McClellan Timidry

[Richard Lindquist]

Bragg had two problems in being in command of troops:

 

1. He was mentally and emotionally unable to get along with a significant precentage of other people (he did have his cronies and adherents).

 

2. He couldn't read a map and had a really blind eye for terrain features. If the war had been fought on terrain like a billiard table, he might have done better.

 

AS Johnston was a really good soldier who hadn't made the mental leap from commanding small units and isolated posts into being the generalissimo of a large territory with large bodies of troops under him. He made an operational hash of Shiloh, then died trying to lead a regiment to make up for it.

 

Joe Davis wasn't brilliant, just run of the mill. He wasn't a major scewup as a brigadier. If he hadn't been the president's nephew, no one would have noticed him.

[Rich]

Bragg had two problems in being in command of troops:

 

1. He was mentally and emotionally unable to get along with a significant precentage of other people (he did have his cronies and adherents).

 

I can see his grade school deportment marks....Works and plays well with other children? No.

 

2. He couldn't read a map and had a really blind eye for terrain features. If the war had been fought on terrain like a billiard table, he might have done better.

Yeah, I always figured that if he hadn't been led by the nose into position by Taylor at Buena Vista he may have disappeared into obscurity.

 

AS Johnston was a really good soldier who hadn't made the mental leap from commanding small units and isolated posts into being the generalissimo of a large territory with large bodies of troops under him. He made an operational hash of Shiloh, then died trying to lead a regiment to make up for it.

 

I agree, which is why I phrased it the way I did. Actually very few generals early on displayed very good strategic or operational sense....except for Scott, Grant, and Sherman.

 

Joe Davis wasn't brilliant, just run of the mill. He wasn't a major scewup as a brigadier. If he hadn't been the president's nephew, no one would have noticed him.

 

Well, he wasn't as big a screwup as Iverson, but he did manage to screwup pretty well none the less at Gettysburg. Of course that doesn't make them unique on that battlefield, it was sort of screwup city for brigadiers - and some higher ups too - on those three days. But then I really haven't paid much attention to his post-GB aactivities.

[irregularmedic]

Er, no, aside from attributing much of the work of Meigs and Ingalls to McClellan, you seem unaware that the proximate cause of the "fair collapse" of logistics in the Army of the Potomac in late 1862 and early 1863 was that Burnside - McClellan's successor - elected to attempt a winter campaign, utilizing the means that McClellan had instituted? I assume you are also unaware that there was an earlier "fair collapse" under McClellan during the Virginia-Maryland Campaign in summer and fall of 1862 - albeit less far-reaching than the later winter collapse - because of the loss of some 2,500 wagons and teams in the peninsula, directly due to McClellan's failure to plan for their evacuation? Note also that the "McClellan" logistic standard was for about 55 wagons and teams per 1,000 men, perforce reduced because of those losses to about 30 per 1,000 men (the standard used by Burnside as well), but was then intentionally reduced to 20 per 1,000 men by Meigs and Ingalls for the summer campaign in 1863, a standard that was maintained with little difficulty until the end of the war.

 

BTW, about the longest "payroll" delay other than this specific case I'm aware of was one month, but they again were due to the simple difficulty of getting specie to the men since payroll was not done by check. In the same vein boot and clothing problems were more attributable to quality control in contracting and manufacturing those goods, especially early in the war, which was outside the purview of any of the commanders of the Army of the Potomac - ever hear the term "shoddy"?

 

 

Perhaps it was because they were in the west, but the 7th Kansas Volunteer Cavalry seemed to be 4-6 months behind in being paid more often than not, from 1861 all the way to the end of the war. At least one of the times they got paid, they only received a portion of their back pay, still leaving them months in arrears.

 

Now perhaps they were the very last to be paid given that they were in the west and frequently in disfavor given their tactics, and it is true that at least part of the regiment had it's pay withheld for a time, but the book Jennison's Jayhawkers suggests that pay being months behind was pretty common.

 

A few other items from the book that having bearing on the discussion so far:

 

- Although cavalry they usually fought as dragoons

 

- It wasn't just the boots that were shoddy, I know riding is hard on uniforms but they seemed plagued with uniforms that fell apart.

 

- They were very poorly armed for much of the war, several of the companies retaining the muskets they were originally issued until quite late.

 

- They recognized the near uselessness of the sabre in modern warfare, and although at least some of the companies were issued sabres and they did not actually discard them, IIRC they only made one mounted charge, instead usually operating as dragoons.

 

Although the book never suggested so, I wondered if the fact that most of the regiment was equipped with muskets for much of their service had more than a little to do with their choice of tactics.

[Richard Lindquist]

Well, he wasn't as big a screwup as Iverson, but he did manage to screwup pretty well none the less at Gettysburg. Of course that doesn't make them unique on that battlefield, it was sort of screwup city for brigadiers - and some higher ups too - on those three days. But then I really haven't paid much attention to his post-GB aactivities.

 

I wouldn't hold Gettysburg against Davis. It was his first real battle and you can't name too many ANV general officers who did.nt screw up at Gettysburg in one way or another. The only division commander who didn't mess up something was Hood and he was wounded early on in the battle. The rest of the division commanders all chose Gettysburg to have "bad days".

[Rich]

I wouldn't hold Gettysburg against Davis. It was his first real battle and you can't name too many ANV general officers who did.nt screw up at Gettysburg in one way or another. The only division commander who didn't mess up something was Hood and he was wounded early on in the battle. The rest of the division commanders all chose Gettysburg to have "bad days".

 

That's fair, I guess just like everyone else I like to pick on poor Joe just because of who his uncle was.

 

And emphatically yes, the ANV general officer corps seems to have had a collective "bad days" from mid-June and into the fall. Maybe it was something in the Pennsylvania water? Or too much good Pennsylvania vittles or applejack?

[BP]

And emphatically yes, the ANV general officer corps seems to have had a collective "bad days" from mid-June and into the fall. Maybe it was something in the Pennsylvania water? Or too much good Pennsylvania vittles or applejack?

 

As many Confederates said, fighting on their home soil was one thing, but invading Pennsylvania was another. Interesting historical New York Times article title "Invading the North".

[Grant Whitley]

As many Confederates said, fighting on their home soil was one thing, but invading Pennsylvania was another. Interesting historical New York Times article title "Invading the North".

 

There are a bunch of old NYT articles indexed on Google. It's fascinating. I was reading some stuff from the run up to Sumter a few weeks ago. I didn't know or didn't remember that Anderson had threatened the shipping traffic into Charleston.

[KingSargent]

There are a bunch of old NYT articles indexed on Google. It's fascinating. I was reading some stuff from the run up to Sumter a few weeks ago. I didn't know or didn't remember that Anderson had threatened the shipping traffic into Charleston.

Mid-19thC newspaper reports are not to be trusted AT ALL.

[R011]

Mid-19thC newspaper reports are not to be trusted AT ALL.

You mean they were just like early 21stC ones?

[DesertFox]

You mean they were just like early 21stC ones?

 

When do Newspapers (or Radio or TV) ever change?

[67th Tigers]

The newspapers were very different to what we have today. Reports from "the field" were copied verbatum from one paper to another, and judged against a correspondant's reliability.

 

It amazes me that the papers routinely published military movements etc.

[Rich]

It amazes me that the papers routinely published military movements etc.

 

And as well the newspapers are also still a primary source for casualty data since local papers routinely published the nominal lists that accompanied regimental bttle reports. And since some of these - many for Confederate operations - were for reports that never entered OR, they are often the only way to discover casualty data in some cases.

[Grant Whitley]

Mid-19thC newspaper reports are not to be trusted AT ALL.

 

What I recall reading was supposed to be reproductions of official communications between Anderson and various SC/CSA officials, so it could be double checked easily enough.

[Guest aevans]

Reports from "the field" were copied verbatum from one paper to another, and judged against a correspondant's reliability.

 

Not much different than pool or agency reporting today. And modern media using pool feeds doesn't even have a chance to pick a source for reliability -- you get the product of whatever pool guy is on the spot.

[KingSargent]

What I recall reading was supposed to be reproductions of official communications between Anderson and various SC/CSA officials, so it could be double checked easily enough.

When it is double-checked against originals, I'll believe it.

 

Until then, I say it is likely bovine feces. Newspapers were even more editorially biased than they are today; it was even worse in the 18thC. I had a prof who was big on "original sources," and I spent manymany hours going blind reading microfilmed antique newspapers.

 

There is a book about wartime reporting, The First Casualty (sorry CRS author). The title comes from the maxim "The first casualty in war is Truth."

 

Just think about it: at the time most of the generals didn't know what was going on, some reporter was supposed to cut through the Fog Of War?

 

67th Pussycat, a lot of those "movement reports" in papers were rumors or deliberate misinformation. For every accurate report some historian picks up to "prove" his thesis (or that does turn out to be true) there were dozens of lies and "oopsies" that have slipped from view. One thing I did learn while getting eyestrain in the microfiche room was that there could be two or three different "reports" of the SAME INCIDENT in a paper, all divergent from each other; sometimes one would be correct.

 

In a lot of cases "Our Correspondent" was just that - a letter some LT wrote to his Mommy. In fact in the 18thC almost ALL "news items" came from letters recived and passed to newspapers - they were more like small town bulletin boards to spread news, especially in America.

[Grant Whitley]

When it is double-checked against originals, I'll believe it.

 

Until then, I say it is likely bovine feces. Newspapers were even more editorially biased than they are today; it was even worse in the 18thC. I had a prof who was big on "original sources," and I spent manymany hours going blind reading microfilmed antique newspapers.

 

It's hard to miss the editorial line in those old papers, but in this case Anderson threatening the shipping traffic doesn't do anything to bolster the pretty strongly anti-Southern line of the NYT in the articles that I've seen. If anything, I'd see it as doing the opposite.

[67th Tigers]

When it is double-checked against originals, I'll believe it.

 

Until then, I say it is likely bovine feces. Newspapers were even more editorially biased than they are today; it was even worse in the 18thC. I had a prof who was big on "original sources," and I spent manymany hours going blind reading microfilmed antique newspapers.

 

There is a book about wartime reporting, The First Casualty (sorry CRS author). The title comes from the maxim "The first casualty in war is Truth."

 

Phillip Knightley, and the conclusion seems roughly to be that war reporting was broadly accurate until Vietnam, when managing news reports becomings a large part of war.

 

67th Pussycat, a lot of those "movement reports" in papers were rumors or deliberate misinformation. For every accurate report some historian picks up to "prove" his thesis (or that does turn out to be true) there were dozens of lies and "oopsies" that have slipped from view. One thing I did learn while getting eyestrain in the microfiche room was that there could be two or three different "reports" of the SAME INCIDENT in a paper, all divergent from each other; sometimes one would be correct.

 

In a lot of cases "Our Correspondent" was just that - a letter some LT wrote to his Mommy. In fact in the 18thC almost ALL "news items" came from letters recived and passed to newspapers - they were more like small town bulletin boards to spread news, especially in America.

 

A Lt of the time was a fairly experienced officer. The time between promotions in the 19th century would be decades (25 years after Commissioning, R E Lee was still a Captain). However, I suspect you're filtering through your own worldview.

[Rich]

A Lt of the time was a fairly experienced officer. The time between promotions in the 19th century would be decades (25 years after Commissioning, R E Lee was still a Captain). However, I suspect you're filtering through your own worldview.

 

Well, at least it might be a bit more accurate than yours apparently is, seeing as how yours is populated by mythical militias armed with mythical weapons.

 

Seriously, Lee was commissioned in the Class of 1829 and was promoted to captain in 1836, so roughly eight years in service. He didn't make major until 1847, but in the same year was promoted to lieutenant colonel and then breveted colonel, 19 years after commissioning. To put that in a terms of a more modern "worldview", my Dad received his commission as a 1st lieutenant in the Regular Army in 1949, after re-entering as a Reserve 1st Lieutenant in 1948 (he had been commissioned in April 1943 as a 2nd Lieutenant and was discharged in 1946 as a 1st Lieutenant AUS), he was promoted captain in 1952, effectively after eight years service, exactly the same as Lee, and received his promotion to lieutenant colonel in 1964, so roughly 21 years of service, again similar in terms of actual service to Lee. It wasn't unusual in the 19th century for an officer to rusticate as a major, simply because in the US Army there were so few lieutenant colonel and colonel billets open, but 25 years as a captain was a mite unusual.

[Rich]

In a lot of cases "Our Correspondent" was just that - a letter some LT wrote to his Mommy. In fact in the 18thC almost ALL "news items" came from letters recived and passed to newspapers - they were more like small town bulletin boards to spread news, especially in America.

 

In all fairness to Tigger, I must point out that frequently such officers were not wet behind their ears butter bars, but often were mature, experienced officers, who supplemented their income by writing "military and naval news" fillers for newspapers and journals, as well as full-length books, drawing on their service experience to write about subjects that were fascinating to the lay reader of the time.

 

Further, the current concept of military security in some ways is a very modern one, stemming from the 20th century information explosion. Note that a fully regularized and militarized intelligence and counterintelligence service that coallated and analyzed multi-source intelligence was developed in the Civil War by Hooker, which may have been the first instance of the creation of a complete military intelligence staff as opposed to it being a civilian contract service or an occassional staff function?

[67th Tigers]

I found an excellent NYT article the other day railing against the US promotion system in the 19th C. I'll see if I can find it: Yes, here. Amongst other things, 12 year 2Lts....

[FALightFighter]

Seriously, Lee was commissioned in the Class of 1829 and was promoted to captain in 1836, so roughly eight years in service. He didn't make major until 1847, but in the same year was promoted to lieutenant colonel and then breveted colonel, 19 years after commissioning. To put that in a terms of a more modern "worldview", my Dad received his commission as a 1st lieutenant in the Regular Army in 1949, after re-entering as a Reserve 1st Lieutenant in 1948 (he had been commissioned in April 1943 as a 2nd Lieutenant and was discharged in 1946 as a 1st Lieutenant AUS), he was promoted captain in 1952, effectively after eight years service, exactly the same as Lee, and received his promotion to lieutenant colonel in 1964, so roughly 21 years of service, again similar in terms of actual service to Lee. It wasn't unusual in the 19th century for an officer to rusticate as a major, simply because in the US Army there were so few lieutenant colonel and colonel billets open, but 25 years as a captain was a mite unusual.

 

Compared to the current US Army practice- my career

May 1997- commissioned, 2LT USAR

Jun 1997- entered active duty

Dec 1998- promoted to 1LT (18 months active federal commissioned service- AFCS)

Dec 2000- promoted to CPT- 3 years, 6 months AFCS

Feb 2007- promoted to MAJ- 9 years, 8 months AFCS

 

My promotion to LTC board is currently scheduled for release in Jul-Aug 2011, with promotion sometime in late 2011 or 2012, at almost 15 years service.

[Richard Lindquist]

In all fairness to Tigger, I must point out that frequently such officers were not wet behind their ears butter bars, but often were mature, experienced officers, who supplemented their income by writing "military and naval news" fillers for newspapers and journals, as well as full-length books, drawing on their service experience to write about subjects that were fascinating to the lay reader of the time.

 

Riuch: I would submit that the Civil War "butter bar" (actually not since 2LT just had blank shoulder boards at the time) who was far more likely "write home" would have been a brand new officer "elected" by his company or appointed by his Col when the regt was formed. The RA 2LT with years and years under their belts were being rapidly promoted to higher grades (Custer went from a brand new 2LT USMA grad to a division commander during the war.

[Rich]

Riuch: I would submit that the Civil War "butter bar" (actually not since 2LT just had blank shoulder boards at the time) who was far more likely "write home" would have been a brand new officer "elected" by his company or appointed by his Col when the regt was formed. The RA 2LT with years and years under their belts were being rapidly promoted to higher grades (Custer went from a brand new 2LT USMA grad to a division commander during the war.

 

Actually as I understand it the original "butter bars" were 2nd lieutenants in the US Cavalry, who were known as such from 1856 when the 1st Regiment was formed, the regulation then being that 2nd lieutenant's shoulder strap was the branch of service color, without insignia. But the general term applying to 2nd lieutenants of all branches dates to 1917, when the gold bar for 2nd lieutenants was adopted.

 

In any case I did not mean to intimate that all such correspondents were 2nd lieutenants, but rather that they were serving officers, not sniveling children as could be implied from King's remarks.

 

I notice though that my reply to Tigger evidently disappeared into the aether, so I'll try to reconstruct it.

 

The article from the 1878 edition of the New York Times is interesting both for what it says and what it doesn't say. For one thing, the "railing" had been going on and off for some time, since the original regulation in question dated from 1801. But for another it is intersting that despite the periodic protests, the regulation remained unchanged to 1891. Even more interesting, the 1901 textbook on US Military Law in describingthe history of the regulation noted that despite the periodic railing at the Army's interpretation of the regulation, even the language remained virtually unchanged until 1891. In other words even though the Army's stand on the matter was well known for 90 years, it wasn't ever considered a serious enough problem that required even a clarification of the language of the regulation.

 

And there were other factors in play as well. For example, the senior captain of artillery Loomis L. Langdon had been a captain in 1861 at Fort Pickens after being commissioned in 1854 (8 years ), but had remained a captain throughout the Civil War, never having accepted a volunteer commission, which was something that was actually unremarkable in the artillery. And it wasn't like he wasn't distinguished, among other things he raised the US flag over the Confederate Capital in Richmond in April 1865. And yes, he was still a captain in 1878....but then the senior major of artillery Albion P. Howe was a brevet major general, as was the senior lieutenant colonel of artillery, Romeyn B. Ayres, and many others. The war generated a huge number of officers and there were a small number of postwar billets for them, which also led to the stagnation in ranks that was actually worse after the war than before.

 

BTW, don't feel too sorry for poor Loomis, although "only" a captain "still" he was also a brevet lieutenant colonel, was promoted major in 1879, lieutenant colonel in 1884, and colonel in 1889, eventually commanding the US Army detachment in Sherman's funeral cortege.

[KingSargent]

I found an excellent NYT article the other day railing against the US promotion system in the 19th C. I'll see if I can find it: Yes, here. Amongst other things, 12 year 2Lts....

Also:

Phillip Knightley, and the conclusion seems roughly to be that war reporting was broadly accurate until Vietnam, when managing news reports becomings a large part of war.

NYT?! Gawd, you REALLY don't care what you use for sources, do you?

 

And you are demonstrating your lack of comprehension skills again. I do not see how you can get "The news wasn't managed until Vietnam" out of Knightley's book.

 

The most you can say was that the managing was not done by a monolithic MSM before VN. There were still plenty of lies, there were just some competition papers to get another (also slanted) view. Just recall William Randolph Hearst drumming up the Spanish-American War and tell me there was no "managed news" again.

 

 

 

Rich etc, I used LT as an example of low-rankers writing to Mommy with limited info and Mommy giving it to the local bar-rag. Considering the wide literacy among troops during the ACW, I could have said PVT or CPL as a source for the "news." And most of the "war correspondents" picked up their rumors in bars, especially in WnDC.

[Colin Williams]

I found an excellent NYT article the other day railing against the US promotion system in the 19th C. I'll see if I can find it: Yes, here. Amongst other things, 12 year 2Lts....

 

That article is from after the Civil War and not exactly relevant to pre-Civil War conditions. As a result of the Civil War, a large number of pre-war Regular officers left the Army (Confederates, casualties, inability to stand the rigors of combat, etc.), and the Army compensated for their absence by offering places to promising and willing officers from the the Volunteers. Because of this and because the post-war Army was somewhat larger than the pre-war Army, officers who were Lieutenants and Captains in 1861 (or not even in the Army) were often promoted to Major or higher in the Regular Army after 1865. Unfortunately for subsequent promotion prospects, officers of approximately the same relatively young age filled almost all the senior slots, clogging the system for decades.

 

For example, successful generals like Schofield, Howard, Hancock and Ord were rewarded with single stars. Others such as Miles, Grierson, Mackenzie and Gibbon became Colonels. Crook and Custer became Lt. Colonels. Then, with a few exceptions, such as Crook's promotion to Brigadier General as a reward for his Apache service (and political ties to President Hayes) and Miles' promotion to Brigadier General (and Ord's forced retirement) due to political influence, these officers sat at their same rank for years on end, with all the Captains and Majors who had commanded regiments, brigades and divisions in the Civil War waiting for them to retire or die. I believe Grierson got his star in 1890, after Crook died, so it took more than 20 years for him to advance one rank. This wasn't unusual.