How to win a nuclear war?

[Xavier]

In your world of magic pixies and unicorns, were the Soviets hell-bent on a war of aggression in post-war Europe too?

 

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The fact the Britain and France decided, at great expense and to the detriment of their conventional capabilities, to introduce their own indigenous nuclear weapons programs speaks volumes as to their “confidence” their guarantor power would seek its own self-annihilation in their defense.

part of what I was trying to say

For anyone to argue that France and England would see themselves obliterated as national entities, and all in the defense of, say, the Germans who had been so wonderful to them just decades before, I would heartily suggest; guess again.

true, OTOH the French wouldn't like Soviets on the Rhine either...

[Assessor]

The conventional wisdom was that the best way (or only way) to win a nuclear war was to NOT start one.

 

This was based on the "cheap talk" deterrance principle. For all the puff and blow, and magic pixies or whatever, you would never be quite sure the other guy WOULDN'T let go with everything he had left. The stakes were so big that no sane person would have wanted to "try to live on the difference" as John Wayne said.

[Guest aevans]

In your world of magic pixies and unicorns, were the Soviets hell-bent on a war of aggression in post-war Europe too?

 

Now that's pretty hilarious. You obviously haven't been around very long to accuse me of believing in magic.

 

More to the point, the Soviets didn't have to be hell-bent on war or totally resigned from war, the point is that in periods of crisis in which war might look attractive, having the US nuclear guarantee hovering over the proceedings (even if there was a chance it wouldn't be honored) acted as a brake on proceeding.

 

The fact the Britain and France decided, at great expense and to the detriment of their conventional capabilities, to introduce their own indigenous nuclear weapons programs speaks volumes as to their “confidence” their guarantor power would seek its own self-annihilation in their defense.

Now that is what logicians call a non sequitur. It simply doesn't follow that just because independent British and French nuclear forces provided a retaliatory hedge against a failure of the US nuclear guarantee that that was the only -- or even the primary -- reason for their existence. There were also reasons of national prestige, independence of action against non-Warsaw Pact powers, etc.

 

For anyone to argue that France and England would see themselves obliterated as national entities, and all in the defense of, say, the Germans who had been so wonderful to them just decades before, I would heartily suggest; guess again.

 

I would heartily suggest that you get up to speed on nuclear strategy and the history of nuclear strategy. West Germany did not seek the atomic bomb in the Sixties because it had nuclear guarantees from both the US and Great Britain. Those guarantees might not have been honored when push came to shove, but the Germans were confident enough that they might be that they did not reject the them.

 

Actually, of all of the NATO nuclear powers, only the French did not offer nuclear guarantees to other states.

[glenn239]

true, OTOH the French wouldn't like Soviets on the Rhine either...

 

I wholeheartedly agree. No doubt, had push come to shove, the French would have been willing to blow East Germans off the face of the Earth at the same rate as Russia put paid to West Germans. In fact, the willingness of Russians and French to kill Germans, as a demonstration of their national wills, might have been devastating to Central Europe - perhaps even to the point where Germany ceased to exist as a significant power. In such a situation, while it might be argued that when the dust settled Russia had not won a victory, it still would be certain that Germany had, very much indeed, lost.

[glenn239]

This was based on the "cheap talk" deterrance principle. For all the puff and blow, and magic pixies or whatever, you would never be quite sure the other guy WOULDN'T let go with everything he had left. The stakes were so big that no sane person would have wanted to "try to live on the difference" as John Wayne said.

The Soviet Union was a satiated state in terms of its foreign policy. Nuclear war, if one comes, will be fought between the “haves” and the “have nots”. “Have nots” can be, shall we say, under-represented in the history chapter on reasonable states and state policy. Picture what happens in 1939 with the Germans, Russians and British possessing, say, several hundred A-bombs each. Hitler ain’t gonna stop, so the question isn’t if the Bomb deters him (Hitler would view stepping across the line as an act of will meant to expose his enemies’ weakness) , but rather how WMD’s would fit into a total war scenario.

 

More to the point, the Soviets didn't have to be hell-bent on war or totally resigned from war,

 

Soviet Cold War intentions in Europe are central to the question of the impact of the American nuclear deterrent upon their behaviour. If the Russians never held offensive ambitions in Europe, then American policy didn’t ‘deter’ a damn thing. In fact, the Russia agenda didn’t much change from 1909 to 1989, and nowhere in it did the Russians much give care about anything in Europe past the Balkans, the Danube basin, and Poland – ie, what they had in pocket during the Cold War.

 

The most effective NATO policy on nuclear weapons, IMO, was the integration of tactical (battlefield) weapons within NATO’s military command structure. Judging by their manipulation of the peace movements in the 70’s and 80’s, this seemed to have pushed the Russian button – and small wonder. By divesting real WMD combat power into the alliance combat organization, the Americans virtually assured to the Russians that nuclear retaliation would occur – at least within the territories of Poland, East Germany, etc.

[glenn239]

Now that is what logicians call a non sequitur. It simply doesn't follow that just because independent British and French nuclear forces provided a retaliatory hedge against a failure of the US nuclear guarantee that that was the only -- or even the primary -- reason for their existence. There were also reasons of national prestige

…

 

Countries develop military systems for reasons of national interest. When Great Britain decided, at great cost, to deploy WMD’s, the core issue driving their behaviour was why nuclear bombs in their exclusive control was deemed a crucial national interest when - at least on paper - American nuclear weapons would be used in harmony with exclusively British interests. The possibility that comes to my mind is that if push came to shove, British interests were not necessarily American interests, and all the rubber-stamped guarantees in the world wouldn’t alter the fact a nanometer.

 

I would heartily suggest that you get up to speed on nuclear strategy and the history of nuclear strategy. West Germany did not seek the atomic bomb in the Sixties because it had nuclear guarantees from both the US and Great Britain.

 

As I said before – talk is cheap, and the “history” of nuclear strategy is a bunch of unclassified theoretical material written by stuffy professor types and military theoreticians. The history of a real nuclear war would be written by a dictatorial gambler, with an eye for the enemies’ weakness, using WMD’s to force fissures in their coalition.

[glenn239]

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Edited December 27, 2007 by glenn239

[Mote]

The Soviet Union was a satiated state in terms of its foreign policy. Nuclear war, if one comes, will be fought between the “haves” and the “have nots”. “Have nots” can be, shall we say, under-represented in the history chapter on reasonable states and state policy. Picture what happens in 1939 with the Germans, Russians and British possessing, say, several hundred A-bombs each. Hitler ain’t gonna stop, so the question isn’t if the Bomb deters him (Hitler would view stepping across the line as an act of will meant to expose his enemies’ weakness) , but rather how WMD’s would fit into a total war scenario.

 

Strategic bombing with chemical weapons was the Doomsday fear of the interwar to WWII era. Effectively, they did have an arsenal of several atomic weapons. Yet neither side purposefully used them (a few accidental releases being recorded).

[seahawk]

During the Cold War, West Germany felt itself protected enough from a first use of atomic weapons be the WarPac, to not pursue own atomic weapons, as the real situation was that the WarPac could not use its weapons against NATO without killing a few thousands Americans or British soliders in the process. Secondly German Air Force units had atomic bombs. Those were controlled by a small US detachement, but that was guarded by Germans. Does anybody belive that 12 americans could stop the Germans from using the bombs if they felt betrayed by the US ? So in that situation the protection was seen as good enough, while the set-up also meant that a first use of such weapons by Germany was politcally impossible.

[BansheeOne]

Does anybody belive that 12 americans could stop the Germans from using the bombs if they felt betrayed by the US ?

 

Yes, since AFAIK the bombs couldn't have been armed without them. Hence the term of "dual key arrangement".

[Exel]

Slightly OT, but I had a thought about the possible use of nukes today related to the use of chemical weapons in WW2. There both sides had stockpiles of chemical weapons, but no one used them. Could the same happen with nuclear powers today? Even in a large scale war two nuclear powers would refrain from the use of nuclear weapons out of fear of retaliation and stick to conventional warfare?

 

There's of course the issue of chemical weapons having been judged quite ineffective in WW1 whereas nukes are unquestionably effective. But how big a factor was that in WW2? Would the belligerents have abstained from the use of chemical weapons regardless, even if they had been more effective weapons?

[Exel]

I wholeheartedly agree. No doubt, had push come to shove, the French would have been willing to blow East Germans off the face of the Earth at the same rate as Russia put paid to West Germans. In fact, the willingness of Russians and French to kill Germans, as a demonstration of their national wills, might have been devastating to Central Europe - perhaps even to the point where Germany ceased to exist as a significant power. In such a situation, while it might be argued that when the dust settled Russia had not won a victory, it still would be certain that Germany had, very much indeed, lost.

 

I lol'd.

[Guest aevans]

Soviet Cold War intentions in Europe are central to the question of the impact of the American nuclear deterrent upon their behaviour. If the Russians never held offensive ambitions in Europe, then American policy didn’t ‘deter’ a damn thing. In fact, the Russia agenda didn’t much change from 1909 to 1989, and nowhere in it did the Russians much give care about anything in Europe past the Balkans, the Danube basin, and Poland – ie, what they had in pocket during the Cold War.

 

Whether or not a strategic competitor has a long range policy of aggression, crises and opportunities can arise from time to time in which leaders are tempted to abandon policy and take direct action. One of the primary purposes of deterence is to make people stop and think in those situations.

 

The most effective NATO policy on nuclear weapons, IMO, was the integration of tactical (battlefield) weapons within NATO’s military command structure. Judging by their manipulation of the peace movements in the 70’s and 80’s, this seemed to have pushed the Russian button – and small wonder. By divesting real WMD combat power into the alliance combat organization, the Americans virtually assured to the Russians that nuclear retaliation would occur – at least within the territories of Poland, East Germany, etc.

 

Tactical nukes aren't designed for that kind of thing. Do you think that nuclear units in the field had targetting fills for downtown Warsaw and Leipzig?

[Guest aevans]

Secondly German Air Force units had atomic bombs. Those were controlled by a small US detachement, but that was guarded by Germans. Does anybody belive that 12 americans could stop the Germans from using the bombs if they felt betrayed by the US ?

 

Absolutely. US nuclear weapons are intentionally designed to be useless unless specific release measures are taken, key pieces of which the Germans did not have access to.

[glenn239]

Absolutely. US nuclear weapons are intentionally designed to be useless unless specific release measures are taken, key pieces of which the Germans did not have access to.

Small wonder. If the Germans used an American made bomb to attack a target in the Soviet Union, the Russians would retaliate directly into the United States. Even if the damage were limited to one or two attacks before everyone backed down, the American and Soviet economies would be crippled, as hundreds of millions of people suddenly panic and run for the hills.

 

Tactical nukes aren't designed for that kind of thing. Do you think that nuclear units in the field had targetting fills for downtown Warsaw and Leipzig?

 

I think they are as capable of detonating in a downtown core as out in the countryside

[Guest aevans]

I think they are as capable of detonating in a downtown core as out in the countryside

 

The point flew over your head at 40,000 ft AGL.

[Noble713]

IMO, war is an activity in which there are significant risks attached to the rewards sought through force. Predation is an activity in which force is likewise the mediating element, but in which the rewards so outweigh the gains that they can be considered irrelevant to decisions on whether or not to engage. As Peter Young once put it, the essence of being a soldier is not that of killing your enemy, but in offering oneself up to the risk of being killed in return.

 

 

I don't know about anyone else, but I'm more than willing to change my career from "Professional Soldier" to "Professional Human Eradicator".

[p620346]

I have heard that if the US wanted to win a nuclear war with the USSR it should have launched a strike on new years eve because everyone on duty would have bee drunk.

[SCFalken]

Even if the damage were limited to one or two attacks before everyone backed down, the American and Soviet economies would be crippled, as hundreds of millions of people suddenly panic and run for the hills.

 

In the case of a significant increase in tensions, it's likely most of the major US cities would be depopulated (of the segments of populace that own vehicles) as soon as we started moving reinforcements to Europe.

 

If the Soviets come through Fulda, the wise man isn't sitting in Omaha or NYC.

 

Falken

[Mk 1]

In the case of a significant increase in tensions, it's likely most of the major US cities would be depopulated (of the segments of populace that own vehicles) as soon as we started moving reinforcements to Europe.

 

If the Soviets come through Fulda, the wise man isn't sitting in Omaha or NYC.

Yes, and no.

 

Consider your circumstances ... you fear an enemy attack, you fear that your city is a top-rated target, and you have the means to get out ...

 

You still have to have somewhere to go, and you still need food and water, and shelter, when you get there. For yourself and for your family.

 

Unless it was an organized evacuation, most of those who might flee at an increase of tensions would return within a few short days. You just won't have a hundred-million people sitting out under the stars, rubbing sticks together to start campfires to cook the the rabbits they killed with their hand-made bows and arrows.

 

And most people know this. Or would realize this, when they came to the point of deciding whether or not to go, and realized they had no where to go to.

 

All of that said, when/if a nuke actually did light up a city in the homeland, substantial portions of the population would indeed flee in fear, even IF they didn't know where they were going or how they were going to feed themselves. And so yes indeed, the economic dislocation would be dramatic.

 

So dramatic, that for all of the government plans, you have to assume that the cost of implementing a general evacuation of cities at a time of heightened tensions would turn such a move into a big bold signal to the opposition of imminent attack by the evacuating nation. No industrial nation could afford to do an evacuation and NOT precipitate the decision-point in the conflict.

 

-Mark 1

[glenn239]

The point flew over your head at 40,000 ft AGL.

 

The distinction between a 'tactical' and 'strategic' nuclear weapons is, with the exception of its attack radius, largely ethereal in terms of the raw capabilities of the weapons themselves. You wrote,

 

Tactical nukes aren't designed for that kind of thing. Do you think that nuclear units in the field had targetting fills <sic? files?> for downtown Warsaw and Leipzig?

 

Nucs kill what they are aimed at, and Warsaw is a set of coordinates that can be typed into a firing computer in about 1 minute. If your ally promises to aim for the guys in the hills but actually hits Leningrad with a 20kt bomb instead, then whatever the Soviets obliterate in retalation are just as dead. They won't give a damn that Leningrad just got baked by a 'tac' nuc, or that the smaller yield only killed 500,000 people instead of 1,000,000.

 

In the case of a significant increase in tensions, it's likely most of the major US cities would be depopulated (of the segments of populace that own vehicles) as soon as we started moving reinforcements to Europe.

 

The inability of the US government to cope with something as simple as the New Orleans disaster leaves one, shall we say, not entirely confident that they could hurdle the logistics of relocating100 or 150 million people.

[Exel]

Did the people in major cities run for the hills en masse during Cuban missile crisis?

 

I find depopulation of major cities very unlikely until the fighting actually breaks out, and even then most would probably return shortly when they see that nukes didn't hit them (yet).

[SCFalken]

Did the people in major cities run for the hills en masse during Cuban missile crisis?

 

Not really the same thing as the scenario of NATO clearing the decks (repatriation of AMCITs/Dependants, CONUS units deploying to Europe and breaking open the POMCUS dumps, SSBNs surging, etc).

 

Given that, yeah, I think much of the mobile (i.e. have vehicles) urban population would clear the major cities.

 

 

Falken

[Guest aevans]

The distinction between a 'tactical' and 'strategic' nuclear weapons is, with the exception of its attack radius, largely ethereal in terms of the raw capabilities of the weapons themselves.

 

There's wolrd of difference between .5-5 kt and 330 kt. But that's not really what I was talking about. I was talking about the intended use and consequent implementation constraints. For instance:

 

You wrote,

 

Tactical nukes aren't designed for that kind of thing. Do you think that nuclear units in the field had targetting fills <sic? files?> for downtown Warsaw and Leipzig?

 

Nucs kill what they are aimed at, and Warsaw is a set of coordinates that can be typed into a firing computer in about 1 minute. If your ally promises to aim for the guys in the hills but actually hits Leningrad with a 20kt bomb instead, then whatever the Soviets obliterate in retalation are just as dead. They won't give a damn that Leningrad just got baked by a 'tac' nuc, or that the smaller yield only killed 500,000 people instead of 1,000,000.

 

You plug coordinates into field artillery and short range rocket fire control systems. Weapons designed to attack over scores or hundreds of miles have to have pre-designed flight plans. Those could possibly be developed in the field, but only if the field personnel have the requisite maps, magnetic and gravitational field/terrain surveys, etc. I don't know for a fact, but more than likely those were only provided for actual bases and potential enemy assembly areas, and not for cities far in the enemy rear.

 

BTW, fill is what I meant to say. It's slang for mission essential data to be loaded into a weapons or communication system.