Elite units - Pros and Cons?

[Heirophant]

Let’s have a discussion on the reasons for identifying and selecting soldiers of above-average or exceptional competence (however a specific army may define that quality), and then concentrating them in units composed exclusively of like individuals.

 

I must make clear that I am not talking about soldiers selected for loyalty to a regime, or because of social or caste reasons. Let us exclude those from the discussion, right now.

 

I’m also not referring to elite units which emerge naturally in any large organization such as an army.

 

Often, an unintended combination of dynamic leaders, social-professional cohesion/morale (probably via serving together continuously for long periods), esprit, belief in cause (country, religion, politics), and hard training – all come together to raise some units above others with ostensibly the same class of manpower, equipment and training resources. Because these units are not specifically formed to be better than others, their arising cannot be planned for, merely identified if it does occur, and the unit used accordingly.

 

I want to talk about elite units which were formed and specifically intended to be of above average or exceptional competence, and the advantages and disadvantages of doing so.

 

 

There are good reasons armies form elite formations. The “Pros”:

 

1) To concentrate “combat power” (also called “fighting power”) so that success is over-ensured; this is probably the single best reason to form elite units.

Generally speaking, it’s accepted that concentration and focusing of effort and capability is one of the principles of war. When you want your decisive operation to succeed, you want to over-ensure its success by putting as much “fighting power” into it as possible. As much logistical support, firepower, technical means and quality and quantity of manpower as possible.

 

This is where elite units, in theory, come in. All that fighting power takes up SPACE – so and so number of square miles for maneuver units, x amount of real estate for support units etc. The theory holds that you want as much “punch” in as small a space as possible, so that you can use this fighting power with maximum concentration and focus against the enemy’s vulnerable points.

 

 

By this above single parameter, if say an “elite” armored brigade, because it was composed of exceptional leaders and soldiers, were to be the over-all equivalent in combat of 2 “regular-line” armored brigades, that elite brigade would be a better choice for a decisive operation, because it could bring to bear the same “fighting power” as the 2 regular ones, but concentrated in say half the space – thus having a better margin to over-ensure success – they face fewer of the enemy, for a start.

 

Obviously, this also applies to special forces “commando” forces (SAS, Delta, KSK, Seals, Alpha/Vympel) and indeed all crucial, decisive operations where maximum over-ensurance is needed.

 

An example might be the formation of the World War I “Stosstruppen” in the late war period. AFAIK the storm troops were the best 1/3 of the German Army and were selected to lead the offensives because of their high élan.

 

2) Limited resources, in whatever form; this is another reason to form elite units.

 

Often, money’s the limiting factor. This can apply whether referring to a ragtag 3rd world militia or the mighty United States, EU, China or whoever.

 

When there’s only a limited supply of the finest, most advanced weapons and equipment, it should be used by those who can get the most out of it – the exceptional troops; the elite units.

 

We saw this in World War 2 with the formation of Airborne Divisions (limited airlift), US and Japanese Marines (limited amphib lift), even Panzer Divisions (limits on armor availability, so not everyone could be in an armored division; the soldiers of panzer units were said to be the best in the army).

 

 

Okay those are the “Pros”.

 

 

What of the “Cons”?

 

 

1) Elite units deprive regular units of crucial small-unit leaders and of higher-quality fighters.

Obviously, not all soldiers in an army are equally good at what they do, even with the same training, equipment and support. The better soldiers are the backbone of the army, and determine the army’s over-all performance out of all proportion to their numbers. Unit leaders are absolutely key, but even the troops who are not leader material but are simply more skilled, more capable and better individual fighters serve as inspiration and moral bulwarks to their comrades.

 

If you take away the good junior officers, NCOs and the better fighters, the regular, non-elite units suffer a decline in fighting power.

If too much emphasis is placed on elite units, the entire rest of the army can be adversely affected. You would then have, perhaps, a two-tier, HI-LO army: the elite units, and the rest with poorer leaders, lesser fighters and lower cohesion/morale and capability.

 

2) The increase in fighting power through the concentration of the “best of the best” may not be great enough to offset the decline in fighting power of the line units.

 

There have been arguments that elite units have at best a small advantage in fighting power over well-led and -trained regular units composed of a mix of leaders, good fighters and a mass of average fighters. Meanwhile, non-elite units deprived of good leaders and good fighters perform significantly worse than usual.

 

In this line of argument, the army which distributes its quality manpower evenly in its’ regular units would give only a little away in terms of fighting power against the enemy’s elite units, while being significantly better than the enemy’s line units.

 

So over-all, the army which spreads out its good leaders and troops has the advantage, perhaps.

 

 

So, on to the questions:

 

When are elite units worthwhile?

 

Should elite forces be emphasized in some circumstances, de-emphasized in others?

 

Is is possible to over-concentrate the best troops, adversely affecting the whole army?

When is this point reached?

 

Have there been studies or books which have investigated these very issues?

[rmgill]

Elite becomes a problem and it goes to their heads for one.

 

For example, I've heard some interesting things from Marines late of Falluja who had some run ins with Rangers who more or less did EVERYTHING wrong but didn't care because they were Rangers.

[Sikkiyn]

Elite becomes a problem and it goes to their heads for one.

 

For example, I've heard some interesting things from Marines late of Falluja who had some run ins with Rangers who more or less did EVERYTHING wrong but didn't care because they were Rangers.

 

We could start a seperate topic on the pro/con of the hooah factor.

[philgollin]

There was supposedly a general feeling in the British Army at the end of WW2 that the dilution of the better quality soldiers into "private armies" and elite forces had gone too far towards the end of WW2.

 

There was no doubting the worth of the SAS, SBS, Commandos, Paratroopers, Chindits and various special brigades, but the feeling was that the better quality of soldier who would normally otherwise have formed the core of the senior NCOs in "ordinary" formations were being syphoned off. But whilst this was good when relatively little of the overall army was involved in the fighting and the effect of the elite forces were out of proportion to their size, once the main fighting in North-West Europe started then the opportunity for these forces to use their small scale superiority was lost in the huge scale.

 

This was one of the reasons for the disbandment of the majority of the forces at the end of the war. Of course, the specific skills of the Commandos and Paratroopers kept them going and the usefulness of the SAS and SBS meant that they re-emerged not too long after WW2. There is, AGAIN SUPPOSEDLY, some present day discontent within the ordinary regiments of the army that the SAS and paratroopers skim off some of the best recruits which otherwise would be assets to the future NCO corps.

[A2Keltainen]

One thing to consider when discussing the dilution of ordinary units, is that in a volunteer military (and with the country not under some extremely serious military threat), some of the high quality people who join because they want to serve in special/elite units, may choose not join at all if that option isn't there. I can imagine that some people would choose to go for an interesting civilian career, if the SAS/SBS/KSK/SFOD-D/SEAL/etc. option isn't there and the nearest thing the military can offer them is service in a regular infantry unit.

 

Edit:

 

Another thing to consider: Most of the special/elite units are looking for extremely fit individuals for their shooter positions. Now, I bet there is a significant amount of individuals out there who have good to exceptional leadership abilities, but who lack the fitness necessary for service in the special/elite units.

 

In addition, the special/elite units hopefully serve as inspiration for the regular units regarding overall individual and unit performance, and some of them (mostly elite infantry units such as the US Rangers) also serve as a breeding ground for officers who then continue to regular units and hopefully raise the standard there.

 

Edit 2:

 

One things to consider is the size and mix of your elite/special units. I think I best can show what I mean by the following example:

 

Option A:

A1. Really small SR/DA/CT unit(s) similar to SAS/SBS, made up of the very best infantry style soldiers.

A2. Rest of the infantry units.

 

Option B:

B1: Really small SR/DA/CT unit(s) similar to SAS/SBS, made up of the very best infantry style soldiers.

B2: Medium size elite infantry unit(s), similar to US Rangers, and British Paras and Marines.

B3: Rest of the infantry units.

 

I personally think that every military will benefit from having the A1/B1 unit(s), simply because they can do missions the other unit cannot do (a good example being combat diver tasks, paramilitary tasks and CT tasks). The big question IMHO is the B2 units. One could make a case for having a limited amount of them as support for the A1/B1 unit(s), which basically is what the US Rangers and one the British Para battalions are today, but then there is the option of, and question about, having a larger amount of them for more or less ordinary infantry work.

 

Edit 3:

 

Also, if you don't have cool special units, how will Tom Clancy make millions by selling out his name to computer/video games? "Tom Clancy's 143rd Old Mauser Equipped Reservist Home Guard Regiment" doesn't have quite the same "punch" to it as "Tom Clancy's Super Secret Snake Eating High Speed Low Drag Elite Shadow Commando Group".

Edited December 13, 2007 by A2Keltainen

[Ariete!]

lot of good points have already been made; I hope I shan’t be repetitive as I add some general considerations.

 

- In any organization/field of endeavor, some groups will outshine others through hard work and innovation; offering themselves up as exemplars to be emulated. If, however, better performance is due to much better inputs (personnel selection, equipment, training facilities/budgets) that are not generally available, the exemplar effect is completely lost and indeed overall morale may be adversely affected.

 

- The decisive factor is the average performance of the system. Thus, a standard of excellence, or at least competence, in training, esprit, equipment, etc. should be established institution-wide. Esprit d’armee over esprit de corps (see the USMC and the Whermacht as good examples of this). Meritocratic rewards and transparent competition can help this. Ex-ante ‘elitism’ tends to work against it.

 

- There will always be a need for specialized / unconventional units. I would resist equating this automatically with being “elite”.

 

- While pre-selection certainly can help, especially form a motivational standpoint, to some extent individuals act/react to meet implicit/explicit expectations/labels. People in elite units will try to measure up – what are people in “bog-standard” units supposed to do?

 

- There is nothing wrong with morale-boosting sense of unit chauvinism (esprit de corps) but filed-grade and, especially, general-grade officers need to watch out for ‘elite’ status substituting for adequate equipment and hard training.

 

- I note that armies with poor esprit d’armee seem to experience a proliferation of ‘elite’ (as opposed to merely specialized) units, historically.

 

- In one way, a good short-hand for “elite” status may be the ability to accomplish missions with minimal supervision/direction/structure. Given the trend (due to asset constraints and geopolitical developments) toward ever more dispersed operations, it could be argued that all combat units these days need to be “elite” (obviously, in its relative conception, the elite must always be a minority). Indeed the level of training (let alone the equipment) of modern-day infantry in the better armies is not far from what in WW2 only the ”elite” might get.

 

- There seems to be a strong emphasis, in selecting personnel for elite units, on physical fitness well beyond a decent level of stamina/strength but approaching selection-by-ordeal. I feel that while this ensures a cadre of people with great physique and above-normal pain acceptance/forebearance, it may cut out too many otherwise qualified/useful people (intelligence, cunning, tactical sense, fighting ability, extrinsic motivation) and raise the costs of the programs tremendously through an exceedingly high wash-out rate.

[Brian Kennedy]

General Slim bitches about this a lot in Defeat Into Victory, pointing out that most tasks assigned to elite units by other generals were jobs that he expected any of his soldiers to be able to do (scouting, etc.).

 

Ah, here it is:

 

"Any well-trained infantry battalion should be able to do what a commando can do: In the Fourteenth Army they could and did. This cult of special forces is as sensible as to form a Royal Corps of Tree Climbers and say that no soldier, who does not wear a green hat with a bunch of oak leaves stuck in it, should be expected to climb a tree." (pp. 547-548).

 

There was supposedly a general feeling in the British Army at the end of WW2 that the dilution of the better quality soldiers into "private armies" and elite forces had gone too far towards the end of WW2.

 

There was no doubting the worth of the SAS, SBS, Commandos, Paratroopers, Chindits and various special brigades, but the feeling was that the better quality of soldier who would normally otherwise have formed the core of the senior NCOs in "ordinary" formations were being syphoned off. But whilst this was good when relatively little of the overall army was involved in the fighting and the effect of the elite forces were out of proportion to their size, once the main fighting in North-West Europe started then the opportunity for these forces to use their small scale superiority was lost in the huge scale.

[baboon6]

I think Slim did also write something along the lines of the fact that one type of special forces unit was necessary, that which operated in small teams behind enemy lines, often cooperating with local forces, such as Force 136 or OSS Detachment 101 did in Burma. I think a lot of his prejudice against "elite" units came from the antics of Wingate, who took up a lot of resources (and demanded more) without ever really achieving what he set out to. This is not to denigrate the men who made up the Chindits.

[Brian Kennedy]

I think Slim did also write something along the lines of the fact that one type of special forces unit was necessary, that which operated in small teams behind enemy lines, often cooperating with local forces, such as Force 136 or OSS Detachment 101 did in Burma. I think a lot of his prejudice against "elite" units came from the antics of Wingate, who took up a lot of resources (and demanded more) without ever really achieving what he set out to. This is not to denigrate the men who made up the Chindits.

 

Heh -- exactly and I should have brought that up (he writes what you mentioned in the paragraphs immediately following the section I quoted ).

 

Also I'm sure that elite forces have more use in today's smaller, volunteer armies -- if nothing else they're a valuable recruiting tool to bolster the prestige and sexiness of a service to potential recruits. Sort of like how every car manufacturer needs to have a supercar in its lineup to attract buyers, even though most of those buyers end up buying the economy sedan, okay I'm taking this metaphor way too far....

[Sardaukar]

I think Slim did also write something along the lines of the fact that one type of special forces unit was necessary, that which operated in small teams behind enemy lines, often cooperating with local forces, such as Force 136 or OSS Detachment 101 did in Burma. I think a lot of his prejudice against "elite" units came from the antics of Wingate, who took up a lot of resources (and demanded more) without ever really achieving what he set out to. This is not to denigrate the men who made up the Chindits.

 

Well...Chindits were not formed by much of the selection. Indeed, one reason to form them and operate them was to heighten the morale of ordinary units by showing what ordinary troops were capable of doing. At least when they started, their personnel was not specially selected ala elite units.

[Mk 1]

So far in the discussion it seems to me we have discussed some pros and cons, but not actually sought to define any set of valid reasons for establishing elite formations.

 

What do we hope to achieve with elite units? What should we reasonably hope to achieve? This is a critical benchmark to set, so that we can measure whether a given unit achieves that, or falls short.

 

To my thinking, the most successful examples of elite units in history are elite units that have been established for a specialized combat role. Paratroopers are an example. Bad enough to think of dropping regular infantry out of airplanes, you also don't want to spend the time and effort to train them on fighting deep behind enemy lines. You don't expect, nor want, that they will fight small unit actions un-coordinated with supporting arms and effective supply. Turns out that the specialist training of paras made them particularly effective light infantry forces, but many very good para units (ie: German and Italian in WW2) were chewed to pieces by regular forces because having them trained to a higher "elite" status did nothing to help them fight a better supported and supplied enemy. So also are the USMC -- very effective at amphibious assault. Very effective in all-arms cooperation at the small and medium unit level -- skills that are key when the battlefield is isolated from larger formations. But I would not expect to see so much success from a USMC force in the midst of a battle of wide sweeping ground maneuvers.

 

Elite units that have been established just to be better at common combat roles have a far more checkered history. Did SS Panzer Divisions perform better than Wehrmacht Panzer Divisions? Well, in truth, there were some stunningly well executed operations by several of the Wehrmacht units. I seriously question whether siphoning off better equipment and manpower for the SS divisions improved or reduced the effectiveness of the German war effort. So also with the Soviet Guards units. Giving an honorific title to a unit which does particularly well is fine. Giving it a new TOE with expanded levels of equipment must of necessity come at the expence of the non-Elite units.

 

Concentration of combat potential is a reasonable objective, particularly for offensive operations or for a mobile/flexible defense. But that can be achieved by having unit TOEs to reflect these specialties rather than just having generic elite units. So a "breakthrough" division might have more artillery, embedded engineers and heavy armor. It might also have a higher level of training in all-arms cooperation for reducing fortified positions. That is all valid, but it makes it a specialist elite unit, not just a generic an elite unit.

 

Scaling cliffs to blow up gun emplacements -- a job best left to an elite force. Shoring up the line, seeking out the enemy's main line of resistance, seeking to identify, rupture, penetrate and exploit any weakness in the enemy's defenses -- a job that you should be able to hand to a well trained line unit. If you can't, you need to focus on improving your line units, not distracting your leadership by making a couple elite units.

 

-Mark 1

[Briganza]

There was no doubting the worth of the SAS, SBS, Commandos, Paratroopers, Chindits and various special brigades, but the feeling was that the better quality of soldier who would normally otherwise have formed the core of the senior NCOs in "ordinary" formations were being syphoned off. But whilst this was good when relatively little of the overall army was involved in the fighting and the effect of the elite forces were out of proportion to their size, once the main fighting in North-West Europe started then the opportunity for these forces to use their small scale superiority was lost in the huge scale.

 

This was one of the reasons for the disbandment of the majority of the forces at the end of the war. Of course, the specific skills of the Commandos and Paratroopers kept them going and the usefulness of the SAS and SBS meant that they re-emerged not too long after WW2. There is, AGAIN SUPPOSEDLY, some present day discontent within the ordinary regiments of the army that the SAS and paratroopers skim off some of the best recruits which otherwise would be assets to the future NCO corps.

my bold

 

I would strongly argue this.

 

Early para and army commando units were made up of volunteers who were disillusioned with sitting in camp and painting stones. But later most of the AB division, Chindits and commandos was made up of regiments re-rolled to do the job, RMLI and the glider infantry.

 

Your understanding of the recruiting process of todays UK forces is also suspect. The best and brightest are creamed off for trades or other corps who need soldiers to think. The RMP require recruits to score very high on their entrance test. Infantry is way down the bottom. You are not selected for regiments, you select your regiment. This is normally done by your home region, mine was home counties but we still had jocks, paddies, scousers and the occasional Geordie. Para reg recruits from all over and it is your wish to join not them selecting you. If you pass the test (same test as any other infantry recruit) you start recruit training in the same camp as other infantry regiments. So to suggest that they get the cream of the crop could not be further from the truth. As for selection, again volunteers only after about 5 years service and any one can and does vulunteer from cooks to bottle washers. Bring inf is not a requirement as they are not infantry and do not need to know most of the infantry skills. There was a period when they would send troopers with a non inf background on junior and senior Brecon to learn inf tactics.

[Jim Martin]

my bold

 

I would strongly argue this.

 

Early para and army commando units were made up of volunteers who were disillusioned with sitting in camp and painting stones. But later most of the AB division, Chindits and commandos was made up of regiments re-rolled to do the job, RMLI and the glider infantry.

 

By comparison, after the Torch landings, many of Darby's Rangers left the Rangers to join line infantry units, because the Rangers were not being used in combat, but were being held in reserve for special operations. The Rangers were extremely discontented with not seeing any action.

[Brian Kennedy]

Well...Chindits were not formed by much of the selection. Indeed, one reason to form them and operate them was to heighten the morale of ordinary units by showing what ordinary troops were capable of doing. At least when they started, their personnel was not specially selected ala elite units.

 

True, but Slim argues that when the Chindits were formed/assigned/whatever, they got more authority to pass on their less-worthy troops to other, regular units, weakening the army as a whole.

[Archie Pellagio]

One thing i've often wondered is the supposed benefits of "knighting" perfectly ordinary troops into "elite" troops ala the Chindits?

 

Would that be an accurate assesment in the eyes of the fora?

[baboon6]

True, but Slim argues that when the Chindits were formed/assigned/whatever, they got more authority to pass on their less-worthy troops to other, regular units, weakening the army as a whole.

 

I think Slim's major problem with the Chindits (besides Wingate) was that he was forced to break up , for the '44 operation, a well-trained, battle-experienced division (70th Infantry Div), to be split into long-range penetration brigades (and the brigades into columns, about half a battalion in size each). It could be argued (very strongly I feel) that 70 Div could have been far more useful in its original state, and employed as a division. Julian Thompson puts it better than I can in his The Imperial War Museum Book of the War Behind Enemy Lines. I've read a lot of the stuff about the Chindits (Fergusson and Calvert's books, Shelford Bidwell, Louis Allen) and Thompson is just about the only author who takes a cold hard look and asks a) was it the best use of resources? and what did they really achieve?

[Assessor]

My takes, for what it’s worth is as follows, using the definitions above

 

The A1/B1 units are those with special, specialised functions that cannot (or do not need to be) readily duplicated among the bulk of the armed forces. These kind of units have arisen mainly as a function of the technological / societal context of modern warfare.

 

The B2 units are the descendents (in function if not in heredity) of the early elite formations – the sort of thing that 200 odd years ago would be called “Guard” units in Europe.

 

These weren’t better equipped than the majority, although they often got a better physical class of recruit. By a combination of esprit de corps, discipline and a few imponderables, they were able to stand where others fell back, break through where others were repulsed, etc. They became the armies’ aces in the hole.

 

The argument, probably now and then, is how many aces is it prudent to hold, at the cost of weakening the rest of your hand? As long as warfare remains unpredictable, commanders are going to want those aces, but that need must be balanced against the wider effects: a smallish B2 force probably doesn’t draw enough men out of the overall pool to have a huge effect on the pool – it isn’t weakening the NCO class for instance across the rest of the army, or depleting the body of recruits of all of the best material. When B2 grows as a proportion, this starts to happen. There is probably a tipping point where the B2/B3 ratio goes awry, if anyone feels like calculating it!

 

I suggest that European armies historically counteracted the pernicious effects of B2 units by having strong local loyalties to the B3 units, as mentioned above – even the best potential recruits felt a draw toward their local regiment, rather than simply gravitating to the B2 units. As these links have been weakened and eroded (The East Anglian Regument ), the draw for the B3 has decreased. Again, there’s probably a measurable point at which this tips.

[Assessor]

My takes, for what it’s worth is as follows, using the definitions above

 

The A1/B1 units are those with special, specialised functions that cannot (or do not need to be) readily duplicated among the bulk of the armed forces. These kind of units have arisen mainly as a function of the technological / societal context of modern warfare.

 

The B2 units are the descendents (in function if not in heredity) of the early elite formations – the sort of thing that 200 odd years ago would be called “Guard” units in Europe.

 

These weren’t better equipped than the majority, although they often got a better physical class of recruit. By a combination of esprit de corps, discipline and a few imponderables, they were able to stand where others fell back, break through where others were repulsed, etc. They became the armies’ aces in the hole.

 

The argument, probably now and then, is how many aces is it prudent to hold, at the cost of weakening the rest of your hand? As long as warfare remains unpredictable, commanders are going to want those aces, but that need must be balanced against the wider effects: a smallish B2 force probably doesn’t draw enough men out of the overall pool to have a huge effect on the pool – it isn’t weakening the NCO class for instance across the rest of the army, or depleting the body of recruits of all of the best material. When B2 grows as a proportion, this starts to happen. There is probably a tipping point where the B2/B3 ratio goes awry, if anyone feels like calculating it!

 

I suggest that European armies historically counteracted the pernicious effects of B2 units by having strong local loyalties to the B3 units, as mentioned above – even the best potential recruits felt a draw toward their local regiment, rather than simply gravitating to the B2 units. As these links have been weakened and eroded (The East Anglian Regument ), the draw for the B3 has decreased. Again, there’s probably a measurable point at which this tips.

[Ariete!]

We can take for granted that modern armies need (and indeed are in the majority composed of) what could at one time be considered ‘specialist troops’ in the technical sense (engineers, artillery, tanks, etc.).

 

As for the issue of “elite” infantry units I think the only sort that may be needed, besides well-equipped and well-trained “line” forces, are units whose role is to execute raids (including personnel rescue) / perform close recce (including target acquisition) well behind enemy lines and in small unit sizes. All other jobs should be performable by ‘normal’ units.

 

Considering that such units would probably represent less than 10% of the infantry force, the should not dilute the main army (especially considering that many lower-ranking personnel that thrive in SOFs would do so-so in lien units) or cost too much

 

Amphibious and Airborne (and to a lesser extent Air Assault and Mountain) troops in my opinion obtain a certain elite status but from a planning and TOE standpoint, once deployed, basically operate as normal maneuver units.

 

The point Mk1 made about misuse by Germany and Italy of airborne units due to their fighting spirit (just think about Folgore’s immolation in the middle of the desert at El Alamein with barely any AT equipment…) is very valid and continues today.

 

Needless to say, looking at most armed forces today, there does seem to be a ridiculous proliferation of ‘elite’ and SOF units which is matched by / results in their ‘underemployment’ in roles which are really normal patrol / light infantry roles.

[Cyber_Ghost]

It seems that small elite units are best for a wide variety of operations, however each unit would be best suited for a specific task... IOW a recon unit shouldn't also be a takeover unit, a lesson that was learned the hard way by the IDF. These units would be suited for the specific tasks that require long training, and specialized equipment not found in the line formations.

 

A way to use these unit further is to have some of the leaders, in the IDF case mostly officers, transfered to command regular units. These officers would bring with them knowledge, working procedures and experience into their new commands.

[shep854]

Specialized units have long been a bone of contention in USMC. Back in WWII, there was opposition to the Raiders and ParaMarines for the reasons mentioned above, and resistance to Recon also, the complaint being the formation of "an elite with an elite," and that most missions could be performed by regular Marine infantry units.

[baboon6]

It seems that small elite units are best for a wide variety of operations, however each unit would be best suited for a specific task... IOW a recon unit shouldn't also be a takeover unit, a lesson that was learned the hard way by the IDF. These units would be suited for the specific tasks that require long training, and specialized equipment not found in the line formations.

 

A way to use these unit further is to have some of the leaders, in the IDF case mostly officers, transfered to command regular units. These officers would bring with them knowledge, working procedures and experience into their new commands.

 

Well I can understand the IDF forming special units for certain tasks, as they have a limited time to train their men and use them on ops, but if you look at outfits like 22 SAS, SBS, SASR, Delta, they are capable of carrying out quite a variety of operations, including recce, direct action, counter-terrorism, in the case of the Brits and Aussies training local forces too.

[Ariete!]

For sure, reading books like “generation kill” (admittedly not exactly a scholarly treatment of OIF1), one gets the impression that the USMC didn’t really know what to do with a whole battalion of ‘recon’. Their utility, compared to a similar unit of LAVs, seemed marginal and their vulnerability, while partly counterbalanced by élan was problematic to say the least.

[CV9030FIN]

For sure, reading books like “generation kill” (admittedly not exactly a scholarly treatment of OIF1), one gets the impression that the USMC didn’t really know what to do with a whole battalion of ‘recon’. Their utility, compared to a similar unit of LAVs, seemed marginal and their vulnerability, while partly counterbalanced by élan was problematic to say the least.

 

Got any more info about that book (author, whole name, ISBN)? Thanks!

[A2Keltainen]

Got any more info about that book (author, whole name, ISBN)? Thanks!

 

Title: Generation Kill

Author: Evan Wright

ISBN: It's available in several different editions, so pick one since it isn't hard to find given title and author.

 

It's an interesting read.