McClellan Timidry

[Sparviero]

I think that would be the case in any army. I was just curious if his charisma would have been able to improve the Union's fortunes early in the war.

[KingSargent]

I think that would be the case in any army. I was just curious if his charisma would have been able to improve the Union's fortunes early in the war.

McClellan had charisma, he lacked drive and aggressiveness.

[DesertFox]

McClellan had charisma, he lacked drive and aggressiveness.

 

I don't think his complete disrespect for Lincoln helped very much either.......

[67th Tigers]

I watched a show which stated that the Army of the Potomac had not been paid in sixth months in the start of 1863. Anybody know what the cause was?

 

Simple lack of resources to support an army of 300,000 men. There were also major problems with issuing replacement clothes, boots (especially boots), with feeding etc., which mainly manifested after McClellan was removed. It was his ability and force of will that kept the AoP together during 1862, and with his removal the logistics suffered a fair collapse.

[Sparviero]

McClellan had charisma, he lacked drive and aggressiveness.

 

 

Well Garibaldi had both of those in spades.

[Guest aevans]

Simple lack of resources to support an army of 300,000 men. There were also major problems with issuing replacement clothes, boots (especially boots), with feeding etc., which mainly manifested after McClellan was removed. It was his ability and force of will that kept the AoP together during 1862, and with his removal the logistics suffered a fair collapse.

 

ROTFLMFAO!!!

 

Here's a homework assignment: What do the Vicksburg and Gettysburg campaigns, and Sherman's march to the sea all have in common?

 

BTW, if you're right, how in the world did the AoP ever manage the siege of Vicksburg without McClellan?

Edited January 10, 2008 by aevans

[67th Tigers]

ROTFLMFAO!!!

 

Here's a homework assignment: What do the Vicksburg and Gettysburg campaigns, and Sherman's march to the sea all have in common?

 

BTW, if you're right, how in the world did the AoP ever manage the siege of Vicksburg without McClellan?

 

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=hg7UfLD...umbnail#PPP1,M1

[Guest aevans]

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=hg7UfLD...umbnail#PPP1,M1

 

And that's an answer how? Where and how did the AoP's logistics "collapse" after the departure of McClellan? If they did, how in the world were the Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg campaigns mounted within the next eight months?

[Rich]

Simple lack of resources to support an army of 300,000 men. There were also major problems with issuing replacement clothes, boots (especially boots), with feeding etc., which mainly manifested after McClellan was removed. It was his ability and force of will that kept the AoP together during 1862, and with his removal the logistics suffered a fair collapse.

 

Er, no, aside from attributing much of the work of Meigs and Ingalls to McClellan, you seem unaware that the proximate cause of the "fair collapse" of logistics in the Army of the Potomac in late 1862 and early 1863 was that Burnside - McClellan's successor - elected to attempt a winter campaign, utilizing the means that McClellan had instituted? I assume you are also unaware that there was an earlier "fair collapse" under McClellan during the Virginia-Maryland Campaign in summer and fall of 1862 - albeit less far-reaching than the later winter collapse - because of the loss of some 2,500 wagons and teams in the peninsula, directly due to McClellan's failure to plan for their evacuation? Note also that the "McClellan" logistic standard was for about 55 wagons and teams per 1,000 men, perforce reduced because of those losses to about 30 per 1,000 men (the standard used by Burnside as well), but was then intentionally reduced to 20 per 1,000 men by Meigs and Ingalls for the summer campaign in 1863, a standard that was maintained with little difficulty until the end of the war.

 

BTW, about the longest "payroll" delay other than this specific case I'm aware of was one month, but they again were due to the simple difficulty of getting specie to the men since payroll was not done by check. In the same vein boot and clothing problems were more attributable to quality control in contracting and manufacturing those goods, especially early in the war, which was outside the purview of any of the commanders of the Army of the Potomac - ever hear the term "shoddy"?

[Rich]

url=http://books.google.co.uk/

 

I'm curious, do you ever use any resource other than Google Books snippets? What would you do if you didn't have the Internet?

[Guest aevans]

Er, no, aside from attributing much of the work of Meigs and Ingalls to McClellan, you seem unaware that the proximate cause of the "fair collapse" of logistics in the Army of the Potomac in late 1862 and early 1863 was that Burnside - McClellan's successor - elected to attempt a winter campaign, utilizing the means that McClellan had instituted? I assume you are also unaware that there was an earlier "fair collapse" under McClellan during the Virginia-Maryland Campaign in summer and fall of 1862 - albeit less far-reaching than the later winter collapse - because of the loss of some 2,500 wagons and teams in the peninsula, directly due to McClellan's failure to plan for their evacuation? Note also that the "McClellan" logistic standard was for about 55 wagons and teams per 1,000 men, perforce reduced because of those losses to about 30 per 1,000 men (the standard used by Burnside as well), but was then intentionally reduced to 20 per 1,000 men by Meigs and Ingalls for the summer campaign in 1863, a standard that was maintained with little difficulty until the end of the war.

 

But can we really term any of those episodes a real collapse, given that operations still proceeded?

[Rich]

But can we really term any of those episodes a real collapse, given that operations still proceeded?

 

That's part of why I put "fair collapse" into quotes, nor did I use the term "complete collapse" (although the winter of 62-63 along the Rappahanock may qualify albeit that was a transportation collapse - generated by weather and the persistant shortage of wagons and horses (courtesy of the Mac's Peninsula Campaign and problems in the remount service). Of course "collapse" gives no sense of a timeframe in and of itself or when the recovery occurred or even if there was a recovery. But good 'ol Tigger was as vague as he usually is on such things so yes I should have been more specific.

 

So yes, I would term those real "collapses" of one degree or another, each of which lasted different periods and were of differing severity, and all of which were eventually corrected, resulting in improvements both in the understanding and capabilities of the Quartermasters (90 percent of whom were getting OJT), as well as the doctrine employed. Is that better?

[Guest aevans]

So yes, I would term those real "collapses" of one degree or another, each of which lasted different periods and were of differing severity, and all of which were eventually corrected, resulting in improvements both in the understanding and capabilities of the Quartermasters (90 percent of whom were getting OJT), as well as the doctrine employed. Is that better?

 

It doesn't have to be better. It was a serious question. I know a reasonable amount about the general logistics picture and the consequent operational constraints. I don't know much about the details of the various ups and downs in implementation.

 

BTW, your mention that the Quartermasters were learning on the job reminded me of the recent body of work on the development of operational techniques over the course of the war. My impression is that we should stop be less critical of the men who fought the war, especially for their early mistakes, and appreciate them more for how far they had come by the end of it.

[Rich]

It doesn't have to be better. It was a serious question. I know a reasonable amount about the general logistics picture and the consequent operational constraints. I don't know much about the details of the various ups and downs in implementation.

 

And it was a serious answer. There were many logistical hiccups during the ACW, on both sides, and in all theaters. Those specifically related to the Army of the Potomac, that could be classified as "collapses" or "fair collapses" are those I alluded to, of which that during the winter of 1862/1863 was the worst in terms of overall effects and length.

 

BTW, your mention that the Quartermasters were learning on the job reminded me of the recent body of work on the development of operational techniques over the course of the war. My impression is that we should stop be less critical of the men who fought the war, especially for their early mistakes, and appreciate them more for how far they had come by the end of it.

 

If you meant "should stop be[ing so critical of the men who fought the war" - which I think from the context you must have? - then I could not agree more. By the end of the war the operational and tactical capabilities of the Union armies were probably second to none in the world (I'm trying to remember who it was that was sent as an observer to the Prussian Army during the Franco-Prussian War - Sheridan? - who was simply appalled by the tactical and operational shortcomings shown by both sides and remarked something to the effect that they were lucky they never had to face a Forrest or Wilson? It's probably apocryphal but pretty close to reality).

[KingSargent]

And it was a serious answer. There were many logistical hiccups during the ACW, on both sides, and in all theaters. Those specifically related to the Army of the Potomac, that could be classified as "collapses" or "fair collapses" are those I alluded to, of which that during the winter of 1862/1863 was the worst in terms of overall effects and length.

If you meant "should stop be[ing so critical of the men who fought the war" - which I think from the context you must have? - then I could not agree more. By the end of the war the operational and tactical capabilities of the Union armies were probably second to none in the world (I'm trying to remember who it was that was sent as an observer to the Prussian Army during the Franco-Prussian War - Sheridan? - who was simply appalled by the tactical and operational shortcomings shown by both sides and remarked something to the effect that they were lucky they never had to face a Forrest or Wilson? It's probably apocryphal but pretty close to reality).

Sheridan was indeed the US observer, and he was not impressed with either side. I don't know about the quote, but it sounds like him.

 

Considering the slow movements, movement FUBARs, and just plain refusals to move, the French especially were lucky Sheridan didn't have firing powers as when he relieved Warren. Although if he fired enough French generals early enough, things would probably have gone better for the French - be hard to go worse. The French government could have used a few J.W. Booths, too.

[Guest aevans]

And it was a serious answer. There were many logistical hiccups during the ACW, on both sides, and in all theaters. Those specifically related to the Army of the Potomac, that could be classified as "collapses" or "fair collapses" are those I alluded to, of which that during the winter of 1862/1863 was the worst in terms of overall effects and length.

 

I knew it was serious. Just wanted to assure you that I appreciated it in that fashion.

 

If you meant "should stop be[ing so critical of the men who fought the war" - which I think from the context you must have? - then I could not agree more. By the end of the war the operational and tactical capabilities of the Union armies were probably second to none in the world (I'm trying to remember who it was that was sent as an observer to the Prussian Army during the Franco-Prussian War - Sheridan? - who was simply appalled by the tactical and operational shortcomings shown by both sides and remarked something to the effect that they were lucky they never had to face a Forrest or Wilson? It's probably apocryphal but pretty close to reality).

 

Yeah, that's what I meant -- someday I'll learn to speech propurly.

 

I never heard the observer story, but if it isn't factual, it should be. It fits hand in glove with Moltke's alledged comments about the ACW being irrelevant to European warfare. Thomas or Sherridan with a Union army, against a comparably sized Prussian or French force, would have irrelevantly ripped his opponents lips off in a maneuver campaign.

[67th Tigers]

Sheridan was indeed the US observer, and he was not impressed with either side. I don't know about the quote, but it sounds like him.

 

Considering the slow movements, movement FUBARs, and just plain refusals to move, the French especially were lucky Sheridan didn't have firing powers as when he relieved Warren. Although if he fired enough French generals early enough, things would probably have gone better for the French - be hard to go worse. The French government could have used a few J.W. Booths, too.

 

You seem to have a very different interpretation of "Great celerity of combination was therefore possible, the columns moving in compact order...." and his praise of the Germans (with whom he was marching, not the French) for marching at 3mph. Sheridan found the French and Germans far more advanced than the Americans but could not speculate "how the Germans might have gotten along on bottomless roads - often none at all - through the swamps and quicksands of Northern Virginia, from the Wilderness to Petersburg, and from Chattanooga to Atlanta and the sea.".

 

He could only find strategic fault, three of them on the French side "the first of these blunders was the acceptance of battle by Macmahon at Worth; the second in attaching too much importance to the fortified position of Metz, resulting in three battles - Colomby, Mars-la-tour and Gravelotte - all of which were lost; and the third, the absurd movement of Macmahon along the Belgian frontier to relieve Metz...."

 

I never heard the observer story, but if it isn't factual, it should be. It fits hand in glove with Moltke's alledged comments about the ACW being irrelevant to European warfare. Thomas or Sherridan with a Union army, against a comparably sized Prussian or French force, would have irrelevantly ripped his opponents lips off in a maneuver campaign.

 

Of course, the ACW is pretty irrelevent to European warfare, there was nothing that wasn't already considered, belond possibly the idea of reintroducing the Dragoon/ Mounted Infantry. After all, the best attack the Union ever made, Upton at the Muleshoe, was an inferior variant of the standard attack tactics as laid down in the British 1859 Infantry Manual...

[67th Tigers]

I'm curious, do you ever use any resource other than Google Books snippets? What would you do if you didn't have the Internet?

 

I've found it the easiest way to suggest reading a book to someone, unlike Amazon it gives a preview. It's a very good overview of the progress of logistics to a functional state.

[Guest aevans]

Of course, the ACW is pretty irrelevent to European warfare, there was nothing that wasn't already considered, belond possibly the idea of reintroducing the Dragoon/ Mounted Infantry.

 

Dragoons? American Civil War cavalry performed all of the operational missions that any European cavalry did. The only real difference is that American cavalry realized early in the war that the tactical capabilities of cavalry had changed. It wasn't a new or resurrected type of cavalry, just a doctrinal adjustment to battlefield reality.

 

As for the general case, the practical demonstration of what works and what doesn't is always relevant. French operations in 1870 certainly demonstrate that they could have benefitted from Union and Confederate lessons learned.

 

After all, the best attack the Union ever made, Upton at the Muleshoe, was an inferior variant of the standard attack tactics as laid down in the British 1859 Infantry Manual...

 

Attacking in close order, in echelon, with weapons essentially unloaded (charged but not capped) was considered a standard method of attack in British doctrine? By Jingo!

[67th Tigers]

Dragoons? American Civil War cavalry performed all of the operational missions that any European cavalry did. The only real difference is that American cavalry realized early in the war that the tactical capabilities of cavalry had changed. It wasn't a new or resurrected type of cavalry, just a doctrinal adjustment to battlefield reality.

 

So von Belows "death ride", paralysing an entire French Corps for 3 hours and allowing the Germans to envelope them for the cost of a couple of hundred men wasn't worth the investment?

 

As for the general case, the practical demonstration of what works and what doesn't is always relevant. French operations in 1870 certainly demonstrate that they could have benefitted from Union and Confederate lessons learned.

Attacking in close order, in echelon, with weapons essentially unloaded (charged but not capped) was considered a standard method of attack in British doctrine? By Jingo!

 

Upton launched his Division in four successive lines (although in much closer order than the British allowed for, half the interval the British used at the Alma), skirmishing forward after a whirlwind artillery barrage, simply lacking the exploitation force. I believe you're getting confused with Hancock's attack the next day (one of his divisions did advance in column with upcapped muskets and suffered heavily)

[Guest aevans]

So von Belows "death ride", paralysing an entire French Corps for 3 hours and allowing the Germans to envelope them for the cost of a couple of hundred men wasn't worth the investment?

 

It was an isolated, unreproducible result, as numerous cavalry brigades and divisions learned over the next fifty years. But it's typical of people who don't understand war (including a great many people in uniform) to equate luck with skill.

 

Upton launched his Division in four successive lines (although in much closer order than the British allowed for, half the interval the British used at the Alma), skirmishing forward after a whirlwind artillery barrage, simply lacking the exploitation force. I believe you're getting confused with Hancock's attack the next day (one of his divisions did advance in column with upcapped muskets and suffered heavily)

 

"In echelon" doesn't just refer to an angled back from the front formation, it also refers to attacking in depth, as in, "Soviet doctrine envisioned attacking in several echelons." I shouldn't have tasked your limited kowledge by expecting you to know that. Also, advancing "in successive lines" is the same thing as advancing "in column", where formation of brigade or larger size are concerned. Additionally, I was indeed thinking of upton's attack, which also made us of the uncapped musket. Finally, calling the preparatory bombardment for Upton's assault a "whirlwind" is laying on quite thick -- it was a standard artillery bombardment of the day, probably cut off by fading light and ammo supply issues much more than by design.

[67th Tigers]

It was an isolated, unreproducible result, as numerous cavalry brigades and divisions learned over the next fifty years. But it's typical of people who don't understand war (including a great many people in uniform) to equate luck with skill.

 

Errr, you care to name any examples?

 

"In echelon" doesn't just refer to an angled back from the front formation, it also refers to attacking in depth, as in, "Soviet doctrine envisioned attacking in several echelons." I shouldn't have tasked your limited kowledge by expecting you to know that. Also, advancing "in successive lines" is the same thing as advancing "in column", where formation of brigade or larger size are concerned. Additionally, I was indeed thinking of upton's attack, which also made us of the uncapped musket. Finally, calling the preparatory bombardment for Upton's assault a "whirlwind" is laying on quite thick -- it was a standard artillery bombardment of the day, probably cut off by fading light and ammo supply issues much more than by design.

 

Who is talking about echeloned attacks? The assault on Maryles Heights at Fredericksburg was an echeloned attack, the 16 brigade attacks were launched one after the other without supporting each other. None had sufficient momemtum to cross the deadly ground and deliver shock. As I've mentioned (probably), the British assaulted a far more formidible position in 1854 simply by crossing that deadly ground in open order.

 

Echeloned attacks and attacks by successive lines are different in that in the latter the skirmish line is supported by the main line, which is supported by the supporting line, which in turn is supported by the reserve line. It gives the attackers the momentum necessary to carry on forward.

 

As for the artillery, they massed a large number of batteries, and opened fire at 6pm, ceasing firing at 6.10pm, when Upton's skirmish line was 50 yards short of the forward positions (and his main line, and Upton himself, 200 yards away, 150 yds behind the skirmish line).

[Guest aevans]

Errr, you care to name any examples?

 

Every army that continued to see the sword/lance as the principle cavalry weapon.

 

Who is talking about echeloned attacks? The assault on Maryles Heights at Fredericksburg was an echeloned attack, the 16 brigade attacks were launched one after the other without supporting each other. None had sufficient momemtum to cross the deadly ground and deliver shock. As I've mentioned (probably), the British assaulted a far more formidible position in 1854 simply by crossing that deadly ground in open order.

"[T]hat deadly ground"!? What a breathless romantic we are today!

 

Echeloned attacks and attacks by successive lines are different in that in the latter the skirmish line is supported by the main line, which is supported by the supporting line, which in turn is supported by the reserve line. It gives the attackers the momentum necessary to carry on forward.

 

That's a pretty fine distinction. Under fire, the difference between attacking in echelon, as you describe it, and attacking in column (as in successive lines, not in actual dense column) is pretty academic.

 

As for the artillery, they massed a large number of batteries, and opened fire at 6pm, ceasing firing at 6.10pm, when Upton's skirmish line was 50 yards short of the forward positions (and his main line, and Upton himself, 200 yards away, 150 yds behind the skirmish line).

 

Once again you're demonstrating your misunderstanding of Civil War infantry tactics. If a skirmish line was advanced, it was intended to scout and secure the ground prior to a general attack by the whole division, not as a phase of choreographed assault as in European tactics.

[Rich]

So von Belows "death ride", paralysing an entire French Corps for 3 hours and allowing the Germans to envelope them for the cost of a couple of hundred men wasn't worth the investment?

 

Oh dear, here we go again.... von Bredow's "death ride" did no such thing. His attack was on the artillery of the French IV Corps, which had been poundingthe German infantry on von Alvensleben's left for some time. It suceeded in that mission, attacking between 1400 and 1430. But at 1500, when Ladmirault's IV Corps arrived on the scene and again threatened to envelope the German left, von Bredow was long gone, there is no evidence that Ladmirault even knew of his attack, the two German cavalry divisions to his front rapidly withdrew in front of his cavalry, abandoning Mars-le-Tour, and what delayed his advance - for about a half-hour was his decision to aquiesce to his leading division commanders request that the attack not jump off until the second division could come up (he was worried by the German infantry to his front, unaware that their flank was exposed), by which time the German X Corps had appeared. Of course what should have relieved the Germans nearly turned into a debacle when the leading German division of X Corps (19th Division) promptly attacked Ladmirault's front instead of his flank as ordered.

 

Upton launched his Division in four successive lines (although in much closer order than the British allowed for, half the interval the British used at the Alma), skirmishing forward after a whirlwind artillery barrage, simply lacking the exploitation force. I believe you're getting confused with Hancock's attack the next day (one of his divisions did advance in column with upcapped muskets and suffered heavily)

 

And.... There is no comparison between the Alma - a rather disjointed and imperfectly sited Russian defense consisting of a few poorly constructed and non-contiguous field fortifications - and Spotsylvania - a rather well thought out, continuous field fortification, defended through its length by rather good and experienced infantry, equipped with rifles and well supported by artillery. I'm rather curious how an "open order" line - British, American, or Zulu - was supposed to "skirmish forward" to seize that position? Ask the defenders very nicely to help them over the parapet?

 

Upton's Brigade (2nd Brigade, 1st Division, Sixth Corps) was reinforced by four regiments of the 3rd Brigade and four regiments of the 2nd Division, which was formed in four succesive lines, each of three regiments. The first had muskets loaded and capped, the rest loaded but not capped, all had bayonets fixed. Orders for the first line were to advance to seize the parapet, and then wheel left and right, the second line following was to pass through. But the third line was to be held in reserve behind the second line, although it would advance, while the fourth line remained in reserve, lying down at the edge of the woods when the other three lines advanced (but was eventually committed). No skirmishers were sent forward (the approaches had all been identified and laid out by a ground reconnaissance given to all the senior officers by Upton beforehand). The interval in the first and second line was close, because of the intended maneuver of the first line and the desire to get them over the parapet as quickly as possible, there is no mention that I have found that the third line was at a close interval though and the fourth line went prone at the edge of the wounds while the other three advanced, so were at an interval of a few hundred yards when the first line engaged, hardly a "close interval"?

 

And the exploitation force, Mott's Division, another 12 regiments did exist, although they did not in the event move forward (the reasons are disputed) and at the last moment Barlow's Division of Second Corps was withdrawn from the operation because they had become engaged in repelling Heth's attack earlier in the day and so were out of position.

 

In any event the position was seized, but could not be held because of the failure of the reserves to come forward.

 

Nor was Upton's assault an "inferior variant" since it was not based upon British tactics at all (and those tactics employed at the Alma would have failed miserably), but rather on his own tactical experimentation and was closely modeled on his succesful assault on the Rappahanock fortified bridgehead.

 

Oh, your remarks regarding Hancock's assault are pretty far off the mark too.

 

BTW, I have kind of an interest in Spottsylvania in general and Upton's Assault in particular, my great-great uncle Thomas Hulings, Lieutenant-Colonel, Pennsylvania Volunteers, was killed commanding the 49th Pennsylvania (from 2nd Brigade - Hancock's old command - and was the left regiment in the second line, reputedly he was the farthest advanced Union officer when he was killed) in that attack and once upon a time I had read every regimental account extant of that affair, as well as the accounts in OR, many of them while walking the ground. So please don't try teaching your Granny to suck eggs on this one?

Edited January 11, 2008 by Rich

[67th Tigers]

Oh dear, here we go again.... von Bredow's "death ride" did no such thing. His attack was on the artillery of the French IV Corps, which had been poundingthe German infantry on von Alvensleben's left for some time. It suceeded in that mission, attacking between 1400 and 1430. But at 1500, when Ladmirault's IV Corps arrived on the scene and again threatened to envelope the German left, von Bredow was long gone, there is no evidence that Ladmirault even knew of his attack, the two German cavalry divisions to his front rapidly withdrew in front of his cavalry, abandoning Mars-le-Tour, and what delayed his advance - for about a half-hour was his decision to aquiesce to his leading division commanders request that the attack not jump off until the second division could come up (he was worried by the German infantry to his front, unaware that their flank was exposed), by which time the German X Corps had appeared. Of course what should have relieved the Germans nearly turned into a debacle when the leading German division of X Corps (19th Division) promptly attacked Ladmirault's front instead of his flank as ordered.

 

12th Cavalry Brigade (-) broke cover at 1,000 yds, charged over the French artillery and sabred the gunners (the 7th Prussian Cuirassiers, who were his first line). His second line charged into the disordered French infantry and spent a good half hour sabring the infantry before the French, before finally being driven back by a French cavalry charge by two brigades. He lost 379 sabres out of the 804 who charged. IV Corps took 3 hours to recover order.

 

And.... There is no comparison between the Alma - a rather disjointed and imperfectly sited Russian defense consisting of a few poorly constructed and non-contiguous field fortifications - and Spotsylvania - a rather well thought out, continuous field fortification, defended through its length by rather good and experienced infantry, equipped with rifles and well supported by artillery.

 

Did I compare the Mule Shoe and Alma? I know I'm prone to comparing the Stone Wall and Marye's Heights to the Alma, but ack well...

 

The fortifications at the Mule Shoe were typical of those used at the time. A rampart was created by building up a wall of logs, with a innovation of the shallow trench being behind, rather than in front of the defences. This would be regardedas a fairly hasty defence in Europe (since a 6 hour hasty defence featured a 6-8 foot deep trench ahead of an 4-5 foot Earthen rampart, with multiple obstacle belts thrown several hundred yards forward and fields of fire cleared). The Mule Shoe defences appear to lack a ditch, abatis belts, a Chevaux-de-frisse belt and a forward skirmish line of rifle pits (again, generally built up out of felled logs rather than dug in), at least in all the accounts I've read.

 

(After 10 mins skips trying to upload the image of the standard British entrenchment proceedures)

 

Much of the rampart was blasted apart by the artillery strike, and the Confederates took to kneeling down in their 1.5-2 foot deep shell scrape to offer some protection.

 

I'm rather curious how an "open order" line - British, American, or Zulu - was supposed to "skirmish forward" to seize that position? Ask the defenders very nicely to help them over the parapet?

? That's hopefully deliberately obteuse, as the development of such tactics were a step towards modern tactics.

 

How ever, lets consider Isandwana. The British infantry deployed at a 3m (10 foot) interval, i.e. the next rifleman was 3m to his left or right, and deployed in a single rank. This method of fighting was generally found to be the optimal formation against a European enemy (and proved to still be in 1914*) who it was expected would go to ground 4-600m out and engage in a firefight. The British maintained a very effective fire (there was no problems with ammunition supply as has been suggested), but the Zulus were simply stoned enough not to quailed by the huge casualties and manage to close to close quarters, where the open British formation meant that they were simply overrun. This caused somewhat of a backlash against modern tactics, with the British bring an "artillery formation" back into the manual, a closed order rifle line for fighting non-rifle armed opponents (and which some commanders used against the Boers, doh!)

 

<much snippage due to lack of time>

 

Oh, your remarks regarding Hancock's assault are pretty far off the mark too.

 

Was mainly thinking of Barlow's Division in a column Napoleon would have thought unwieldy....

 

 

BTW, I have kind of an interest in Spottsylvania in general and Upton's Assault in particular, my great-great uncle Thomas Hulings, Lieutenant-Colonel, Pennsylvania Volunteers, was killed commanding the 49th Pennsylvania (from 2nd Brigade - Hancock's old command - and was the left regiment in the second line, reputedly he was the farthest advanced Union officer when he was killed) in that attack and once upon a time I had read every regimental account extant of that affair, as well as the accounts in OR, many of them while walking the ground. So please don't try teaching your Granny to suck eggs on this one?

 

Excellent, then I hope you'll put me straight on anything I've misread.

 

 

 

* Although it was found that 4 waves was generally not enough depth in 1914, and the British switched to 8 waves, making a mockery of their final adoption of 4 coy Bns. The Australians, maintaining the old 8 coy Bn found attacks easier to control, as you could simply assign a coy to each wave.