What if the USA enters WW2 in September 1939?

[Xavier]

I just thought of something else. With Spain definitely out of the war, it might prove expedient for Portugal to openly join the fight from the start, thus giving the Allies use of the Portuguese Atlantic islands much earlier than in reality, & maybe air bases on the mainland of Portugal. Would make life pretty bloody hard for the U-boats. And maybe even more troops, if someone paid for decent kit for them.

And what does Portugal has to gain in all that?

[swerve]

And what does Portugal has to gain in all that?

 

Same as in 1943, real history. Being on the winning side, & a minor economic boost to partly compensate for the disruption of the war.

[GdG**]

Very interesting what-if and point of views posted here.

 

Strategically; I think, as everyone has pointed it, that the US belligerence in 1939 would have definitely pushed Mussolini to stay out of the war, or even force him to repeat the same scenario as during WW1. In that case, the plans the Allies had for a front in the Balkans would have been envisaged more seriously.

 

As for the symbolic forces the US could have sent to Europe in 1939, I don't think that equipping them was a problem. That would have actually been the same as in 1917; tanks and artillery provided by the French. Tanks were rolling out of factories at a decent rate. There had more cannons than necessary (not AT nor AA, OK), that were familiar to the US forces, since these were Mle 1897's and Mle 1917's.

 

OTOH, I doubt training could have been provided to USAC in France, since the Armée de l'Air was in an even worse situation than the RAF in 1940 as for producing new pilots.

 

However, I think that 2 or 3 US divisions could have made a difference if the German attack had happened in May 1940; after all, 3 motorized divisions was what lacked to mount an effective counter-attack on the Schwerpunkt.

Edited December 24, 2007 by GdG**

[Ken Estes]

....

 

However, I think that 2 or 3 US divisions could have made a difference if the German attack had happened in May 1940; after all, 3 motorized divisions was what lacked to mount an effective counter-attack on the Schwerpunkt.

The French would have looked from their Atlantic shores for a long time before any US Army motorized or armored units showed up.

 

The 1st Armored Division activated at Fort Knox on July 15, 1940

The 2nd Armored activated at Fort Benning, Georgia on July 15, 1940

No US infantry divisions have organic tank battalions, nor are they motorized.

The first two USMC divisions, which do have organic tank battalions, are redesignated on paper from brigades in early 1941.

 

To make it worse, I don't see how even a symbolic AEF of three footmobile divisions could have been shipped to Europe in time for May-June 1940. The US entering the war in 1939 would not have materially altered the stand-up of ground forces, with respect to mid-1940. I'd bet that even in [historical] 1942, tanks are being delivered without main guns, etc.

[Jim Martin]

Ken, what was the strength of the USMC in Sept. 1939?

[Sardaukar]

However, I think that 2 or 3 US divisions could have made a difference if the German attack had happened in May 1940; after all, 3 motorized divisions was what lacked to mount an effective counter-attack on the Schwerpunkt.

 

Equipping was a problem in 1939-40, like Ken said. No way in hell those 2-3 AEF divisions be armoure4d/motorized formations. We'd be looking 2-3 infantry divisions with not much counter-attack power vs. massed tanks.

[Ken Estes]

Ken, what was the strength of the USMC in Sept. 1939?

Right, Jim, I forgot to put that in. From the 15,355 lowpoint under the Hoover administration, the Corps grew, thanks to the inaguration of the Fleet Marine Force [designed for a wartime 25K] to the new authorization and funding for [drum-roll, please] 19,367 men by 1939, of which fewer than half mustered with the FMF. That's why only the east coast 1st Brigade was fully equipped [incl 1st Tank Company], while the west coast 2nd Brigade remained just the 6th Marine Regt until the expansion of 1940. Even so, by early 1941, the USMC was considered the most ready to deploy, 1st Brigade figuring in early war plans to seize Martinique or to occupy the Azores; actually another did go to Iceland before the war started for the US.

 

Yet the entire armored fighting vehicle strength of the Corps July 1940 consisted of the three officers and 46 enlisted men of the 1st Tank Company, 1st Marine Brigade, and their ten CTL-3 series tankettes.

[Jim Martin]

Right, Jim, I forgot to put that in. From the 15,355 lowpoint under the Hoover administration, the Corps grew, thanks to the inaguration of the Fleet Marine Force [designed for a wartime 25K] to the new authorization and funding for [drum-roll, please] 19,367 men by 1939, of which fewer than half mustered with the FMF. That's why only the east coast 1st Brigade was fully equipped [incl 1st Tank Company], while the west coast 2nd Brigade remained just the 6th Marine Regt until the expansion of 1940. Even so, by early 1941, the USMC was considered the most ready to deploy, 1st Brigade figuring in early war plans to seize Martinique or to occupy the Azores; actually another did go to Iceland before the war started for the US.

 

Yet the entire armored fighting vehicle strength of the Corps July 1940 consisted of the three officers and 46 enlisted men of the 1st Tank Company, 1st Marine Brigade, and their ten CTL-3 series tankettes.

 

 

4th Marines in China wasn't really a full regiment either, was it?

[John Dudek]

4th Marines in China wasn't really a full regiment either, was it?

 

Not while in China, but after it was sent to the Philippines in November 1941, it quickly became overstrength as the Regiment was given every Marine and unassigned Navy Blue Jacket on Luzon. The 4th Marines was also given many Army troops that managed to make it to Corregidor after Bataan fell to the Japanese.

[John T]

The Navy could contribute a lot. Norway would be impossible imho for the germans, as would be any planing for Sea Lion

 

 

But from German perspective, US entry would only make the need for Uboat bases outside Germany more important so I think Weserübung would have been staged at first opportunity(If SKL was allowed to)

 

But it gives one of my old favorites WI a new twist:

 

The First Sea Lord looked at Admiral King with a smile,

- You know, we both have a lot of old battleships too slow for a fight in open sea against our German adversaries.

I have thus prepared a plan to support the Nordic countries and bring the Germans to fight at their own back yard where they can't run away. I call the plan Operation Catharine....

 

So Germany attacks Norway,

Narvik goes according to history, Warspite smashes the remaining destroyers in Second battle for Narvik.

 

Tronheim

USS Texas and a destroyer sqn supported by USS Ranger (vindicators attacking the Coastal defences and even F3F could screen out HE 59's) forces a entry into Trondheim fjord and closing vaernes Airfield. - The main failure of OTL was the Allieds two flanking landings but not attacking the airfield in between, giving Stukas twenty minutes of flight to attack the harbours.

 

German forces in the area have to retreat SE and as Allied shifts focus to Trondheim a larger part of the Norwegian army survives and further allied reinforcements makes the german going much slower.

 

 

Will Catharine be implemented?

 

B-17's bombing Sola into submission?

and what, If any difference would P-35's with twice the range of Spitfire do?

 

And in the submarine branch, US- German contest of who have the worst torpedoes

 

Cheers

/John T

[Jabberwocky]

and what, If any difference would P-35's with twice the range of Spitfire do?

 

Considering that the P-35 was slow (~280mph), badly underarmed ( just 1 x .50 and 1 x.30) and underpowered (850 hp), had no self sealing fuel tanks or armour and displayed poor lateral stability despite several attempts to remedy the problem, I'd say not much.

 

If the P-35 appeared in numbers, it may of resulted in a lot of good pilots being chewed up by Bf 109s. Personally, I think I'd rather see hordes of Hawk-75A-2/3/4s, especially the A4s, which were probably a better all-around fighter than the Hurricane I, if perhaps not as adaptable. While they may range less than a P-35, they were ~20-40 mph faster, climbed up to 750 ft/min better, and were more nimble than a Spitfire in certain parts of the envelope. Armament is a weak spot with 4 to 6 RCMGs being barely adequate.

[Marek Tucan]

OTOH USAAF fighting alongside Brits so early on and experiencing problems with RCMG's might lead to more emphasis on 20mm cannon as compared to .50 - Imagine say P-47D with two Hispano's and four .50's

[Sardaukar]

I think in 1939-41 USAAF would be even more useful supplying pilots than planes.

[shep854]

Coming in late, but after reading the thread, it sounds as if the main US contribution at that time would be psychological. Aside from USN's contribution at sea, we would still be a supply and individual replacement depot. I was wondering if US units would be stripped of gear to support the Allies, but since so much of it was obsolescent, that seem doubtful.

 

I have read that US strategy anticipated entering the war in 1944-45. As an aside, what could the world strategic picture have been in that case?

[Assessor]

Coming in late, but after reading the thread, it sounds as if the main US contribution at that time would be psychological. Aside from USN's contribution at sea, we would still be a supply and individual replacement depot. I was wondering if US units would be stripped of gear to support the Allies, but since so much of it was obsolescent, that seem doubtful.

 

I have read that US strategy anticipated entering the war in 1944-45. As an aside, what could the world strategic picture have been in that case?

 

 

 

Given the paucity even of rifles among the Allies at that stage, I think that any American offering such aid might have had his hand bitten off! Presumably though there would be some reluctance to do this, since they wouldn't be available to train the expanding US Army / Marine Corps?

 

I agree the main contribution might be psychological - things were finely balanced and a feeling of being helpd might have tipped it. However, at that time so many things went Germany's way by a very small margin. The presence of what would be (by later war standards) small numbers of men, aircraft and ships might have made a disproportionate difference.

[Mk 1]

This has turned out to be a pretty interesting thread so far. Keep up the flow of good information and analysis, fellas!

 

Given the paucity even of rifles among the Allies at that stage, I think that any American offering such aid might have had his hand bitten off! Presumably though there would be some reluctance to do this, since they wouldn't be available to train the expanding US Army / Marine Corps?

The US did in fact supply substantial quantities of infantry arms. The US Army was in the throws of re-equipping with the M1 Garand as its standard rifle, and was able to surplus off a variety of WW1 weapons to the allies. Brits got a lot of P17s right after Dunkirk, but the bigger issue was ammunition -- adding the US .30-06 to British supply issues was not very helpful, and the US was not surplussing off its ammo, as the caliber was still the US Army standard for rifles and machine-guns. The French were re-equipped with Springfields after the French North African campaign, where commonality of ammunition with the US logistics infrastructure was actually seen as a significant plus, French 7.5mm and 8mm rounds being of increasingly uncertain supply.

 

I agree the main contribution might be psychological - things were finely balanced and a feeling of being helpd might have tipped it. However, at that time so many things went Germany's way by a very small margin. The presence of what would be (by later war standards) small numbers of men, aircraft and ships might have made a disproportionate difference.

I am re-inforced in my original view by the comments I've seen in aggregate so far.

 

I don't think the US could have contributed anything more of substance to the ground forces or the air forces, nor contributed much more in the way of armaments, than occured in real life. As it was the US was expanding its military production and training about as fast as was conceivable. To give anything more to the allies any earlier, whether in men or material, would have had a very small impact on the Germans, but a significant negative impact on the US Army growing to the level it reached by '42/43.

 

But the USN was a force in being, equipped and trained, in 1939. It could indeed have become a part of the battle earlier than it did. Its impact on the Norwegian campaign might have been significant if it was well used, but that is a big what-if. Perhaps more significant would have been its impact on German planning, which may or may not have turned off of the campaign in the West all together, or its impact in the Mediteranean and on Italy, which in truth I had not considered but could indeed have been substantial. Keeping France in the war, and Italy out of the war, changes the entire political complexion of the early war years. Romania was in the long run perhaps Germany's most important ally, and they were a reluctant ally as it was. Any more political weight against joining the German "juggernaught" may have kept them at home, and that would indeed have made a very different war.

 

-Mark 1

[Exel]

But the USN was a force in being, equipped and trained, in 1939. It could indeed have become a part of the battle earlier than it did. Its impact on the Norwegian campaign might have been significant if it was well used, but that is a big what-if. Perhaps more significant would have been its impact on German planning, which may or may not have turned off of the campaign in the West all together -snip-

 

How do you figure? I can see Germany postponing Barbarossa until things are settled favorably in the West, but how could Germany not deal with France after Poland? Letting France grow stronger with US aid is a sure way to get destroyed; the Allies wont offer any favorable peace terms after Munich and Poland, and peace is what Hitler needs to fight his grand campaign against the bolsheviks. Hitler needs a quick victory over France and then force UK into some kind of settlement before USA ramps up its war machine.

 

If anything I'd see that after France - assuming it goes historically and judging from this thread we have no reason to assume otherwise, apart from no Vichy - Hitler will push for Battle of Britain much more aggressively than he did. Not for enabling Sealion as USN makes that even more impossible than in OTL, but to persuade the Brits into peace talks. With Barbarossa delayed that means BoB will go on for much longer with Luftwaffe not having to shift focus into other theaters. Battle of Britain becomes the primary 'front' at least for a time.

 

Historically the RAF was at a breaking point before Göring shifted attention to bombing London. Had the efforts to destroy RAF continued and even more resources invested into the campaign, could the Germans have achieved at least some form of victory or would the US belligerence have maintained the balance or tipped it for RAF's favor earlier?

[Mote]

Historically the RAF was at a breaking point before Göring shifted attention to bombing London. Had the efforts to destroy RAF continued and even more resources invested into the campaign, could the Germans have achieved at least some form of victory or would the US belligerence have maintained the balance or tipped it for RAF's favor earlier?

 

Not true actually. RAF Fighter Command was even stronger at the end of the anti-airfield operations than it was at the beginning and the losses for the Luftwaffe were horrific. Switching to cities resulted in a lower loss rate for the Luftwaffe than they were taking futilely trying to knock out RAF Fighter Command.

[shep854]

Not true actually. RAF Fighter Command was even stronger at the end of the anti-airfield operations than it was at the beginning and the losses for the Luftwaffe were horrific. Switching to cities resulted in a lower loss rate for the Luftwaffe than they were taking futilely trying to knock out RAF Fighter Command.

 

Verrrry interesting. Everything I have ever heard/read was that the RAF was at the end of its rope, especially considering pilots fit for combat. There might have been plenty of airframes, but the aircrew were exhausted. Can you link/refer to your sources? It would make fascinating reading.

[Ken Estes]

We can count on HP Willmott for some pithy info. After 12 August, the German High Command came to the realization that the unexpected effectiveness of the RAF stemmed in part from the radar stations established throughout So. England. "It was against these stations and RAF airfields that the Luftwaffe turned its attention after 12 August in a deliberate attempt to destroy the RAF's ability to maintain combat air patrols. The Luftwaffe came very close to success in its attempt. Between 12 and 23 August the RAF continued to inflict disproportionate losses upon the Luftwaffe, accounting for 299 German aircraft for the loss of 177, but thereafter losses came roughly into balance with 294 German and 269 British aircraft destroyed between 24 August and 5 September, the difference being that the vast majority of British losses were sustained by Fighter Command whereas those incurred by the Luftwaffe were shared between its bombers and fighters. In fact, by 5 September Fighter Command, despite the care with which it was committed to battle, had been brought to the edge of destruction."

 

"By September Fighter Command was reduced to committing to battle pilots with as little as 10 hours' flying time in fighters, but it was to be saved from defeat by a combination of three factors: the Luftwaffe's inability to mount sustained attacks on the scale needed to achieve success because of its losses; intervals of bad weather that broke the continuity essential to German efforts; and the inability of Goering, in personal command of the Luftwaffe's efforts, to concentrate upon single targets for the time needed to achive decisive results."

 

Willmott, The Great Crusade, 109.

 

Two pages later, the pithiest: "In the course of the campaign the RAF lost 520 pilots; within three years both Bomber Command and the 8th US Air Force would lose such numbers in single missions over Germany." [must mean total airmen, not pilots]

 

"The only practical result of the campaign was that after September the RAF possessed a greater measure of superiority over Southern England in daylight hours than it had in August; in every other respect Britain's position was unchanged. At no point could she challenge Germany's control of Western Europe."

 

How that guy can write!

[John Dudek]

This has turned out to be a pretty interesting thread so far. Keep up the flow of good information and analysis, fellas!

The US did in fact supply substantial quantities of infantry arms. The US Army was in the throws of re-equipping with the M1 Garand as its standard rifle, and was able to surplus off a variety of WW1 weapons to the allies. Brits got a lot of P17s right after Dunkirk, but the bigger issue was ammunition -- adding the US .30-06 to British supply issues was not very helpful, and the US was not surplussing off its ammo, as the caliber was still the US Army standard for rifles and machine-guns. The French were re-equipped with Springfields after the French North African campaign, where commonality of ammunition with the US logistics infrastructure was actually seen as a significant plus, French 7.5mm and 8mm rounds being of increasingly uncertain supply.

I am re-inforced in my original view by the comments I've seen in aggregate so far.

 

I don't think the US could have contributed anything more of substance to the ground forces or the air forces, nor contributed much more in the way of armaments, than occured in real life. As it was the US was expanding its military production and training about as fast as was conceivable. To give anything more to the allies any earlier, whether in men or material, would have had a very small impact on the Germans, but a significant negative impact on the US Army growing to the level it reached by '42/43.

 

But the USN was a force in being, equipped and trained, in 1939. It could indeed have become a part of the battle earlier than it did. Its impact on the Norwegian campaign might have been significant if it was well used, but that is a big what-if. Perhaps more significant would have been its impact on German planning, which may or may not have turned off of the campaign in the West all together, or its impact in the Mediteranean and on Italy, which in truth I had not considered but could indeed have been substantial. Keeping France in the war, and Italy out of the war, changes the entire political complexion of the early war years. Romania was in the long run perhaps Germany's most important ally, and they were a reluctant ally as it was. Any more political weight against joining the German "juggernaught" may have kept them at home, and that would indeed have made a very different war.

 

-Mark 1

 

Agreed. The "Great Depression" of the 30's is over and done with, practically overnight, as millions of men are drafted into service and industrial production ramps up from a snail's pace to full, wartime production in less than six months time. Germany would have had to win and quickly win big in France before the "Arsenal of Democracy" began supplying all the wants and needs of the Allies.

 

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Prime Minister Winston Churchill wrote that upon going to bed on the evening of 7 December, he "slept the untrouble sleep of the saved."

[Marek Tucan]

Verrrry interesting. Everything I have ever heard/read was that the RAF was at the end of its rope, especially considering pilots fit for combat. There might have been plenty of airframes, but the aircrew were exhausted. Can you link/refer to your sources? It would make fascinating reading.

 

Fighter Group 11 maybe, but AFAIK RAF intentionally held rest of FG's from giving 11 too much support to conserve forces for expected invasion and such.

[Jim Martin]

Fighter Group 11 maybe, but AFAIK RAF intentionally held rest of FG's from giving 11 too much support to conserve forces for expected invasion and such.

 

 

I've played sims of BoB, and squadrons were never permanently assigned to any Group. Sqns were routinely rotated out of 11 to "rear" Groups for rest and reforming.

[Richard Lindquist]

Not quite, sad ending for what sounded like a pretty good unit. They were used for Cadre for a number of units and when it came time for them to deploy, they were turned into service troops.

 

 

John: 2nd Cav Div was not an "asset" that was highly sought after. 1st Cav Div only deployed to the Pacific because Big mac would take any formation he could get his hands on. 2nd Cav Div was essentialy a notional division in 1939 and wasn't truly activated as a division until April 1941. It had one "white" brigade (2nd and 14th Cav) and one "colored" brigade (9th and 10th Cav). These units all existed at less than half strength in 1939.

 

The division was 'semi-deactivated" in July 1942 with the "white" elements of the division unhorsed and converted into the 2nd and 14th Armored Regiments of the 9th Armored Division. The 4th Cav Brigade (Colored) remained on active duty and in Feb 1943 was used to reconstitute the 2nd Cav Div (forming the new 5th Cav Bde (Colored) with the 2th and 28th Cav Regt.

 

The only sizeable "colored" soldiers in the 1939 army were the badly understrength 24th and 25th Inf and the 9th and 10th Cav plus the National Guard 372nd Inf and 184th Field Artillery. These six regiments had to provided cadres for the 92nd and 93rd Inf Div, the 2nd Cav Div, three separate Inf Regts, and numerous artillery, AAA, engineer, ordnance, and quartermaster regiments being activated in 1940-1942. As a result, the famed "Buffalo Soldiers" were pretty badly diluted through the "colored" force structure so that 9th and 10th Cav were no better off for personnel than a host of other units.

When they got to North Africa, the theater commander decided he needed some TC Stevedore and Construction Engineer Battalions more than he needed a dismounted cavalry division.

[Sardaukar]

Anyone have idea how many fighter pilots USAAF could have "volunteered" for RAF if RAF Fighter Command started to run bit short in 1940 ? Even 100 would have been decent reinforcement (planes were not a big problem, there was quite good production of Spits and Hurris), considering casualty figures.