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Posted
What theater of operations has a threat that will be resolved by rapid commitment of one(1) Heavy Bde that would not be resolved by commitment of multiple lighter Bdes, combined with commitment of other services? Why go early with insufficient force (ie Dieppe) when waiting 3-6 monthes means you're going to have, at least, 4-6 heavy Bdes fully trained and ready for commitment to theater?

 

As in a contingency theater? A lot of them. Iraq could have been handled with a system like this - we had several months of prep time before that. Deploy the on-call active HBCT and use the 3-4 months to break the other two HBCTs out of their training cycles and deploy them too. Likewise mobilize the Guard HBCTs you'd need and have them fall in on the pre-positioned brigade sets we have in theater (at Kuwait and Qatar) as the 3-4 months come to a close. I don't remember off the top of my head if we've got any brigade sets afloat in MPS groups or if that's just the Marines.

 

Which would you rather have? Your 4-6 HBCTs on active duty, and nothing else but SBCT's and IBCT's? Or 9-12 HBCT's in the NG/Reserve, 2 HBCT's on active duty, as well as the SBCT's, IBCT's and other units on AD. USMC #'s generally show that reserve units are less than 1/3rd the cost of AD units WRT ongoing costs outside equipment issues. Now granted, this will require diligence and commitment to training and organization from your reserve forces, which seems to be an issue in some units, but there is no other viable way to maintain the manpower #'s everyone wants as well as the heavy hardware and fancy toys. S/F....Ken M

 

I'd still advocate 3 HBCTs on active duty, 10-15 in the more Guard, and the rest of the active army (~40-45 brigades) either SBCT or IBCT (airborne). Maybe another 15-20 IBCTs (non-airborne) or SBCTs in the Guard.

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Posted

Out of curiosity, if we were to draw down to ~1-3 HBCTs on active duty, would it behoove us to modify our TO&Es or OOB at all? Maybe field independent armor/mech battalions? Do away with the current IBCT/SBCT TO&Es for something new? Maybe add a brigade-level tank/mech company or MGS company?

Posted
...Which would you rather have? Your 4-6 HBCTs on active duty, and nothing else but SBCT's and IBCT's? Or 9-12 HBCT's in the NG/Reserve, 2 HBCT's on active duty, as well as the SBCT's, IBCT's and other units on AD...

 

Given current constraints (48 BCTs active), I'd propose:

 

8 HBCTs, IOT allow a cycle with 2 training, 2 resetting, 2 ready and 2 deployed.

 

12 IBCTs (at least 4 ABN), IOT to allow the cycle with 3 BCTs in each stage.

 

The remaining 23 should be SBCTs. I see them as the most flexible, given dismounted strength greater than an IBCT, as good or better operational mobility than an HBCT. If we can't put them all in Strykers immediately, we could use the same organization for commonality of doctrine and training, and use an M113 chassis basis (yeah, I got the tradeoff in capabilities- the end result is similiar), or maybe something else, like the Australian "Bushmaster" infantry carrier.

 

Regarding modifications of OOBs, I would like to see an assault gun company in each IBCT (something air-droppable, with AT capability, ala Sheridan, maybe a bad analogy).

 

Thoughts?

Posted

As a small personal bias, I'd love to see the M-8 Buford or the Thunderbolt operational for the airborne requirement. Still more effective than the MGS, IMHO.

Posted

I remember $1.2 million per ICV being batted around, but that sounds unusually low for anything that the Army buys. That might be the original figure or the vehicle without all the gizmos.

Posted

The disgusting part of this reorg is that, if you crunch the numbers, we basically doubled the amount of headquarters personnel (in brigade and above echelons).

 

... and to think that this reorg was sold as "increasing foxhole strength".

 

(putting more people in a headquarters doesn't increase efficiency - it just increases the workload on subordinate unit headquarters...)

Posted

what about constabulary type units

Posted

The big problem for that idea is what happens to the guard TOE's when there isn't a high-op-tempo war going on?

 

How long did it take to equip guard units effectively in iraq?

 

When the war is over in Iraq and funding goes down again, you'll see the NG units with the same M4's and humvees when the rest of the mil. is using some sort of blue death ray and in flying tanks. (exaggeration I know but you know my point - how many guard units were using M60's, no M249's, no body armour, no NVG's etc in 04/05?)

 

Also, not sure here but isn't NG dependent primarily on state funding and that gets supplimented by funds from the pentagon?

Posted
Heavy MP Brigades?

Falken

 

I think that the Maneuver Enhancement BDEs are supposed to have a combat arms battalion in them.

 

I like the idea of a Constabulary Brigade:

HHC- heavy on EN and CA planners

 

STB- HHC, HHC BDE, MI CO, SIG CO, Security CO organized to secure a couple of fixed sites (BDE main camp and 2-3 satellites)

 

CA BN- HHC and 4 or 5 companies, with the ability inside its companies to secure their own movements and operations in at least semi-permissive environments; needs to have functional cells (either within each company, or each company specializes)

 

EN BN- verticle and horizontal construction- I don't know enough about EN organization to specify internal organization, but needs to be able to (a)build roads, (B) build buildings, © plan construction and (d) supervise execution by locals

 

MP BN- HHC and 4 or 5 companies; needs to be able to (a) conduct area security, (B) conduct law enforcement and detaineed training, © conduct detainee operations

 

SPT BN- standard HHC, supply/trans CO, maint CO and medical CO; medical company needs to be more robust than normal for a BCT IOT support multiple facilities and conduct training

 

Combat Arms BN (yeah, i know, we'll have to find a new acronym, since CAB is already Combined Arms BN in the HBCT- maybe we can call it a security battalion)- I don't want to create a new organization, but nothing really fits. A Stryker battalion with an appropriate FSC, or an infantry battalion, with a CBT EN co assigned, like in the HBCT CAB might work, but short on ability to develop situational awareness. A Stryker RSTA with FSC and EN would be better, but short on sustained combat power (no infantry). Creating an organization from current companies, I would like HHC, 2 x RECON TRPs (Stryker or light), 2 x IN CO (Stryker or light), surveillance CO (Stryker, or similiar organization based on HMMWV), EN CO (with EOD embedded), FSC to support

 

What do you think?

Posted

Ineed treatment - was actually dreaming of this last night.

 

Bde HQ

 

Patrol Companies

Detention Company

Intelligence Company

UAV unit

SWAT/Fire Support unit

Interrogation unit

Posted

The United States is not Finland and it is not Israel. Unlike either of those countries, the primary of the mission of American ground forces is not defending the borders but forward deployment and expeditionary warfare. That is not a good mission for a predominantly reserve force.

 

So you are proposing a transition to a mostly reserve based force, which is just supplemented by smaller scale active duty rapid deployment forces? I could see how that could work. I've never been a proponent of large standing armies, seeing that well-managed reserve forces can do just as well or even better than fully professional ones, but are far more economical during peace-time. An expanded NG system might be the perfect compromise between traditional conscription-reserve (as used in Finland or Israel) and a fully professional force (as is the US Army).
Posted

I am confused

 

have been reading an on line NY National guard magazine - it refers to an engineer btn - 1st of 102 rgt as being part of 10th Bde. I did not think the engineers were regimented - is this an attempt to retain the 102 rgt - also what is 10th Bde !!

Posted
The United States is not Finland and it is not Israel. Unlike either of those countries, the primary of the mission of American ground forces is not defending the borders but forward deployment and expeditionary warfare. That is not a good mission for a predominantly reserve force.

 

Forward deployment, Cold War style, should probably be curtailed and heavily modified for the post-Cold War environment. I agree with your arguements, which is why we should restrain Army spending for large AD forces and focus on keeping a heavy force Army reserve and increase USMC/USN spending for expeditionary use, USAF should remain about the same, perhaps (slightly) reduce budget by downsizing the nuclear force, especially the ICBM's. The (big) US Army is not a very efficient expeditionary force, witness the massive footprint they have brought us in Iraq, Bosnia, A-stan and just about anywhere else they setup. This isn't good or bad, it's just their ethos, they build infrastructure like they're going to be PCS'd there forever. MPS and other forward deployment of heavy gear to zones of contention is a wise thing, further reducing the need for airlift and other shipping methods. The USN and USMC(as well as SOCOM) have a long tradition of expeditionary warfare and living "lean" and will be much more cost effective then using the big Army square peg in the round hole. S/F.....Ken M

Posted (edited)
The United States is not Finland and it is not Israel. Unlike either of those countries, the primary of the mission of American ground forces is not defending the borders but forward deployment and expeditionary warfare. That is not a good mission for a predominantly reserve force.

 

True that. US military has totally different mission from just securing the homeland. Especially French had very bad experiences using conscripts in expeditionary warfare (Indochina, Algeria etc.). I'm not sure how well, if at all, "non-volunteer" reserves would suit for that. Volunteers a la NG etc. will work lot better, but are more expensive and more limited in numbers.

Edited by Sardaukar
Posted
I am confused

 

have been reading an on line NY National guard magazine - it refers to an engineer btn - 1st of 102 rgt as being part of 10th Bde. I did not think the engineers were regimented - is this an attempt to retain the 102 rgt - also what is 10th Bde !!

 

This organization is part of the New York Guard, a state only organization that is designed to fill the National Guard's state mission when the National Guard is federalized, and to do some other state military missions.

http://www.dmna.state.ny.us/nyg/nyg.html#msn

 

They are not a federal military organization, and are not bound by the same rules for things like unit designation.

Posted
This organization is part of the New York Guard, a state only organization that is designed to fill the National Guard's state mission when the National Guard is federalized, and to do some other state military missions.

http://www.dmna.state.ny.us/nyg/nyg.html#msn

 

They are not a federal military organization, and are not bound by the same rules for things like unit designation.

 

Excellent - though somewhat confusing

 

Merry Christmas

Posted

Outsourcing. Establish the US equivalent of a Foreign Legion with a core cadre of US officers, SNCOs and technical specialists (for tasks requiring higher Security Clearances). Pretty much the same job A-Teams are doing standing up allied national forces.

Primary organization would be independent light infantry/constabulary battalions and eventually regimented supporting arms like arty, cav and engineers to support them. They would be employed 'old school', i.e. plenty of boots on the ground, eyes on, with spartan HQs and staffs.

Sadly it would be impossible for the Army to raise, train and administer these units so it would almost certainly have to fall to SOCOM to do so. It would be a great training ground for A-Teams etc.

Units would all be quartered outside CONUS. 12 BNs in Iraq and Kuwait, 1 BN in Djibouti, 3 BNs in Georgia etc.

 

Enlistment is for 10 years at the end of which you get citizenship and a mustering out bonus. Stay on for the full 20 and you get a pension.

 

Welcome to the Legio Americana.

Posted
Outsourcing. Establish the US equivalent of a Foreign Legion with a core cadre of US officers, SNCOs and technical specialists (for tasks requiring higher Security Clearances). Pretty much the same job A-Teams are doing standing up allied national forces.

Primary organization would be independent light infantry/constabulary battalions and eventually regimented supporting arms like arty, cav and engineers to support them. They would be employed 'old school', i.e. plenty of boots on the ground, eyes on, with spartan HQs and staffs.

Sadly it would be impossible for the Army to raise, train and administer these units so it would almost certainly have to fall to SOCOM to do so. It would be a great training ground for A-Teams etc.

Units would all be quartered outside CONUS. 12 BNs in Iraq and Kuwait, 1 BN in Djibouti, 3 BNs in Georgia etc.

 

Enlistment is for 10 years at the end of which you get citizenship and a mustering out bonus. Stay on for the full 20 and you get a pension.

 

Welcome to the Legio Americana.

 

Hire ex-Royal Marines and Ghurka NCOs as cadre.

 

 

Falken

Posted
That gives me image of something like "Black & Tans" from Irish "Troubles"-times...:P

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_and_Tans

 

Have done a lot of reading on these guys and personally while in general they were by no means angelic, I think they got a raw deal on the PR. The IRA in that time were also not Angelic

Posted
Have done a lot of reading on these guys and personally while in general they were by no means angelic, I think they got a raw deal on the PR. The IRA in that time were also not Angelic

 

True that. But they did pull that bad PR on themselves too, by few very public and totally idiotic incidents. Plus they were often confused with Auxiliaries (and vise versa) and their doings (even though Auxies had better reputation).

 

IRA was not very nice either...but it's dangerous to start to think that "since they did that, we can do this too.."..which is popular nowadays too.

Posted
True that. But they did pull that bad PR on themselves too, by few very public and totally idiotic incidents. Plus they were often confused with Auxiliaries (and vise versa) and their doings (even though Auxies had better reputation).

 

IRA was not very nice either...but it's dangerous to start to think that "since they did that, we can do this too.."..which is popular nowadays too.

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