Excuse making over Messina escape?

[KingSargent]

Sorry to be so long getting back, it's been a busy Armistace Day weekend. Haven't had much time to enjoy myself.

Agreed....in part. The problems though were manifold. The Allied air forces were operating at the limits of their range, Malta was 275 kilometers and Pantelleria 350 kilometers from the target; easy for the light, medium, and heavy bombers, problematic for anything else. And the bombers simply weren't accurate enough to have an effect on shipping....they were all level bombers. Then, to boot, even if they could have attacked from lower levels the results may have been nearly suicidal, every time I look at it I'm amazed at the numbers of antiaircraft weapons concentrated around the straits, Basically, in a box roughly 10 by 20 kilometers (200 sq, km.) there were:

 

Italian antiaircraft defenses consisted of:

13 102mm batteries

56 90mm batteries

73 76mm batteries

13 75mm batteries

18 37mm batteries (German equipment)

47 20mm batteries (German and Italian equipment)

With 664 heavy guns and 292 light and medium guns. Reportedly about half the 102mm batteries were in fixed defenses along the coast and were lost, as were many of the 76mm and 75mm batteries, but supposedly most of the 90mm batteries were mobile. Lets be conservative and assume half the heavy guns and one-third the light guns were lost in the retreat to Messina. So 146 heavy and 193 light and medium guns.

 

The Germans had another 333 88mm guns and 140 20mm and 37mm guns. So at least 479 heavy guns and 333 light and medium guns....not including the guns on the MFP and Siebels and those brought in from northern and central Italy to cover the withdrawal. It may be the highest concentration of the war?

 

And then of course the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica were a lot closer to their bases too.

Thanks for another dose of good data. I sure wish I had access to your sources.

 

Not entirely germane, but AFAIK Naples traffic went to Palermo until Patton took it (not that there was much since the landings).

 

Any idea how accurate those claims are? Are they from what pilots said at the time or from Axis records of losses available post-war? Finally, do you have any data on how many got through - IOW, what was the percentage of loss?

 

I didn't look closely either, the evacuation routes were pretty well dispersed, they were actually (from south to north):

 

Taormina-Occhio

Ali-Occhio

Pte Schiava-Occhio

Galati-Occhio

Pistrina-Gallica

Messina-Villa san Giovanni

Beaches north of Messina (two major embarkation points)-Gallico and Carone

Ganziri-Villa san Giovanni

Torre Faro - Villa san Giovanni

 

So the targets were dispersed, but of course the guns could be pre-sited to cover them.

 

I'm still trying to figure out how close that is to the number of vessels lost. Of the sunk 35 were dumb barges, 10 were MFP, and 1 was a Siebel, all of those are hard to confirm. But I've run into at least 6 "large" freighters reported sunk by the Axis, versus the 9 in the total I gave. I'll try to dig into it a bit more.

 

Erm, when were they planning this? I was under the impression that Sicily got sold as a stand-alone op that did NOT commit to further advance into Italy.

Granted it was pretty easy to cross at Messina, that's why Monty got that job and the Yanks (with ca.50% British troops) got Salerno.

 

I'll agree, provided the "circumstances" include less than 100% effort by MAAF. Expanding the thread a bit, that brings us to the question of the overall planning. IMHO the original plan that had Patton landing on the NW corner and Monty landing on the S and SW coast was a better one than what it turned into. The "all in one area Monty Plan" guaranteed a slow frontal assault. Taking Palermo and Syracuse both early and advancing along both coasts would seem preferable to going up the middle.

 

It was pretty much a given IIRC by the end of July, midway through the campaign, that the Allies would at least seize the Foggia airfield complexes. It's interesting how much Allied strategy was actually governed by at need to aquire airbases. I don't think anyone was fooling themselves that they were going to stand pat in Sicily....momentum, maintain the initiative and all that.

Which is why I said it was strategically imperative, for political reasns if nothing else. Imagine how thrilled Stalin would have been if the Allies had cleared Africa and then rotated on the thumbs.

 

BTW, the Messina crossing may have been easy, but they also did BAYTOWN as well, and Salerno would have been effective if it hadn't been so obvious and 29. Pz.-Gren. and 1. Fs.J.D. hadn't been so good at delaying actions.

 

But given the distance for land-based air and the lack of carrier air, there was no way that Patton's plan was going to be accepted, and it was quickly shelved. And who says that MAAF did not give 100 percent? It's pretty evident they didn't maintain a very high sortie rate during July and August, but it was little different han the months before or after...so?

Which indicates to me that there wasn't a real serious effort by the air people to do anything but to do their Douhetian thing with no competition. Patton asked for US naval air support, but someone decided the land-based air could provide all that was needed, which they patently could not. If CCS had pushed it they MIGHT have pried a couple of CVs from the USN, as was done several times when new ships 'detoured' to shoot up Germans to support a specific operation before heading to the PTO. There wasn't a whole lot going on in the PTO in Summer 1943 that the Essexes HAD to do their work-ups there.

 

1. USAAF wasn't the only AF involved. (Or if they were what was the RAF doing and why was the RAF in high command slots?)

 

What does "flown in support of HUSKY" mean? Does this include raids up the Italian boot which "supported HUSKY" in the same way that 8thAAF raids on Germany supported HUSKY?

 

Er, yeah, but it's the one I have the more complete data on and they comprised about half the strength....so?

 

USSAF Interdiction Missions:

 

2-8 July - 378 - all flown to Sicily

9-15 July - 2,491 - all except 204 (flown to Italy, mostly Naples port facilities) to Sicily

16-22 July - 1,170, all except 321 flown to Italy (railyards and Naples port again), the 321 went to Sicily

23-29 July - 473, 316 to Sicily, 157 to Italy

Total 4,512, so 66.5 percent to Sicily.

 

During the same period strikes against airfields included 2,028 against Sicily, 1,032 against Italy, 238 against Sardinia, so 3,298, so Sicily was 61.5 percent of the total.

 

Which does not negate the AF's stated plans NOT to cooperate but to "do there own thang." Even if the AFs had managed 100% operational capability it would mean nothing if their HQ wouldn't send them where they were needed.

 

Not quite what was said, but it's the way the Army and Navy heard it. The Air Forces (RAF) tried to 'splain they wuze at the end of their endurance and the navies had committed all escort carrier resources to the Atlantic temporarily, to paraphrase you, the Army and Navy were given a tough task and should have gotten on with it, understanding the limits of the support they could expect. And if they didn't like it, they needed to come up with a plan to account for it. Sometimes I think they all enjoyed the qvetching, it gave everyone fuel for stoking the fire of the budgetary fights.

 

Might they have done better if MAAF had had the slightest interest in "Support?" ISTR that the TAFs originated to get "Support" away from AF HQs that wanted nothing to do with the concept. From the timing, I suspect dissatisfaction with MAAF's attitude and operations in HUSKY was a motivator for the change.

 

"Interest" doesn't increase endurance, doesn't increase turnaround times, doesn't reduce pilot fatigue from flying repeated, long over water flights.

Given what the Air Forces could do when motivated (keeping planes operational in the Pacific in 1942 springs to mind), my AF Paranoia suspects that had higher MAAF HQ had any interest in doing 'non-Douhetian' support missions that sufficient materials and motivation would have been supplied to do better than they did.

 

But the support commands went away because they didn't work too well, the headquarters and ground echelon ISTR was too big and unresponsive, that was one of the lessons of the campaign? And it was awkward too, since it had a medium and/or light bomber component stuck into it, which was good for interdiction but poor for close support. The response was the TAC, which was heavier on flying assets, while a lot of the ground staff and admin was pushed up or laterally, to allow the TAC HQ to concentrate on flying missions. So Ninth Air Force had a large HQ, maintenance, support, air defense, and engineer components, and a separate medium and light bomber component as a separate air command, but its TACs essentially comprised a wing HQ and fighter bombers as flying units.

 

I was sounding like a little kid in sarcastic response to being called a whinger (not by you!) earlier in the thread.

 

S'okay, guess I've been reading too much whining of late? Sorry.

 

And were there any AF planes over the fleet or beaches during these attacks?

 

Nope, or at best not much, since most were executed at night or twilight, and the MAAF nightfighter assets sucked, al of 48 aircraft on hand, and IIRC a poor serviceability, the early airborne radars were finicky. And the fighters - except the few P-38, all had short legs.

 

Let's see... in operations in other areas, enemy fighters were kept away from the spotters by Allied fighters operating in the area (or completely isolating it as at NEPTUNE).

 

But were there any patrols planned? You can't blame weather for canceling ops if no one (read MAAF) planned to do those ops anyway.

 

In other operations the AO was closer to the base area, the aircraft had longer legs, the base area was better developed, or there were carriers available....or all of the above. That wasn't the case with HUSKY.

 

Few to no standing patrols were attempted, it would have been a good way to burn up gas for little purpose. There were large scale strikes planned, including ones to suppress the German airfields, which would have included fighter cover, but the weather delays pretty much screwed that.

All of the above come under the heading of 'Things could have been done better if the AFs had wanted to support the other services. IMHO paranoid opinion.

 

It wasn't. Given the strategic imperative at the time it was essential. This is hardly in the same category as frontal assaults on Pacific beaches that could be easily by-passed.

 

The Marianas weren't easy, but they had to be done since the whole Pacific strategy hinged on getting B-29 bases. But the Marianas would have been a lot easier if they were done in 1943 instead of operations in the Gilberts and Marshalls that netted nothing that occupying undefended islands would have done. The Japanese were falling back from defense line to defense line and building the next while we obligingly banged our noses on the line in the way. Simply bypassing the defense lines and going for the gusto (before those islands were fortified) would have prevented hard targets from becoming hard targets.

So what I bitch about is hard jobs that didn't have to be hard jobs - or jobs at all. Hard jobs with a good reason are what I have always been there for.

 

Why was it any more "strategically imperative" than any Pacific island? You've argued the "opening shipping lanes" deal was a scam?

And I think it was and the diversion of effort to the 'soft underbelly' should not have happened. But by the time we got Tunisia cleared going to NWE was not a viable option.

 

Was there a critical ned for Sicilian airfields? They were pretty crappy. Foggia? Means you got to get involved on the mainland of Europe before you're really ready. Why not Sardinia? They got it for a song and could base oodles of aircraft on it to hit northern Italy (where the only industry was), southern France and Germany....and could then threaten (dare I say it? ) a major invasion at La Spezia-Genoa. Why is it worth GIs or Tommies to seize a marginally useful island in the Med, but not worth it expending Marines for the same purpose in the Pacific?

Like I said above, political considerations (not just Stalin, the Home Fronts would have screamed as well if we had 'sat it out' for a year) made it necessary to "Do SOMETHING, ferChrissakes!!". They way we were positioned meant that whatever we could do would have to happen in the Med, and don't think Churchill didn't know that.

As for Sardinia, we did get it cheap, but I wonder how cheap it would have been if the Axis troops hadn't been pulled out to protect Sicily and Italy.

I was acknowledging that the NO TRAFFIC goal would have been impossible to completely meet, but it was the goal that should have been set and that more effort should have been expended trying to meet it.

For one thing, if blocking the Strait of Messina had been an ongoing task, possibly someone might have noticed the withdrawal going on? Assuming the Axis went ahead with withdrawal plans with an in-place gauntlet to run.

 

I guess I've given you enough of a hard time about that contradiction, I'll let it go.

 

But blocking the "straits" - which really means the sealanes from the mainland to Sicily - was ongoing. By hitting what could be seen, which usually meant shore facilities and ships in port, since there simply wasn't the strength to put standing patrols up 24-7 looking for coasters. And given the lack of night and all weather aircraft (what there was was committed to the Bay of Biscay, frying what was considered to be bigger fish at the time) I don't think they would have had a very easy time "noticing"?

If the CCS couldn't do it right, they shouldn't have done it. Going with Monty's plan (and without Patton's requested Naval Air) condemned the ground troops to frontal assaults against prepared positions in crappy terrain with poor (or no) air support. If the poor planes had too far to fly, clear the Western Sicilian Plain and move the bases forward. Of course that would have meant moving AF personnel out of cozy billets....

At least they shouldn't have been pushing the ground offensive with no support. What was the hurry? The Axis certainly wasn't going to counter-attack (what fun if they did...). If we couldn't prevent the Axis from pulling out, why kill our people to pretend we're trying to stop it?

[Rich]

Thanks for another dose of good data. I sure wish I had access to your sources.

 

PURPLE! Someone's gotta get the quotes function fixed, pronto!

 

BTW, you can get just about any HERO/DMSi/TNDA/TDI report you want - except classified, unreleased, and company-sensitive reports - they are all available as PDF files. The reports are $12 each, plus $5 S&H (plus an additional fee for overseas or express delivery). So 10 reports for $125. You could get the entire library for about $1,400. Just contact SRichTDI@aol.com to let her know which one's you want and she will set up the CD, dump the money into our PayPal account, and voila!

 

BTW, I've been referring to report 033B. Interdection in Operation HUSKY.

 

Which is why I said it was strategically imperative, for political reasns if nothing else. Imagine how thrilled Stalin would have been if the Allies had cleared Africa and then rotated on the thumbs.

 

Sardinia would have been a heck of a lot easier - there was virtually nothing there - and would have had about the same strategic effect or more, forcing the Germans and Italians to spread their coastal defenses out instead of allowing them to concentrate in Sicily.

 

Which indicates to me that there wasn't a real serious effort by the air people to do anything but to do their Douhetian thing with no competition. Patton asked for US naval air support, but someone decided the land-based air could provide all that was needed, which they patently could not. If CCS had pushed it they MIGHT have pried a couple of CVs from the USN, as was done several times when new ships 'detoured' to shoot up Germans to support a specific operation before heading to the PTO. There wasn't a whole lot going on in the PTO in Summer 1943 that the Essexes HAD to do their work-ups there.

 

Planning began in late February, early March, that's why Patton was pulled out of II Corps before Tunisia was finished. That is, at the height of the Atlantic "crisis" that was perceived by the Allies. But the perception that the battle had been won wasn't until midsummer, too late to redeploy for HUSKY, but soon enough that they were available for AVALANCHE and BAYTOWN.

 

And I'm not sure what Essexes were available by July? That could then have redeployed for the Central Pacific ops by October? Or that the Navy would have been willing to risk in the "confined waters" of the Med (yeah, they let Ranger do it, but then they thought Ranger was little better than a aircraft ferry).

 

Given what the Air Forces could do when motivated (keeping planes operational in the Pacific in 1942 springs to mind), my AF Paranoia suspects that had higher MAAF HQ had any interest in doing 'non-Douhetian' support missions that sufficient materials and motivation would have been supplied to do better than they did.

 

By the end of June 1943 there were only 790 P-38s operational in all overseas theaters, 187 were in the Pacific, 2 were in England, and 514 were in the Med. Given that those are the aircraft that have the endurance, which was rather a greater requirement than "motivation", to accomplish the effort you think was required, it looks like the "materials" were allocated pretty reasonably (England was stripped earlier in the year of nearly all their P-38 to be sent to the Med).

 

All of the above come under the heading of 'Things could have been done better if the AFs had wanted to support the other services. IMHO paranoid opinion.

 

Yep, paranoia. And it doesn't explain the low sortie rates that were typical in the Med, before, during, and after, which are the heart of the matter. And, yet again, "doing things better" has little effect on endurance of aircraft and pilots.

 

And I think it was and the diversion of effort to the 'soft underbelly' should not have happened. But by the time we got Tunisia cleared going to NWE was not a viable option.

 

I tend to agree....but why wasn't Sardinia an even better option?

 

Like I said above, political considerations (not just Stalin, the Home Fronts would have screamed as well if we had 'sat it out' for a year) made it necessary to "Do SOMETHING, ferChrissakes!!". They way we were positioned meant that whatever we could do would have to happen in the Med, and don't think Churchill didn't know that.

As for Sardinia, we did get it cheap, but I wonder how cheap it would have been if the Axis troops hadn't been pulled out to protect Sicily and Italy.

 

Nobody was "pulled out" of Sardinia that I am aware of? About the only thing there was Division Sardinian, which was the ash and trash of rear echelon remnants of 90. leichte, Afrika Korps convalescents and similar, exactly what was used to organize Division Sizilian. Now Sardinian became 90. Panzergrenadier and Sizilian became 15. Panzergrnadier in August, but 90. wasn't really operational until about October. THere was also Luftwaffe ground crews and some Flak units, but nothing like what was on Sicily, I would be surprised if there was more than about 15,000 Wehrmacht personnel there and total armored strength was something like a dozen assault guns.

 

If the CCS couldn't do it right, they shouldn't have done it. Going with Monty's plan (and without Patton's requested Naval Air) condemned the ground troops to frontal assaults against prepared positions in crappy terrain with poor (or no) air support. If the poor planes had too far to fly, clear the Western Sicilian Plain and move the bases forward. Of course that would have meant moving AF personnel out of cozy billets....

At least they shouldn't have been pushing the ground offensive with no support. What was the hurry? The Axis certainly wasn't going to counter-attack (what fun if they did...). If we couldn't prevent the Axis from pulling out, why kill our people to pretend we're trying to stop it?

 

So by "doing it right" that means doing it so that it wasn't a "tough nut"? But you also argue that it was necessary to do the "tough nut" jobs when it was a strategic imperative? So which is it? They couldn't allocate carriers given the other "tough nut" they felt they had to conquer in the Atlantic, but they still needed to do it, to satisfy Uncle Joe? Guess I'm confused now?

 

And I think you forget how short the campaign was? It would have been late July before there could have been any clearing of the Western Sicilian Plain for airbases, the plain had to be captured first. Once that was done the engineers could go in to do the construction, then the ordnance, fuel, and maintenance echelons had to be landed, then the air units could be staged in....and by the time all that was accomplished they might have been just in time to wave as the Germans left Calabria? Seriously, the timing would have been tight, but it might have been possible. OTOH it may have further disrupted air operations reducing the sortie rate even further? I'll see what I can dig up on Sicilian airbase construction and what aviation engineer assets were available at the time (they were pretty scarce in Tunisia earlier in the year, which contributed to the Air Forces poor showing there).

Edited November 14, 2007 by Rich

[Old Tanker]

I just read R. Atkinson's take on the AXIS evacuation of Sicily , from book The Day of Battle.

 

His take includes no one up the chain of command had a plan to deal with the caper at anytime during the campaign. They became to busy planning the next invasion.

The AF was more interested in destroying cities than it was docks and boats. The Ger. didn't have any 88s at Messina.No AXIS AA was capable of reaching 25,000 ft.

Brit intel was aware of arrangements but not dates as of Aug.1. The navy also wasn't interested in intervening with big ships.

The Allied command realized after the fact that they had screwed up big time.

[KingSargent]

Thanks again for the info. Maybe I can get the PDFs for Christmas...

SNIP all the stuff I'm not going to argue about, I've condensed an overall reply below.

 

So by "doing it right" that means doing it so that it wasn't a "tough nut"? But you also argue that it was necessary to do the "tough nut" jobs when it was a strategic imperative? So which is it?

A "tough nut" that is necessary means you think about it more, devote more resources. As you say the P-38s were combed out for the MTO. A great part of the problem was of course the British assumption that the Yanks would fukkup anything they tried and so they had to go in next to Monty so he could hold their hand.

 

They couldn't allocate carriers given the other "tough nut" they felt they had to conquer in the Atlantic, but they still needed to do it, to satisfy Uncle Joe? Guess I'm confused now?

Fleet CVs were not necessary for the ASW war. There was a pretty constant movement of Essexes and CVLs to the Pacific. It could be possible to trace exactly when they sortied, but I don't have that info. But sending new units to the ETO was not unheard-of, Essex's own fighter squadron got its combat cherry popped flying from Ranger during TORCH.

Most of what the CVs in the PTO were doing in 1943 was figuring out how to operate in groups and practicing and they could have done that in the MTO. Maybe if AB&Co hadn't thoroughly PO'd Marshall and King at Casablanca (see below) the CVs could have been made available.

 

And I think you forget how short the campaign was? It would have been late July before there could have been any clearing of the Western Sicilian Plain for airbases, the plain had to be captured first. Once that was done the engineers could go in to do the construction, then the ordnance, fuel, and maintenance echelons had to be landed, then the air units could be staged in....and by the time all that was accomplished they might have been just in time to wave as the Germans left Calabria? Seriously, the timing would have been tight, but it might have been possible. OTOH it may have further disrupted air operations reducing the sortie rate even further? I'll see what I can dig up on Sicilian airbase construction and what aviation engineer assets were available at the time (they were pretty scarce in Tunisia earlier in the year, which contributed to the Air Forces poor showing there).

For one thing there were lots of airfields in Western Sicily. Where do you think all the Axis planes over Malta and Tunisia came from? The Allies wouldn't have to start from scratch, at least the best places to put an airfield were already known, even if they were full of holes.

From what I have read on the Tunisian campaign the airfield construction problem got solved. Starting from one captured airfield five satellite fields were built from scratch and operational in 24 hours in one instance (this was after Kasserine). I don't think those engineers had gone anyplace else, and I don't think they would have a problem turning Sicily into a giant airfield complex PDQ.

Sardinia is another matter. From what maps I have (an atlas) it does not look like Sardinia has ROOM (that is not mountainous) to put in a lot of airfields. At least not enough airfields to support the SBC that people talk about.

If we HAD to dominate the Med (and going somewhere else was not on the cards in May 1943), IMHO we should have done a little better job in Sicily and then taken the Foggia airfields in Souther Italy and forget about going farther up the boot. That would have effectively "cleared the Med" for AB's two million tons of shipping :rolleyes: .

Between Foggia and Cyprus the Allied AFs should have been able to keep Axis AFs in Greece and the Balkans from interfering too much with traffic hugging the N coast of Africa. Of course that would require a bit more than the ops AB pushed at Casablanca.

 

Casablanca was a mistake IMHO. The US came ready to figure out how to implement the France in '43 ops. The British walked all over them, pulled figures out of the air, told them they were stupid, and got their 'soft underbelly' strategy - very poor debate tactics. When confronted with some plan I thought would not work, I would let the other party show his, work with him, and let HIM figure out that it was not workable. Of course this wasn't at the Grand Strategy level, and occasionally I ended up tweaking the other guy's plan until it worked . IMHO the Brits should have tried to figure out how to implement the NWE In '43 Plan with the US info and let EVERYBODY figure out that it was unworkable rather than just Pronouncing Unworkability From On High. Convinced (they were not stupid, AB&Co opinions notwithstanding) rather than bullied, the US CoS would then have been more cooperative in the Med strategy and things MIGHT have gone better.

[Rich]

Thanks again for the info. Maybe I can get the PDFs for Christmas...

 

I hope so, if you do I'm angling for a commission out of Chris for the deal.

 

SNIP all the stuff I'm not going to argue about, I've condensed an overall reply below.

Awwwwww! You're no fun!

 

A "tough nut" that is necessary means you think about it more, devote more resources. As you say the P-38s were combed out for the MTO. A great part of the problem was of course the British assumption that the Yanks would fukkup anything they tried and so they had to go in next to Monty so he could hold their hand.

 

I agree, but I'm just not sure what other resources there were? The ETO got stripped of troops and equipment to support the MTO, there just wasn't much else in the kitty. And it wasn't just perfidious Albion, again, no carriers meant no north coast landing, it was considered too dangerous by everyone....except maybe Georgie.

 

Fleet CVs were not necessary for the ASW war. There was a pretty constant movement of Essexes and CVLs to the Pacific. It could be possible to trace exactly when they sortied, but I don't have that info. But sending new units to the ETO was not unheard-of, Essex's own fighter squadron got its combat cherry popped flying from Ranger during TORCH.

Most of what the CVs in the PTO were doing in 1943 was figuring out how to operate in groups and practicing and they could have done that in the MTO. Maybe if AB&Co hadn't thoroughly PO'd Marshall and King at Casablanca (see below) the CVs could have been made available.

 

Sorry, two different answers in there. The CVL were all committed to winning the battle of the Atlantic (or being tied dockside by the RN while they whinged about them not being proper carriers and dangerous. And air groups are not very good with carriers and Ranger wasn't enough alone, I was wondering what might be available, but didn't have Morison. Of the Essex-class it looks like Essex (31 Dec 42), Bunker Hill (24 May 43), Lexington (17 Feb 43), and Yorktown (15 Apr 43) may habe been available, except those are commissioning dates and say nothing about when they were worked up and had air groups ready to operate off them. I bet just Essex and Lexington may have been. Of the CVLs it looks like the possibles are Belleau Wood (31 Mar 43), Cowpens (28 May 43), Independence (14 Jan 43), and Princeton (25 Feb 43), but for the same reasons i suspect it was only three? And I have a feeling that may have been putting too many eggs in one basket as far as the Navy staff was concerned? Carrier strength in the Pacific was pretty thin at this time, that's why USS Robin was around?

 

For one thing there were lots of airfields in Western Sicily. Where do you think all the Axis planes over Malta and Tunisia came from? The Allies wouldn't have to start from scratch, at least the best places to put an airfield were already known, even if they were full of holes.

From what I have read on the Tunisian campaign the airfield construction problem got solved. Starting from one captured airfield five satellite fields were built from scratch and operational in 24 hours in one instance (this was after Kasserine). I don't think those engineers had gone anyplace else, and I don't think they would have a problem turning Sicily into a giant airfield complex PDQ.

Sardinia is another matter. From what maps I have (an atlas) it does not look like Sardinia hasROOM (that is not mountainous) to put in a lot of airfields. At least not enough airfields to support the SBC that people talk about.

If we HAD to dominate the Med (and going somewhere else was not on the cards in May 1943), IMHO we should have done a little better job in Sicily and then taken the Foggia airfields in Souther Italy and forget about going farther up the boot. That would have effectively "cleared the Med" for AB's two million tons of shipping :rolleyes: .

Between Foggia and Cyprus the Allied AFs should have been able to keep Axis AFs in Greece and the Balkans from interfering too much with traffic hugging the N coast of Africa. Of course that would require a bit more than the ops AB pushed at Casablanca.

 

I think I said I had to look at it a bit more, so hold your horses. I've just always had an affection for the Sardinia, which should have led to a thinning of the German defenses, including on Sicily, especially if it was followed by Corsica? Played right it could lead to September assault on Sicily from both north and south, doing the annihilation thing of the Axis forces there and allow Anvil in August 44 to come in at Genoa-La Spezia. It pretty much comes down to how important the Foggia bases were?

 

BTW, I'm snipping what I have little to argue with as well.

Edited November 15, 2007 by Rich

[KingSargent]

 

I agree, but I'm just not sure what other resources there were? The ETO got stripped of troops and equipment to support the MTO, there just wasn't much else in the kitty. And it wasn't just perfidious Albion, again, no carriers meant no north coast landing, it was considered too dangerous by everyone....except maybe Georgie.

 

Sorry, two different answers in there. The CVL were all committed to winning the battle of the Atlantic (or being tied dockside by the RN while they whinged about them not being proper carriers and dangerous.

Excuse me? The Independence class CVLs were all committed to the PTO. CVEs were committed to the Atlantic ASW war.

 

And air groups are not very good with carriers and Ranger wasn't enough alone, I was wondering what might be available, but didn't have Morison. Of the Essex-class it looks like Essex (31 Dec 42), Bunker Hill (24 May 43), Lexington (17 Feb 43), and Yorktown (15 Apr 43) may habe been available, except those are commissioning dates and say nothing about when they were worked up and had air groups ready to operate off them. I bet just Essex and Lexington may have been. Of the CVLs it looks like the possibles are Belleau Wood (31 Mar 43), Cowpens (28 May 43), Independence (14 Jan 43), and Princeton (25 Feb 43), but for the same reasons i suspect it was only three? And I have a feeling that may have been putting too many eggs in one basket as far as the Navy staff was concerned? Carrier strength in the Pacific was pretty thin at this time, that's why USS Robin was around?

As I mentioned, after Casablanca Ernie King said F__K the Brits (he pretty much always said that ) and the chances of getting some of his precious Essexes into the Med were nil. OTOH, the US JCS had bought into the 'Germany First' strategy and were prepared to implement it until Casablanca convinced them that the Brits weren't really serious about taking on Germany and wanted to play their old "Peripheral Games." Had AB&Co handled the conference better the JCS might have released forces from commitment to the Pacific to boost a specific op in Europe. They did anyway, on a minor scale.

 

The first CVTGs with the new CVs formed in the Pacific around July IIRC, so they could have been available for the Med in July, seeing as how it takes less time to get to the Med from the East Coast than to Pearl Harbor.

 

I think I said I had to look at it a bit more, so hold your horses. I've just always had an affection for the Sardinia, which should have led to a thinning of the German defenses, including on Sicily, especially if it was followed by Corsica? Played right it could lead to September assault on Sicily from both north and south, doing the annihilation thing of the Axis forces there and allow Anvil in August 44 to come in at Genoa-La Spezia. It pretty much comes down to how important the Foggia bases were?

 

While the Sardinia - Corsica axis looks good and the Germans boogied out of them without much encouragement from us, I still question if it would have been so easy had the Germans not had to defend Sicily and Italy. Going to Corsica especially is like putting your head into a noose as Axis planes not tied down in Italy could attack from bases all around the coast from S. France to N. Italy.

 

IMNSHO, taking Foggia was essential if the Casablanca mandate to 'clear the Med' was to be implemented. Even AFTER we got Foggia, merchant shipping was still at risk from Greek and Crete-based planes. The fact that the Germans didn't historically have enough planes to make the threat good is not wholly germane, they might have if we had gone the Sardinia - Corsica route instead of attriting the LW in Sicily and Italy.

 

As for ANVIL in Northern Italy instead of South France, you might clear Italy faster, but then what? We have pretty much established here that doing a 'Reverse Hannibal' over the Alps to Germany was a no-go. Again IMNSHO, the big advantage to ANVIL was the easing of logistics to NWE through Marseilles, not to mention that if the Germans had tried to hold a line in France instead of boogieing all the way to Germany after Falaise the troops coming up the Rhone could flank them.

 

[Rich]

Excuse me? The Independence class CVLs were all committed to the PTO. CVEs were committed to the Atlantic ASW war.

 

Damned late night, that's what I meant....as I'm sure you realized.

 

As I mentioned, after Casablanca Ernie King said F__K the Brits (he pretty much always said that ) and the chances of getting some of his precious Essexes into the Med were nil. OTOH, the US JCS had bought into the 'Germany First' strategy and were prepared to implement it until Casablanca convinced them that the Brits weren't really serious about taking on Germany and wanted to play their old "Peripheral Games." Had AB&Co handled the conference better the JCS might have released forces from commitment to the Pacific to boost a specific op in Europe. They did anyway, on a minor scale.

 

Sorry, but I've become perenially suspicious of simplistic, fatuous-sounding, but "widely accepted" explanations for why things happened the way they did. It sems almost inevitably now that those explanations are oversimplified, they are fatuous, and they are "widely accepted" because lazy historians simply like to crib their peers opinions. King, like most of the USN, was fixated on the Pacific and much of his antipathy to the British appears to have been based on his perception of their inability to understand why the USN was focused on the Pacific and his other perception that the RN wasn't pulling it's weight in the Med anymore, and worse, in collusion with the CIGS was conspiring to indulge in hare-brained diversions and peripheral strategies, simply because they could call on the growing American naval power and the avowed "Germany first" strategy to do so. As a one-liner that may have translated as "F__K the Brits" but there was a lot more reason behind it than knee-jerk neanderthalism. Saying that it was so in a sense denigrates the man and officer, he may have been a nasty son-of-a-bitch, but he was also a professional and not an idiot.

 

The first CVTGs with the new CVs formed in the Pacific around July IIRC, so they could have been available for the Med in July, seeing as how it takes less time to get to the Med from the East Coast than to Pearl Harbor.

Er, how does "around July" work for having them sailing off of Sicily 9/10 July? Seems a bit imprecise? And again, looking at the commissioning dates, how many were actually operational as ships and as task groups, and when? Until I can get a bit more on that I'm reserving full judgment.

 

While the Sardinia - Corsica axis looks good and the Germans boogied out of them without much encouragement from us, I still question if it would have been so easy had the Germans not had to defend Sicily and Italy. Going to Corsica especially is like putting your head into a noose as Axis planes not tied down in Italy could attack from bases all around the coast from S. France to N. Italy.

 

Er, huh? So you're saying if the Germans defended Sardinia and Corsica more strongly, then it would have been more difficult to attack them....okaaay, but that then implies the troops to do so have to come from the defenders of Sicily and Italy? Which makes them weaker and less of a "tough nut"? And the Allies had the initiative and the amphibious capability, so....

 

Anyway, Sardinia was seized and was turned into an Allied air base to support operations against Italy....and there were no attacks from bases all around the coast that stymied that? It's actually relatively little different from Sicily, just fewer Germans there.

 

IMNSHO, taking Foggia was essential if the Casablanca mandate to 'clear the Med' was to be implemented. Even AFTER we got Foggia, merchant shipping was still at risk from Greek and Crete-based planes. The fact that the Germans didn't historically have enough planes to make the threat good is not wholly germane, they might have if we had gone the Sardinia - Corsica route instead of attriting the LW in Sicily and Italy.

Which then obviously means that we needed to attack Crete and the Greek mainland, Yugolsavia et al? Thanks Winnie. And the Luftwaffe simply wasn't going to do anything other than be attrited in Sicily and Italy, they were took weak and it makes little difference whether the Allied aircraft are operating out of Sicily or Sardinia (although caveat regarding the basing capabilities of the two, I haven't looked into that yet).

 

As for ANVIL in Northern Italy instead of South France, you might clear Italy faster, but then what? We have pretty much established here that doing a 'Reverse Hannibal' over the Alps to Germany was a no-go. Again IMNSHO, the big advantage to ANVIL was the easing of logistics to NWE through Marseilles, not to mention that if the Germans had tried to hold a line in France instead of boogieing all the way to Germany after Falaise the troops coming up the Rhone could flank them.

 

Actually, I was thinking something a little different. If Sardinia-Corsica are reduced in the July-August 1943 timeframe, then it could be possible to launch HUSKY in early September from the north and south side of Sicily - if the Axis doesn't do the smart thing and simply evacuate. If they don't they get the result you think they should have, the annihilation of the forces there. That compromises the defenses of southern Italy, which in turn allows an assault at Genoa-La Spezia by Fifth Army, followed by Eighth Army (with probably a diversionary single-corps assault across the straits), driving across Italy to Venice and cutting off all German forces in Italy. They can then be allowed to sit impotently (they can attempt to attack an Allied position in the northern Appenines or they can try evacuating to Yugoslavia. From there the Allies can chose to followup with a summer landing on the French Riveria - quite possibly with stronger forces than historically - advance on Trieste, or liberate Italy.

 

The real problem with Italy was the Allies got impatient and tried to do it the long way.

[KingSargent]

Damned late night, that's what I meant....as I'm sure you realized.

I did, but it's so rare to catch you in a boo-boo...

Sorry, but I've become perenially suspicious of simplistic, fatuous-sounding, but "widely accepted" explanations for why things happened the way they did. It sems almost inevitably now that those explanations are oversimplified, they are fatuous, and they are "widely accepted" because lazy historians simply like to crib their peers opinions. King, like most of the USN, was fixated on the Pacific and much of his antipathy to the British appears to have been based on his perception of their inability to understand why the USN was focused on the Pacific and his other perception that the RN wasn't pulling it's weight in the Med anymore, and worse, in collusion with the CIGS was conspiring to indulge in hare-brained diversions and peripheral strategies, simply because they could call on the growing American naval power and the avowed "Germany first" strategy to do so. As a one-liner that may have translated as "F__K the Brits" but there was a lot more reason behind it than knee-jerk neanderthalism. Saying that it was so in a sense denigrates the man and officer, he may have been a nasty son-of-a-bitch, but he was also a professional and not an idiot.

I realize that, but the USN was strongly Anglophobic at the time, and I imagine "F--k the Brits" was pretty common USN usage. I fully agree with your analysis, I've just gotten tired of typing it over and over so used FTB for shorthand.

BTW, Ernie's daughter once said, "My father is the most even-tempered man in the Navy. He's always mad."

 

Er, how does "around July" work for having them sailing off of Sicily 9/10 July? Seems a bit imprecise? And again, looking at the commissioning dates, how many were actually operational as ships and as task groups, and when? Until I can get a bit more on that I'm reserving full judgment.

Me too. I'd look it up (I'm sure I have it) but 1. I just got A $300 book order in, and 2. I'm packing for a trip. So I'm a bit distracted.

 

Er, huh? So you're saying if the Germans defended Sardinia and Corsica more strongly, then it would have been more difficult to attack them....okaaay, but that then implies the troops to do so have to come from the defenders of Sicily and Italy? Which makes them weaker and less of a "tough nut"? And the Allies had the initiative and the amphibious capability, so....

What I mean to say is that just because a condition existed historically does not mean it would exist under alternative conditions. Sicily was a tough nut, but if we had gone to Sardinia the Germans could have flown the Fallschirmjager into there and we would be doing a Cassino trying to dig them out of the mountains.

 

Anyway, Sardinia was seized and was turned into an Allied air base to support operations against Italy....and there were no attacks from bases all around the coast that stymied that? It's actually relatively little different from Sicily, just fewer Germans there.

I didn't say Sardinia was too close, I said Corsica was. Again, just because historical response was weak does not mean it had to be so. If Uncle Adolf felt threatened by Sardinia more than he did Sicily, you can bet there would have been more air opposition than there was. Granted the Germans were pretty strained all over, but they could still shift forces, and the guy in charge wasn't exactly rational.

 

Which then obviously means that we needed to attack Crete and the Greek mainland, Yugolsavia et al? Thanks Winnie.

Well, he did.... pulled 4th British and 4th Indian Divs, plus odds and sods, out of Italy to go to Greece. There was a lot of Brit SF involvement in the Balkans, and he tried to move into the Aegean and got kicked out. Crete eventually surrendered after being cut off for a while. Once again Axis air in the Eastern Med didn't amount to a lot, but there was some and there could have been more.

 

And the Luftwaffe simply wasn't going to do anything other than be attrited in Sicily and Italy, they were took weak and it makes little difference whether the Allied aircraft are operating out of Sicily or Sardinia (although caveat regarding the basing capabilities of the two, I haven't looked into that yet).

The point is, we don't KNOW what they would have done under different circumstances. Hitler was capable of moving the whole LW to the Med. Far out, but megalomaniacs are by definition far out.

 

Actually, I was thinking something a little different. If Sardinia-Corsica are reduced in the July-August 1943 timeframe, then it could be possible to launch HUSKY in early September from the north and south side of Sicily - if the Axis doesn't do the smart thing and simply evacuate. If they don't they get the result you think they should have, the annihilation of the forces there. That compromises the defenses of southern Italy, which in turn allows an assault at Genoa-La Spezia by Fifth Army, followed by Eighth Army (with probably a diversionary single-corps assault across the straits), driving across Italy to Venice and cutting off all German forces in Italy. They can then be allowed to sit impotently (they can attempt to attack an Allied position in the northern Appenines or they can try evacuating to Yugoslavia. From there the Allies can chose to followup with a summer landing on the French Riveria - quite possibly with stronger forces than historically - advance on Trieste, or liberate Italy.

Yeah, that might work. Don't see any reason why not at first glance.

 

The real problem with Italy was the Allies got impatient and tried to do it the long way.

They did it all on the fly. More diplomatic behavior at Casablanca might have gotten the Brits their Med strategy with the full backing of the JCS, which would mean more resources, more long-range planning, and more coordination.

As it was, for example a lot of the landing craft assets were pulled out of the Med long before they would be needed in NWE, just to keep them from being caught up in Winnie's Wild Wonderful Schemes. Real planning by the CCS could have resulted in enough landing craft to do lots in the Med before sailing for Blighty - and maybe lots of naval support too.

[Rich]

I did, but it's so rare to catch you in a boo-boo...

 

 

I realize that, but the USN was strongly Anglophobic at the time, and I imagine "F--k the Brits" was pretty common USN usage. I fully agree with your analysis, I've just gotten tired of typing it over and over so used FTB for shorthand.

BTW, Ernie's daughter once said, "My father is the most even-tempered man in the Navy. He's always mad."

You can tell she adored her Daddy.

 

Me too. I'd look it up (I'm sure I have it) but 1. I just got A $300 book order in, and 2. I'm packing for a trip. So I'm a bit distracted.

 

Hey, PDFs! But believe me I understand, we don't leave for two weeks yet, and I'm dying to go, I haven't had a real holiday for six months.

 

What I mean to say is that just because a condition existed historically does not mean it would exist under alternative conditions. Sicily was a tough nut, but if we had gone to Sardinia the Germans could have flown the Fallschirmjager into there and we would be doing a Cassino trying to dig them out of the mountains.

 

The bane of what ifs strikes again. The problem is that when you start assuming that, then you can assume anything, including lizard men in giant starships arriving to settle things. I like to do as little violence to the past as possible. So, if everything else is the same when the HUSKY convoys sail, except they go to Sardinia instead of Sicily, why should that mean that the Sardinian garrison would change?

 

And, frankly, that's a good way to get 1. Fs.J.D. more tore up than it did on Sicily. How is a couple thousand paratroopers going to make more of a difference arriving on Sardinia to support a single, badly understrength and under-equipped Panzergrenadier division than they would arriving on Sicily to support elements of two divisions (and later three when parts of 29. Pz.Gren. arrived from the mainland - and given the distance, it's unlikley such a transfer onto Sicily would be successful).

 

I didn't say Sardinia was too close, I said Corsica was. Again, just because historical response was weak does not mean it had to be so. If Uncle Adolf felt threatened by Sardinia more than he did Sicily, you can bet there would have been more air opposition than there was. Granted the Germans were pretty strained all over, but they could still shift forces, and the guy in charge wasn't exactly rational.

Sardinia was vulnerable, so vulnerable that they bugged out rather than attempt to defend it. And it makes a great stepping stone to Corsica, which is untenable with Allied control of the sea and air, even is it is closer to the mainland. Sometimes baby steps work better.

 

Well, he did.... pulled 4th British and 4th Indian Divs, plus odds and sods, out of Italy to go to Greece. There was a lot of Brit SF involvement in the Balkans, and he tried to move into the Aegean and got kicked out. Crete eventually surrendered after being cut off for a while. Once again Axis air in the Eastern Med didn't amount to a lot, but there was some and there could have been more.

 

To be fair, that was in fall of 1944 after things had already been screwed up by Clark going for Rome, the French and VI Corps being pulled out, so it must have seemed just the thing to withdraw troops from Italy and send them to Greece. At least my scheme may have kept them too occupied to try that idiocy.

 

BTW, tit-for-tat back at you re boo-boos, Crete did "eventually surrender"....around 10 Mat 1945. Many of the other Aegean island were evacuated though when HG F did the bug-out boogie from Greece, but Dolfie thought it was best to hang onto Crete.

 

The point is, we don't KNOW what they would have done under different circumstances. Hitler was capable of moving the whole LW to the Med. Far out, but megalomaniacs are by definition far out.

Or space lizards could show up. He may have been capable of doing so to anywhere, but the largest-scale attampt to do something similar ended in disaster in France in 1944, otherwise the biggest similar movements were a couple of Gruppen or the occasional Geschwader. In theater transfers were different, the Luftwaffe did quite a bit of base hopping.

 

Yeah, that might work. Don't see any reason why not at first glance.

 

Maybe, maybe not, we'll never know.

 

They did it all on the fly. More diplomatic behavior at Casablanca might have gotten the Brits their Med strategy with the full backing of the JCS, which would mean more resources, more long-range planning, and more coordination.

As it was, for example a lot of the landing craft assets were pulled out of the Med long before they would be needed in NWE, just to keep them from being caught up in Winnie's Wild Wonderful Schemes. Real planning by the CCS could have resulted in enough landing craft to do lots in the Med before sailing for Blighty - and maybe lots of naval support too.[/b]

 

Pretty much, except the withdrawals of landing craft were post AVALANCHE and many were delayed for SHINGLE as well. The problem is there just were never enough of them.

Edited November 16, 2007 by Rich

[KingSargent]

You can tell she adored her Daddy. smile.gif

Hey, old Ernie taught her to tell it like it is.... ;)

 

Sardinia was vulnerable, so vulnerable that they bugged out rather than attempt to defend it. And it makes a great stepping stone to Corsica, which is untenable with Allied control of the sea and air, even is it is closer to the mainland.

Ah, but we did not HAVE control of the sea and air throughout the Med in July 1943, especially in the Gulf of Genoa or whatever it is called.

 

To be fair, Where does it say "King has to be fair?" that was in fall of 1944 after things had already been screwed up by Clark going for Rome, the French and VI Corps being pulled out, so it must have seemed just the thing to withdraw troops from Italy and send them to Greece. At least my scheme may have kept them too occupied to try that idiocy.

That he didn't get away with it until the fall of 1944 doesn't mean he didn't want to earlier. And he DID pull that asinine Leros op in the Aegean in 1943.

 

BTW, tit-for-tat back at you re boo-boos, Crete did "eventually surrender"....around 10 Mat 1945.

I thought that was the case, but didn't want to take time to look it up. WTF, May 10, 1945 IS eventually...

 

Many of the other Aegean island were evacuated though when HG F did the bug-out boogie from Greece, but Dolfie thought it was best to hang onto Crete.

Roger that, but AFAIK there was no German air activity there. I think pulling the garrison out was just too risky by that time. Not to mention finding transport....

 

Pretty much, except the withdrawals of landing craft were post AVALANCHE and many were delayed for SHINGLE as well. The problem is there just were never enough of them.

There could have been more of them if the JCS had been fully on board with "Germany First" instead of going off in a snit after Casablanca. A lot of amphib gear went to worthless ops in the PTO and SWPA.

I do believe that a lot of the impetus for Pacific ops was, "We have stuff, if we don't use it those bastards in the ETO (or MTO or SWPA, etc) will hijack it."

[Rich]

Hey, old Ernie taught her to tell it like it is.... ;)

 

Yep.

 

Ah, but we did not HAVE control of the sea and air throughout the Med in July 1943, especially in the Gulf of Genoa or whatever it is called.

Don't need it to do Sicily (southside) or Sardinia. Cagliari is pretty much where you want to be, but there is also that nice long north-south orientation of the island, making it possible to hit from west and south.

 

Where does it say "King has to be fair?"

 

Don't get saucy with me Bernaise!

 

That he didn't get away with it until the fall of 1944 doesn't mean he didn't want to earlier. And he DID pull that asinine Leros op in the Aegean in 1943.

Yeah, but a brigade isn't a corps.

 

I thought that was the case, but didn't want to take time to look it up. WTF, May 10, 1945 IS eventually...

 

Yeah, you say tomato, and I say....

 

Roger that, but AFAIK there was no German air activity there. I think pulling the garrison out was just too risky by that time. Not to mention finding transport....

I'd have to look, but I think they kept minor Luftwaffe ops going there till the end?

 

There could have been more of them if the JCS had been fully on board with "Germany First" instead of going off in a snit after Casablanca. A lot of amphib gear went to worthless ops in the PTO and SWPA.

I do believe that a lot of the impetus for Pacific ops was, "We have stuff, if we don't use it those bastards in the ETO (or MTO or SWPA, etc) will hijack it."

 

Actually a lot of the 'Phib units, especially the LCI (L) and LCT flotillas, were pretty periapetetic, and of course a lot did move MTO to ETO, CONUS to ETO and PTO to ETO in late 1943 and then especially in early 1944 when Ike and Monty put their collective foot down over the situation. Then a lot migrated back to the MTO for DRAGOON before most went to the PTO in late 1944 and early 1945 (have you read the account of the LCT flotilla that sailed from the ETO to the PTO through one of the typhoons?). But I was also thinking of the production and availability of the craft. Morison has a good explication of the situation worldwide in May 1944, it would be interesting to see what it was like a other times? But beyond that, what the PTO got was what was most necessary for them, the AP and AK, and then later the LSD, that weren't quite so vital in the ETO/MTO. If I can ever break away the time I might try to take a look at it.

Edited November 16, 2007 by Rich

[KingSargent]

Yep.

 

Don't need it to do Sicily (southside) or Sardinia. Cagliari is pretty much where you want to be, but there is also that nice long north-south orientation of the island, making it possible to hit from west and south.

Don't get saucy with me Bernaise!

 

Yeah, but a brigade isn't a corps.

Yeah, you say tomato, and I say....

 

I'd have to look, but I think they kept minor Luftwaffe ops going there till the end?

Not any offensive ones, I think. Where would they get fuel? Maybe a weekly mail run to show the troops that they had not been abandoned.

 

Actually a lot of the 'Phib units, especially the LCI (L) and LCT flotillas, were pretty periapetetic, and of course a lot did move MTO to ETO, CONUS to ETO and PTO to ETO in late 1943 and then especially in early 1944 when Ike and Monty put their collective foot down over the situation. Then a lot migrated back to the MTO for DRAGOON before most went to the PTO in late 1944 and early 1945 (have you read the account of the LCT flotilla that sailed from the ETO to the PTO through one of the typhoons?). But I was also thinking of the production and availability of the craft. Morison has a good explication of the situation worldwide in May 1944, it would be interesting to see what it was like a other times? But beyond that, what the PTO got was what was most necessary for them, the AP and AK, and then later the LSD, that weren't quite so vital in the ETO/MTO. If I can ever break away the time I might try to take a look at it.

Actually, I think the biggest factor militating against Sardinia was that the whole idea (theoretically) was to clear the Sicilian Narrows for AB's mythical two million tons of shipping. Taking Sardinia did squat to clear the Med for traffic.

 

In re the amphib and shipping, it took three to five times the shipping to support a unit in the PTO as in the ETO/MTO. A lot of that was ships waiting weeks or months to unload in crappy little harbors. Having a major slow-down in the PTO to build up and fight in Europe (CVTFs and all) faster could get the Allies on the Ground in NWE sooner and/or in greater strength. Then send everything to the Pacific and go for it. The PTO didn't really get rolling until 1944 anyway, all that would be lost were the campaigns for worthless places of no economic value and full of horrible diseases. I refer of course to the Solomons and New Guinea. And if the APs and AKs were in the ETO, the Allies would not be limited to a cross-Channel op. They could do landings in the Bay of Biscay or Norway, just to confuse things. Hard to do that with LCTs and LCIs based in Blighty.