Excuse making over Messina escape?

[JWB]

The argument from the USAAF side claims the Germans got away because of a lack of joint planning, ei pointing fingers at Army for not doing enough. I personaly believe the air force command in the Med were quite a bit more gun shy than their counterparts in England.

 

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchro.../cc/renner.html

[JWB]

The pertinent part of the article:

 

The successful Axis evacuation of Sicily across the Straits of Messina is sometimes viewed as a failure of interdiction, but it should primarily be viewed as a failure of joint planning and leadership. Allied planning effort focused on securing the beachhead, with a dearth of planning for follow-on operations to conclude the campaign. General Alexander, the Allied commander in the Mediterranean, told his air and naval component commanders on 3 August 1943, "Indications suggest that the Germans are making preparations for withdrawal to the mainland … We must be in a position to take immediate advantage of such a situation by using full weight of the Naval and Air Power. You have no doubt co-ordinated plans to meet this contingency."19 In fact, they had not made plans to prevent the German evacuation, nor did they after this ‘suggestion.’ The Axis armies would successfully evacuate Sicily due to "the failure of the Allied commanders to view the interdiction of a German retreat from the island as a fundamental strategic requirement that had to be integrated into the plans of all three services."20 The difficult terrain around Messina allowed small numbers of soldiers to hold the advance of Allied Armies during the evacuation, and the Navy had legitimate concerns about mines and shore batteries while operating in the Straits of Messina. The resulting reliance upon airpower alone to prevent the evacuation did not consider the 150 x 88mm and 333 x 20mm Axis AAA pieces along the straits.21 On 1 August, Air Vice Marshal Arthur Coningham (Commander of the Tactical Air Forces) informed Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder (MAAF Commander), "The Messina area ‘flak’ was now practically prohibitive for all aircraft except the heavy bombers."22 Although AAA shot down only 3-5 aircraft, it damaged 28 of 96 (29%) of the bombers on 15 August and 44 of 96 (45%) on 16 August, plus over 30 fighter-bombers.23

 

Coningham’s release of the Strategic Air Forces from the commitment to attack the evacuation beaches also shares responsibility for the failure to interdict the evacuation.24 He released the bombers to hit the backlog of strategic targets and to start preparations for invasion of Italy. When the evacuation was detected, however, it was too late to request the bombers, as they had just attacked Rome. Furthermore, the Strategic Air Forces were busy preparing to receive B-17s from England following the Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission of 17 August.25 However, even if Coningham had used the bombers, airpower alone could not prevent the German evacuation. The results were a successful evacuation of 38,846 German soldiers, 10,356 vehicles, and 14,949 tons of supplies and an Italian evacuation of 62,000 soldiers, 277 vehicles, and 41 artillery pieces.26 The escape of the Axis armies meant the Allies would fight these soldiers on mainland Italy, extending the duration and increasing the cost of the Italian campaign. If the Allies had countered the evacuation through a joint plan, the successful interdiction of the Axis armies may have been the ‘Stalingrad’ of the Italian campaign

[KingSargent]

The evacuation went on for a long time, the excuse of the Air Forces being "busy on that day" is hogwash.

 

The truth is that the Airforces (both) refused to coordinate or cooperate in any way during the Sicilian Campaign. They would not provide cover over the invasion fleets and beaches, they would not provide CAS. They would not provide air cover over USN or RN ships that might be sent into the Straits of Messina.

 

If someone had an emergency mission to be flown, he was to submit a request in writing to the Air HQ in Africa (whatever it was called). Air HQ promied that a committee would look at the request within 24 hours of receipt at HQ, and consider if the requested mission should be flown.

[JWB]

How often was that "24 hours" met?

[KingSargent]

How often was that "24 hours" met?

I have no idea, but obviously there would be no response to an emergency like the invasion fleets being bombed to hell. The AFs felt that they could win by bombing Axis airfields.

 

I doubt that many requests actually went through the mill. The Army and Navy had learned to expect nothing, and they got exactly that.

[Brian Kennedy]

I wonder how much of a lack of cooperation was due to fear of friendly AA -- after Navy gunners wiped out a healthy chunk of the 82nd Airborne...

[irregularmedic]

What about the navies? Why couldn't UK and US fleets interdict the traffic? That's what I've always scratched my head about, the airpower in the region wasn't exactly anti shipping trained or experienced except for the Malta based stuff anyway right?

[KingSargent]

What about the navies? Why couldn't UK and US fleets interdict the traffic? That's what I've always scratched my head about, the airpower in the region wasn't exactly anti shipping trained or experienced except for the Malta based stuff anyway right?

Because they were not going to go into narrow, dangerous, mined waters without air cover. The Air Forces refused to provide it to to interdict shore batteries. It would not be too prudent to send surface ships into waters where they couldn't maneuver, especially without sweeping for mines. I don't know what minecraft were available at that time, but whatever they were would be very vulnerable to Axis batteries - the AA batteries (unemployed because the AFs wouldn't provide them with targets) were largely DP and could slaughter small minecraft.

 

The AFs also did not bomb the dock facilities on either side of the strait.

[irregularmedic]

Because they were not going to go into narrow, dangerous, mined waters without air cover. The Air Forces refused to provide it to to interdict shore batteries. It would not be too prudent to send surface ships into waters where they couldn't maneuver, especially without sweeping for mines. I don't know what minecraft were available at that time, but whatever they were would be very vulnerable to Axis batteries - the AA batteries (unemployed because the AFs wouldn't provide them with targets) were largely DP and could slaughter small minecraft.

 

The AFs also did not bomb the dock facilities on either side of the strait.

 

 

"American Luftwaffe" indeed!

[KingSargent]

"American Luftwaffe" indeed!

Don't forget the Royal Luftwaffe...

[Rich]

Because they were not going to go into narrow, dangerous, mined waters without air cover. The Air Forces refused to provide it to to interdict shore batteries. It would not be too prudent to send surface ships into waters where they couldn't maneuver, especially without sweeping for mines. I don't know what minecraft were available at that time, but whatever they were would be very vulnerable to Axis batteries - the AA batteries (unemployed because the AFs wouldn't provide them with targets) were largely DP and could slaughter small minecraft.

 

The AFs also did not bomb the dock facilities on either side of the strait.

 

 

Makes a good story....too bad it isn't quite true. The major problem encountered by the Air Forces, which was true throughout the Italian Campaign, was a lack of reconnaissance assets, which led to some major intelligence failures. What is perhaps most intriguing about Sicily is that it took so long for the Allies to realize that the Axis was actively evacuating Sicily; the Italians were mostly gone by the time they did.

 

“The Allied Air offensive had two basic purposes during the last week of July and the following weeks in August. The initial purpose was to prevent the movement of troops and supplies into Sicily. A concentrated assault on shipping, i.e., barges, freighters, Siebel ferries and other craft, was launched by A-36s and P-40s. When it became evident that the enemy, rather than reinforcing, was evacuating, the objective became one of preventing withdrawal across the strait. A concerted attack by heavies, mediums and fighters began on I August and did not let up until the evacuation was over. Messina became the principal target.

 

In the first ten days of August B- 17s flew 198 sorties, Wellingtons 302, against Messina. The heavies bombed supply points in the city, the mediums concentrated on the marshalling yards (and the beaches below Cape Peloro) and fighter- bombers massed against shipping and docks. From 11 to 17 August Wellingtons flew 396 sorties against evacuation beaches on both sides of the strait.

 

The enemy evacuation was conducted in a masterful manner. The Italian withdrawal began on 3 August, using three small steamers and other small craft. By 16 August it was complete. Seventy thousand officers and men had been evacuated I somewhere between 227 and 500 vehicles (depending on the information source), 75 artillery pieces, and 12 mules also made the crossing safely.

 

The German evacuation began on 10 August. In order to speed the process and increase security a variety of embarkation points were used. To transport the troops and their equipment the Germans, as well as the Italians, used whatever craft were available; thirteen Siebel ferries, seven MFPs, sixteen L-boats, one 932-ton train ferry, two small steamers, four moter rafts, and a variety of small boats. In the space of six days this conglomeration of vessels carried 39,569 troops (4,444 of them wounded), 9,605 vehicles, 47 tanks, 94 guns, 2,078 tons of ammunition and fuel, and I5,700 tons of supplies safely across the Strait of Messina.

 

During the evacuation process NAAF tried to interrupt it by bombing both sides of the strait. From 8 to 14 August an average of 85 Wellingtons bombed beaches and ports each night. Medium and fighter bombers flew 1,170 sorties against beaches and boats from 8 to 17 August, around the clock during the last three days. No Axis planes challenged the Allied aircraft, for the evacuation was carried cut with no air protection whatever. Unfortunately faulty intelligence and intense flak from hundreds of antiaircraft guns made the results of all this effort negligible. Only one MFP and two Siebel ferries were sunk and the German evacuation process was scarcely interrupted.” (HERO Report 033B. Interdiction Operations During HUSKY)

 

Interdiction sorties against Messina 30 July-5 August totaled 168, plus 23 against the mainland of 496 directed at interdiction targets, out of 848 sorties flown in theater. From 6-12 August everything was directed at bridges in Sicily, trying to cut the retreat routes, a total of 202 sorties out of 1,509 flown in theater. Then from 13-17 August 582 sorties were directed against the evacuation, 510 on the ports and 72 – many strafing by fighter-bombers – against the beaches, out of 2,144 flown in theater.

 

Losses in support of interdiction operations for HUSKY during the period were 45 destroyed, 32 missing, and 251 damaged, but include losses in interdiction operations against the mainland and Sardinia (which were very limited) as well as Sicily.

 

So it isn't true that they didn't bomb the docks or make any attempt to interdict the crossing. Unfortunately what is true is that the scale of the overall effort allocated to interdiction of any kind was relatively minor, the USAAF and RAF between them had 468 heavy bombers, 993 medium bombers, 193 light bombers, and 325 fighter bombers, as well as 132 torpedo bombers, That in 21 days they were only able to allocate 4,501 sorties to interdiction missions is pretty sad.

[Ariete!]

Yeh, but then if they HAD concentrated on the straits, the usual knee-jerk flyboy haters would be moaning about how the (uselesss) advance to Parelrmo and/or Messina was slowed down by the lack of air force support. Or they’ve be whingeing about the horrific (HORRIFIC I TELL YOU) axis air raids they brave soljurs had been subjected to because the dummy air farce didn’t interdict axis airports, etc.

 

Facile criticism of the air force is Sparky-like in its persistence and close-mindedness.

[KingSargent]

Yeh, but then if they HAD concentrated on the straits, the usual knee-jerk flyboy haters would be moaning about how the (uselesss) advance to Parelrmo and/or Messina was slowed down by the lack of air force support.

In what way was the advance to Palermo and Messina useless? The object of the exercise was to clear the island. Taking the biggest ports would seem a good idea - sort of cuts off retreat, reinforcement and/or resupply, doesn't it?

Of course the advance could be seen as "useless" because the Axis was withdrawing anyway, but why would the Axis withdraw if they weren't facing an offensive?

 

Or they’ve be whingeing about the horrific (HORRIFIC I TELL YOU) axis air raids they brave soljurs had been subjected to because the dummy air farce didn’t interdict axis airports, etc.

Well, they were certainly whingeing - with very good reason - about the brave soljurs and saylers killed because the dummy air forces weren't providing any air cover and support. A few fighters over the island could possibly have made things a tad uncomfortable for the aerial reinforcement by the FJRs (1&3?), which would have meant fewer Allied casualties in the ground fighting.

 

Facile criticism of the air force is Sparky-like in its persistence and close-mindedness.

Facile criticism is not good. Reasoned criticism by people who knew what was going on is somewhat less than "Sparky-like." Please note that I am not including myself among those who knew what was going on, I am only passing along what they said.

=======================================================================================

Re Rich:

 

Okay, I should have written: "The AFs also did not EFFECTIVELY bomb the dock facilities on either side of the strait, NOR DID THEY EVEN BEGIN TRYING IN TIME."

 

As you point out, the AF efforts were begun late and were nowhere near "Maximum Effort" - and were accompanied by massive whingeing about diverting the AFs from their proper role. One of the lessons being taught in the Pacific (I know, nobody in the ETO knew or cared what happened in SWPA and PTO) was that if you want to take an island you isolate it from reinforcement and resupply FIRST - or if you think you might still have surprise, as soon as the invasion starts. That the Axis managed resupply, reinforcement, and withdrawal certainly does not impress ME with the operational acumen of the USAAF and RAF. As you say, the Axis efforts were masterful, but they were certainly aided by Allied ineptitude.

 

The Navies could have isolated Sicily, but they were afraid to (OK, OK, 'excessively cautious') without air cover. Messina was out of effective Allied fighter range until airfields could be captured/built on Sicily itself, but the airfields in Western Sicily fell quickly enough that fighter cover over Messina would have been possible PDQ. FTM, Patton asked for the Ranger during the planning stages to cover both the beaches and the surface forces, but Ranger's deployment was denied because of the proximity of Allied land bases and the assumption that land-based air would handle it. Indeed land-based air probably could have handled it if they had tried, but we will never know, will we?

 

I don't know if the presence of Ranger and 50-80 fighters (she carried 54 during TORCH) would have inspired the admirals to send ships into the Straits of Messina, but they were certainly loathe to go without ANY fighter cover.

 

Sicily was not a shining moment for the upper echelons of the RAF and USAAF in the MTO.

[EchoFiveMike]

The evacuation went on for a long time, the excuse of the Air Forces being "busy on that day" is hogwash.

 

The truth is that the Airforces (both) refused to coordinate or cooperate in any way during the Sicilian Campaign. They would not provide cover over the invasion fleets and beaches, they would not provide CAS. They would not provide air cover over USN or RN ships that might be sent into the Straits of Messina.

 

If someone had an emergency mission to be flown, he was to submit a request in writing to the Air HQ in Africa (whatever it was called). Air HQ promied that a committee would look at the request within 24 hours of receipt at HQ, and consider if the requested mission should be flown.

 

Change the locations and you essentially have the way air is run in Iraq except on a 72hr cycle. The more things change, the more they stay the same.... S/F....Ken M

[Rich]

Okay, I should have written: "The AFs also did not EFFECTIVELY bomb the dock facilities on either side of the strait, NOR DID THEY EVEN BEGIN TRYING IN TIME."

 

Again, part of the problem was that nobody realized they were bugging out until the bigout was well under way. And the question really is, "could the air forces have more effectivelt bombed "dock facilities" and would that have kept the Axis forces from withdrawing across the strait?" Which comes down to home sorties were being generated and were the Axis using the docks?

 

]As you point out, the AF efforts were begun late and were nowhere near "Maximum Effort" - and were accompanied by massive whingeing about diverting the AFs from their proper role. One of the lessons being taught in the Pacific (I know, nobody in the ETO knew or cared what happened in SWPA and PTO) was that if you want to take an island you isolate it from reinforcement and resupply FIRST - or if you think you might still have surprise, as soon as the invasion starts. That the Axis managed resupply, reinforcement, and withdrawal certainly does not impress ME with the operational acumen of the USAAF and RAF. As you say, the Axis efforts were masterful, but they were certainly aided by Allied ineptitude.

 

I never siad it wasn't a maximum effort, I said that the, "scale of the overall effort allocated to interdiction of any kind was relatively minor," which is slightly different. And they had a pretty good idea that preventing vessels from getting to islands was a good way to prevent reinforcement, the two priority targets prior to HUSKY were the airfields on Pantelleria, Sicily, Sardinia, and the mainland, and the dock facilities at Naples, Messina, and Syracuse. The real problem was the the MAAF simply weren't generating many sorties during July and August anywhere mostly because of the flight times, which resulted in slow sortie turnarounds and crew fatigue. In July there were only 2,860 HB, 4,579 MB & LB, and 15,660 fighter sorties in the entire theater. And in August the sortie rate dropped off significantly, with just 2,097 HB, 4,337 MB & LB, and 14,074 fighter sorties flown in theater. The 701 bomber sorties flown against the harbors 30 July-17 August are actually about 10 percent of the total sorties of all kinds flown for the month.

 

The Navies could have isolated Sicily, but they were afraid to (OK, OK, 'excessively cautious') without air cover.

 

Er, given the potential minefields and the number of coastal batteries, plus heavy Flak batteries perfectly capable of engaging ships, if the Allied navies had stuck their noses to close to Messina the great likelihood is that it would have been lopped off. All told ISTR there was something in the neighborhood of 600-700 heavy guns that could be brought to bear on the approaches.

 

It was a pretty tough nut, so both the navies and air forces I think can be forgiven if they were a little angst-ridden about the idea.

[KingSargent]

Again, part of the problem was that nobody realized they were bugging out until the bigout was well under way. And the question really is, "could the air forces have more effectivelt bombed "dock facilities" and would that have kept the Axis forces from withdrawing across the strait?" Which comes down to home sorties were being generated and were the Axis using the docks?

If they weren't using the docks to leave, they were using them to resupply and reinforce. I don't see any reason except flak concentrations at the Straits not to make them THE interdiction effort. Did the Allies have aerial mines in the MTO? If not they had plenty of time to get some from Blighty if they had thought about it during planning.

 

I never siad it wasn't a maximum effort, I said that the, "scale of the overall effort allocated to interdiction of any kind was relatively minor," which is slightly different.

Minor means 'not maximum,' no?

 

And they had a pretty good idea that preventing vessels from getting to islands was a good way to prevent reinforcement, the two priority targets prior to HUSKY were the airfields on Pantelleria, Sicily, Sardinia, and the mainland, and the dock facilities at Naples, Messina, and Syracuse. The real problem was the the MAAF simply weren't generating many sorties during July and August anywhere mostly because of the flight times, which resulted in slow sortie turnarounds and crew fatigue. In July there were only 2,860 HB, 4,579 MB & LB, and 15,660 fighter sorties in the entire theater. And in August the sortie rate dropped off significantly, with just 2,097 HB, 4,337 MB & LB, and 14,074 fighter sorties flown in theater. The 701 bomber sorties flown against the harbors 30 July-17 August are actually about 10 percent of the total sorties of all kinds flown for the month.

So where did all the fighters go? Standing patrols over MAAF HQ? Allied soljurs and saylurs never saw them overhead...

Just maybe if the soljurs and saylurs had ever seen any Allied planes overhead they wouldn't have been so trigger-happy about shooting at their own spotters and C-47s.

 

Er, given the potential minefields and the number of coastal batteries, plus heavy Flak batteries perfectly capable of engaging ships, if the Allied navies had stuck their noses to close to Messina the great likelihood is that it would have been lopped off. All told ISTR there was something in the neighborhood of 600-700 heavy guns that could be brought to bear on the approaches.

Well, the Navies might not have wanted to go, and the Air Forces gave them the perfect excuse not to, didn't they?

 

It was a pretty tough nut, so both the navies and air forces I think can be forgiven if they were a little angst-ridden about the idea.

I was under the impression that tough nuts were what we spent fortunes on nutcrackers for. The gruntz sure got minimal help dealing with the troops and ammo the Axis reinforced with.

[Rich]

If they weren't using the docks to leave, they were using them to resupply and reinforce. I don't see any reason except flak concentrations at the Straits not to make them THE interdiction effort. Did the Allies have aerial mines in the MTO? If not they had plenty of time to get some from Blighty if they had thought about it during planning.

 

Sorry, I was trying to get out of the office at a decent time so failed to finish my thought. Part of the problem is that "docks" were not really neccessary to the evacuation, the MFP, Siebels, motor rafts and so on were able to load and unload over beaches and did. The target was reasonably dispersed.

 

And "THE interdiction" effort included....as I already said....ports on the mainland, intially, to keep stuff from getting to Sicily, airfields throughout the Med - a MAJOR effort, railroads - to keep stuff from getting to the ports, and so on. And of course the strategic missions. Lots of targets, big area, all of a sudden all those aircraft don't seem to be very many.

 

And mines are pretty hit or miss, along about the time they would be getting a decent density the evacuation would be over - it simply didn't take very long - and then the Allies get to figure out how they cross at Messina....with all those mines in the way.

 

Minor means 'not maximum,' no?

Er, NO? "Minor" means "minor', as in "lesser, as in size, extent, or importance." A "maximum effort" in terms of Allied air operations in World War II is quite different.

 

So where did all the fighters go? Standing patrols over MAAF HQ? Allied soljurs and saylurs never saw them overhead...

 

Escorting bombers and fighter bombers (which BTW are included in the fighter sorties). But there just weren't many Allied fighter bombers at this time, about 150 A-36 and some P-40, most of the Allied fighters were either dedicated interceptors or escorts still.

 

But if you really want to act childish I'll see if I can find out where the fighter missions went?

 

Just maybe if the soljurs and saylurs had ever seen any Allied planes overhead they wouldn't have been so trigger-happy about shooting at their own spotters and C-47s.

Childishness doesn't become you.

 

I was under the impression that tough nuts were what we spent fortunes on nutcrackers for. The gruntz sure got minimal help dealing with the troops and ammo the Axis reinforced with.[/b]

 

Er, this from the guy that rants and raves - periodically - about how crazy it was for the Marines to attack "tough nuts" in the Pacific? And are you bitching about what was coming in - where the major interdiction effort went, in June and July - or coming out? Make up your mind.

Edited November 8, 2007 by Rich

[Ken Estes]

Unless we had figured out a way to keep our air power constantly overhead, day and night in mid-1943 [i think not] one was not going to stop an evacuation that really required little transit time. I have steamed through the "Strait" of Messina on a DD, admittedly at night, and it is a tight fit, seemingly a stone's throw to either side. There must have been numerous loading/landing points and the transit at 10 Kts must not have been over 15 minutes. It was not going to be stopped, just harrassed. After all, when did such a feat of arms by air power ever occur.....E5M is still waiting, it would seem.

[hojutsuka]

Well, they were certainly whingeing - with very good reason - about the brave soljurs and saylers killed because the dummy air forces weren't providing any air cover and support.

Can you provide any actual statistics to show that given the aircraft available, deploying them differently would have made a major difference?

 

A few fighters over the island could possibly have made things a tad uncomfortable for the aerial reinforcement by the FJRs (1&3?), which would have meant fewer Allied casualties in the ground fighting.

A few fighters over the island? Are you thinking of F-15s?

 

There were more than a few Allied fighters flying over Sicily on 12 July 1942, but they were mostly over Syracuse and Gela. World War II day fighters were limited in the airspace they could try to dominate by the range of the Mk 1 Eyeball, or if they were lucky enough to have radar-aided fighter direction, the effective range of the surface-based radar.

 

Since FJR 3 landed at Catania, well behind the Axis lines, no radar-aided ground fighter direction was available. So the only realistic way to make the aerial reinforcement by FJR3 "a tad uncomfortable" would have been to have a standing CAP of Allied fighters over the area.

 

A standing CAP is expensive, and 12 July is D+2. I doubt that many Allied fighter units were operational on Sicilian airfields on D+2, and whatever ones were operational would have as first priority air cover over the beachheads and the advancing ground units (after all, they were whingeing according to you ). The Royal Navy had used escort carriers (which would have been unnecessary if fighters could have provided sufficient CAP over Sicily from North African airfields) to provide air cover for the landings, but escort carriers were limited in operational endurance (remember the British modifications to reduce vulnerability of their escort carriers by reducing the avgas storage, and even more critical, the operational losses of Seafires flying from escort carriers were very high).

 

Furthermore, unless the Allies had ULTRA intelligence, there was no reason to assume that FJR3 would parachute in at Catania, as opposed to some other airfield in Sicily.

 

Finally, there was a very good reason for the Allies to NOT put a CAP over Catania on 12 July. The British 8th Army was planning to seize the Primasole Bridge just south of Catania on July 13, using Lathbury's 1st Parachute Brigade. It was thus important to avoid alerting the Axis forces in vicinity of Catania by too much air activity.

 

One of the lessons being taught in the Pacific (I know, nobody in the ETO knew or cared what happened in SWPA and PTO) was that if you want to take an island you isolate it from reinforcement and resupply FIRST - or if you think you might still have surprise, as soon as the invasion starts. That the Axis managed resupply, reinforcement, and withdrawal certainly does not impress ME with the operational acumen of the USAAF and RAF. As you say, the Axis efforts were masterful, but they were certainly aided by Allied ineptitude.

I think you are ignoring geography here, KingSargent. The Pacific is a big ocean. In order to supply their garrisons on Pacific islands, the Japanese had to use ships, which represented concentrated targets traveling for days on the ocean without air cover. Given the advantages of codebreaking and radar-equipped maritime patrol aircraft, it was possible for USN to interdict Japanese supplies to the more remote islands almost totally.

 

Sicily is separated from Italy by the Strait of Messina, which is less than 2 miles wide at the narrowest point, and only 3.2 miles at Messina. Railways and roads can be used for the rest of the supply route, and experience has shown that it is very difficult to interdict supply routes on land, even on peninsulars like Italy, by airpower alone. Furthermore, the before Sicily was taken, the Axis had airbases and aircraft in Sicily and elsewhere covering the supply route to Sicily, and Allied airpower was limited in its effect by distance and Axis defenses.

 

In short, if you really wanted to isolate Sicily from supplies and reinforcements before invading, you probably would have needed to wait a year or so and build up the equivalent of Eighth Air Force in North Africa first, to take care of Axis airpower in the Med and destroy the Axis communications. It would certainly have made the invasion of Sicily less risky, but was that worth the wait?

 

The Navies could have isolated Sicily, but they were afraid to (OK, OK, 'excessively cautious') without air cover.

A major lesson of the war in the Pacific was that ships without air cover were terribly vulnerable. I thought that you were complaining that ETO disregarded lessens of SWPA and PTO. Now you are complaining because the navies had learned the primary lesson of the naval war in the Pacific.

 

Hojutsuka

[KingSargent]

Sorry, I was trying to get out of the office at a decent time so failed to finish my thought. Part of the problem is that "docks" were not really neccessary to the evacuation, the MFP, Siebels, motor rafts and so on were able to load and unload over beaches and did. The target was reasonably dispersed.

The target was in a narrow body of water, not a huge area.

 

And "THE interdiction" effort included....as I already said....ports on the mainland, intially, to keep stuff from getting to Sicily, airfields throughout the Med - a MAJOR effort, railroads - to keep stuff from getting to the ports, and so on. And of course the strategic missions. Lots of targets, big area, all of a sudden all those aircraft don't seem to be very many.

Why spread the effort up and down the boot? Messina is the choke point that must be passed. And WHAT "strategic missions?"

 

And mines are pretty hit or miss, along about the time they would be getting a decent density the evacuation would be over - it simply didn't take very long - and then the Allies get to figure out how they cross at Messina....with all those mines in the way.

1. The Allies did not HAVE to cross at Messina.

2. Keeping the Germans from getting away would have helped subsequent ops in Italy immensely.

 

Er, NO? "Minor" means "minor', as in "lesser, as in size, extent, or importance." A "maximum effort" in terms of Allied air operations in World War II is quite different.

Semantics aside, you stated that the Allied effort seemed minor in comparison to the resources available.

 

Escorting bombers and fighter bombers (which BTW are included in the fighter sorties). But there just weren't many Allied fighter bombers at this time, about 150 A-36 and some P-40, most of the Allied fighters were either dedicated interceptors or escorts still.

I wasn't talking fighter-bombers, I was talking fighters providing air cover and intercepting German attacks on the invasion beaches and fleets and covering hypothetical Allied fleet intervention at Messina.

 

But if you really want to act childish I'll see if I can find out where the fighter missions went?

I was quite serious, not childish. BTW, the deliberate misspellings were borrowed from an earlier post.

In any case, Morison said that the USN's spotter floatplanes were shot at by US gunners because they assumed anything in the air was enemy. Ditto the C-47 shoot-down - coming in right after an unopposed (by air forces) raid and having no warning that US planes would be about the gunners just shot at anything moving in the sky.

 

Childishness doesn't become you.

It is childish to say that MAYBE having a few Allied planes overhead helping out from time to time would have encouraged the gunners to perform a little aircraft recognition drill before firing?

 

Er, this from the guy that rants and raves - periodically - about how crazy it was for the Marines to attack "tough nuts" in the Pacific?

I rant and rave about attacking "tough nuts" that did not have to be taken to further the war effort. I have no problem with a hard job, but I object to UNNECESSARY hard jobs.

 

And are you bitching about what was coming in - where the major interdiction effort went, in June and July - or coming out? Make up your mind.

I am bitching about both. There should have been NO* traffic either way across Messina.

 

*I fully realize that stopping ALL traffic would be nearly impossible, but a lot more went both ways than should have if the Allies were serious about interdicting Sicily. IMHO, if Sicily was important enough to drop seven divisions on to play 'hey diddle diddle, straight up the middle," the Navies and AFs should have helped out a bit more. About the only spark of inventiveness I see was Patton's minor amphib end runs on the north coast, and those could have been better - they were pretty spur of the moment ad hoc affairs.

[KingSargent]

Unless we had figured out a way to keep our air power constantly overhead, day and night in mid-1943 [i think not] one was not going to stop an evacuation that really required little transit time. I have steamed through the "Strait" of Messina on a DD, admittedly at night, and it is a tight fit, seemingly a stone's throw to either side. There must have been numerous loading/landing points and the transit at 10 Kts must not have been over 15 minutes. It was not going to be stopped, just harrassed. After all, when did such a feat of arms by air power ever occur.....E5M is still waiting, it would seem.

Your point.

 

However it obviously was not going to be stopped with the effort expended, and further resources were in theater. IOW, they could have tried and chalked up a more informative failure.

[KingSargent]

Can you provide any actual statistics to show that given the aircraft available, deploying them differently would have made a major difference?

Of course not. One cannot statistically compare something that happened with something that did not.

MAYBE the AFs did not have the planes available, but we can't know because their operational methods ensured that whatever a/c were available would not be used to assist ground or naval operations.

 

A few fighters over the island? Are you thinking of F-15s?

Not hardly, I am thinking about the planes that were in range and available that weren't there.

 

There were more than a few Allied fighters flying over Sicily on 12 July 1942, but they were mostly over Syracuse and Gela.

Right Brits got (some) air cover.

 

World War II day fighters were limited in the airspace they could try to dominate by the range of the Mk 1 Eyeball, or if they were lucky enough to have radar-aided fighter direction, the effective range of the surface-based radar.

There were fighter-direction ships with the landing forces. They don't have to dominate all that much airspace. The areas the Germans were attacking was fairly limited in scope.

 

Since FJR 3 landed at Catania, well behind the Axis lines, no radar-aided ground fighter direction was available. So the only realistic way to make the aerial reinforcement by FJR3 "a tad uncomfortable" would have been to have a standing CAP of Allied fighters over the area.

Right, and the fighters were available, including night-fighting Beaufighters. I am not sure of the routes flown by the FJRs, but IF they came in over the north coast they could have been picked up by one of the above-mentioned FDC ships while well out at sea.

 

A standing CAP is expensive, and 12 July is D+2. I doubt that many Allied fighter units were operational on Sicilian airfields on D+2, and whatever ones were operational would have as first priority air cover over the beachheads and the advancing ground units (after all, they were whingeing according to you ). The Royal Navy had used escort carriers (which would have been unnecessary if fighters could have provided sufficient CAP over Sicily from North African airfields) to provide air cover for the landings, but escort carriers were limited in operational endurance (remember the British modifications to reduce vulnerability of their escort carriers by reducing the avgas storage, and even more critical, the operational losses of Seafires flying from escort carriers were very high).

The only one who recognized the problem at an early stage and tried to do something about it was Patton who wanted Ranger and TORCH-like support. He didn't get it.

 

Furthermore, unless the Allies had ULTRA intelligence, there was no reason to assume that FJR3 would parachute in at Catania, as opposed to some other airfield in Sicily.

I did not say interception would be sure or simple. I am saying that just MAYBE an interception might have taken place or just MAYBE some sover the island would have deterred the Germans from even trying to fly in the FJRs. I can't say it would certainly have worked, you cannot say it would certainly have NOT worked, because the MAAF HQ had made it quite clear in the planning stages (that they did not participate in) that they would do nothing of the sort.

 

Finally, there was a very good reason for the Allies to NOT put a CAP over Catania on 12 July. The British 8th Army was planning to seize the Primasole Bridge just south of Catania on July 13, using Lathbury's 1st Parachute Brigade. It was thus important to avoid alerting the Axis forces in vicinity of Catania by too much air activity.

Perhaps if there had been more air activity, the Axis might have been used to it and not alerted by an increase?

 

 

I think you are ignoring geography here, KingSargent. The Pacific is a big ocean. In order to supply their garrisons on Pacific islands, the Japanese had to use ships, which represented concentrated targets traveling for days on the ocean without air cover. Given the advantages of codebreaking and radar-equipped maritime patrol aircraft, it was possible for USN to interdict Japanese supplies to the more remote islands almost totally.

Yes the Pacific is a big ocean. However, many of the islands are quite close together. After the problems they had on a constantly-reinforced Guadalcanal, the rest of the advance up the Solomons chain at least attempted (largely successfully) to interdict the target islands.

In the Central Pacific one example should suffice (that's all you're getting anyhow). After Tarawa was taken at cost, there were four other Japanese-held islands with air bases and garrisons fairly near. Conveniently they were arranged sort of in a square, and in the middle of the square was a nice empty atoll called Majuro (there may have been a squad of IJA on the atoll). The USN moved into Majuro, developed a nice fleet base and replenishment facility, and built airfields from which the occupied islands could be interdicted and kept them isolated for the rest of the war. After the war had moved on a bit, new air units were given 'live-fire breakin training' and that sufficed to keep up the isolation.

 

Sicily is separated from Italy by the Strait of Messina, which is less than 2 miles wide at the narrowest point, and only 3.2 miles at Messina. Railways and roads can be used for the rest of the supply route, and experience has shown that it is very difficult to interdict supply routes on land, even on peninsulars like Italy, by airpower alone. Furthermore, the before Sicily was taken, the Axis had airbases and aircraft in Sicily and elsewhere covering the supply route to Sicily, and Allied airpower was limited in its effect by distance and Axis defenses.

Where did I say it would be easy? I am saying that available resources were NOT used and that MAAF's attitude was that the resources would not be used to cooperate with other services. Period.

 

In short, if you really wanted to isolate Sicily from supplies and reinforcements before invading, you probably would have needed to wait a year or so and build up the equivalent of Eighth Air Force in North Africa first, to take care of Axis airpower in the Med and destroy the Axis communications. It would certainly have made the invasion of Sicily less risky, but was that worth the wait?

Well, I wouldn't have gone to Sicily in the first place, but nothing else was really feasible in 1943 and it was politically impossible to wait. So if they were going to have a major effort, why starve it, and then allow MAAF to underutilize the resources they HAD?

 

A major lesson of the war in the Pacific was that ships without air cover were terribly vulnerable.

More to the point it was even more apparent in the Med.

 

I thought that you were complaining that ETO disregarded lessens of SWPA and PTO.

Only in regards to the necessity to interdict an island you want to take.

 

Now you are complaining because the navies had learned the primary lesson of the naval war in the Pacific.

No, I am saying that having become aware of the lesson, they inserted opposable digits in anal sphincters and rotated. IOW, they didn't try to address the problem; or rather those who DID try to address it were scuppered by the intransigence of MAAF.

 

This thread is about "did the MAAF have an excuse?" As should be clear by now, IMHO MAAF was responsible for just about everything that went wrong.

[Rich]

The target was in a narrow body of water, not a huge area.

 

The "target" I was referring to, and which you appeared to be addressing, was the facilities for getting men, equipment and supplies onto vessels that would get them off Sicily. You referred over and over again to "docks" when a large part of that operation occurred over beaches, the vessels emplyed to a large extent did not require "docks." And yes, the seas are very narrow there, which made the trip short and the vessels fleeting - and very well protected - targets. It was quite possible the densist concentration of flak in the war.

 

Why spread the effort up and down the boot? Messina is the choke point that must be passed. And WHAT "strategic missions?"

Messina as a "port" was and still is more closely associated with Naples, Villa san Giovanni and Regio di Calabria were ferry stops for local traffic. But deepwater traffic and the majority of shipping going to Sicily was via Naples. And they had some success, between 13 May and 17 August they managed to sink 129 and damage 102 vessels.

 

1. The Allies did not HAVE to cross at Messina.

2. Keeping the Germans from getting away would have helped subsequent ops in Italy immensely.

 

1. No, but it was a whole lot easier than anything else and it was also what they were planning on.

2. Yep, but the only way that would have been likely is if they had landed closer to Messina and cut off the German retreat by land. Given the circumstances pushing them off the island towards Messina virtually guarateed some, if not all, would escape.

 

Semantics aside, you stated that the Allied effort seemed minor in comparison to the resources available.

I guess I got to stop rushing my answers? The point is that the Allied air effort - in toto seems minor compared to the assets they had available. If you look at the sortie figures, 192 B-17s and 240 B-24 managed to get off 3,242 effective sorties in July, which is barely over a quarter sortie per aircraft per day. And 580 light and medium bombers only managed barely a quarter sorties per aircraft per day as well?

 

Or to look at it another way, USAAF interdiction operations 2-29 July totaled 7,610 sorties. There were only 7,439 bomber sorties during all of July and the majority of the fighter bomber sorties were flown as interdiction (1,590), so about 7,610 of about 9,029 bombing sorties were flown in support of HUSKY.

 

So even though the resources appear large, the evidence is that they were having problems generating operations, which leads me to suspect that it wasn't simply air force intransigence and stupidity at work. And even though it may not have been large in terms of number of sorties, the majority of the operations were supporting HUSKY.

 

I wasn't talking fighter-bombers, I was talking fighters providing air cover and intercepting German attacks on the invasion beaches and fleets and covering hypothetical Allied fleet intervention at Messina.

 

Again, the problem appears to be more than simple air force mulishness. XII Air Support Command was assigned to support Seventh Army and II Corps for the invasion (and yes, it was an "Air Support Command" just like it sounds, although the concept disappeared from USAAF shortly to be replaced later in 1944 by Tactical Air Commands). It actually had 441 aircraft, 152 fighters (Spitfires and P-40), 52 reconnaissance, observation and liaison aircraft (P-51, P-38 and odds and ends), 150 fighter bombers (A-36), and 114 bombers (B-26). But during the entire campaign, 39 days, they only managed to get off 916 sorties total, and only 90 fighter sorties.

 

I was quite serious, not childish. BTW, the deliberate misspellings were borrowed from an earlier post.

It may have just been too late for me, but it was starting to sound like you were the little kid that believes something has to be the way they want it to be, because that's the way they want it to be.

 

In any case, Morison said that the USN's spotter floatplanes were shot at by US gunners because they assumed anything in the air was enemy. Ditto the C-47 shoot-down - coming in right after an unopposed (by air forces) raid and having no warning that US planes would be about the gunners just shot at anything moving in the sky.

 

Er, you need to re-read the action reports, the first air attack on CENT was at 0430 10 July, followed at 2215 11 July by a larger attack. DIME was hit at 0458 10 July (sinking Maddox), Murphy was damaged by attacks during the day, and Lst-313 was bombed and sunk at dusk. On 11 July between 2150 and 2300 was the heaviest raids; it was on the tailend of those that the 52nd TCW flew in.

 

But the problem for the SOCs were German fighters launching from Gerbini.

 

It is childish to say that MAYBE having a few Allied planes overhead helping out from time to time would have encouraged the gunners to perform a little aircraft recognition drill before firing?

Er, there were "a few"....that was the problem. Specifically on 10 July there were morning fogs at Pantalleria that delayed launching and the distance involved made it almost impossible to maintain standing patrolls.

 

I rant and rave about attacking "tough nuts" that did not have to be taken to further the war effort. I have no problem with a hard job, but I object to UNNECESSARY hard jobs.

 

But how was Sicily "easy"?

 

I am bitching about both. There should have been NO* traffic either way across Messina.

 

*I fully realize that stopping ALL traffic would be nearly impossible, but a lot more went both ways than should have if the Allies were serious about interdicting Sicily. IMHO, if Sicily was important enough to drop seven divisions on to play 'hey diddle diddle, straight up the middle," the Navies and AFs should have helped out a bit more. About the only spark of inventiveness I see was Patton's minor amphib end runs on the north coast, and those could have been better - they were pretty spur of the moment ad hoc affairs.[/b]

 

You say there should have been "NO traffic" at the same time you say it was "nearly impossible" to do that? Do you see why I'm starting to envisage a four year-old?

Edited November 9, 2007 by Rich

[KingSargent]

The "target" I was referring to, and which you appeared to be addressing, was the facilities for getting men, equipment and supplies onto vessels that would get them off Sicily. You referred over and over again to "docks" when a large part of that operation occurred over beaches, the vessels emplyed to a large extent did not require "docks." And yes, the seas are very narrow there, which made the trip short and the vessels fleeting - and very well protected - targets. It was quite possible the densist concentration of flak in the war.

I have never argued that Messina wasn't a tough target. I can understand the MAAF being reluctant to go there. I don't imagine the Yank and CW grunts were too thrilled to be doing what amounted to frontal assaults against entrenched troops in rough terrain either - but they had to.

 

Messina as a "port" was and still is more closely associated with Naples, Villa san Giovanni and Regio di Calabria were ferry stops for local traffic.

Not entirely germane, but AFAIK Naples traffic went to Palermo until Patton took it (not that there was much since the landings).

 

But deepwater traffic and the majority of shipping going to Sicily was via Naples. And they had some success, between 13 May and 17 August they managed to sink 129 and damage 102 vessels.

Any idea how accurate those claims are? Are they from what pilots said at the time or from Axis records of losses available post-war? Finally, do you have any data on how many got through - IOW, what was the percentage of loss?

 

1. No, but it was a whole lot easier than anything else and it was also what they were planning on.

Erm, when were they planning this? I was under the impression that Sicily got sold as a stand-alone op that did NOT commit to further advance into Italy.

Granted it was pretty easy to cross at Messina, that's why Monty got that job and the Yanks (with ca.50% British troops) got Salerno.

 

2. Yep, but the only way that would have been likely is if they had landed closer to Messina and cut off the German retreat by land. Given the circumstances pushing them off the island towards Messina virtually guarateed some, if not all, would escape.

I'll agree, provided the "circumstances" include less than 100% effort by MAAF. Expanding the thread a bit, that brings us to the question of the overall planning. IMHO the original plan that had Patton landing on the NW corner and Monty landing on the S and SW coast was a better one than what it turned into. The "all in one area Monty Plan" guaranteed a slow frontal assault. Taking Palermo and Syracuse both early and advancing along both coasts would seem preferable to going up the middle.

 

I guess I got to stop rushing my answers? The point is that the Allied air effort - in toto seems minor compared to the assets they had available. If you look at the sortie figures, 192 B-17s and 240 B-24 managed to get off 3,242 effective sorties in July, which is barely over a quarter sortie per aircraft per day. And 580 light and medium bombers only managed barely a quarter sorties per aircraft per day as well?

 

Or to look at it another way, USAAF interdiction operations 2-29 July totaled 7,610 sorties. There were only 7,439 bomber sorties during all of July and the majority of the fighter bomber sorties were flown as interdiction (1,590), so about 7,610 of about 9,029 bombing sorties were flown in support of HUSKY.

1. USAAF wasn't the only AF involved. (Or if they were what was the RAF doing and why was the RAF in high command slots?)

2. What does "flown in support of HUSKY" mean? Does this include raids up the Italian boot which "supported HUSKY" in the same way that 8thAAF raids on Germany supported HUSKY?

 

So even though the resources appear large, the evidence is that they were having problems generating operations, which leads me to suspect that it wasn't simply air force intransigence and stupidity at work. And even though it may not have been large in terms of number of sorties, the majority of the operations were supporting HUSKY.

Which does not negate the AF's stated plans NOT to cooperate but to "do there own thang." Even if the AFs had managed 100% operational capability it would mean nothing if their HQ wouldn't send them where they were needed.

 

Again, the problem appears to be more than simple air force mulishness. XII Air Support Command was assigned to support Seventh Army and II Corps for the invasion (and yes, it was an "Air Support Command" just like it sounds, although the concept disappeared from USAAF shortly to be replaced later in 1944 by Tactical Air Commands). It actually had 441 aircraft, 152 fighters (Spitfires and P-40), 52 reconnaissance, observation and liaison aircraft (P-51, P-38 and odds and ends), 150 fighter bombers (A-36), and 114 bombers (B-26). But during the entire campaign, 39 days, they only managed to get off 916 sorties total, and only 90 fighter sorties.

Might they have done better if MAAF had had the slightest interest in "Support?" ISTR that the TAFs originated to get "Support" away from AF HQs that wanted nothing to do with the concept. From the timing, I suspect dissatisfaction with MAAF's attitude and operations in HUSKY was a motivator for the change.

 

It may have just been too late for me, but it was starting to sound like you were the little kid that believes something has to be the way they want it to be, because that's the way they want it to be.

I was sounding like a little kid in sarcastic response to being called a whinger (not by you!) earlier in the thread.

 

Er, you need to re-read the action reports, the first air attack on CENT was at 0430 10 July, followed at 2215 11 July by a larger attack. DIME was hit at 0458 10 July (sinking Maddox), Murphy was damaged by attacks during the day, and Lst-313 was bombed and sunk at dusk. On 11 July between 2150 and 2300 was the heaviest raids; it was on the tailend of those that the 52nd TCW flew in.

And were there any AF planes over the fleet or beaches during these attacks?

 

But the problem for the SOCs were German fighters launching from Gerbini.

Let's see... in operations in other areas, enemy fighters were kept away from the spotters by Allied fighters operating in the area (or completely isolating it as at NEPTUNE).

 

Er, there were "a few"....that was the problem. Specifically on 10 July there were morning fogs at Pantalleria that delayed launching and the distance involved made it almost impossible to maintain standing patrolls.

But were there any patrols planned? You can't blame weather for canceling ops if no one (read MAAF) planned to do those ops anyway.

 

But how was Sicily "easy"?

It wasn't. Given the strategic imperative at the time it was essential. This is hardly in the same category as frontal assaults on Pacific beaches that could be easily by-passed.

The Marianas weren't easy, but they had to be done since the whole Pacific strategy hinged on getting B-29 bases. But the Marianas would have been a lot easier if they were done in 1943 instead of operations in the Gilberts and Marshalls that netted nothing that occupying undefended islands would have done. The Japanese were falling back from defense line to defense line and building the next while we obligingly banged our noses on the line in the way. Simply bypassing the defense lines and going for the gusto (before those islands were fortified) would have prevented hard targets from becoming hard targets.

So what I bitch about is hard jobs that didn't have to be hard jobs - or jobs at all. Hard jobs with a good reason are what I have always been there for.

 

You say there should have been "NO traffic" at the same time you say it was "nearly impossible" to do that? Do you see why I'm starting to envisage a four year-old?

I was acknowledging that the NO TRAFFIC goal would have been impossible to completely meet, but it was the goal that should have been set and that more effort should have been expended trying to meet it.

For one thing, if blocking the Strait of Messina had been an ongoing task, possibly someone might have noticed the withdrawal going on? Assuming the Axis went ahead with withdrawal plans with an in-place gauntlet to run.

[Rich]

Sorry to be so long getting back, it's been a busy Armistace Day weekend. Haven't had much time to enjoy myself.

 

I have never argued that Messina wasn't a tough target. I can understand the MAAF being reluctant to go there. I don't imagine the Yank and CW grunts were too thrilled to be doing what amounted to frontal assaults against entrenched troops in rough terrain either - but they had to.

 

Agreed....in part. The problems though were manifold. The Allied air forces were operating at the limits of their range, Malta was 275 kilometers and Pantelleria 350 kilometers from the target; easy for the light, medium, and heavy bombers, problematic for anything else. And the bombers simply weren't accurate enough to have an effect on shipping....they were all level bombers. Then, to boot, even if they could have attacked from lower levels the results may have been nearly suicidal, every time I look at it I'm amazed at the numbers of antiaircraft weapons concentrated around the straits, Basically, in a box roughly 10 by 20 kilometers (200 sq, km.) there were:

 

Italian antiaircraft defenses consisted of:

13 102mm batteries

56 90mm batteries

73 76mm batteries

13 75mm batteries

18 37mm batteries (German equipment)

47 20mm batteries (German and Italian equipment)

With 664 heavy guns and 292 light and medium guns. Reportedly about half the 102mm batteries were in fixed defenses along the coast and were lost, as were many of the 76mm and 75mm batteries, but supposedly most of the 90mm batteries were mobile. Lets be conservative and assume half the heavy guns and one-third the light guns were lost in the retreat to Messina. So 146 heavy and 193 light and medium guns.

 

The Germans had another 333 88mm guns and 140 20mm and 37mm guns. So at least 479 heavy guns and 333 light and medium guns....not including the guns on the MFP and Siebels and those brought in from northern and central Italy to cover the withdrawal. It may be the highest concentration of the war?

 

And then of course the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica were a lot closer to their bases too.

 

Not entirely germane, but AFAIK Naples traffic went to Palermo until Patton took it (not that there was much since the landings).

 

Any idea how accurate those claims are? Are they from what pilots said at the time or from Axis records of losses available post-war? Finally, do you have any data on how many got through - IOW, what was the percentage of loss?

 

I didn't look closely either, the evacuation routes were pretty well dispersed, they were actually (from south to north):

 

Taormina-Occhio

Ali-Occhio

Pte Schiava-Occhio

Galati-Occhio

Pistrina-Gallica

Messina-Villa san Giovanni

Beaches north of Messina (two major embarkation points)-Gallico and Carone

Ganziri-Villa san Giovanni

Torre Faro - Villa san Giovanni

 

So the targets were dispersed, but of course the guns could be pre-sited to cover them.

 

I'm still trying to figure out how close that is to the number of vessels lost. Of the sunk 35 were dumb barges, 10 were MFP, and 1 was a Siebel, all of those are hard to confirm. But I've run into at least 6 "large" freighters reported sunk by the Axis, versus the 9 in the total I gave. I'll try to dig into it a bit more.

 

Erm, when were they planning this? I was under the impression that Sicily got sold as a stand-alone op that did NOT commit to further advance into Italy.

Granted it was pretty easy to cross at Messina, that's why Monty got that job and the Yanks (with ca.50% British troops) got Salerno.

 

I'll agree, provided the "circumstances" include less than 100% effort by MAAF. Expanding the thread a bit, that brings us to the question of the overall planning. IMHO the original plan that had Patton landing on the NW corner and Monty landing on the S and SW coast was a better one than what it turned into. The "all in one area Monty Plan" guaranteed a slow frontal assault. Taking Palermo and Syracuse both early and advancing along both coasts would seem preferable to going up the middle.

 

It was pretty much a given IIRC by the end of July, midway through the campaign, that the Allies would at least seize the Foggia airfield complexes. It's interesting how much Allied strategy was actually governed by at need to aquire airbases. I don't think anyone was fooling themselves that they were going to stand pat in Sicily....momentum, maintain the initiative and all that.

 

BTW, the Messina crossing may have been easy, but they also did BAYTOWN as well, and Salerno would have been effective if it hadn't been so obvious and 29. Pz.-Gren. and 1. Fs.J.D. hadn't been so good at delaying actions.

 

But given the distance for land-based air and the lack of carrier air, there was no way that Patton's plan was going to be accepted, and it was quickly shelved. And who says that MAAF did not give 100 percent? It's pretty evident they didn't maintain a very high sortie rate during July and August, but it was little different han the months before or after...so?

 

1. USAAF wasn't the only AF involved. (Or if they were what was the RAF doing and why was the RAF in high command slots?)

 

What does "flown in support of HUSKY" mean? Does this include raids up the Italian boot which "supported HUSKY" in the same way that 8thAAF raids on Germany supported HUSKY?

 

Er, yeah, but it's the one I have the more complete data on and they comprised about half the strength....so?

 

USSAF Interdiction Missions:

 

2-8 July - 378 - all flown to Sicily

9-15 July - 2,491 - all except 204 (flown to Italy, mostly Naples port facilities) to Sicily

16-22 July - 1,170, all except 321 flown to Italy (railyards and Naples port again), the 321 went to Sicily

23-29 July - 473, 316 to Sicily, 157 to Italy

Total 4,512, so 66.5 percent to Sicily.

 

During the same period strikes against airfields included 2,028 against Sicily, 1,032 against Italy, 238 against Sardinia, so 3,298, so Sicily was 61.5 percent of the total.

 

Which does not negate the AF's stated plans NOT to cooperate but to "do there own thang." Even if the AFs had managed 100% operational capability it would mean nothing if their HQ wouldn't send them where they were needed.

 

Not quite what was said, but it's the way the Army and Navy heard it. The Air Forces (RAF) tried to 'splain they wuze at the end of their endurance and the navies had committed all escort carrier resources to the Atlantic temporarily, to paraphrase you, the Army and Navy were given a tough task and should have gotten on with it, understanding the limits of the support they could expect. And if they didn't like it, they needed to come up with a plan to account for it. Sometimes I think they all enjoyed the qvetching, it gave everyone fuel for stoking the fire of the budgetary fights.

 

Might they have done better if MAAF had had the slightest interest in "Support?" ISTR that the TAFs originated to get "Support" away from AF HQs that wanted nothing to do with the concept. From the timing, I suspect dissatisfaction with MAAF's attitude and operations in HUSKY was a motivator for the change.

 

"Interest" doesn't increase endurance, doesn't increase turnaround times, doesn't reduce pilot fatigue from flying repeated, long over water flights.

 

But the support commands went away because they didn't work too well, the headquarters and ground echelon ISTR was too big and unresponsive, that was one of the lessons of the campaign? And it was awkward too, since it had a medium and/or light bomber component stuck into it, which was good for interdiction but poor for close support. The response was the TAC, which was heavier on flying assets, while a lot of the ground staff and admin was pushed up or laterally, to allow the TAC HQ to concentrate on flying missions. So Ninth Air Force had a large HQ, maintenance, support, air defense, and engineer components, and a separate medium and light bomber component as a separate air command, but its TACs essentially comprised a wing HQ and fighter bombers as flying units.

 

I was sounding like a little kid in sarcastic response to being called a whinger (not by you!) earlier in the thread.

 

S'okay, guess I've been reading too much whining of late? Sorry.

 

And were there any AF planes over the fleet or beaches during these attacks?

 

Nope, or at best not much, since most were executed at night or twilight, and the MAAF nightfighter assets sucked, al of 48 aircraft on hand, and IIRC a poor serviceability, the early airborne radars were finicky. And the fighters - except the few P-38, all had short legs.

 

Let's see... in operations in other areas, enemy fighters were kept away from the spotters by Allied fighters operating in the area (or completely isolating it as at NEPTUNE).

 

But were there any patrols planned? You can't blame weather for canceling ops if no one (read MAAF) planned to do those ops anyway.

 

In other operations the AO was closer to the base area, the aircraft had longer legs, the base area was better developed, or there were carriers available....or all of the above. That wasn't the case with HUSKY.

 

Few to no standing patrols were attempted, it would have been a good way to burn up gas for little purpose. There were large scale strikes planned, including ones to suppress the German airfields, which would have included fighter cover, but the weather delays pretty much screwed that.

 

It wasn't. Given the strategic imperative at the time it was essential. This is hardly in the same category as frontal assaults on Pacific beaches that could be easily by-passed.

 

The Marianas weren't easy, but they had to be done since the whole Pacific strategy hinged on getting B-29 bases. But the Marianas would have been a lot easier if they were done in 1943 instead of operations in the Gilberts and Marshalls that netted nothing that occupying undefended islands would have done. The Japanese were falling back from defense line to defense line and building the next while we obligingly banged our noses on the line in the way. Simply bypassing the defense lines and going for the gusto (before those islands were fortified) would have prevented hard targets from becoming hard targets.

So what I bitch about is hard jobs that didn't have to be hard jobs - or jobs at all. Hard jobs with a good reason are what I have always been there for.

 

Why was it any more "strategically imperative" than any Pacific island? You've argued the "opening shipping lanes" deal was a scam? Was there a critical ned for Sicilian airfields? They were pretty crappy. Foggia? Means you got to get involved on the mainland of Europe before you're really ready. Why not Sardinia? They got it for a song and could base oodles of aircraft on it to hit northern Italy (where the only industry was), southern France and Germany....and could then threaten (dare I say it? ) a major invasion at La Spezia-Genoa. Why is it worth GIs or Tommies to seize a marginally useful island in the Med, but not worth it expending Marines for the same purpose in the Pacific?

 

I was acknowledging that the NO TRAFFIC goal would have been impossible to completely meet, but it was the goal that should have been set and that more effort should have been expended trying to meet it.

For one thing, if blocking the Strait of Messina had been an ongoing task, possibly someone might have noticed the withdrawal going on? Assuming the Axis went ahead with withdrawal plans with an in-place gauntlet to run.

 

I guess I've given you enough of a hard time about that contradiction, I'll let it go.

 

But blocking the "straits" - which really means the sealanes from the mainland to Sicily - was ongoing. By hitting what could be seen, which usually meant shore facilities and ships in port, since there simply wasn't the strength to put standing patrols up 24-7 looking for coasters. And given the lack of night and all weather aircraft (what there was was committed to the Bay of Biscay, frying what was considered to be bigger fish at the time) I don't think they would have had a very easy time "noticing"?