Wheels within wheels.

Edited January 22, 2008 by Rich

[Jim Martin]

The USA started building up its army rather quickly when WW2 began. What scope was there for doing it even faster? Not enough to make any difference in 1940, I would think, but by 1941?

 

What you see in the "rapid" buildup after Pearl Harbor is actually just the buildup we began in Sept 1940 finally reaching fruition. We began the draft and expansion of the Army way back the, but we didn't start seeing a decent military capability, along with the requisite modern equipment, until late 1942. There are stories from early 1942 of troops drilling with broomsticks, trucks labelled "TANK" for maneuvers, etc. Trying to kick off mobilization in Sept 1939 wouldn't have helped that much, and remember by 1940, US Industry had already begun gearing up for war a whole year previously, especially given orders from overseas for weapons and materielle. Mobilization in Sept 1939 would have meant the US starting off from a totally cold start. I still don't see truly capable combat formations of meaningful size becoming available for commitment to the European Theater until early 1942, sorry.

[seahawk]

And how would the US being in the war change Germna plans ?

 

- Battle for France most likely unchanged

 

But would they even try the BoB and Sea Lion, as they should have know it would be impossible to protect their invasion form the combined US+british fleets.

 

Would they try Norway, when again facing the problem of keeping in supplied when facing the combined US/british Navies.

 

Would they fight in North Africa, where the supply problem would be much worse with a strong US fleet in theatre ?

 

I believe they wonßt try Sea Lion, with that they can be more defensive in the BoB, which means they lose less pilots. I also believe that North Africe won´t happen (Italy might stay out of the war completely), Norway is questionable.

[Jim Martin]

And how would the US being in the war change Germna plans ?

 

- Battle for France most likely unchanged

 

But would they even try the BoB and Sea Lion, as they should have know it would be impossible to protect their invasion form the combined US+british fleets.

 

Would they try Norway, when again facing the problem of keeping in supplied when facing the combined US/british Navies.

 

Would they fight in North Africa, where the supply problem would be much worse with a strong US fleet in theatre ?

 

I believe they wonßt try Sea Lion, with that they can be more defensive in the BoB, which means they lose less pilots. I also believe that North Africe won´t happen (Italy might stay out of the war completely), Norway is questionable.

 

Hah, we might be able to pull together one full-strength division to send to France by May 1940, but that would mean destroying our ability to form cadres for new divisions forming--which means we wouldn't send them. We'd keep the Regular Army in the States, busily trying to train additional divisions. The US Navy would show up, so England wouldn't have worries about invasion, and Norway probably wouldn't have happened.

[Jim Martin]

Oh--we could send some National Guard divisions; the Brits and French wouldn't want them. Underequipped (even by 1939 US Army standards, which were very low), abysmally trained, RIDDLED with nepotism. Only one or maybe 2 of the Guard divisional commanders of 1940 actually got to keep their divisions and go overseas with them. But it took 2 years of exercises and evaluations to weed out the overaged and incompetent.

 

The US Army Reserve existed pretty much only on paper.

[John T]

some comments on the discussion:

 

I think it is hard to compare US strength of 1939 with the world as of September 1939, it is too easy to compare with Germany 1943 or US 1945 since that is what we know from real history.

The German army had it's share of ineficiency too that where shown during the early campaigns,

so I think the US disadvantage where less pronounced in 1940 than in 1942-44.

Or put it diffrently, US Army was probably not that much worse than French or British army of 1939.

 

Secondly, lend-lease from September 1939 would make a tremendous effect on investments in US.

The problem would have been what could have made any deliveries before the sitation before May 40?

Motorized part of the French army?

 

Third, If US enters the war the expansion whould probably have gone faster than in reality, while as long French manpower stood against the Germans the pressing need for imediate manpower reinforcements was secondary to the knowledge of the huge reserves that would come within a few years.

US army was a cadre, with an intent to be expanded.

If I got it right with an Reserv officers cadre 100 000 strong, but "Eligible for duty" what training did they have ?

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-WD...WD-Plans-6.html

the Reserve officers eligible for duty, increasing year by year since 1921, numbered 104,575 in mid-1939.

Even if they only where 25 000 reserve officers and 10 000 officers thats close to 50% of the Germany army's officer corps as of September 1939.

 

Then I found this

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-WD...WD-Plans-6.html

 

By abandoning the old organization and adopting the new, it was possible with existent units to attain five effective divisions of the new type, which could be promptly assembled with complementary troops, and started off to field training as a test of the new organization. This was the Army's first step in a slow change-over of all old-type divisions into the more flexible form.

How much better off where the British/French/Polish/German divisions mobilizing in September 1939?

 

Cheers

/John T.

[swerve]

...

The problem would have been what could have made any deliveries before the sitation before May 40?

Motorized part of the French army?...

 

Cheers

/John T.

 

That's a good point. Lorries (trucks) would have been very valuable to both the British & French armies, & the USA had by far the biggest motor industry in the world.