McClellan Timidry

[KingSargent]

I thought it was an ancient Maxim that an army fought with what it had not what they wished to have?

McClellan, Rosecrans, and Halleck apparently missed it. Of course they all started with armies that had literally nothing, so they HAD to build up. They just took it too far and delayed too much. Grant moved when most men had guns of some sort.

[Guest aevans]

The conditions at Chancellorsville seem quite a bit different than at Gettysburg

 

If nothing else, Lee was on Union soil, did not know the battle field, and the Union force was concentrated.

 

The Union force was not concentrated on July 1, 1863. Also, to be picky, Lee really didn't know the Chancellorsville battlefield all that well, but he did have willing local help. Finally, being on Union soil was a victory in itself, since the primary objective of the campaign was to disrupt AoP offensive plans for the balance of the campaigning season.

[Jim Martin]

I thought it was an ancient Maxim that an army fought with what it had not what they wished to have?

 

I see Don Rumsfeld is now posting on Tanknet.

[DesertFox]

I see Don Rumsfeld is now posting on Tanknet.

 

 

I thought I remembered hearing it from someone else other than Rumsfeld.......

[DesertFox]

The Union force was not concentrated on July 1, 1863. Also, to be picky, Lee really didn't know the Chancellorsville battlefield all that well, but he did have willing local help. Finally, being on Union soil was a victory in itself, since the primary objective of the campaign was to disrupt AoP offensive plans for the balance of the campaigning season.

 

I have heard an that the Gettysburg Campaign allowed the Virginia farmers to work mostly unmolested. If that was so, a chase around the North might have been better? Could Lee have broken in another direction, not engaging, and do something like a more gentle version of Sherman's March and ate off the land for an extended period? The Union fought with an arm behind its back metaphorically and doing what Sherman did, scorched earth in effect, might have caused the absolute wrong effect.

 

I am just exploring different ideas on this not saying anyone is wrong.....I am playing the hindsight is 20/20 game

Edited December 4, 2007 by DesertFox

[Jim Martin]

I thought I remembered hearing it from someone else other than Rumsfeld.......

 

 

It's an obvious truism, and probably as old as Sun Tzu, but with the way that Rumsfeld got raked over the coals for stating the obvious, you'd think he had thought it up himself.

[Guest aevans]

I have heard an that the Gettysburg Campaign allowed the Virginia farmers to work mostly unmolested. If that was so, a chase around the North might have been better?

 

Could Lee have broken in another direction, not engaging, and do something like a more gentle version of Sherman's March and ate off the land for an extended period? The Union fought with an arm behind its back metaphorically and doing what Sherman did, scorched earth in effect, might have caused the absolute wrong effect.

 

The 1863 raid into the North left Richmond mostly uncovered. Lee had to maintain his line of communication west of South Mountain so that he could retreat to cover the Confederate capital should the Union have called his bluff. There was never a question of extending the raid very far into the North or for too long. Even the suggestion that Philadelphia might have been threatened or even sacked relies on such an unlikely turn of events -- essentially, the AoP commander dropping the ball worse than McClellan ever did -- that it would never have come to pass.

[DesertFox]

It's an obvious truism, and probably as old as Sun Tzu, but with the way that Rumsfeld got raked over the coals for stating the obvious, you'd think he had thought it up himself.

 

Well, that is politics. Not as if Lincoln was not attacked...called "Ape" or "Gorilla" by McClellan. Clinton played posturing games with Iraq but when Bush invaded, many swung against him when they saw the wind change.

Edited December 4, 2007 by DesertFox

[DesertFox]

The 1863 raid into the North left Richmond mostly uncovered. Lee had to maintain his line of communication west of South Mountain so that he could retreat to cover the Confederate capital should the Union have called his bluff. There was never a question of extending the raid very far into the North or for too long. Even the suggestion that Philadelphia might have been threatened or even sacked relies on such an unlikely turn of events -- essentially, the AoP commander dropping the ball worse than McClellan ever did -- that it would never have come to pass.

 

Which specific generals do you "Blame" on the Union side?

[Jim Martin]

Which specific generals do you "Blame" on the Union side?

 

With very few exceptions, early operations by the Union in both the West and the East were comedies of errors, in the west the incompetence was rife on both sides really. Halleck was atrociously dilatory, but Johnston was no rocket scientist when he attacked at Shiloh (column of corps in line???!!! Puh-leeze!!!!) None of the AOP commanders were really worth a damn until Meade took over, and while Meade was really only adequate...that's all that an army with the resources of the AOP required, when matched against the resource-poor ANV.

 

McClellan take a lot of crap for his operational idiocy, and rightly so, but he was a masterful organizer and trainer of men. The AOP which Grant used to beat Lee into submission, had been created by McClellan, and he'd done a pretty good job of it. He just was unable to use the army he created.

[KingSargent]

With very few exceptions, early operations by the Union in both the West and the East were comedies of errors, in the west the incompetence was rife on both sides really. Halleck was atrociously dilatory, but Johnston was no rocket scientist when he attacked at Shiloh (column of corps in line???!!! Puh-leeze!!!!)

I can't really fault old Albert Sidney for that. Consider the terrain, the green troops, and the timing. Either AS made his approach march with the corps intermixed - and it was bad enuff without that - or he spent all day thrashing around in thick woods trying to get organized while Grant got his act together. Attacking in column of corps in line was bad, anyhing else against Grant in a prepared formation and position would be worse. There simply wasn't time and space to screw around and also maintain surprise.

 

None of the AOP commanders were really worth a damn until Meade took over, and while Meade was really only adequate...that's all that an army with the resources of the AOP required, when matched against the resource-poor ANV.

The AoP's problem was abominable staff work and command dissension. Look at Burnside before Fredricksburg. He did a quick beautiful maneuver, caught Lee with his pants down, and somebodies lost the frigging bridging train. Getting anyone to obey orders in the AoP, especially if it involved getting up early and moving before the hangovers dissipated, was next to impossible. And the FUBARs and dilatoriness were allowed to continue until Sheridan canned Warren for his 'slows' jut before Appomatox. Had somebody gotten canned for being slow to obey orders in 1862, the AoP might have turned into a professional army instead of a political debating club.

Grant is blamed for Cold Harbor, the blame lies with the corps commanders who FUBARed by the numbers. They're lucky I wasn't Grant, I would have shot them all.

 

McClellan take a lot of crap for his operational idiocy, and rightly so, but he was a masterful organizer and trainer of men. The AOP which Grant used to beat Lee into submission, had been created by McClellan, and he'd done a pretty good job of it. He just was unable to use the army he created.

Another good organizer was, amazingly enough, Ben Butler. He did an outstanding job running departments, and he was tremendously handicapped by obstreperous corps commanders who couldn't or wouldn't obey orders. His Army of the James could have walked into Richmond practically unopposed but the lead corps CO stopped and sent messages back calling for more entrenching tools. Butler told him he was supposed to be advancing, not entrenching. Needless to say, the 'advance' was not resumed. Butler didn't feel he could do anything about his Corps COs because they were old Regulars assigned to him by Grant and he (Butler) was 'just a political general.'

When he went on the Fort Fisher expedition, the Navy CO Porter wouldn't even tell him where the Navy was.

Butler might not have achieved much in the field, but I don't think anyone could have given what he had to work with.

[Richard Lindquist]

I can't really fault old Albert Sidney for that. Consider the terrain, the green troops, and the timing. Either AS made his approach march with the corps intermixed - and it was bad enuff without that - or he spent all day thrashing around in thick woods trying to get organized while Grant got his act together. Attacking in column of corps in line was bad, anyhing else against Grant in a prepared formation and position would be worse. There simply wasn't time and space to screw around and also maintain surprise.[/b]

 

 

ASJ was greatly over-rated. His strategic planning (or lack thereof) initiated the entire string of Confederate disasters in the west. Although he wasn't at either place, he was directly responsible for the Island No 10, Fort Henry, and Fort Donelson debacles. I fail to see how it is more difficult to deploy from the march into an attack formation other than column of corps in line. Immediately upon contact, his entire command lost all command and control by the normal chain of command. ASJ himself was mortally wounded trying to coordinate the assualt of a few disorganized individual regiments instead of trying to fix his field army-level broken command system. This is why I alwauys laugh when some unreconstructed rebel bleats that "we ewould have won in the west is ASJ hadn't been killed at Shiloh".

[Richard Lindquist]

Another good organizer was, amazingly enough, Ben Butler. He did an outstanding job running departments, and he was tremendously handicapped by obstreperous corps commanders who couldn't or wouldn't obey orders. His Army of the James could have walked into Richmond practically unopposed but the lead corps CO stopped and sent messages back calling for more entrenching tools. Butler told him he was supposed to be advancing, not entrenching. Needless to say, the 'advance' was not resumed. Butler didn't feel he could do anything about his Corps COs because they were old Regulars assigned to him by Grant and he (Butler) was 'just a political general.'

When he went on the Fort Fisher expedition, the Navy CO Porter wouldn't even tell him where the Navy was.

Butler might not have achieved much in the field, but I don't think anyone could have given what he had to work with.[/b]

 

The best thing for the Union (and for New Orleans) would have been to have left Butler, a very capable administrator, in charge of New Orleans. That was a job he did extremely well and was on his way to giving the city a decent sewage and trash removal system as well as instituting some level of honesty into the city government. Lincoln bowed to political pressure in removing Butler there. New Orleans could have used someone like Butler in charge during Katrina.

 

While Butler's corps commanders did deserve some share of the blame, the failures of the Army of the James are due in large part to Butler himself. As soon as the Nov 1864 election was over, Grant moved quickly to get rid of Butler and replace him with Ord. This allowed Gibbon to be given a well-deserved corps command.

[Guest aevans]

I can't really fault old Albert Sidney for that. Consider the terrain, the green troops, and the timing. Either AS made his approach march with the corps intermixed - and it was bad enuff without that - or he spent all day thrashing around in thick woods trying to get organized while Grant got his act together. Attacking in column of corps in line was bad, anyhing else against Grant in a prepared formation and position would be worse. There simply wasn't time and space to screw around and also maintain surprise.

 

What are you talking about? He lost a whole day effecting that deployment.

 

And where do you get the idea that he would have had to march with corps intermixed to enable a line of corps, corps in column deployment? The first corps to arrive would have been sent to the right or left of the deployment line and the formation filled in by subsequent corps as they arrived, in much the same fashion as classical greek hoplites deployed from march column into a phalanx. He even had enough cavalry available to secure the entire deployment line.

[KingSargent]

The best thing for the Union (and for New Orleans) would have been to have left Butler, a very capable administrator, in charge of New Orleans. That was a job he did extremely well and was on his way to giving the city a decent sewage and trash removal system as well as instituting some level of honesty into the city government. Lincoln bowed to political pressure in removing Butler there. New Orleans could have used someone like Butler in charge during Katrina.

He also had the most sanitary and healthy camps in the Army, and arranged housing and rations for the Bacs that came to his area. He initiated housing and ration issues for the families of Blacks who enlisted in the Union Army (Ord in contrast was very anti-Black) and promoted Black units, who did well when given a chance.

It's interesting that with all the rumors and investigations of Butler's supposed "corruption," no one ever proved a single allegation against him. There was undoubtedy corruption in his operating area and Butler was no saint (he was a Democrat machine politician after all), but I don't think the shenanigans in his area ever went over the levels of "business as usual" in the 1860s US. At least he never abandoned a whole campaign to go steal cotton like Banks did.

 

While Butler's corps commanders did deserve some share of the blame, the failures of the Army of the James are due in large part to Butler himself. As soon as the Nov 1864 election was over, Grant moved quickly to get rid of Butler and replace him with Ord. This allowed Gibbon to be given a well-deserved corps command.

Butler was untrained in warfare and he knew it, so he had to rely on subordinates who were much less than cooperative. There were also apparently misunderstandings about what Grant actually wanted him to do when the capaign opened, leading to the Army of the James vacillating between Petersburg and Richmond and taking neither when they were both vulnerable. He probably could have taken both, except for Smith and Gillespie's (?) FUBARs and resistance.

The Union had a serious shortage of people who were both capable and cooperative. Probably the best thing that could have been done would have been to leave Butler in command of the Virginia- Carolina Department (or whatever it was actually called) and put someone like Sheridan or Schofield (not that he was perfect) in field command of the Army of the James.

[Richard Lindquist]

He probably could have taken both, except for Smith and Gillespie's (?) FUBARs and resistance.

 

 

Quincy Gilmore. He wasn't all that great as a corps commander, but was a pretty good engineer officer and did quite well from a technical standpoint in a number of post--war engineer assignments.

[Jim Martin]

What are you talking about? He lost a whole day effecting that deployment.

 

And where do you get the idea that he would have had to march with corps intermixed to enable a line of corps, corps in column deployment? The first corps to arrive would have been sent to the right or left of the deployment line and the formation filled in by subsequent corps as they arrived, in much the same fashion as classical greek hoplites deployed from march column into a phalanx. He even had enough cavalry available to secure the entire deployment line.

 

The cavalry organization was FUBAR as well. Rather than have a large cavalry reserve under a consolidated command, they were parcelled out as Corps and even Divisional assets.

[KingSargent]

What are you talking about? He lost a whole day effecting that deployment.

 

And where do you get the idea that he would have had to march with corps intermixed to enable a line of corps, corps in column deployment? The first corps to arrive would have been sent to the right or left of the deployment line and the formation filled in by subsequent corps as they arrived, in much the same fashion as classical greek hoplites deployed from march column into a phalanx. He even had enough cavalry available to secure the entire deployment line.

I have one question: have you been to Shiloh and seen the ground? I don't see how any formation-changing of corps-sized units would be possible in that mess. Greek hoplites fought in open terrain, usually flat, not dense forest.

 

The only way I can see to achieve corps columns would be to march in line 'A' of Corps 1-4, face left and advance, then move line 'B' of Corps 1-4, and repeat until you got the army deployed.

 

It's akin to Longstreet's "move around the right" so beloved of Gettysburg buffs. I gave up on that notion when I looked at the terrain. Unless the woods were a lot more clear in 1863 than they were in 2003, nobody is going to move through them in combat formation. Moving in column down the pike is all you could do, and that means marching under the guns of the AoP on Cemetary Ridge.

[DesertFox]

Still, 140 years is enough to completely change terrain at least as far as trees are concerned. I know where I used to live in upstate New Hampshire there were vast clearcut areas which now are basically jungles......

 

I call that because I found an old stone bridge (fairly wide) in the middle of the woods with no sign of an old road on either side.

Edited December 6, 2007 by DesertFox

[Jim Martin]

Still, 140 years is enough to completely change terrain at least as far as trees are concerned. I know where I used to live in upstate New Hampshire there were vast clearcut areas which now are basically jungles......

 

I call that because I found an old stone bridge (fairly wide) in the middle of the woods with no sign of an old road on either side.

 

 

Much of New England's farm economy died at the end of the 19th Century as the lands in the West opened up, and rails made transportation of food to the Eastern cities easier. The terrain around Little Round Top on the Union left was hilly and wholly unsuited to cultivation, and was heavily wooded even at the time of the battle, besides the contours of the terrain being unsuited for rapid movement of large bodies of troops in formation, even absent vegetation. Have you walked the ground at Gettysburg?

[DesertFox]

In honesty, I have not! One day, I would like to and I don't really disagree with you (or KS) but just stating that the amount of trees can change completely in over a hundred years.

[Guest aevans]

I have one question: have you been to Shiloh and seen the ground? I don't see how any formation-changing of corps-sized units would be possible in that mess. Greek hoplites fought in open terrain, usually flat, not dense forest.

 

The only way I can see to achieve corps columns would be to march in line 'A' of Corps 1-4, face left and advance, then move line 'B' of Corps 1-4, and repeat until you got the army deployed.

 

I spent two days at Shiloh in 2004. There's nothing there to prevent deployment of corps in column. If you don't like me Greek hoplite analogy, imagine guiding deployment on the Corinth Road:

 

The first division in column to reach the deployment line files off to the right or left until it's last regiment is just off the road,

The next division does likewise, but a few hundred yards to the rear,

Divisions fill in until the corps is deployed,

The next corps in column does likewise, except that it's divisions push the already deployed corp's corrsesponding divisions to the left or right until about half of the division line is deployed,

When the third corps comes along, it deploys in the opposite direction from the first corps, and

The reserve corps stays in march column on or near the raod.

 

A variation on this is to deploy the first corps in column astride the guide road and the following corps to the right or left as appropriate.

 

That's an almost bonehead simple deployment plan. Anybody could have followed it.

 

It's akin to Longstreet's "move around the right" so beloved of Gettysburg buffs. I gave up on that notion when I looked at the terrain. Unless the woods were a lot more clear in 1863 than they were in 2003, nobody is going to move through them in combat formation. Moving in column down the pike is all you could do, and that means marching under the guns of the AoP on Cemetary Ridge.

 

They maneuvered in combat formation through the woods in almost every battle in the West, including Shiloh, and many battles in the East. The constraint at Gettysburg wasn't capability, it was time.

[DesertFox]

I watched a show which stated that the Army of the Potomac had not been paid in sixth months in the start of 1863. Anybody know what the cause was?

[Sparviero]

How would the US army have taken to having Guiseppe Garibaldi commanding an army if he had dropped his demands?

[KingSargent]

How would the US army have taken to having Guiseppe Garibaldi commanding an army if he had dropped his demands?

There was a distinct prejudice against foreign officers in high tanks in the US Army. It would probably not have gone well.