Joint German & French Operation

[DesertFox]

Assume that the Bismarck survives her run into the Atlantic and gets to Brest.

The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau are also there and British efforts to bomb them fail. All three are also joined by the Tirpitz.

 

Also, assume that the German are able to either capture the ships and crew themselves or find loyal Vishy French crews for the Richelieu, Dunkerque, and Strasbourg. Assume that the Jean Bart is not complete.

 

All seven Battleships and Battlecruisers sortie together (with whatever escorts are available) in Late 1941 (Call it November) to sweep the British merchant fleet and convoys from the Sea. With what the British can muster, can they stop his force?

[Marek Tucan]

Pull back convoys to ports, let Axis burn fuel, if all goes well, magnificent 7 finds empty ocean or, if loitering around for a long enough, it finds Home Fleet. Oh and since it's november already, they might meet Home Fleet plus USN Atlantic battle line (what was there back then?)...

 

Since the French ships, if crewed by Germans, will lack experience and when crewed by French, won't be so eager to fight for Germany, they won't be all that good asset in the engagement IMO. No need for outright desertion, but Admiral Benbow's trouble may appear - maybe even when encountering weaker opponent.

 

But getting French fleet in 1941 is too big an assumption IMO.

 

Btw how is Tirpitz going to get there? During summer? Nights short, RAF and RN alerted by Bismarck and on first notice of Tirpitz sailing they'd try their best to stop it cold and revenge Hood atleast this way if Bismarck is in safety for now... Or do you think Tirpitz meeting the rest at seas? Weather might be more favorable to sneak up but still it would have to pass GIUK gap.

[DesertFox]

Pull back convoys to ports, let Axis burn fuel, if all goes well, magnificent 7 finds empty ocean or, if loitering around for a long enough, it finds Home Fleet. Oh and since it's november already, they might meet Home Fleet plus USN Atlantic battle line (what was there back then?)...

 

Would the US get involved in such a thing, it seems a big step.

As well, wouldn't keeping the convoys in port severely hurt Great Britain?

 

Since the French ships, if crewed by Germans, will lack experience and when crewed by French, won't be so eager to fight for Germany, they won't be all that good asset in the engagement IMO. No need for outright desertion, but Admiral Benbow's trouble may appear - maybe even when encountering weaker opponent.

 

There is a full year and a half to work up.

 

But getting French fleet in 1941 is too big an assumption IMO.

 

Historically, the British were afraid of the French fleet falling into German hands

 

Btw how is Tirpitz going to get there? During summer? Nights short, RAF and RN alerted by Bismarck and on first notice of Tirpitz sailing they'd try their best to stop it cold and revenge Hood atleast this way if Bismarck is in safety for now... Or do you think Tirpitz meeting the rest at seas? Weather might be more favorable to sneak up but still it would have to pass GIUK gap.

 

Maybe a spoiler, have the twins deploy to get British attention. While that occurs, Tirpitz

 

One little change, assume that the Graff Zeppelin is completed and manages to join the combined force (assuming that Goring is fought successfully) and has embarked 30 fighters to protect the combined fleet.

[67th Tigers]

Pull back convoys to ports, let Axis burn fuel, if all goes well, magnificent 7 finds empty ocean or, if loitering around for a long enough, it finds Home Fleet. Oh and since it's november already, they might meet Home Fleet plus USN Atlantic battle line (what was there back then?)...

 

Atlantic Fleet, 7 Dec 41 (effective ships only):

 

Carriers

Ranger (in Caribean)

Yorktown (Norfolk)

Wasp (Bermuda)

 

Battleships

Arkansas, New York and Texas (New England)

New Mexico (Norfolk)

Mississippi and Idaho (Iceland)

 

Heavy Cruisers

Augusta (New England)

Tuscaloosa and Wichita (Iceland)

Quincy and Vincennes (escorting British troop convoy)

 

Without going to smaller ships that is, however, of note the fleet at Iceland has another 8 DD

 

Thus, the USN if they intervened had 2 BB, 2 CA and 8 DD immediately available at Iceland

[Marek Tucan]

Would the US get involved in such a thing, it seems a big step.

 

USN was already under orders to attack German submarines by November, so I'd expect Neutrality Patrol with rather loose regulations in case of encountering weaker German adversary (if the raid is to succeed in finding enemy, the force is inevitably to split up). Plus US DD's were already on part of the route in escorts - how would the US react to yet another DD destroyed by Germans? Washington and North Carolina were on shakedown in Caribbean by that time and North Carolina was ending this assignment, won't it be called upon to reinforce Atlantic fleet's battleline should threat of such a large-scale incursion to US zone of interest arise?

 

As well, wouldn't keeping the convoys in port severely hurt Great Britain?

It would. Having major naval combatants run in North Atlantic winter weather, burning fuel and taking damage, plus possibly being encountered with enemy heavy units, would OTOH hurt Germany as well.

 

There is a full year and a half to work up.

 

Depends on date of seizure - from the initial post I got the idea of ad hoc seizure for this sortie, ie generally after Bismarck sails to St Nazaire. Plus anyway these ships would have to pass Gibraltar.

 

Historically, the British were afraid of the French fleet falling into German hands

Historically, Allies were afraid of Alpenfestung If Germans seized them earlier, I'd expect Home Fleet reinforcing Force H in order to be able to tackle them in the strait - if such a large incursion is feared I don't know whether Churchill would push for that morale booster of PoW plus Repulse in Singapore.

 

Maybe a spoiler, have the twins deploy to get British attention. While that occurs, Tirpitz

 

Depends where you do deploy them - if just maneuvers off port or short-range incursion, I doubt they!ll get the attention. If long-range mission, then they are in danger of having to confront the enemy. Since this topic is full of assumptions, assume that one of escort destroyers of ambushed convoy, facing unbeatable odds, goes Glowworm on one of Twins

 

One little change, assume that the Graff Zeppelin is completed and manages to join the combined force (assuming that Goring is fought successfully) and has embarked 30 fighters to protect the combined fleet.

 

Then I'd assume Pound will burst a vessel from the stress and be replaced with someone more capable Graf Zeppelin was assumed to be 85% complete in May 41, IOW even if miraculously finished for Nov 41, it'd be fresh ship with fresh air group and even if Göring is pressed to free up some aircrafts for it, any launch would have to be consulted with him I'd suggest keeping assumptions to ships already operational

[hojutsuka]

Assume that the Bismarck survives her run into the Atlantic and gets to Brest.

The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau are also there and British efforts to bomb them fail. All three are also joined by the Tirpitz.

 

Also, assume that the German are able to either capture the ships and crew themselves or find loyal Vishy French crews for the Richelieu, Dunkerque, and Strasbourg. Assume that the Jean Bart is not complete.

 

All seven Battleships and Battlecruisers sortie together (with whatever escorts are available) in Late 1941 (Call it November) to sweep the British merchant fleet and convoys from the Sea. With what the British can muster, can they stop his force?

IMHO this scenario is a non-starter.

 

Quite aside from the difficulties the Germans face in getting the French ships under their control and assembling them in French naval ports on the Atlantic (already noted by others that have replied), the scenario assumes that the seven ships could be successfully based at French ports for raids on the Atlantic convoys. This is demonstrably false.

 

Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were based at French ports between 22 March 1941 and 11 February 1942 (when they left for Germany, the famous "Channel Dash"). During this period, the RAF made repeated attacks on the ships. While RAF losses were fairly heavy, the damage from the continuous attacks prevented the Germans from attempting another operation such as the one between February and March 1941, when the two ships sunk or captured 22 ships totaling 115,000 tons. The return of Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prinz Eugen to Germany via the Channel was in fact an acknowledgement by the Germans that they could not successfully base their capital ships at French Atlantic ports.

 

Having more than twice the number of capital ships in French ports simply increases the chances that the RAF bombs will hit a capital ship. And Bismarck. Tirpitz, and Richelieu were very large ships that could only be docked at the Normandie Dock at St. Nazaire AFAIK. So if more than one of the big three had underwater damage from torpedo (Gneisenau was torpedoed 6 April 1941) or bombing (Scharnhorst had underwater damage resulting in 3000 tons of water aboard from 5 bomb hits on 24 July 1941) or mining, only one could be repaired at a time and the others would have to wait until the first one was out of the dock.

 

In short, basing seven capital ships in French Atlantic ports and having them all ready to sortie in one big operation is extremely unlikely to happen, given that the Germans could not even get Scharnhorst and Gneisenau repaired and ready to go on a joint operation.

 

Hojutsuka

[Pachy]

Historically, the British were afraid of the French fleet falling into German hands

History has proven this fear was largely unfounded. First, Pétain was never willing to get into active military co-operation. When Darlan authorized German planes to re-fuel in Syria on their way to Iraq, which was the closest Vichy every got to fighting alongside Germany, he got his fingers slapped. A few weeks later, as things were turning bad for Vichy troops in Syria, the idea of accepting help from nearby German forces was contemplated, but abandoned eventually.

 

But mostly, whatever wild promises Abbetz could make, I don't see any hint Hitler was willing to treat France other than like an enemy under control.

[Lambda]

History has proven this fear was largely unfounded. First, Pétain was never willing to get into active military co-operation. When Darlan authorized German planes to re-fuel in Syria on their way to Iraq, which was the closest Vichy every got to fighting alongside Germany, he got his fingers slapped. A few weeks later, as things were turning bad for Vichy troops in Syria, the idea of accepting help from nearby German forces was contemplated, but abandoned eventually.

 

But mostly, whatever wild promises Abbetz could make, I don't see any hint Hitler was willing to treat France other than like an enemy under control.

Well summed up. Also I don't see that enough French crews showing enough loyalty to the German cause to man all these ships. Not even mentioning anyone in the German chain of command trusting all-French crews an inch. Now sending them in numerical superiority in a joint raid with the best German capital ships? There's no knowing what could have crossed their minds. And before you ask, I don't thinkmixed French-German crews would have made much sense, be it in matters of manpower, training or internal politics.

Regarding harbor availability on the Atlantic coast, I'd like some confirmation that there were no other ports able to dock ships of this size (I'm thinking Brest mainly, but possibly Bordeaux, Le Havre, doubtfully Lorient and Cherbourg). That's just a thought, I have no idea how these ports looked like at the time, except that they were major military and/or civilian harbors.

Going astray a bit here, what about seizing and using those ships harbored at Mers-el-Kébir as well?

[DesertFox]

I think I can just explain the premise. It is basically the idea that virtually the worst nightmare of the British Navy could imagine came to pass. The Germans are able to get a fleet of fast battleships with support together.

 

The situation is not really suppose to be fair but be a nightmare. You are right in a lot of areas. The Germans quite likely would find it virtually impossible to fuel them and trying to shift some of the forces to Brest would be just as difficult.

 

Still, it sounds like something like what I am proposing was one of the British fears during World War II, at least the early part. Some cases realism seems to fly out the window.

[Marek Tucan]

Also I don't see that enough French crews showing enough loyalty to the German cause to man all these ships. Not even mentioning anyone in the German chain of command trusting all-French crews an inch.

 

And in the same time Vichy govt, even if it agreed to give the ships at German disposal, would for sure demand them being crewed by French sailors, it won't give the ships off to German crews... And then, on high seas, upon encounter with Allied battle line... I'd guess worst case for Allies would be French ships not joining the fight, best case French ships utilising distraction, throwing German liaison officers over the board and steaming to West Indies

 

Also what if Vichy uses "loan" of these ships as a wildcard to be allowed to send rest offleet to North Africa, farther from German hands? Then upon op. Torch, Allied navy suddenly getting major reinforcement instead these ships being sunk in Toulon?

[hojutsuka]

Regarding harbor availability on the Atlantic coast, I'd like some confirmation that there were no other ports able to dock ships of this size (I'm thinking Brest mainly, but possibly Bordeaux, Le Havre, doubtfully Lorient and Cherbourg). That's just a thought, I have no idea how these ports looked like at the time, except that they were major military and/or civilian harbors.

If anyone can come up with a list of available drydocks on the French Atlantic coast during the period, with dimensions of docks and approach channels*, I would be very interested.

 

In the meantime, we can consider what the Royal Navy thought about it.

 

On March 28, 1942, the British mounted a major raid on St. Nazaire (Operation Chariot - see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/St._Nazaire_Raid). Though casualties were heavy, the operation was considered a success because the Normandie dock was disabled for the duration of the war.

 

The Normandie dock was targeted because the Royal Navy feared that it could be used to support the Tirpitz if she were transferred to the French Atlantic ports. Note that if there were any other docks in French Atlantic ports which could have been used to repair the Tirpitz, disabling Normandie dock alone would have been pointless.

 

Hojutsuka

 

* The approach channel can be critical. Jean Bart was built at St. Nazaire in a construction drydock ("forme Caquot"), but this drydock could not have been used for repairs, as the channel to the Loire was too restricted. When Jean Bart left the drydock, the channel had to be specially dredged, and even though she was much lighter than when complete (she was missing the guns, turret machinery, and roof for her "B" turret, all her secondary guns except 5 twin 90mm AA which had been installed as an emergency measure, all fire control mechanisms, three out of her four 1500kw turbogenerators, etc.) and was carrying the bare minimum of consumables (only 125 tons of fuel, for example), she nevertheless went aground several times and was only freed with the aid of multiple tugs. Clearly, it would have been out of the question to use the "forme Caquot" to repair Jean Bart or the similarly sized Tirpitz after underwater damage, as then the ship would be drawing even more water than at normal full load.

[Lambda]

On March 28, 1942, the British mounted a major raid on St. Nazaire (Operation Chariot - see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/St._Nazaire_Raid). Though casualties were heavy, the operation was considered a success because the Normandie dock was disabled for the duration of the war.

 

The Normandie dock was targeted because the Royal Navy feared that it could be used to support the Tirpitz if she were transferred to the French Atlantic ports. Note that if there were any other docks in French Atlantic ports which could have been used to repair the Tirpitz, disabling Normandie dock alone would have been pointless.

Good point. Thinking about it, even a large military harbor like Brest doesn't currently appear to have drydocks fit for such large ships. For reference, the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz-Eugen cruisers were based there from 1941 onwards, but these were significantly lighter.