Elite units - Pros and Cons?

[A2Keltainen]

if you look at outfits like 22 SAS, SBS, SASR, Delta, they are capable of carrying out quite a variety of operations, including recce, direct action, counter-terrorism, in the case of the Brits and Aussies training local forces too.

 

But don't forget that most of these units specialize both on the sub unit and individual levels. For example, 22 SAS splits their squadrons in mountain, air, boat, and mobility troops when operating in the "green" role, and in sniper and assault troops when operating in the "black" role, and the individual members specialize in skills such as medic, signaler, demolitions expert, etc. After all, there are time limits on how many skills an individual can be real good at, despite his motivation, natural abilities, and available monetary resources. Time spent on improving your SR skills, is by definition time not spent on improving your DA skills, or at least not to the same degree as if you had spent it on DA specific training.

[CV9030FIN]

Title: Generation Kill

Author: Evan Wright

ISBN: It's available in several different editions, so pick one since it isn't hard to find given title and author.

 

It's an interesting read.

 

thanks...

[Sardaukar]

Ditto.

[jakec]

My question on this topic would be: what evidence is there of the improved fighting effectiveness of these elite units? Is there operational research showing an elite brigade consistently besting regular divisions. Note, this is not a question about the specialised roles and functions some elite units may perform such as airborne or amphibious warfare for which extra training and better teamwork may be deemed important.

 

IIRC there was a wargame designer (Balowski? Bakowski?) who was a firm believer in the 'elite units' thesis and designed games in which said elite units played a disproportionate role - in NW Europe 1944 for instance.

[Kenneth P. Katz]

There is a compelling reason to field elite units that have highly specialized roles and missions.

 

Elite line units (infantry, armor, fighter squadrons, etc.) don't make any sense.

[A2Keltainen]

Elite line units (infantry, armor, fighter squadrons, etc.) don't make any sense.

 

But what if your economy forces you to have a high/low equipment mix, with a rather large difference in quality between the high end equipment and the low end equipment. In that case, wouldn't it make sense to choose the better soldiers to operate the high end equipment in order to maximize the value of it? An example of a high/low mix is a country with two armored brigades; the first one equipped with Leopard 2, and the second one equipped with the first one's previous Leopard 1s.

[Sardaukar]

Isn't Israeli Air Force having that concept ? Best pilots get assigned to units with best planes and you can be "downgraded" down to transport planes/attack helicopters etc. if you lose your capability.

[pikachu]

Actually, does that also apply to first-user units in rich countries? F-22 squadrons in the US or Rafale squads in France, for instance. I don't mean evaluation units but actual line units that receive priority. In many cases these units get the distinction of being called elite (by the media) by virtue of being assigned the newest toys first. Although I suppose there are cases, like the Stryker brigades, where such distinction is harder to make by virtue of the type of new toys being assigned.

 

Also, since eventually the F-22 and F-15 will have to work side-by-side for a long time to come (same as F-35 and F-16) won't that automatically create elite-regular distinctions in the USAF?

Edited December 18, 2007 by pikachu

[Ariete!]

But what if your economy forces you to have a high/low equipment mix, with a rather large difference in quality between the high end equipment and the low end equipment. In that case, wouldn't it make sense to choose the better soldiers to operate the high end equipment in order to maximize the value of it? An example of a high/low mix is a country with two armored brigades; the first one equipped with Leopard 2, and the second one equipped with the first one's previous Leopard 1s.

 

A very good example, very 'real world' and one I will deal with.

 

I think it's incredibly dangerous to have a 'crack unit' with Leo 2s and good training and then the guys in very low-survivability, semi-marginal firepower in Leo 1s AND LESS TRAINING. How would such a unit fight? Very poorly I suspect. It reminds me of some Italian army units in WW".

 

I know, training costs money, yes, but above all it's a matter of attitude/not wasting money on other stuff. I'd rather have a handful fewer Leo2s but allow the guys with Leo 1s to train and to feel they are not 2nd class soldiers just because they have poorer weapons. If used appropriately, after all, a Leo 1 is not quite junk yet. In fact I might give the Leo1 Brigade some extra training in rapid operations / more "cavalry"-type missions that emphasize speed/agility, etc. to help make up that equipment deficit.

 

Then you still have a good Leo 2 brigade for breaking the back of the enemy but also a good Leo 1 force for mobile defence, pursuit, delaying actions, etc.

[shep854]

The thread seems to be moving into the area of "first-line" vs "second-line" units rather than the genuine "elites." A very valid concept, due to the expense of an effective military. "Elite" units are most commonly associated with unique missions which require specific, specialized skills.

 

The "Unique, specialized" concept is where USMC gets its claim to elite status, not its esprit, battle record or size. In fact, the sheer size of USMC leads some to question its claim to be elite.

[Old Tanker]

The thread seems to be moving into the area of "first-line" vs "second-line" units rather than the genuine "elites." A very valid concept, due to the expense of an effective military. "Elite" units are most commonly associated with unique missions which require specific, specialized skills.

 

The "Unique, specialized" concept is where USMC gets its claim to elite status, not its esprit, battle record or size. In fact, the sheer size of USMC leads some to question its claim to be elite.

 

I have a serious problem with the common use of Elite , do you mean specialized units ?

 

There is a thread on this forum about ACR's in the U.S. Army, as an x-tanker they qualify as Elites by my mindset.

Of course the recruiters , Hollywood and the media thrive on Elites and I constantly run into them at all the local bars , you know them !

They did 3 tours in Nam as Airborne, Ranger and Special Forces.

 

Oh well , just my $0.02s worth.

[jakec]

My definition of "elite" would be a unit that has very restrictive entry requirements, can pick-and-choose recruits from across the military and/or from the best of the new intake of raw recruits, has extra training over the norm and access to the pick of equipment. I don't see the mere fact of having a specialised battlefield task as making a unit "elite", clearly others mileage does vary.

[Guest aevans]

My definition of "elite" would be a unit that has very restrictive entry requirements, can pick-and-choose recruits from across the military and/or from the best of the new intake of raw recruits, has extra training over the norm and access to the pick of equipment. I don't see the mere fact of having a specialised battlefield task as making a unit "elite", clearly others mileage does vary.

 

Modern special forces meet your personnel quality, selective entry, enhanced training, and enhanced equipment requirements. That's why they're generally considered "elite". The pre-20th Century definition isn't that far off of today's, the major difference being that old skool elites (Guards, Grenadiers, etc.) had traditional battlefield tasks.

[Mk 1]

The pre-20th Century definition isn't that far off of today's, the major difference being that old skool elites (Guards, Grenadiers, etc.) had traditional battlefield tasks.

Not sure I parsed that statement correctly, but I don't think that the "old skool" model as described should be consigned to the pre-20th Century timeframe. Please note I am not trying to force my interpretation on the statement. If that was not what was intended, my apoligies in advance. I am not responding to jus this posting, but to an undercurrent I find in the thread which spans several posts by multiple posters.

 

I think part of the difficutly in discussing the topic of "elites" is the lack of clarity on the model. We are struggling with definitions, but the heart of the issue is that the term "elite" can be, and is, used for more than one model. It can apply to:

 

1 ) Special-purpose troops who are trained and equipped to perform non-standard tasks; or

 

2 ) "Better" troops with higher levels of training and better equipment for performing standard battlefield tasks.

 

Ken Katz has indicated in simple terms that the first model (#1 above) makes sense to him, and the second (#2) doesn't. At least his statement is clear. I am inclined to agree, but have not managed to say so in such simple and unequivocal termonology, in part because I'm just not quite that certain.

 

But we should not dismiss model #2 as non-existent, or no longer existent. I have seen several statements which seem to dismiss it as if it were a mis-interpretation, a mis-representation, or perhaps just an issue left behind by the march of history.

 

We have too many examples from WW2 (SS Panzer Divisions), from the Cold War (Soviet Guards), and even from OIF (Iraqi Republican Guards), to suggest that the second model is not present in modern militaries. The model exists. Whether it is a productive model or not is a good question. But the model exists, and has in fact been pretty widely applied over recent years and decades.

 

-Mark 1

[A2Keltainen]

I think part of the difficutly in discussing the topic of "elites" is the lack of clarity on the model. We are struggling with definitions, but the heart of the issue is that the term "elite" can be, and is, used for more than one model. It can apply to:

 

1 ) Special-purpose troops who are trained and equipped to perform non-standard tasks; or

 

2 ) "Better" troops with higher levels of training and better equipment for performing standard battlefield tasks.

 

Do the Soviet Operational Maneuver Groups belong to 1 or to 2 above in your opinion?

[Exel]

Armies need to do things that are very demanding. Things that require high physical fitness and rigorous training to get done. Such missions naturally translate into high requirements on the individual, which the "average" soldier may not be able to meet. Thus arises the necessity for "special" troops that have higher recruitment and training standards than other troops. Because of their training and high individual recruitment criteria these troops naturally perform better than the "average" troop. Often their missions also require specialized equipment, sometimes better than what the "average" trooper needs. Thus you have the combination of highly trained troops of uncommon qualities and better-than-average equipment. These may then be referred to as "elite".

 

As such it's a natural state of affairs. They are just another group of specialists amongst many - just like pilots, engineers or tankers, all highly specialized branches. Their mission requirements just happen to be very demanding, which gives them that extra recognition and prestige. Worth noting is that most armed forces don't have designated Elite Forces but Special Forces. Tankers may be just as elite in their own profession and Rangers are in theirs. Having "elite" forces is not an end in itself, just a development from requiring demands and needs.

Edited December 20, 2007 by Exel

[Exel]

double post

Edited December 20, 2007 by Exel

[Exel]

triple post - wtf over?

Edited December 20, 2007 by Exel

[Old Tanker]

As such it's a natural state of affairs. They are just another group of specialists amongst many - just like pilots, engineers or tankers, all highly specialized branches. Their mission requirements just happen to be very demanding, which gives them that extra recognition and prestige. Worth noting is that most armed forces don't have designated Elite Forces but Special Forces. Tankers may be just as elite in their own profession and Rangers are in theirs. Having %2

 

There you go and now I agree with you.

IMO the medical personnel with highly developed skills , dedication and equipment and the miracles performed saving lives meets the criteria of Elite.

[shep854]

There you go and now I agree with you.

IMO the medical personnel with highly developed skills , dedication and equipment and the miracles performed saving lives meets the criteria of Elite.

 

Ding ding ding! Old Tanker gets the prize!! Well said!

[Guest aevans]

Not sure I parsed that statement correctly, but I don't think that the "old skool" model as described should be consigned to the pre-20th Century timeframe...We have too many examples from WW2 (SS Panzer Divisions), from the Cold War (Soviet Guards), and even from OIF (Iraqi Republican Guards), to suggest that the second model is not present in modern militaries. The model exists. Whether it is a productive model or not is a good question. But the model exists, and has in fact been pretty widely applied over recent years and decades.

 

As early as Napoleon's Grand Army the selectively manned and disproportionally resourced guards model of eliteness was showing signs of decreased utility. And one of the reasons we're having this discussion are the known problems created by SS or Republican Guard type eliteness models. If it's taken two centuries to switch from guards eliteness to special forces eliteness, it doesn't strike me as having taken too long, compared to the overall span of history.

[Guest aevans]

Do the Soviet Operational Maneuver Groups belong to 1 or to 2 above in your opinion?

 

Operational maneuver groups were a conceptual tasking in a doctrinal model, not actual fromations. Of course, because they were supposed to do some key things, the commander would want to assign good troops to this tasking and the Soviets may have tended to assign the same army or armis to the task on exercise and in war plans. So the OMG was something for good, but not necessarily elite, troops to do, not a sign of eliteness in itself.

[A2Keltainen]

Operational maneuver groups were a conceptual tasking in a doctrinal model, not actual fromations. Of course, because they were supposed to do some key things, the commander would want to assign good troops to this tasking and the Soviets may have tended to assign the same army or armis to the task on exercise and in war plans. So the OMG was something for good, but not necessarily elite, troops to do, not a sign of eliteness in itself.

 

My thoughts exactly. Mk 1 specified:

 

Special-purpose troops who are trained and equipped to perform non-standard tasks; or

IMHO, OMG had a non-standard task, and I guess a commander would chose units for it/them that had the right training and equipment for the task.

 

"Better" troops with higher levels of training and better equipment for performing standard battlefield tasks.

 

As we both seem to agree, the responsible commander would probably assign good units for the OMGs.

[Guest aevans]

IMHO, OMG had a non-standard task, and I guess a commander would chose units for it/them that had the right training and equipment for the task.

 

I think what was meant by "non-standard" is stuff that requires unusual methods of entry (parachutes/small boats/SCUBA) and high levels of tactical competence due to relatively small forces. The OMG was a standard tasking within the Soviet operational framework, just one that was expected to be disproportionately decisive with respect to the number and types of troops employed.

[Mk 1]

1 ) Special-purpose troops who are trained and equipped to perform non-standard tasks; or

 

2 ) "Better" troops with higher levels of training and better equipment for performing standard battlefield tasks.

IMHO, OMG had a non-standard task, and I guess a commander would chose units for it/them that had the right training and equipment for the task. ... the responsible commander would probably assign good units for the OMGs.

I think what was meant by "non-standard" is stuff that requires unusual methods of entry (parachutes/small boats/SCUBA) and high levels of tactical competence due to relatively small forces. The OMG was a standard tasking within the Soviet operational framework, just one that was expected to be disproportionately decisive with respect to the number and types of troops employed.

I think Tony has it closer to what I was hoping to suggest.

 

In my understanding the troops in an OMG were not specialists in the sense of my option 1 above. They were trained as infantry soldiers, tankers, artillerists, and engineers and assigned to their regiments just as they would be in any other regiments. The difference was mostly in the approach their divisional and corps level commanders and staffs were expected to take to execute their assigned roles.

 

One might suggest that a commander and staff would become an elite (in the sense of number 1 above) if they were assigned to OMG units from one rotation to the next. But I don't see that designation applying to the troops.

 

On the other hand, as Tony has suggested, a commander might very well wish to have higher quality troops in his OMG, to give him a better chance of succeeding in his assigned role. So it may well be that an OMG would have troops that qualify as elites (in the sense of number 2 above) in it. But then, which commander wouldn't want to have higher quality troops, to give him a better chance of succeeding in his assigned role? This is one of the biggest problems with category 2 elites -- every commander wants them, and since the elite guys are just a subset of the total force structure, most commanders wind up dissappointed on this matter. So discord among front-line commanders growns as a natural by-product of forming "elite units" under the second model above.

 

-Mark 1