How to win a nuclear war?

[whyhow]

anyone feeling nostalgic for the good ol'days? given our ineffective anti-proliferation effort lately, and our half-hearted anti-proliferation history, I think a regional nuclear war in likely in our lifetime. and a global nuclear war more likely today than during the Cold War. so let's dust of the plans. How do we win with the Bomb?

[p620346]

anyone feeling nostalgic for the good ol'days? given our ineffective anti-proliferation effort lately, and our half-hearted anti-proliferation history, I think a regional nuclear war in likely in our lifetime. and a global nuclear war more likely today than during the Cold War. so let's dust of the plans. How do we win with the Bomb?

 

Pick an oponent like IRAN that may have the bomb but does not have a delivery system capable of hitting the US

[Josh]

anyone feeling nostalgic for the good ol'days? given our ineffective anti-proliferation effort lately, and our half-hearted anti-proliferation history, I think a regional nuclear war in likely in our lifetime. and a global nuclear war more likely today than during the Cold War. so let's dust of the plans. How do we win with the Bomb?

 

I think a regional war much more likely than in the past. I think a global war still quite unlikely. There is little to be gained by either side in a nuclear conflict, unless one of them lacks sufficient means to deliver weapons (or lacks them in the first place). A brew-up between Pakistan and India, or Iran and Israel, I could possibly see (though IMO still unlikely). What other regional brew ups are you suggesting? And how would anyone get to 'global' nuclear war (by which I assume you mean getting the US invovled)? Why would it be default policy for a country to launch its weapons if some other regional conflict that did not directly invovle them started? I fail to see why any country would want to invovle itself in a nuclear exchange between two other parties, outside the usual increase in alert posture.

[jakec]

I'd say the answers are still the same as they always have been...decapitation or very effective counterforce or graduated escalation beyond the point where the enemy cries "uncle".

[Guest aevans]

I'd say the answers are still the same as they always have been...decapitation or very effective counterforce or graduated escalation beyond the point where the enemy cries "uncle".

 

IOW, escalation dominance, in whatever form most readily recommends itself. There are only two end states in nuclear war -- pyrrhic victory or an outrageously pyrrhic draw.

[rmgill]

IOW, escalation dominance, in whatever form most readily recommends itself. There are only two end states in nuclear war -- pyrrhic victory or an outrageously pyrrhic draw.

 

Like at the End of WWII? I don't think that was a pyrrhic victory. If your strike is such that the other side can't get a single shot off or you can intercept them all, the victory isn't pyrrhic at all. Getting to that state where your strike WILL trump theirs utterly is tough but we're pretty darn close to that now as I understand things.

[Guest aevans]

Like at the End of WWII? I don't think that was a pyrrhic victory. If your strike is such that the other side can't get a single shot off or you can intercept them all, the victory isn't pyrrhic at all. Getting to that state where your strike WILL trump theirs utterly is tough but we're pretty darn close to that now as I understand things.

 

If a power can arrange perfectly reliable preemption and uses nukes anyway, it's not engaging in war, it's engaging in predation.

Edited December 18, 2007 by aevans

[Xavier]

Like at the End of WWII? I don't think that was a pyrrhic victory. If your strike is such that the other side can't get a single shot off or you can intercept them all, the victory isn't pyrrhic at all. Getting to that state where your strike WILL trump theirs utterly is tough but we're pretty darn close to that now as I understand things.

2 nukes being popped when the war is already close to won doesn't make WWII a nuclear war

[swerve]

If a power can arrange perfectly reliable preemption and uses nukes anyway, it's not engaging in war, it's engaging in predation.

 

Well said.

[Josh]

I don't understand your opinion on the transition from 'war' to 'predation'; I remember it from some other thread I think involving the total replacement of fighting forces with mechanicals so that one side suffered no risk to personel. That said I doubt we'll see the situation where one side has overwhelming nuclear power over another *and* uses it with 100% safety from retaliation, unless one side simple lacks nuclear weapons. Would that still be predation?

[EchoFiveMike]

Hell, for me, the perfect war is no more in doubt than the fate of the cow at the slaughterhouse. S/F....Ken M

[SCFalken]

Optimally, you win and then go to war. Suboptimally, you go to war and then try to win.

 

Nukes are the ultimate trump card, when one side has them and the other does not (or has an insignificant arsenal, compared to the other side).

 

The only wild card in that situation is the reaction of third parties to the use of nukes by the nuclear-capable party. Would Vlad (or the Chinese, or French or British) launch the Topols if we dropped The Bomb on Tehran (or any given target outside the sphere of influence of a nuclear Power)?

 

 

Falken

Edited December 20, 2007 by SCFalken

[glenn239]

Since a full-out exchange between nuclear powers would negate any possibility of ‘winning’ a nuclear war, their successful use could only occur in situations where the enemy power restrained itself from applying its full WMD capabilities against you. Usage must simultaneously advance your interests while at the same time not giving your nuclear rival a reason escalate unpredictably. Situations where nuclear weapons might increase the chances of victory, without the insane risk of first sending in a decapitating first strike, are:

 

1) The enemy power is lead by a bunch of total pussies.

2) The enemy power is uncertain of its ability to successfully counterattack.

3) The enemy group consists of a nuclear power, projecting conventional force via the territories of a coalition of non-nuclear allies.

4) Your aims are limited in scope and well understood by your opponents.

5) The enemy thinks you are a little nuts, and prone to doing stupid things like ordering all-out atomic attacks because you’re angry.

 

#3 probably contains the real potential for ‘winning’ a nuclear war. Attack the non-nuclear member(s) (the less western these are, the better for you). The enemy coalition will probably shatter on the spot.

[Guest aevans]

I don't understand your opinion on the transition from 'war' to 'predation'; I remember it from some other thread I think involving the total replacement of fighting forces with mechanicals so that one side suffered no risk to personel. That said I doubt we'll see the situation where one side has overwhelming nuclear power over another *and* uses it with 100% safety from retaliation, unless one side simple lacks nuclear weapons. Would that still be predation?

 

IMO, war is an activity in which there are significant risks attached to the rewards sought through force. Predation is an activity in which force is likewise the mediating element, but in which the rewards so outweigh the gains that they can be considered irrelevant to decisions on whether or not to engage. As Peter Young once put it, the essence of being a soldier is not that of killing your enemy, but in offering oneself up to the risk of being killed in return.

[Guest aevans]

Hell, for me, the perfect war is no more in doubt than the fate of the cow at the slaughterhouse. S/F....Ken M

 

At which point is ceases to be war.

[Guest aevans]

#3 probably contains the real potential for ‘winning’ a nuclear war. Attack the non-nuclear member(s) (the less western these are, the better for you). The enemy coalition will probably shatter on the spot.

 

Unless the enemy power guarantees the territorial and political integrity of its allies with its own nuclear arsenal. ISTR a rather significant player doing just that for several decades recently...

[SCFalken]

At which point is ceases to be war.

 

 

Errr.....good?

 

 

 

Falken

[binder001]

I'd say the answers are still the same as they always have been...decapitation or very effective counterforce or graduated escalation beyond the point where the enemy cries "uncle".

 

"graduated escalation" sounds waaayyy too much like the failed Johnson/McNamara approach to Viet Nam. A little bombing to "send a message" just doesn't work when your opponent doesn't operate on the same scale of values as you do. Presuambly, the most likely candidates for your escalation are the same societies who relish strapping bombs on 15 year old girls and putting them on a crowded bus to be detonated. Your "message" will be lost to them - they're off in a delusion about restoring the middle-ages (while their leaders have pacemakers and wear Rollex watches!).

 

"War" versus "predation" is a funny concept. It's as outdated as the false concept of a Western gunfight. Rarely did any pair of gunfighters meet on an open street for a test of skill. Gunfights were usually in bars between drunken, angry men who felt slighted or cheated and were quick to turn to violence. The object was to win, preferably without suffering damage in return.

 

If a conflict were to go over the edge and involve nuclear weapons, one can't afford to fight fair. One side has to "neutralize" the other rapidly - no country can afford the return punch of a fair fight.

[Guest aevans]

Errr.....good?

Falken

 

Doubleplus ungood -- who wants to see a nuclear armed power incapable of being stopped and unconcerned by the cost, even if it happens to be the United States? I'm not a big Robert E. Lee fanatic, but he was absolutely right that it is good that war is terrible.

[Guest aevans]

"graduated escalation" sounds waaayyy too much like the failed Johnson/McNamara approach to Viet Nam. A little bombing to "send a message" just doesn't work when your opponent doesn't operate on the same scale of values as you do. Presuambly, the most likely candidates for your escalation are the same societies who relish strapping bombs on 15 year old girls and putting them on a crowded bus to be detonated. Your "message" will be lost to them - they're off in a delusion about restoring the middle-ages (while their leaders have pacemakers and wear Rollex watches!).

 

We're talking about engaging in nuclear war with somebody that has a significant stockpile of nukes themselves. Flushing your entire stockpile in an attempt to win preemptively is still going to leave anywhere from 10-50% of the enemy force intact. Guess what happens next? That's one of the big reasons that Kahn and others started thinking about fighting an escalation dominance campaign.

 

"War" versus "predation" is a funny concept. It's as outdated as the false concept of a Western gunfight. Rarely did any pair of gunfighters meet on an open street for a test of skill. Gunfights were usually in bars between drunken, angry men who felt slighted or cheated and were quick to turn to violence. The object was to win, preferably without suffering damage in return.

What does that have to do with warfare? The strategies individuals can use against each other, and the motivations that they respond to are different from the strategies and motivations inherrent in warfare. You can't fight a war without spending lives and treasure the way you can win a shootout with one or two other persons.

 

If a conflict were to go over the edge and involve nuclear weapons, one can't afford to fight fair. One side has to "neutralize" the other rapidly - no country can afford the return punch of a fair fight.

 

No one can afford to use all of his weapons and no one can afford not to neutralize every single weapon belonging to the enemy. Since those are mutually exclusive goals in almost every realistic case, your ideas of nuclear strategy are bankrupt.

[Josh]

We're talking about engaging in nuclear war with somebody that has a significant stockpile of nukes themselves. Flushing your entire stockpile in an attempt to win preemptively is still going to leave anywhere from 10-50% of the enemy force intact. Guess what happens next? That's one of the big reasons that Kahn and others started thinking about fighting an escalation dominance campaign.

 

I agree with you in principle, I just want to point out there have been some studies done that sugguest the US, even in a war with what is left of Russia, could pretty easily wipe in the high 90th percentile of their deterant. The subs don't sortie, the bombers are consentrated at a handful of airfields, the ICBMs are vulnerable to precission warheads (laydown B61/83 or W88) and the mobile missiles tend to stick to their garisons which are for all intents and purposes unhardened. That said those last few percent used in counter value is exactly what makes having even one nuclear weapon such a deterant.

[glenn239]

Unless the enemy power guarantees the territorial and political integrity of its allies with its own nuclear arsenal

 

Talk is cheap.

 

If the guarantor power fails to counterattack on the enemies home soil (ie, places its continued existence at higher premium than honouring a pact it hoped wouldn’t be activated), then the minor conventional power(s) (one, some, or all in the coalition) immediately defect. If the guarantor power is not of the same demographic and economic class as the guarantor power, or the minor power doesn’t effect the core interests of the protector, then the chances of a defection are higher. (example – the United States will be less likely to retaliate in defense of Pakistan than to protect Japan).

 

If the guarantor power does counterattack against the territory of the nuclear aggressor, then this power may/will retaliate in kind directly against the guarantor, while at the same time escalating against the minor power. The reasoning being that even if the protector honours its military agreements, the minor power will seek terms rather than face certain destruction. (It being scant consolation to the minor power facing obliteration that the ally took a hit or two).

 

Perhaps the best option for the guarantor would be to counterattack within the territories of the enemies minor conventional partners. Here, both sides are exerting pressure via WMD’s to force the minor partners of the other to cry ‘uncle’ and leave the war. Who actually ‘wins’ such a mess is the side that can better afford its allies saying ‘screw this’ and heading for the hills.

 

In any conceivable situation involving Great Powers, any form of nuclear attack or exchange (even a very limited one) would cause mass panic, and lead to chaos as, literally, tens of millions of people living in large cities fled for the countryside pell-mell.

Edited December 21, 2007 by glenn239

[Guest aevans]

Talk is cheap.

 

Blah, blah, blah...yada, yada, yada...

 

It was precisely such "cheap" talk on the part of the US that led the Soviets to conclude that outright aggression in Europe wasn't worth the risks.

[Xavier]

It was precisely such "cheap" talk on the part of the US that led the Soviets to conclude that outright aggression in Europe wasn't worth the risks.

surely La Force de Frappe, the subs in Faslane and the V-bombers helped a little as well.

[glenn239]

It was precisely such "cheap" talk on the part of the US that led the Soviets to conclude that outright aggression in Europe wasn't worth the risks.

In your world of magic pixies and unicorns, were the Soviets hell-bent on a war of aggression in post-war Europe too?

 

surely La Force de Frappe, the subs in Faslane and the V-bombers helped a little as well

.

 

The fact the Britain and France decided, at great expense and to the detriment of their conventional capabilities, to introduce their own indigenous nuclear weapons programs speaks volumes as to their “confidence” their guarantor power would seek its own self-annihilation in their defense.

 

For anyone to argue that France and England would see themselves obliterated as national entities, and all in the defense of, say, the Germans who had been so wonderful to them just decades before, I would heartily suggest; guess again.