McClellan Timidry

[DesertFox]

When would people here saw was the first sign of McClellan showing his timid streak when it comes to battle?

Could it have been predicted before he was made commander of the Army of the Potomac?

[Richard Lindquist]

When would people here saw was the first sign of McClellan showing his timid streak when it comes to battle?

Could it have been predicted before he was made commander of the Army of the Potomac?

 

It depends on what you mean by "timid". McClellan was a physically brave man and would gladly have given his life for his country. McClellan was a military thinker and was an extremely competent organizer.

 

The strikes against McClellan were:

 

1. He was against total war and hoped to bring the southerners back to the union with a modicum of fighting.

 

2. He felt that the Radical Republicans were the cause of the war and did not want them to become politically victorious.

 

3. He "took counsel of his fears" and believed the Pinkerton reports that said he was badly outnumbered (not the only general in the ACW to have that problem).

 

4. he was afraid of losing "his army" and did not "put all his men in".

 

Probably the proof that mcClellan was the man he was became evident in his lackadasical folowup of Joe Jophnston on his retreat from Manassas and his insistence on a Peninsular Campaign over an Overland Campaign. Lincoln's problem was that if he canned mcClellan, who would he put in charge?? His experiments with McDowell, Pope, Burnsdide, and Hooker were just as bad as lettng mcClellan run things.

 

Guys like Grant, Sherman, and Meade took a while to bubble up through the layers of incompetence.

[DesertFox]

I was not talking about physical bravery but his willingness to risk his men.

 

How about Hancock and Reynolds? How were they seen around the time that McClellan was in charge of AoP?

 

I was not aware he was so political so early on, when was he first considering running for President?

 

While he overcounted his enemies and others did it, wasn't he one of the worst?

[BP]

I was not talking about physical bravery but his willingness to risk his men.

 

How about Hancock and Reynolds? How were they seen around the time that McClellan was in charge of AoP?

 

I was not aware he was so political so early on, when was he first considering running for President?

 

While he overcounted his enemies and others did it, wasn't he one of the worst?

 

Either general could have been solid, except for timimng and wounds.

 

Reynolds was viewed as one of the top officers by his peers on both sides. He probably could have taken the top spot, but was killed at Gettysburg. His chances prior to his death were hurt due to some of the assignments he had, including military governor of Fredericksburg (VA), getting captured after the battle of Gaines Mills and then being withdrawn to command the Pennsylvania Militia when Lee moved into Maryland during the Antietam Campaign. He was often out of the thick of things IOW, but when in battle he was very solid.

 

Hancock was extremely competent (one of my favorite generals on either side), but was only a division commander at Antietam and not senior enough for the post. He was also wounded twice as a division commander in battles prior to Gettysburg. He was probably the Union's consumate corps commander of the Wwar.

[Rich]

How about Hancock and Reynolds? How were they seen around the time that McClellan was in charge of AoP?

 

Er, they were brigade commanders to start, with about three-dozen generals senior to them just in the eastern theater? And then division commanders about the time McClellan was relieved, with at least a dozen or so equivalent in rank to them. That problem was that any choice was essentially a crap shoot.

[DesertFox]

I know Lee was offered command over the Northern forces. Is there anything in the beginning which set him as a theoretical superior choice to McClellan.....

[Guest aevans]

I know Lee was offered command over the Northern forces. Is there anything in the beginning which set him as a theoretical superior choice to McClellan.....

 

People forget that Lee was a Winfield Scott crony from the Mexican war. There was nothing to suggest him except for Winfield Scott himself. He may have been offered a command on the strength of his record as an engineer and Scott's say so, but there's no evidence that he would have been given the key command in the East.

[DesertFox]

People forget that Lee was a Winfield Scott crony from the Mexican war. There was nothing to suggest him except for Winfield Scott himself. He may have been offered a command on the strength of his record as an engineer and Scott's say so, but there's no evidence that he would have been given the key command in the East.

 

If he had been young enough to take command, would Winfield Scott have been able to make a Union victory likely at an earlier time?

[Guest aevans]

If he had been young enough to take command, would Winfield Scott have been able to make a Union victory likely at an earlier time?

 

He had the strategic vision that was eventually followed. But young or old, nobody, not even Lee, was good enough to get a decisive victory by way of battlefield success alone. Also it was going to take some time for the North to get hip to the right approach, and nothing was going to be decided until the right approach was applied.

Edited November 27, 2007 by aevans

[Richard Lindquist]

Hancock was relatively junior and didn't get a corps until Darius Couch left the AoP due to disgust with Joe Hooker after the battle of Chancellorsville. Meade didn't get a corps till after Fredericksburg. Slocum was the senior corps commander at Gettysburg.

[DesertFox]

He had the strategic vision that was eventually followed. But young or old, nobody, not even Lee, was good enough to get a decisive victory by way of battlefield success alone. Also it was going to take some time for the North to get hip to the right approach, and nothing was going to be decided until the right approach was applied.

 

A lot is in the simple areas, a less "timid" commander might have been able to Push the Army of the Potomac to Richmond in the Peninsula campaign. Could it have been done and what would have happened is Richmond had been taken in May 1862?

Edited December 1, 2007 by DesertFox

[BP]

Could it have been done and what would have happened is Richmond had been taken in May 1942?

 

I'd imagine FDR might have been compelled to sue for peace, or at least move the capital west of the Rockies.

[DesertFox]

I'd imagine FDR might have been compelled to sue for peace, or at least move the capital west of the Rockies.

 

Alright, you got me.......

[Guest JamesG123]

A lot is in the simple areas, a less "timid" commander might have been able to Push the Army of the Potomac to Richmond in the Peninsula campaign. Could it have been done and what would have happened is Richmond had been taken in May 1862?

 

Davis would have just moved the capitol to Montgomery, or where ever and continued the fight, same as he eventually did. It was proven that the fight had to be bled out of the South before it would surrender.

[DesertFox]

Wouldn't it have at least been a body blow which would have severely hurt the South?

[Richard Lindquist]

Read Stephen R. Taafe, "Commanding the Army of the Potomac", 2006, University Press of Kansas.

 

 

The four corps commanders selected for McClellan by the administration in 1862 were:

 

I Corps--Irwin McDowell, politically connected, a good administrator, a lusy leader of men

 

II Corps-Charles Sumner, very senior officer, too old and unable to adapt to new realities of warfare

 

III Corps-Samuel Heintzelman, senior officer, like Sumner but not as good a person

 

IV Corps-Erasmus Keyes, darling of the Radical Republicans, irresolute and unaggressive

 

McClellan disliked all of them.

[DesertFox]

Did he like any officers under him at the corp commander level?

[Richard Lindquist]

Did he like any officers under him at the corp commander level?

 

Yes, he reorganized (and cut the size of the corps) to create V Corps (Fitz John Porter) and VI Corps (William Franklin) who were buddies of his.

 

The large number and small size of the Union corps plagued the AoP until 1864.

[DesertFox]

If you were a soldier or officer under McClellan, how would you have been treated by him?

 

I know the soldiers were suppose to have loved him but how about officers of various levels? Would, for examples, colonels, feel the same way?

[KingSargent]

Wouldn't it have at least been a body blow which would have severely hurt the South?

It would have taken out one of the South's few industrial centers. Losing both Richmond and New Orleans in 1862 would have really crippled the South for anything except agriculture, and cannon don't grow on trees.

 

Richmond hadn't been the Capitol long enough to have become the main administrative hub of the South. Losing Washington OTOH would have really messed up the Federal governmental machinery; whether this would have been a good thing or a bad thing is moot.

 

Actually taking Richmond, if it did not cause the CSA to sue for peace, would have allowed the Federal resources to be deployed in a more rational fashion. Perhaps Halleck and Rosecrans could actually have been kicked off their dead butts if all the equipment they were crying for hadn't gone to McClellan.

 

Grant was the only high Union general who said, "Okay, this is what we've got, what's the best use we can make of it?" instead of snivelling about what he could do if he was only properly equipped and up to strength.

[Richard Lindquist]

Order of Battle intelligence (in terems of strength) was the Achilles Heel for both sides. If you read the correspondence of the various department commanders on bioth sides, they always overestimated the enemy strengths and undersestimated their own. The only times that the commanders got the OB intell wrong in the opposite direction were John Pope during the 2nd Bull Run/2nd Manassas Campaign and John B. Hood in the Nashville Campaign (both of which led to disaster). Except for Grant and Lee, most commanders just sat there and demanded more and more reinforcements before they would make a move (and Grant and Lee did keep demanding more and more resources though they would move without them).

[DesertFox]

At Gettysburg, what did Lee think he faced?

[DesertFox]

Grant was the only high Union general who said, "Okay, this is what we've got, what's the best use we can make of it?" instead of snivelling about what he could do if he was only properly equipped and up to strength.

 

I thought it was an ancient Maxim that an army fought with what it had not what they wished to have?

[Old Tanker]

At Gettysburg, what did Lee think he faced?

 

He had just won a significant victory 8 weeks before Gettysburg with 60,000 vs. 130,000 .

 

He now had about 71,000 to invade Pennsylvana vs. the AoP with about 90,000 . So he was basically aware he would be fighting the same army again and he was stronger than 8 weks before.

[DesertFox]

He had just won a significant victory 8 weeks before Gettysburg with 60,000 vs. 130,000 .

 

He now had about 71,000 to invade Pennsylvana vs. the AoP with about 90,000 . So he was basically aware he would be fighting the same army again and he was stronger than 8 weks before.

 

The conditions at Chancellorsville seem quite a bit different than at Gettysburg

 

If nothing else, Lee was on Union soil, did not know the battle field, and the Union force was concentrated.

Edited December 4, 2007 by DesertFox