McClellan Timidry

[Rich]

12th Cavalry Brigade (-) broke cover at 1,000 yds, charged over the French artillery and sabred the gunners (the 7th Prussian Cuirassiers, who were his first line). His second line charged into the disordered French infantry and spent a good half hour sabring the infantry before the French, before finally being driven back by a French cavalry charge by two brigades. He lost 379 sabres out of the 804 who charged. IV Corps took 3 hours to recover order.

 

Using Wiki? The Prussians used the terrain approaching the Rezonville plateau to mask the French fire (I suspect it also served to hide how weak the Prussians were, a major fault of the French all day long was that they kept massively overestimating how strong the Prussians were), allowing them to approach within about 650 yards of the artillery line before they were exposed (von Bredow's movement was not as impetous as is usually made out, some time passed between the order being given by Alvensleben and the charge being executed and the evidence of the skill of the approach hints that he had a pretty good eye for terrain and took the time to figure it out....which curiously enough is what Upton did....I also suspect the common and incorrect "1,000" yards, which is the distance to where the advance began is from romanticized Victorian accounts). The charge itself discommoded the artillery badly, and Canrobert's train evidently decided to panic as well, but his cavalry had already proved useless that morning and their half-hearted countercharge was broken up by fire from their own infantry (as far as I have been able to find the only significant action by French infantry during the charge , I haven't found any account where the Prussian cavalry actually reached them?).

 

And it could be claimed that the French IV Corps took IV hours to recover I suppose, except there is little evidence of any real "order" on their part before the charge, since despite a comfortable superiority they had done nothing but pound the Prussians with artillery since before noon? Again, the critical delay was not by Canrobert, it was by Ladmirault and that was nearly cancelled by Schwarzkoppen's idiocy, but neither had anything to do with the charge.

 

Did I compare the Mule Shoe and Alma? I know I'm prone to comparing the Stone Wall and Marye's Heights to the Alma, but ack well...

"Upton launched his Division in four successive lines (although in much closer order than the British allowed for, half the interval the British used at the Alma)"

 

If you were not by that comparing the tactics used at the Alma with those used by Upton, then I'm not sure what you were doing? I am curious how you compare the Alma to Marye's Heights though?

 

The fortifications at the Mule Shoe were typical of those used at the time. A rampart was created by building up a wall of logs, with a innovation of the shallow trench being behind, rather than in front of the defences. This would be regardedas a fairly hasty defence in Europe (since a 6 hour hasty defence featured a 6-8 foot deep trench ahead of an 4-5 foot Earthen rampart, with multiple obstacle belts thrown several hundred yards forward and fields of fire cleared). The Mule Shoe defences appear to lack a ditch, abatis belts, a Chevaux-de-frisse belt and a forward skirmish line of rifle pits (again, generally built up out of felled logs rather than dug in), at least in all the accounts I've read.

 

The "innovation" had been used for some time and I'm not sure what good a rampart placed behind a defender is supposed to do? As an obstacle in this case it wasn't considered needed, since the Confederate position was placed so the ground sloped down sharply to their front, creating a naturally steep glacis, the ditch behind allowed them to reload under cover, utilizing the ground behind the rampart as a very efficent firing step (see photographs of the defenses at Mary's Heights behind the stone wall for one example of the type). The front was covered by slashings and abatis, but it was difficult to establish a forward line of rifle pits, given that the main fault of the position was that the Union lines approached within 160 to 200 yards of the salient angle (sometimes you don't get six hours to prepare a hasty defense and sometimes that defense is prepared while under fire instead of as an illustration in the field regulations ).

 

BTW, do you have any examples of these hasty European defences actually being used? Or are they only in the field regulation illustrations you were unable to download? Oh, do those European hasty defences also include the second line of entrenchments that had been prepared or the third line that was being worked on to eliminate the tactical fault that had been identified?

 

Much of the rampart was blasted apart by the artillery strike, and the Confederates took to kneeling down in their 1.5-2 foot deep shell scrape to offer some protection.

There is no evidence in any of the accounts that the field artillery "strike" had any effect other than keeping the defenders heads down, and anything else would have been remarkable given the general ineffectiveness found for solid shot and common shell against even simpler field works of the time. The regimental accounts and Upton's report mention climbing over the rampart and down into a ditch, little, if any of it, was broken down in any significant way.

 

? That's hopefully deliberately obteuse, as the development of such tactics were a step towards modern tactics.

 

Try not to be silly. Skirmishing tactics in the mid 19th century had their antecedents in the 18th century, calling them a "step towards modern tactics" is a bit simplistic, it's about the same as saying a 19th century farm wagon was a "step" towards the modern automobile because after all, they both have wheels. Nor were skirmishing tactics an accepted method for assaulting fixed or field fortifications that were properly defended, since skirmish pairs in open order could not generate sufficient firepower or shock action to defeat such a position unless it was very weakly held?

 

How ever, lets consider Isandwana. The British infantry deployed at a 3m (10 foot) interval, i.e. the next rifleman was 3m to his left or right, and deployed in a single rank. This method of fighting was generally found to be the optimal formation against a European enemy (and proved to still be in 1914*) who it was expected would go to ground 4-600m out and engage in a firefight. The British maintained a very effective fire (there was no problems with ammunition supply as has been suggested), but the Zulus were simply stoned enough not to quailed by the huge casualties and manage to close to close quarters, where the open British formation meant that they were simply overrun. This caused somewhat of a backlash against modern tactics, with the British bring an "artillery formation" back into the manual, a closed order rifle line for fighting non-rifle armed opponents (and which some commanders used against the Boers, doh!)

 

Er, the 24th was surprised and was forced to attempt to defend in extended order when by choice the accepted way of dealing with an enemy employing rapid shock action when field fortifications or obstacles could not be used was the concentrated firepower of a closed line. And it worked - for a time - because they were utilizing breechloading rifles using cartridges, although fouling from the cartridges may eventually have contributed to their downfall. But eventually the collapse of their auxilliaries and the poor initial positions they were forced into was probably the decisive problem.

 

And just how is the failed defense of such a "skirmish line" (which it wasn't) at Isandalwana similar to what you claim was an offensive "skirmish" line supposedly used at the Mule Shoe?

 

And just how effective where the offensive tactics employed by Europeans in 1914?

Edited January 11, 2008 by Rich

[Guest aevans]

The fortifications at the Mule Shoe were typical of those used at the time. A rampart was created by building up a wall of logs, with a innovation of the shallow trench being behind, rather than in front of the defences.

 

Breastworks with or without a forward ditch, with or without a backing entrenchment, were not particularly innovative, just easier to construct in the dominant terrain with the materials at hand.

 

This would be regardedas a fairly hasty defence in Europe (since a 6 hour hasty defence featured a 6-8 foot deep trench ahead of an 4-5 foot Earthen rampart, with multiple obstacle belts thrown several hundred yards forward and fields of fire cleared).

It was regarded as a hasty defense in the ACW as well. Compare the construction of the Mule Shoe defenses with those used at Vicksburg, Petersburg, Kennesaw Mountain, etc. Oh wait, I have -- in person where Kennesaw Mountain and Fortress Rosecrans are concerned.

 

BTW, if you actually believe that a defensive position as you describe above could have been constructed in six hours, you're more gullible than any person I've ever met.

 

The Mule Shoe defences appear to lack a ditch, abatis belts, a Chevaux-de-frisse belt and a forward skirmish line of rifle pits (again, generally built up out of felled logs rather than dug in), at least in all the accounts I've read.

 

Considering that they were not expected to be occupied more than a day or two, and improvement was constantly interrupted by impolite neighbors, this is hardly a criticism.

 

Much of the rampart was blasted apart by the artillery strike, and the Confederates took to kneeling down in their 1.5-2 foot deep shell scrape to offer some protection.

I think that would be news to serious students of the Civil War.

 

Was mainly thinking of Barlow's Division in a column Napoleon would have thought unwieldy....

 

But the division columns of D'Erlon's corps at Waterloo weren't?

[67th Tigers]

Using Wiki?

 

Are you? You appear to be using Wawro? (at least of the three accounts I have, only his matches what you wrote below. Howard and Griffith both agree that 12th Cav Bde (-) (he detached his Hussars for flank protection) went through the gunline and were well into the infantry below being hit in the flank and rear by Forton's cavalry division).

 

 

If you were not by that comparing the tactics used at the Alma with those used by Upton, then I'm not sure what you were doing? I am curious how you compare the Alma to Marye's Heights though?

I've used it in the past as a good example of using mass (at the Alma 11,000 bayonets hit in one wave vs 25-30,000 bayonets hitting a 16 unsupported waves), although of course, the British first wave was repulsed by a counterattack and had to hit them again

 

The "innovation" had been used for some time and I'm not sure what good a rampart placed behind a defender is supposed to do? As an obstacle in this case it wasn't considered needed, since the Confederate position was placed so the ground sloped down sharply to their front, creating a naturally steep glacis, the ditch behind allowed them to reload under cover, utilizing the ground behind the rampart as a very efficent firing step (see photographs of the defenses at Mary's Heights behind the stone wall for one example of the type). The front was covered by slashings and abatis, but it was difficult to establish a forward line of rifle pits, given that the main fault of the position was that the Union lines approached within 160 to 200 yards of the salient angle (sometimes you don't get six hours to prepare a hasty defense and sometimes that defense is prepared while under fire instead of as an illustration in the field regulations ).

 

Thank you, I bow to your superior knowledge.

 

Although, yes, the trenches dug in front of the rampart were obstacles. By the British example, men would be 6 feet apart and move 27 cubic feet per hour (typical European soil).

 

5 Hours = shallow defensive trench with earthworks

7 Hours = deeper defensive trench with firing step and heavier earthworks

16 Hours = adds a defensive ditch

 

This would occupy half the workers digging, the other half would clear field of fire, construct abatis etc.

 

BTW, do you have any examples of these hasty European defences actually being used? Or are they only in the field regulation illustrations you were unable to download? Oh, do those European hasty defences also include the second line of entrenchments that had been prepared or the third line that was being worked on to eliminate the tactical fault that had been identified?

In this case, I'm quoting from "The Rifle and the Spade", a lecture given to RUSI 1st April 1859 by Capt Tyler, RE (although maybe it was an April Fools). One of the more interesting points is an experiment into the visibility of different colour uniforms under different conditions. Under most conditions it was found that Rifle Green and Blue were more visible that Red (except at 300yds range in strong daylight).

 

It would be interesting to walk the field fortifications the British and Canadians dug in 1861/2...

 

There is no evidence in any of the accounts that the field artillery "strike" had any effect other than keeping the defenders heads down, and anything else would have been remarkable given the general ineffectiveness found for solid shot and common shell against even simpler field works of the time. The regimental accounts and Upton's report mention climbing over the rampart and down into a ditch, little, if any of it, was broken down in any significant way.

 

I read it was shattered in parts, and that much of the fighting was around these breaches...

 

Try not to be silly. Skirmishing tactics in the mid 19th century had their antecedents in the 18th century, calling them a "step towards modern tactics" is a bit simplistic, it's about the same as saying a 19th century farm wagon was a "step" towards the modern automobile because after all, they both have wheels. Nor were skirmishing tactics an accepted method for assaulting fixed or field fortifications that were properly defended, since skirmish pairs in open order could not generate sufficient firepower or shock action to defeat such a position unless it was very weakly held?

I agree that it is slightly simplistic, since there are two strands in skirmishing, one is a dead end (the French "grande bandes") and one develops eventually into the 1916 "diamond" platoon which is the very definate breakpoint where minor tactics appear and sub-platoon units start maneouvring (although we see glimpses of the future as early as 1854, with Goodlake etc.).

 

Perhaps the desciptions of the attacks in Sharpshooter in the Crimea would be useful reading?

 

Er, the 24th was surprised and was forced to attempt to defend in extended order when by choice the accepted way of dealing with an enemy employing rapid shock action when field fortifications or obstacles could not be used was the concentrated firepower of a closed line. And it worked - for a time - because they were utilizing breechloading rifles using cartridges, although fouling from the cartridges may eventually have contributed to their downfall. But eventually the collapse of their auxilliaries and the poor initial positions they were forced into was probably the decisive problem.

 

That's very simplistic, it was a much more scattered engagement, but we're talking about Pulleine's wing (5 coys of the 1/24th, 1 of the 2/24th, 4 of the NNC, a squadron of NNH and 2 guns), which had formed a refused skirmish line about a mile from the camp and several miles in length. They moved forward into this formation.

 

And just how effective where the offensive tactics employed by Europeans in 1914?

 

Seemed to work fine

[Rich]

Are you? You appear to be using Wawro? (at least of the three accounts I have, only his matches what you wrote below. Howard and Griffith both agree that 12th Cav Bde (-) (he detached his Hussars for flank protection) went through the gunline and were well into the infantry below being hit in the flank and rear by Forton's cavalry division).

 

Nope. Yep. Howard is in my library as well and my earlier, more abbreviated, version was more based on his account. But on reflection he supplies fewer details on the incident (and none of the ones you just gave), that are filled out by Wawro. But both make no mention of Bredow hitting the infantry, neither state or intimate that a 3-hour delay ensued. I'm afraid I am unaware of "Griffith"? Unless good old Paddy eructed one? If so, I expect the less said the better.

 

I've used it in the past as a good example of using mass (at the Alma 11,000 bayonets hit in one wave vs 25-30,000 bayonets hitting a 16 unsupported waves), although of course, the British first wave was repulsed by a counterattack and had to hit them again

Really? Did you include in that how the British line at the Alma was able to deploy out of effective range of the Russians, and advance unhindered (except by vineyards and the river crossing) in a two-mile line, while the Union forces at Fredericksburg had to deploy from a series of defiles (the streets of Fredericksburg), then across a defile (the drainage ditch), all on a front of about three-quarters of a mile, constrained upon their right by a canal and on their left by Hazel Run and the ravine it runs through? But I guess otherwise they must have been identical?

 

It really helps when there is some basis for such a comparison.

 

Thank you, I bow to your superior knowledge.

 

You're welcome.

 

(snip textbook stuff )This would occupy half the workers digging, the other half would clear field of fire, construct abatis etc.

Really? Under close artillery and small arms fire?

 

In this case, I'm quoting from "The Rifle and the Spade", a lecture given to RUSI 1st April 1859 by Capt Tyler, RE (although maybe it was an April Fools). One of the more interesting points is an experiment into the visibility of different colour uniforms under different conditions. Under most conditions it was found that Rifle Green and Blue were more visible that Red (except at 300yds range in strong daylight).

 

Interesting, that's also why orange and yellow eventually replaced "fire-engine red" for emergency equipment. Of course you would think someone might have noticed soemtime in the intervening 110 years?

 

It would be interesting to walk the field fortifications the British and Canadians dug in 1861/2...

 

I read it was shattered in parts, and that much of the fighting was around these breaches...

 

That is incorrect, the fighting "on the rampart" so to speak lasted a few moments at best. I think you may be confusing the defense the Confederates made against the first wave regiments using the small traverses they had constructed and then the fight at the salient angle towards the end after they had counterattacked? The traverses of course only had one "closed" end and evidently the reverse of the salient wall was quite lower than the rest (sorry, hard to show what I mean without an illustration, I hope you follow)?

 

(snip agreement) Perhaps the desciptions of the attacks in Sharpshooter in the Crimea would be useful reading?

That's very simplistic, it was a much more scattered engagement, but we're talking about Pulleine's wing (5 coys of the 1/24th, 1 of the 2/24th, 4 of the NNC, a squadron of NNH and 2 guns), which had formed a refused skirmish line about a mile from the camp and several miles in length. They moved forward into this formation.

 

No, I would argue that your initial comparison was so simplistic to be almost deceptive, rewritten you could have been saying that "they just stood there in a single line at intervals of 10 yards and killed Zulus until something bad happened, but otherwise it was fought just the way the regulations said it should have been fought." I added the details you failed to include from memory so the uninitiated wouldn't get the idea that it was yet another brilliant victory.

 

Seemed to work fine

 

Sure it did.

Edited January 11, 2008 by Rich

[Guest aevans]

That is incorrect, the fighting "on the rampart" so to speak lasted a few moments at best. I think you may be confusing the defense the Confederates made against the first wave regiments using the small traverses they had constructed and then the fight at the salient angle towards the end after they had counterattacked? The traverses of course only had one "closed" end and evidently the reverse of the salient wall was quite lower than the rest (sorry, hard to show what I mean without an illustration, I hope you follow)?

 

They were very traverse happy in their field fortifications during the Civil War. Served them pretty well, too...

[Rich]

They were very traverse happy in their field fortifications during the Civil War. Served them pretty well, too...

 

Naw, they didn't actually know what they were doing, it was just an accident they were there.

 

Seriously, the traverses in this case were put in because the salient angle was partly enfiladed by artillery firing from the north IIRC, but being economical (and under fire) they made them just sufficient to provide protection, so they weren't that much of an obstacle or interior defensive work, but they were better than nothing and were hotly contested (and I'm sure used for shelter by those guys that figured that discretion was the better part....).

[Guest aevans]

Naw, they didn't actually know what they were doing, it was just an accident they were there.

 

Seriously, the traverses in this case were put in because the salient angle was partly enfiladed by artillery firing from the north IIRC, but being economical (and under fire) they made them just sufficient to provide protection, so they weren't that much of an obstacle or interior defensive work, but they were better than nothing and were hotly contested (and I'm sure used for shelter by those guys that figured that discretion was the better part....).

 

I've always been under the impression that the traverses were key in holding the shoulders of the penetrations during both the 10 May and 12 May assaults.

[Rich]

I've always been under the impression that the traverses were key in holding the shoulders of the penetrations during both the 10 May and 12 May assaults.

 

Oh, yeah, I didn't mean to imply that they weren't, but there also wasn't a whole lot to them. And descriptions of fighting over them may have been what generated the mistaken belief by Tigger that there was "fighting in breaches"?

[Rich]

Thomas Hulings, Lieutenant-Colonel, Pennsylvania Volunteers, was killed commanding the 49th Pennsylvania (from 2nd Brigade - Hancock's old command - and was the left regiment in the second line,

 

Urk, this is embarassing. I was just re-reading through the last couple of posts and noticed that in my - hopefully not to vitriolic - diatribe that I managed to reverse the position of my late relative and the 49th Pennsylvania. They in fact were on the right of the second line, not the left. So I guess the is on me this time?

[67th Tigers]

Nope. Yep. Howard is in my library as well and my earlier, more abbreviated, version was more based on his account. But on reflection he supplies fewer details on the incident (and none of the ones you just gave), that are filled out by Wawro. But both make no mention of Bredow hitting the infantry, neither state or intimate that a 3-hour delay ensued. I'm afraid I am unaware of "Griffith"? Unless good old Paddy eructed one? If so, I expect the less said the better.

 

Griffith is indeed Paddy, there is a very short bit about it in "Forward into Battle". I do wonder what people have against Griffith. I recently read part of a book on the (CS) Army of the Tennessee and in the introduction they compared the various major works on tactics (McWhiney's "Attack and Die", Griffith's "Battle Tactics of the American Civil War" and Hagerman's "The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare"), if there are any I should add to this I'd be apprieciative.

 

Back to the topic, none of the 3 books mentioned are IMHO detailed enough to make any analysis beyond the authors own conclusions/ opinions.

 

Really? Did you include in that how the British line at the Alma was able to deploy out of effective range of the Russians, and advance unhindered (except by vineyards and the river crossing) in a two-mile line, while the Union forces at Fredericksburg had to deploy from a series of defiles (the streets of Fredericksburg), then across a defile (the drainage ditch), all on a front of about three-quarters of a mile, constrained upon their right by a canal and on their left by Hazel Run and the ravine it runs through? But I guess otherwise they must have been identical?

 

However, the troops holding the stone wall thought their position precarious, as there was a perfect "Line of Departure" with a cover "Forming Up Place" behind it 450-600 yds in front of their position (they wouldn't have used those terms, since they're the modern terms). Like any action, no direct comparison is really applicable due to the numbers of variables.

 

Really? Under close artillery and small arms fire?

Interesting, that's also why orange and yellow eventually replaced "fire-engine red" for emergency equipment. Of course you would think someone might have noticed soemtime in the intervening 110 years?

 

When I read it I immediately thought thats odd, but knew enough to provide the following explanation; the noticability at 800 yds or in poor light conditions is exactly in the order of the highest frequency colours being most noticable. The Dark Red the British use is very "low energy", and only really dark grey and black were less noticable. However, I know that the eye is more drawn to the colour red, apparently due to it being the colour of blood (apparently it's the third colour named in language development after black and white, green is fourth, the rest I can't remember except that the colour blue didn't exist 3 milennia ago!).

 

That is incorrect, the fighting "on the rampart" so to speak lasted a few moments at best. I think you may be confusing the defense the Confederates made against the first wave regiments using the small traverses they had constructed and then the fight at the salient angle towards the end after they had counterattacked? The traverses of course only had one "closed" end and evidently the reverse of the salient wall was quite lower than the rest (sorry, hard to show what I mean without an illustration, I hope you follow)?

I follow, thanks.

 

No, I would argue that your initial comparison was so simplistic to be almost deceptive, rewritten you could have been saying that "they just stood there in a single line at intervals of 10 yards and killed Zulus until something bad happened, but otherwise it was fought just the way the regulations said it should have been fought." I added the details you failed to include from memory so the uninitiated wouldn't get the idea that it was yet another brilliant victory.

 

I can remember that no one ever bothered to ask the Zulus their account of the battle until a couple of years ago, when one of those "battlefield archeology" TV programs investigated, and since then our understanding of the battle has completely changed. By Zulu accounts (and some ignored British accounts) the Zulus simply charged through the fire, but they'd taken large quantities of psychoactives and were oblivious to the casualties.

 

A google suggests it was "Two Men in a Trench", and that it was run by the Centre for Battlefield Archaeology.

Edited January 11, 2008 by 67th Tigers

[BillB]

I can remember that no one ever bothered to ask the Zulus their account of the battle until a couple of years ago, when one of those "battlefield archeology" TV programs investigated, and since then our understanding of the battle has completely changed. By Zulu accounts (and some ignored British accounts) the Zulus simply charged through the fire, but they'd taken large quantities of psychoactives and were oblivious to the casualties.

 

A google suggests it was "Two Men in a Trench", and that it was run by the Centre for Battlefield Archaeology.

Might be a different one but that sounds like a Timewatch mebbe that had a lot of input from the current SADF or whatever its called now. I seem to recall being unimpressed with the line of argument, which seemed to my admittedly cynical eyes to be based more on a desire to present the pre-white man African military in a good light than anything else. Having watched all the Two Men in a Trench progs when they came out I wasn't overly impressed with them either. I recall a particularly ludicrous hypothesis they put forward about the Scots arty at Flodden...

 

BillB

[Rich]

Griffith is indeed Paddy, there is a very short bit about it in "Forward into Battle". I do wonder what people have against Griffith. I recently read part of a book on the (CS) Army of the Tennessee and in the introduction they compared the various major works on tactics (McWhiney's "Attack and Die", Griffith's "Battle Tactics of the American Civil War" and Hagerman's "The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare"), if there are any I should add to this I'd be apprieciative.

 

The simple answer is that his "Battle Tactics of the American Civil War" is a load of utter and complete codswallop and after suffering through it I resolved to take every work by him with a large pinch of salt....about a hundredweights worth might do (and I have read nothing of his over the last twenty years to cause me to change that opinion). Part of it is his insufferable air of "self cleverness" and sheer arrogance, but the majority of it is his almost stunning lack of knowledge of his subject, combined with what can only be described as a pathetic incapability in performing anything that even resembles research and analysis.

 

And aside from all that it doesn't even have enough heft to qualify as a doorstop, which is about the only function it could be useful for.

 

Hagerman is good in terms of logistics and grand strategy, but isn't really an analysis of tactics (at least as far as i recall, it's been a good dozen years or so since I read him). McWhiney is a rather crazed American version of Griffith, with all the flaws, but at least is bizarrely interesting to read, it's something of a train wreck in that regard, you don't want to look at it, but you feel you must.

 

The best recent scholarship is Brent Nosworthy's "Bloody Crucible of Courage", although some will say that its chief advantage is that it does make a very efficient doorstop. It has flaws and strengths, one strength shown is that he quickly dissects the absurdity that was Griffith's so-called "analysis" of musketry, but then shows his weakness when his own "analysis" using much better data misses the point.

 

Back to the topic, none of the 3 books mentioned are IMHO detailed enough to make any analysis beyond the authors own conclusions/ opinions.

Yes, they try to draw too many conclusions from too little data, Nosworthy is better, but mostly because he covers more ground, his analysis remains a bit thin for my taste?

 

However, the troops holding the stone wall thought their position precarious, as there was a perfect "Line of Departure" with a cover "Forming Up Place" behind it 450-600 yds in front of their position (they wouldn't have used those terms, since they're the modern terms). Like any action, no direct comparison is really applicable due to the numbers of variables.

 

The covered "forming up place" was simply a slight swale and was protected only from the musketry of the troops on the wall itself. And their anxiety - which I have only ever heard expressed in terms of the soldiers on the wall, and what soldier doesn't take advantage of an opportunity to bitch about officers decisions? - was mostly due to the fact that they were isolated from support, with their flanks nominally exposed. All of which was irrelevent, there was simply zero chance for that position to be taken by assault in those circumstances.

 

(snip interesting aside)I follow, thanks.

Good, I wasn't sure I was explaining it very well.

 

I can remember that no one ever bothered to ask the Zulus their account of the battle until a couple of years ago, when one of those "battlefield archeology" TV programs investigated, and since then our understanding of the battle has completely changed. By Zulu accounts (and some ignored British accounts) the Zulus simply charged through the fire, but they'd taken large quantities of psychoactives and were oblivious to the casualties.

 

A google suggests it was "Two Men in a Trench", and that it was run by the Centre for Battlefield Archaeology.

 

I know there are some at this Grate Sight with the odd notion that I am opposed to "battlefield archaeology", but in fact that is not true. OTOH the "they must have been high man" excuse smacks a bit of "it's the only way we could have been beaten by wogs by Jove!" reasoning to me.

[67th Tigers]

The simple answer is that his "Battle Tactics of the American Civil War" is a load of utter and complete codswallop and after suffering through it I resolved to take every work by him with a large pinch of salt....about a hundredweights worth might do (and I have read nothing of his over the last twenty years to cause me to change that opinion). Part of it is his insufferable air of "self cleverness" and sheer arrogance, but the majority of it is his almost stunning lack of knowledge of his subject, combined with what can only be described as a pathetic incapability in performing anything that even resembles research and analysis.

 

The recent comparisons I've read agree that Griffith is roughly correct, but oversimplified with the exceptions missed, while Nosworthy (I have his Napoleonic and ACW books, and read his book on Linear warfare at Rhodes House) tends to agree with Griffith but points out the exceptions.

 

Personally, I'd like to see a well researched book just on the infantry encounter in the ACW with no particular depth. Focusing on the tactics, musketry effectiveness etc.

 

Hagerman is good in terms of logistics and grand strategy, but isn't really an analysis of tactics (at least as far as i recall, it's been a good dozen years or so since I read him). McWhiney is a rather crazed American version of Griffith, with all the flaws, but at least is bizarrely interesting to read, it's something of a train wreck in that regard, you don't want to look at it, but you feel you must.

It was the logistics that most interested me. It's not a branch of warfare well studied, and I was frankly amazed by the huge trains these armies operated with (I was kind of aware of it, but had never done the maths). I thought Sherman's boast of getting his service element down to a quarter of his army was rather odd before.

 

The best recent scholarship is Brent Nosworthy's "Bloody Crucible of Courage", although some will say that its chief advantage is that it does make a very efficient doorstop. It has flaws and strengths, one strength shown is that he quickly dissects the absurdity that was Griffith's so-called "analysis" of musketry, but then shows his weakness when his own "analysis" using much better data misses the point.

 

True, although I've better doorstops (my current one is a Turtledove). What neither seem to have done is compare musketry effectiveness with range, which has been done for smoothbores (producing a roughly usable relationship). Nosworthy at least tries to estimate the number of rounds fired per hit, but without comparison to firefight ranges.

 

The most extreme example I know of is an enounter of the 93rd with a column of battalions at the Alma, where they delivered a surprise volley at 60 yds and hit with 1 round in 7 (about 120 casualties).

 

I know there are some at this Grate Sight with the odd notion that I am opposed to "battlefield archaeology", but in fact that is not true. OTOH the "they must have been high man" excuse smacks a bit of "it's the only way we could have been beaten by wogs by Jove!" reasoning to me.

 

At the committee they tried to blame the rifles and the commisariat. The later has some truth as the Martini-Henry was (IMHO) inferior to the late model Snider (most specifically, it had a huge heat dispersion problem, although this is a problem with all weapons, and with the older Minie rifles etc. they used to poor water down the barrel every 5-10 rounds).

 

The commisariat is even more interesting, they were assumed to have run out of ammunition because no ammo boxes were found, but the Zulus took them.

[67th Tigers]

Re: Nosworthy's stats

 

He appears to have got them from Busk

[Rich]

Re: Nosworthy's stats

 

He appears to have got them from Busk

 

Really? What an odd thing to think, have you actually referred to Nosworthy? Although Busk is given in his bibliography he is not referenced once in Chapter 30 "The Effectiveness of the Rifle Musket". Nor after a cursuory re-review do I find him referenced in Chapter 2 "Advance in Small Arms, 1830-1859", which, considering that Busk published in 1861, would be where I would expect to find him?

 

As ever, I am a little confused as to what you might mean and what significance you apply to this non-factoid?

[67th Tigers]

Really? What an odd thing to think, have you actually referred to Nosworthy? Although Busk is given in his bibliography he is not referenced once in Chapter 30 "The Effectiveness of the Rifle Musket". Nor after a cursuory re-review do I find him referenced in Chapter 2 "Advance in Small Arms, 1830-1859", which, considering that Busk published in 1861, would be where I would expect to find him?

 

As ever, I am a little confused as to what you might mean and what significance you apply to this non-factoid?

 

I was more considering 581-593, giving considerations of the hit rates.

 

As another point of interest, I have the ammunition expenditure Inkerman, the British fired 199,820 rounds (or rather this is the number issued) for 10,959 Russian casualties (from all sources), roughly 1 casualty for 18 rounds fired (!). It doesn't deduct out the casualties to artillery fire (which the Russians state was crushing, especially the 2 18 pdrs), or melee (bayonet/ revolver) injuries either, or any caused by the 7e Leger (although their charge was behind HM 77th).

[Rich]

The recent comparisons I've read agree that Griffith is roughly correct, but oversimplified with the exceptions missed, while Nosworthy (I have his Napoleonic and ACW books, and read his book on Linear warfare at Rhodes House) tends to agree with Griffith but points out the exceptions.

 

Er, the problem with that is that - like Griffith himself - that "agreement" misses multiple points entirely. One problem is that Griffith extrapolated from faulty data - that he even admitted that he in part understood was faulty - that he accidently derived a figure that may be a "rough approximation" (to quote Nosworthy) to the actual figure is hardly praiseworthy. A second problem is that Nosworthy identifies that the key question is not range but relative effectiveness, a point that Griffith missed entirely. A third is that the musketry range controversy is but one of many methodological and analytical errors that Griffith indulged in.

 

Personally, I'd like to see a well researched book just on the infantry encounter in the ACW with no particular depth. Focusing on the tactics, musketry effectiveness etc.

"Well researched" but "with no particular depth"? Did I read that correctly? That in fact is partly what Griffith indulged in, except his was a poorly researched book with no particular depth. Think of him as the John Mosier of the UK.

 

But I agree and my major complaint with Nosworthy is that according to him he did the due diligence that Griffith was too lazy to do, but then Nosworthy simply states that Griffith got it close, but gives no evidence to support that conclusion. Like many he simply doesn't publish the data and analysis that supports his conclusion, but rather just announces the conclusion and asks the reader to accept it on faith. So how close did Griffith's "141 yards" get to Nosworthy's presumably more complete and accurate compilation? He doesn't say. Did he look at Griffith's "pre-1862" and "post-1862" figures (Griffith alledged that his earlier figures - mostly derived from a memoir written some 20 years after the fact by a general officer who didn't actually witness the engagements - for the Peninsula battles showed that the engagement ranges were virtually the same as for Napoleonic smoothbores, rather unsurprising of course considering that probably well over two-thirds of the infantry were equipped with "Napoleonic" smoothbores) and evaluate them or determine even if the dichotomy existed? He doesn't say.

 

All in all very frustrating.

 

It was the logistics that most interested me. It's not a branch of warfare well studied, and I was frankly amazed by the huge trains these armies operated with (I was kind of aware of it, but had never done the maths). I thought Sherman's boast of getting his service element down to a quarter of his army was rather odd before.

 

I agree regarding the study of logistics. But the size of the trains was a logistical requirement, it wasn't caused by ignorance or poor planning.

 

True, although I've better doorstops (my current one is a Turtledove). What neither seem to have done is compare musketry effectiveness with range, which has been done for smoothbores (producing a roughly usable relationship). Nosworthy at least tries to estimate the number of rounds fired per hit, but without comparison to firefight ranges.

Poor Harry, he should have stuck to Byzantium. And yes, that is another salient criticism of Nosworthy, but one he at least attempted to address if not answer, unlike Griffith, who simply ignored it.

 

The most extreme example I know of is an enounter of the 93rd with a column of battalions at the Alma, where they delivered a surprise volley at 60 yds and hit with 1 round in 7 (about 120 casualties).

 

I would be interested in details, especially how such figures were established? Are the Russian units opposed known? Are the casualties taken from their records? Do we know that was the only volley by the 93rd fired on them? ....

 

At the committee they tried to blame the rifles and the commisariat. The later has some truth as the Martini-Henry was (IMHO) inferior to the late model Snider (most specifically, it had a huge heat dispersion problem, although this is a problem with all weapons, and with the older Minie rifles etc. they used to poor water down the barrel every 5-10 rounds).

 

The commisariat is even more interesting, they were assumed to have run out of ammunition because no ammo boxes were found, but the Zulus took them.

 

Hey, if you can place the blame for disaster on a REMF.... Part of the problem with such "blame games" is that they often get so focused on identifying a single proximate cause that they fail to account for the many hidden contributing causes.

[Rich]

I was more considering 581-593, giving considerations of the hit rates.

 

Sorry, but again that qualifies for a big huh? The sources he uses are Neese, Hermann, Hughes, Du Picq, et al (see endnotes on pages 706-707). I'm not sure where he uses Busk, but he certainly does not appear to do so in these pages?

 

As another point of interest, I have the ammunition expenditure Inkerman, the British fired 199,820 rounds (or rather this is the number issued) for 10,959 Russian casualties (from all sources), roughly 1 casualty for 18 rounds fired (!). It doesn't deduct out the casualties to artillery fire (which the Russians state was crushing, especially the 2 18 pdrs), or melee (bayonet/ revolver) injuries either, or any caused by the 7e Leger (although their charge was behind HM 77th).

 

Using total ammunition issues for an army to subsititute for ammunition expenditures and then deriving assumptions on weapons effectiveness at the tactical level from them, is so rife with obvious problems I don't think I'll bother to comment further.

 

(edited to correct misspelling of "think"....it was late)

Edited January 14, 2008 by Rich

[Richard Lindquist]

Using total ammunition issues for an army to subsititute for ammunition expenditures and then deriving assumptions on weapons effectiveness at the tactical level from them, is so rife with obvious problems I don't thing I'll bother to comment further.

 

Back in the early 70s, someone from Rock Island proposed soimething similar to derive the Mean Rounds Between Failure for the mature M2 cal .50. Identify the parts which would cause a non-clearable failure of the gun. Take the total quantity of those parts shiped to Vietnam during a given time period and divided that into the total rounds of .50 shipped to Vietnam during the same time period.

[Guest aevans]

Back in the early 70s, someone from Rock Island proposed soimething similar to derive the Mean Rounds Between Failure for the mature M2 cal .50. Identify the parts which would cause a non-clearable failure of the gun. Take the total quantity of those parts shiped to Vietnam during a given time period and divided that into the total rounds of .50 shipped to Vietnam during the same time period.

 

Well, if you did that over a period of several years, so that you could safely assume that most of the shipped ammo and parts had been consumed, you'd get a good estimate. Over the course of a single battle? Not so much.

[67th Tigers]

Er, the problem with that is that - like Griffith himself - that "agreement" misses multiple points entirely. One problem is that Griffith extrapolated from faulty data - that he even admitted that he in part understood was faulty - that he accidently derived a figure that may be a "rough approximation" (to quote Nosworthy) to the actual figure is hardly praiseworthy. A second problem is that Nosworthy identifies that the key question is not range but relative effectiveness, a point that Griffith missed entirely. A third is that the musketry range controversy is but one of many methodological and analytical errors that Griffith indulged in.

 

Griffith certainly seems to recognise the difference between fire at different ranges, but I don't think his dataset revealed enough. After all, his analysis is over 20 years old (!). Nosworthy in his Napoleonic book identified a coefficient of effectiveness, suggesting at best the smoothbore achieve 1/40th of it's theoretical potential.

 

Incidently, this PhD thesis may be of interest: http://www.library.unt.edu/theses/open/200...issertation.pdf

 

 

 

But I agree and my major complaint with Nosworthy is that according to him he did the due diligence that Griffith was too lazy to do, but then Nosworthy simply states that Griffith got it close, but gives no evidence to support that conclusion. Like many he simply doesn't publish the data and analysis that supports his conclusion, but rather just announces the conclusion and asks the reader to accept it on faith. So how close did Griffith's "141 yards" get to Nosworthy's presumably more complete and accurate compilation? He doesn't say. Did he look at Griffith's "pre-1862" and "post-1862" figures (Griffith alledged that his earlier figures - mostly derived from a memoir written some 20 years after the fact by a general officer who didn't actually witness the engagements - for the Peninsula battles showed that the engagement ranges were virtually the same as for Napoleonic smoothbores, rather unsurprising of course considering that probably well over two-thirds of the infantry were equipped with "Napoleonic" smoothbores) and evaluate them or determine even if the dichotomy existed? He doesn't say.

 

Realistically, there are 3 sets of figures, since "other 1861-2" and 1863 are so close as to be statistically insignificant. They are 1861-3, Seven Pines (much shorter range, if Griffith was dishonest he could have not separated that) and 1864-5.

 

Griffith points out these are within the the "book" range of the old Smoothbore (200yds, but the French manuals of the Napoleonic wars rated the smoothbore out to 500yds, which the British thought ludicrous, Nosworthy's Napoleonic book has good coverage of this). ISTR Paddy states his found ranges are greater than the Napoleonic effective range of 100 yds in more than half of the cases (exc/ Seven Pines which would skew results). Therefore he seems to agree that the ranges have increased beyond the Napoleonic War, but only about doubled.

 

I consider his findings roughly in line with the physics as per Nosworthy. The effective "musket" range (i.e. simply aim for the centre of the body and fire) of the rifled musket has increased from about 50-80 yds to about 100-120 yds, due to a tighter grouping. Beyond this you need to specialist training which most Americans didn't receive in the early war. 1864 onwards there is an increase in properly "rifle trained" troops pushing up the average (e.g. Cleburne's training in the west etc.)

 

 

I would be interested in details, especially how such figures were established? Are the Russian units opposed known? Are the casualties taken from their records? Do we know that was the only volley by the 93rd fired on them? ....

 

I'd have to search for that figure (which I thought was from Ponting, but didn't find it on first inspection). However, Fletcher and Ishchenko's The Crimean War: A Clash of Empire (which I got on Saturday on the promise that it is supposed to be the best balanced account, authored by a Russian with access to their records) gives this description of the encounter:

 

"While the fight raged in front of the Great Redoubt, the Highland Brigade came up on the left of the Guards, the 42nd leading the way, the 93rd and 79th in echelon away to their left. Ahead of these three battalions were no fewer than twelve Russian battalions; the two right battalions of the Kazan, four of the Sousdal, and four battalions of the Ouglitz Regiment which lay higher up the slopes above the Great Redoubt. In addition to these battalions, the two right battalions of the Vladimir Regiment peeled away from the Great Redoubt, bringing themselves up on the left of the two Kazan battalions directly in the path of the advancing 42nd. The problem was that, of course, the twelve Russian regiments were still in column, whereas Campbell's Highlanders were deployed in their two deep line, in which formation every rifle could be brought to bear.

 

.... The 42nd opened fire on the two right battalions of the Kazan and the right Vladimir battalions without halting. The fire ripped into the Russians who, in their combined formation, could reply with only a fraction of the firepower being unloaded into them. But, as Campbell, whose horse had been hit twice, peered through the smoke he could see another Russian column heading towards him from his left. It was the two left battalions of the Sousdal who were coming on pace heading directly for the 42nd's exposed left flank. But then, right on cue, the 93rd 'mad with warlike joy', came storming towards the left of the 42nd. The 93rd, not one of Wellington's old regiments, but one which had last been given a good drubbing at New Orleans on their last major outing, were eager to get into the action and Campbell was forced to ride over and see to their dressings which had become somewhat disorganised....

 

Once the 93rd were correctly formed Campbell returned to the 42nd - how had also halted - and together they continued their advance, firing as they went. Finally the two battalions of Highlanders reached the slope where the Kazan, Vladimir and now the Sousdal battalions waited for them. A tremendous firefight ensued..... until, once again, yet another Russian column was seen approaching towards the open left flank of the 93rd. The column consisted of the two right battalions of the Sousdal Regiments who came pushing in to join their left battalions, now engaged with Campbell. It was a critical moment for Campbell, and the Russians were coming on, relishing the prospect of catching the two Highland battalions in the flank. 'But, some witchcraft, the doomed men fight fancy, was causing the Earth to bear giants'. And so it seemed. For, just as the 93rd had came up in time to cover the left of the 42nd, so it was the 93rd's turn to be saved....."

[Rich]

Griffith certainly seems to recognise the difference between fire at different ranges, but I don't think his dataset revealed enough. After all, his analysis is over 20 years old (!). Nosworthy in his Napoleonic book identified a coefficient of effectiveness, suggesting at best the smoothbore achieve 1/40th of it's theoretical potential.

 

It's impossible to tell what his dataset revealed, because we don't actually know what his dataset was. And age doesn't enter into it, he is simply of that group that likes to make statements of fact, but doesn't consider it necessary to actually "reveal" what his dataset consists of.

 

Incidently, this PhD thesis may be of interest:

Thanks. From a quick skim this looks to be quite good, although again I abhor the absence of the actual dataset details. But I do note with approval his apparent jaundiced view of using Lanchester to model ground combat, an idea that would have appalled the poor old man.

 

Anyway, I look forward to a more leisurely read of it, thanks for finding it, I wish I had more time for pursuing studies of that period.

 

Realistically, there are 3 sets of figures, since "other 1861-2" and 1863 are so close as to be statistically insignificant. They are 1861-3, Seven Pines (much shorter range, if Griffith was dishonest he could have not separated that) and 1864-5.

 

I was going from a 20-year memory I'm afraid. I did have a critique written up at one time, but I think it is on a 5 1/4" disk.

 

But the major problem remains, his sources were suspect and misused.

 

Griffith points out these are within the the "book" range of the old Smoothbore (200yds, but the French manuals of the Napoleonic wars rated the smoothbore out to 500yds, which the British thought ludicrous, Nosworthy's Napoleonic book has good coverage of this). ISTR Paddy states his found ranges are greater than the Napoleonic effective range of 100 yds in more than half of the cases (exc/ Seven Pines which would skew results). Therefore he seems to agree that the ranges have increased beyond the Napoleonic War, but only about doubled.

"Book" ranges scare me, its one reason way the old US Army models of a potential WARPAC conflict expended so much artillery, as the longest-ranged systems they tended to dominate the battle and without logistical limitations burned through ammo like nobodies business. And tactical simulations were worse, since they utilized range data as effectiveness data.

 

BTW, I wonder when a doubling of actual effective range in any commonly held weapon system was considered to be insignificant?

 

I consider his findings roughly in line with the physics as per Nosworthy.

 

(snip technical discussion and interesting anecdote that doesn't really address the question)

[DesertFox]

Curious, what would suggest is the worst Confederate general?

As well, what is you reasoning?

[Old Tanker]

Curious, what would suggest is the worst Confederate general?

As well, what is you reasoning?

 

Many state that Bragg was the worst of those in high command.

Mainly because he was out generalled by US generals in the campaigns through Tennessee and n. Georgia.

Blame is placed on Davis as Bragg was a crony of his.

[Rich]

Many state that Bragg was the worst of those in high command.

Mainly because he was out generalled by US generals in the campaigns through Tennessee and n. Georgia.

Blame is placed on Davis as Bragg was a crony of his.

 

I think the good Bishop General Polk might be a contender for worst. Of course you kind of have to describe some parameters. Only generals in independent command? Do brigadiers and major generals count or do we have to go into the upper echelons? There was also Joe Davis - possibly one of the worst brigadiers on either side, at least of the ones who were apparently usually sober - Magruder could be up there too and of course Albert Sidney Johnston, but he managed to get kilt before he was able to show whether or not his incompetence was transitory or not.