WWI where England sits it out

[glenn239]

We can then imagine Germany amending its plans accordingly, with the intent of keeping down the forces arrayed against it.

 

This boils down to Germany being granted a free hand in the east, in exchange for respecting British interests in the West. IMO, if Grey offers Germany the 1870 Treaty (ie, neutrality, or war against the violator of Belgium), then Germany would probably have accepted. My guess:

 

The immediate effect for Germany of a late declaration of British neutrality would be the dismissal of Moltke and his replacement with another general. Then, they’d rummage through the files and pull out the 1912 eastern mobilization plan, working over the course of days to make it fit the current situation as the call to arms continued. During this period, both the Kaiser and the Chancellor would be in a positively euphoric mood, the sudden British neutrality having cut through the diplomatic webs both perceived had entrapped Germany before the war. The Chancellor will attempt to secure a firm long-term arrangement with Great Britain, and the neutrality declaration will probably give him the upper hand with Tirpitz in the longstanding debate on the High Seas Fleet. The newfound British relationship will exceed in importance any temptation to aggrandize Germany via territorial conquest at Russia’s expense – the Germans will “play nice”.

 

In Paris, the immediate reaction would be disbelief, followed by shock and pure rage shortly thereafter. Then on its footsteps – fear. Joffre would advise strongly that either he receives a free hand in the Ardennes or he can not assure any chance of victory. Poincare will override any such consideration, and within 24 hours of the British declaration Paris will be begging St. Petersburg to reach an accord with Germany on the basis that they could not assure the French Army could tie down a sufficient number of Germans to prevent Russia’s defeat. Joffre would order the standard (not Belgian) variant to French mobilization, and continue preparations with the hope that Britain would come to her senses.

 

I don’t know if Russia would cave in immediately and ask Germany to revert to peacetime relations in exchange for a halt to mobilization. If not, then certainly the “G” Variant would be implemented, with all armies mustering deep inside Russian territory on the defensive. This would allow Conrad to continue with his overly-heavy concentration against Serbia. Bulgaria (and perhaps Italy) will enter the war against Serbia. Belgrade will undergo an experience that would make Sophia’s defeat in 1913 look like a V-Day parade. Serbia will emerge at about ½ her pre-war size.

 

Long term, I would hazard a guess that France, under pressure from Britain and Germany, will effectively cast off the Dual Alliance and mend fences with the colossus across the Rhine. Russia will recoil from her aggressive Balkans policy and revert to one more akin to the pre-1905 era. Bethmann will exploit the situation to try and mend fences with Russia as well as England, to place Germany closer to both than they were with each other. It is this aspect, the fine balance between Germany, Russia and England, that will place the greatest strain on the Anglo-German relationship.

 

In sum, my guess would be that Britain would wind up with France still on her side, a much better working relationship with Germany including some form of naval treaty, and on very bad terms with Russia. Germany and Britain become champions of the Ottoman Empire, with the primary British foreign policy challenge being to prevent Germany from being tempted to exploit France and Russia’s outward into the colonial sphere to Britain’s detriment. Look for Russia to fight Round 2 with Japan before 1920.

[zraver]

Firstly, nobody - absolutely nobody - has suggested that the RN would protect German merchantment. So what are you on about? Secondly, how is it in the interest of a neutral Britain? Fairly irrelevant to Britains interest, perhaps - but not positively beneficial.

You think Britain, the great champion of free trade & freedom of the seas, would impose a blockade on Germany? What you are saying, like Glenn, is that you can't accept the premise.

 

England a champion of free trade-hahahaha tell that to the American shipping they seized. The premise is England sits it out, not that England goes stupid.

 

A conquered France would certainly not be in Britains long-term interest, & nor would complete German domination of the Continent. But imposing a blockade on Germany would mean joining the war. There's no such thing as refusing to carry German trade - British shippers were free agents, & expected the RN to protect their freedom of navigation. For the government to bar them from trading with Germany (would have needed new legislation, which would have been interesting) would, in any case, merely have made a lot of Dutch & Danish harbours very busy with British ships - also expecting protection from the RN.

 

You're doing the same as Glenn. You're arguing against the premise of a neutral Britain, & therefore attacking any argument which starts from that assumption.

 

Where did I say England would impose a blockade, just refusing to carry German or German bound goods and lettign the French do as they will is not a blockade.

 

Your equating English neutrality with a total disregard for national interests, I find this flawed. An English non-involvement probably would have emerged much like America's trade with the Allies in 39/40. Decidedly one sided and serving a political goal.

[swerve]

England a champion of free trade-hahahaha tell that to the American shipping they seized.

 

Different case, different time, totally irrelevant.

 

The premise is England sits it out, not that England goes stupid.

What the hell is this supposed to mean?

 

Where did I say England would impose a blockade, just refusing to carry German or German bound goods and lettign the French do as they will is not a blockade.

 

Your equating English neutrality with a total disregard for national interests, I find this flawed. An English non-involvement probably would have emerged much like America's trade with the Allies in 39/40. Decidedly one sided and serving a political goal.

 

I explained that Britain couldn't refuse to carry German trade in the way you say, without violating the terms of neutrality. It would be require specific legislation, clearly directed against Germany, to give the government the power needed. Equally, "letting the French do as they will" without letting the Germans do the same (e.g. sailing the Hochseeflotte down the Channel bombarding French ports into rubble, as they could in 1914 if we'd let them, the French fleet being in the Med) would be a breach of neutrality.

 

I am not disregarding British national interests, merely not assuming that the interests of France & Britain are identical, which is what you clearly take for granted. What you propose, i.e. Britain aiding France without actually fighting was not sensible, & probably not possible. Unlike the USA in 1939-40, we were right next door to the war, & our political situation & system, & geography, didn't allow for us to pretend neutrality while selling arms exclusively to one side. In 1939-40, it was difficult for the USA to sell anything to Germany because of our blockade. We had no such cover to hide behind.

 

BTW, why do you think your proposed course of action would have been in British interests?

Edited November 10, 2007 by swerve

[zraver]

Different case, different time, totally irrelevant.

 

World war 1 same time frame not totally different very relevant.

 

What the hell is this supposed to mean?

Adding to German's war making ability is not in England's long term interests.

 

I explained that Britain couldn't refuse to carry German trade in the way you say, without violating the terms of neutrality. It would be require specific legislation, clearly directed against Germany, to give the government the power needed. Equally, "letting the French do as they will" without letting the Germans do the same (e.g. sailing the Hochseeflotte down the Channel bombarding French ports into rubble, as they could in 1914 if we'd let them, the French fleet being in the Med) would be a breach of neutrality.

 

1- Germany made the offer to keep the High Seas Fleet bottled up not the British

 

2- All Britain has to do is pass legislation preventing its merchants from carrying war materials to either side. French vessels can jump across the channel easy enough and Britain had other avenues of trade. In such a sitation a Germany without a merchant fleet is as goo as blockaded.

 

I am not disregarding British national interests, merely not assuming that the interests of France & Britain are identical, which is what you clearly take for granted.

I do not take it for granted, I am working on the premise that a German domination of the continent is not in England's interests, France by her self does not posses the power to over run Germany given the historic impotence of the Russian army. The result is stalemate leaving England in an even stronger possition when finacially weakened Germany and France and freshly humilated Russia and A-H finally sue for peace.

 

What you propose, i.e. Britain aiding France without actually fighting was not sensible,

 

I t was quite sensible, its always more sensible to risk some oneelse's blood and treasure.

 

& probably not possible.

Thats what we are debating.

 

Unlike the USA in 1939-40, we were right next door to the war, & our political situation & system, & geography, didn't allow for us to pretend neutrality while selling arms exclusively to one side.

 

You didn't get sucked into the 1870 war.

 

 

In 1939-40, it was difficult for the USA to sell anything to Germany because of our blockade. We had no such cover to hide behind.

 

I am quite sure a reason could have been fabricated.

 

BTW, why do you think your proposed course of action would have been in British interests?

 

I explained that above.

 

But to elaborate, the US was the worlds fastest growing economy in 1914 and would over take Britain in 1919 in the after math of WW1. A fresh scenario where she sits it out instead of bankrupting herself puts her in prime position to be the merchant of Europe once peace is declared. She still has free access to her colonies, has not lost much of her merchant fleet or a generation of workers to the trenches. There is likewise no need for a Washington Naval Treaty instead a bankrupt Germany can be divested of her fleet in trade for British loans after the peace is signed. This means Britain doesn't lose the Royal Navy's edge which would cost her the war in the pacific in 1941 if not for American involvement.

[swerve]

Adding to German's war making ability is not in England's long term interests.

Who is proposing that? Not me.

 

1- Germany made the offer to keep the High Seas Fleet bottled up not the British

So? Again, the relevance problem.

 

2- All Britain has to do is pass legislation preventing its merchants from carrying war materials to either side. French vessels can jump across the channel easy enough and Britain had other avenues of trade. In such a sitation a Germany without a merchant fleet is as goo as blockaded.

 

Nonsense! For Britain to forbid its ships (BTW, few shippers were merchants) to carry war materials to either side would not be a breach of neutrality, but for a nation with half the worlds merchant shipping to forbid it from trading with both Germany & France would be shooting itself in the foot.

 

You are making many assumptions - again - and appear to have a mistaken notion of the naval balance. The Germans had a larger & much more modern battlefleet than France, not vice-versa: German shipping across the North Sea would be much safer than French shipping in the Channel. For Britain to let both fleets operate freely in the North Sea & Channel, & ban its own shipping from trading with both, would therefore be to the advantage of Germany, not France. Also, you ignore neutrals - both shipping fleets (Danish, Dutch & Norwegian shippers would profit mightily) and states. The geographical situation is such that it would be easier for Britain to trade with Germany than with France via 3rd countries.

 

I do not take it for granted, I am working on the premise that a German domination of the continent is not in England's interests, France by her self does not posses the power to over run Germany given the historic impotence of the Russian army. The result is stalemate leaving England in an even stronger possition when finacially weakened Germany and France and freshly humilated Russia and A-H finally sue for peace.

 

Agreed that German domination is not in British interests, but the cost of the war was so great, & its geopolitical consequences so adverse, that a German victory short of complete domination would have been preferable. Inhibiting Germany from attacking France through Belgium & ravaging the French coast, & therefore producing a good chance of a stalemate in the West, would prevent complete German victory, & IMO lead to a negotiated peace, with cession of territory by Russia. Uncomfortable for Britain, but not disastrous.

 

I am quite sure a reason could have been fabricated.

 

And I am quite sure you are wrong.

 

But to elaborate, the US was the worlds fastest growing economy in 1914 and would over take Britain in 1919 in the after math of WW1. A fresh scenario where she sits it out instead of bankrupting herself puts her in prime position to be the merchant of Europe once peace is declared. She still has free access to her colonies, has not lost much of her merchant fleet or a generation of workers to the trenches. There is likewise no need for a Washington Naval Treaty instead a bankrupt Germany can be divested of her fleet in trade for British loans after the peace is signed. This means Britain doesn't lose the Royal Navy's edge which would cost her the war in the pacific in 1941 if not for American involvement.

 

The USA was not the worlds fastest growing economy in 1914 (though growing much faster than all the major European countries, as it had been for many years), & had overtaken Britain in GNP (& even more GDP) long before. As for the rest, I have little argument: a Britain which had not suffered the enormous cost of the war (including subsidising allies) would be far better off. But that is true whether Britain follows the style of neutrality I advocate, or your proposed policy, so it is not an argument in favour of your case. In fact, since you propose self-inflicted economic damage, it's an argument against your policy.

Edited November 10, 2007 by swerve

[KingSargent]

2- All Britain has to do is pass legislation preventing its merchants from carrying war materials to either side. French vessels can jump across the channel easy enough and Britain had other avenues of trade. In such a sitation a Germany without a merchant fleet is as goo as blockaded.

Germany had a very large merchant fleet in 1914. Without the RN to impound most of it (and the US seizing anything in their ports in 1917) and a tight British North Sea blockade, Germany could easily maintain an overseas trade if all they had to worry about was the French Navy - especially if the A-H Navy made embarrassing moves in the Med.

 

With a neutral RN in the Far East, von Spees's Asiatic Squadron could make things difficult for France's Pacific colonies. German Indo-China (hard but maybe possible)? German Polynesia?

[swerve]

Germany had a very large merchant fleet in 1914. Without the RN to impound most of it (and the US seizing anything in their ports in 1917) and a tight British North Sea blockade, Germany could easily maintain an overseas trade if all they had to worry about was the French Navy - especially if the A-H Navy made embarrassing moves in the Med.

 

With a neutral RN in the Far East, von Spees's Asiatic Squadron could make things difficult for France's Pacific colonies. German Indo-China (hard but maybe possible)? German Polynesia?

 

Indeed. I think the French were better placed at the start of the war to chase German merchant ships in the Atlantic & Indian Ocean (more ships, a lot more bases) than the Germans could chase French, but didn't have the ships to do what the RN could & did do. And the RN had a huge edge given by British control of the bulk of the worlds undersea cables.

 

I'd say Polynesia yes, Indo-China no. I don't know how many French & colonial troops were there, but I'd bet a lot more than von Spee could muster, & enough to make a German invasion impractical. But IIRC (I expect you'll know, or have the sources to check) the French naval forces out there were heavily outgunned, so the Germans could raid French ports (Haiphong, etc), & round up French merchant ships, which could be more worthwhile than knocking off economically worthless islands scattered across the Pacific. Or sail west & make a nuisance of themselves around Africa.

[KingSargent]

Indeed. I think the French were better placed at the start of the war to chase German merchant ships in the Atlantic & Indian Ocean (more ships, a lot more bases) than the Germans could chase French, but didn't have the ships to do what the RN could & did do. And the RN had a huge edge given by British control of the bulk of the worlds undersea cables.

 

I'd say Polynesia yes, Indo-China no. I don't know how many French & colonial troops were there, but I'd bet a lot more than von Spee could muster, & enough to make a German invasion impractical. But IIRC (I expect you'll know, or have the sources to check) the French naval forces out there were heavily outgunned, so the Germans could raid French ports (Haiphong, etc), & round up French merchant ships, which could be more worthwhile than knocking off economically worthless islands scattered across the Pacific. Or sail west & make a nuisance of themselves around Africa.

I said maybe possibly Indo-China. Without the UK (and presumably an allied Japan) to contend with, there were German and Austrian troops at Tsingtao that could go adventuring. I don't think there were that many French troops in Indo-China, mostly Annamese Coloniales. I have no idea if they fight hard against Germans or not. In any case it would give the French another nightmare to distract them.

 

Just a thought, I wonder if the Siamese would be interested in moving into Indo-China....

[zraver]

The USA was not the worlds fastest growing economy in 1914 (though growing much faster than all the major European countries, as it had been for many years), & had overtaken Britain in GNP (& even more GDP) long before. As for the rest, I have little argument: a Britain which had not suffered the enormous cost of the war (including subsidising allies) would be far better off. But that is true whether Britain follows the style of neutrality I advocate, or your proposed policy, so it is not an argument in favour of your case. In fact, since you propose self-inflicted economic damage, it's an argument against your policy.

 

This post has been edited by swerve: Sat 10 Nov 2007 1754

 

A quick German victory is even more to Britain's disadvantage long term than the loss of trade during the war. The UK's best bet is to let Germany and AH bleed against Russia and France letting all 4 ruin themselves and then act as peace brokers.

 

A fully supplied Germany and AH with access to British industrial might will defeat France and Russia. Even without the UK's supplies long term Russia and France are mismatched but can make Germany pay for thier victory.

[dpapp2]

The Pacific German forces raise and important question.

Would Japan keep to neutrality, or would they use the situation to get the Pacific German colonies? Or would they try to get Indochina instead, and have a second run against a Russia that is occupied in Europe?

[swerve]

A quick German victory is even more to Britain's disadvantage long term than the loss of trade during the war. The UK's best bet is to let Germany and AH bleed against Russia and France letting all 4 ruin themselves and then act as peace brokers.

 

A fully supplied Germany and AH with access to British industrial might will defeat France and Russia. Even without the UK's supplies long term Russia and France are mismatched but can make Germany pay for thier victory.

 

What quick victory? How do you expect this to come about? I don't believe it likely, & I can't accept it unless you explain the mechanism by which you think it will come about.

 

You have not addressed the effect on France of the High Seas Fleet loose in the Channel & NE Atlantic, faced only by a few French cruisers. I suggest that the damage this would do to French trade would be catastrophic, while German trade would suffer relatively little.

 

You talk of "a fully supplied Germany and AH with access to British industrial might". What about "a fully supplied France access to British industrial might"? You propose depriving France of that access. How will France fuel its industry & run its railways? It imported a sizable proportion of its coal in 1913, much of it from Britain, and a third through Rouen (due to be destroyed by the HSF in your scenario). Germany was self-sufficient.

 

Agreed that Britain might be able to broker a peace after the combatants had exhausted themselves, or better still, earlier than that, as soon as they realised a quick victory was not going to happen. But I feel Britain would be better placed to do that if it had been strictly neutral (why would Germany & AH accept an actively pro-French Britain as a peace broker?) & had done its best to limit the scope of the war, as I propose.

[Argus]

A quick German victory is even more to Britain's disadvantage long term than the loss of trade during the war. The UK's best bet is to let Germany and AH bleed against Russia and France letting all 4 ruin themselves and then act as peace brokers.

 

It would very much depend on the terms and conditions surrounding this 'quick' victory, The problem being it just compounds the historical current flowing from 1870, Germany is even cockier in 'victory' whatever the cost might have been, and the French are even more pissed. Britain's long term interest is in a German defeat in any form, short and qucik being preferable to long and slow, but something inbetween for choice, just bloody enough cool off the hot heads on both sides, but not drive anyone into desperate straits.

 

A fully supplied Germany and AH with access to British industrial might will defeat France and Russia. Even without the UK's supplies long term Russia and France are mismatched but can make Germany pay for thier victory.

 

Who's talking about Britain supplying Germany with military materiel? The Germans would get what they could pay for and not a scrap more if that. Lets not forget Britain's other real asset here, capitol, in 1914 London is the worlds capitol and currency market.

 

Both sides will be looking for loans and currency, and neutrality only means the bankers have to listen to both parties and supply tea and sandwiches, they don't have to loan their money equally. The old boy network, treasury and threadneedle streeet all give the Government semi to unofficial channels to suggest who the banks do business with. The market can quite easily put a big crimp in Germany's access to bulk foreign exchange and with it their ability to pay for imports.

 

Having access to Britain is more valuable to France than it is to Germany, for example France's wartime industry was dependant on British (Welsh in the main) coal, IIRC France also imported a lot of explosives, steel, cloth and other semi-finished materials from the UK all though WWI to feed her own industry. If Britain is neutral, it comes down to who's orders the suppliers are willing to take, and aside from what France might require Russia is in line for a lot more materiel too.

 

shane

Edited November 11, 2007 by Argus

[swerve]

Shane,

 

good points about the capital markets, & the relative ease of putting discreet pressure on them. I can imagine the Rothschilds, for example, being very keen to help their relatives in France arrange loans for the French government, & Germany having difficulty finding similar supporters, while HMG expressed shock at the suggestion that the drying up of capital for Germany might have anything to do with them . . .

 

Frankly, I'd rather not see a German victory, but I'd rather see a limited & painful German win than what Europe (& the UK) actually went through.

 

When this thread started, I wondered if it would have been possible for Britain to have stood aside, & eventually concluded that it would have to be due to a policy to limit the scope of the war as much as possible. That seemed to be possible, given only a small shift in government thinking, & assuming the Germans took note of it. Hence my suggestion that Britain gave Germany & France clear signals that we would act in Britains interests, but at all times seek to maintain peace & good order in international affairs, & honour our obligations. In particular -

1) We would defend Belgian neutrality.

2) We would defend France if attacked, but were not willing to support France if it attacked first.

3) We would not tolerate interference with British trade, or naval action in British waters.

4) We would oppose the extension of the war.

5) We would consider our position if hostile action was taken against any neutral, including attacks on their shipping.

 

Sticking to this policy would allow us, for example, to tell the Italians that attacking France would bring us in on Frances side, & lean on the Turks to keep out, as well as closing the Channel to the fleets of both sides. The German offensive in the West would be stilllborn, resulting in lots of German troops being temporarily in the wrong place: Russias offensive in East Prussia, & Frances attack into Alsace-Lorraine, would both be beaten off, but there would be no immediate large-scale follow-up, & by the time German counter-offensives got going, the French & Russians would be ready enough that they wouldn't be rolled over. France would keep its industrial North-East, and Germany would be deprived of it & Belgian industry, to the benefit of French, & detriment of German, war-fighting capacity.

 

In short, the conditions could be set for a more limited war, which neither side could win quickly or easily. I would expect a bloody stalemate in Alsace-Lorraine, & German advances in the East. One can imagine a war growing in unpopularity, with neither France nor Germany having any life-or-death issue to continue fighting for, Austria suffering economically & having been forced to face up to its military inadequacies, & Russia beaten but unconquered, grudgingly willing to make concessions of non-Russian territories for peace.

 

Such a limited & expensive German victory could discourage more wars. A Germany with more restless Polish & Baltic citizens (want to speculate on their likely voting patterns?) might realise the unwisdom of even more such, Austria would soon have a new Emperor who we know was anti-war & sought to be a conciliator. Things could settle down, with France morose & bitter, Germany with an unsatisfying Pyrrhic victory, Austria desperately trying to repair its economic & internal political damage, & Russia licking its wounds but recognising its inability to gain revenge - and with its own internal problems, as in 1905. And on the sidelines, Britain with its capital reserves even larger than pre-war & its navy & merchant fleet even more dominant. Imperial decline staved off for a while, instead of accelerated.

 

Not great, but compared to what actually happened . . .

Edited November 11, 2007 by swerve

[zraver]

What quick victory? How do you expect this to come about? I don't believe it likely, & I can't accept it unless you explain the mechanism by which you think it will come about.

 

by defeat of the French field armies. Historically Germany beat Russia and I don't see any change regarding Tannenburg. France's pell mell dash into the Alsace Lorraine is like wise doomed. Even if Germany does not violate Belgium or sortie the HSF long term the mismatch in manpower and industry dooms France.

 

You have not addressed the effect on France of the High Seas Fleet loose in the Channel & NE Atlantic, faced only by a few French cruisers. I suggest that the damage this would do to French trade would be catastrophic, while German trade would suffer relatively little.

I never addressed it because there is no way the HSF will sortie and the UK remain neutral.

 

You talk of "a fully supplied Germany and AH with access to British industrial might". What about "a fully supplied France access to British industrial might"?

 

I never assumed France would not have acess to British industry and resources.

 

You propose depriving France of that access.

no I don't.

 

Agreed that Britain might be able to broker a peace after the combatants had exhausted themselves, or better still, earlier than that, as soon as they realised a quick victory was not going to happen. But I feel Britain would be better placed to do that if it had been strictly neutral (why would Germany & AH accept an actively pro-French Britain as a peace broker?) & had done its best to limit the scope of the war, as I propose.

 

Better placed probably, but her interests would not be better served with any type of peace that let Germany keep her fleet and humbled France.

 

 

Argus,

 

Who's talking about Britain supplying Germany with military materiel? The Germans would get what they could pay for and not a scrap more if that. Lets not forget Britain's other real asset here, capitol, in 1914 London is the worlds capitol and currency market.

 

Both sides will be looking for loans and currency, and neutrality only means the bankers have to listen to both parties and supply tea and sandwiches, they don't have to loan their money equally. The old boy network, treasury and threadneedle streeet all give the Government semi to unofficial channels to suggest who the banks do business with. The market can quite easily put a big crimp in Germany's access to bulk foreign exchange and with it their ability to pay for imports.

 

It has been suggested that British merchantmen would carry goods for Germany in thier hulls. As far as loans go, the UK wants to make the war long (France builds up debt) and hard so that post war Germany has to mortage/sell off parts of the HSF to get the loans she needed during and after the war.

[dpapp2]

Blocking the Channel does not mean that Germany cannot use its fleet against France. On the contrary. Dunkerque could still be subjected to bombardment and raids from the North Sea (depends on the definition of the "English Channel" of course).

 

Also, German dreadnoughts were pretty long-range. The Kaiser-Koenig classes (only the former available at start) has 8000nm range at 12kts, the battlecruisers 4000nm at 14kts. And the French lacks fast ships larger than a destroyer. Germany could hit and take French colonies on the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean, based in the safe havens of Ostafrika and Namibia. That would be easier than to try for Indochina. Take Reunion and the Indian Ocean Archipelago, even Djibouti. I'd assume French Congo would fall eventually. German naval presence on the colonies was Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, four light cruisers and the austrian Kaiserin Elisabeth.

 

However. With the Ottomans having no reason to join the war, Russia can be supplied both through the Med. The HSF can announce the blockade of Archangelsk, with inspecting every single neutral ship that is bound there, confiscating anything contraband. The Mediterranean would be more interesting, as the same blockade could be declared by Austria, inspecting every ship heading towards the Bosporus. With the battle raging in the Atlantic, the better part of the French fleet should be engaged protecting the Atlantic Coast and the colonies. So the Ottomans must be bought by the Russians and the French, but the Germans can also make counteroffers.

 

Serbia would fall early 1915 the latest, with German troops against Russia allowing Austria to concentrate on Serbia. Also, with the higher number of German divisions on the Russian Front, the Austrian forces would not suffer so serious setbacks, and most probably Przemysl would not be taken, saving a 110,000 professional Austrian troops for later phases.

 

The German Navy would certainly be more active in the Baltic, with all the predreadnoguhts and a huge number of destroyers available, not having to play fleet-in-being against the Home Fleet. However, their utility would be somewhat limited.

 

End result IMO is the war being concluded in 1916, with a CP victory. Serbia was punished, Germany (and even Austria) acquiring some additional colonies on the expense of the French. All the warring powers exhausted, indebted either to UK or USA(Germany). German and French navy attrited, not posing any danger to Great Britain, and financial constraints preventing a similar buildup for another 15-20 years.

Edited November 11, 2007 by dpapp2

[swerve]

by defeat of the French field armies. Historically Germany beat Russia and I don't see any change regarding Tannenburg. France's pell mell dash into the Alsace Lorraine is like wise doomed. Even if Germany does not violate Belgium or sortie the HSF long term the mismatch in manpower and industry dooms France.

 

I've taken as a given the defeat of both the Russian offensive into East Prussia & the French offensive into Alsace-Lorraine. So what? Under the scenario we're postulating, any German invasion of France would have to be via the relatively narrow, heavily-defended Alsace-Lorraine front. Defensible terrain, with a much higher density of French troops than was attainable on the real Western Front. We know what machine guns & barbed wire did in actuality. Why should it be different, in circumstances more favourable to the defence, & with France better-armed from her own industries? By what mechanism do you see French armies being pushed back? Remember that the purpose of the Schlieffen plan was to outflank the formidable defences of Alsace-Lorraine. You're saying that frontal assaults will work. I doubt it.

 

Manpower was still heavily weighted against Germany & AH, by Russia, & France had scope to use colonial manpower. Yes, Germany had an industrial advantage, but with French industry intact & neither Belgian or any French industry in German hands, the preponderance was much less than that with which the Allies took 4 years to to win. In the real war, the Germans couldn't accept withdrawing from their initial conquests until driven out of them, & the French & British, with material & numerical superiority, would not accept a peace on terms of defeat when they expected to win. We are postulating a very different situation.

 

I never addressed it because there is no way the HSF will sortie and the UK remain neutral.

I never assumed France would not have acess to British industry and resources.

You argued that the French navy would be able to sweep Geman ships from the North Sea. That implies British indifference to the HSF sortieing, since to permit the French to operate in the North Sea but bar the Germans from a sortie would be an overt act of war against Germany. Permitting the Germans to sortie would cut the French off from vital resources such as Welsh coal. Therefore, you implicitly assumed France would be deprived of access to British industry. But I can see that you didn't realise it was a necessary consequence of what you were arguing for.

 

Better placed probably, but her interests would not be better served with any type of peace that let Germany keep her fleet and humbled France.

Argus,

It has been suggested that British merchantmen would carry goods for Germany in thier hulls. As far as loans go, the UK wants to make the war long (France builds up debt) and hard so that post war Germany has to mortage/sell off parts of the HSF to get the loans she needed during and after the war.

 

This is very frustrating. You're backing & filling all the time. You accept that the HSF sortieing would be impermissible by Britain, but only when confronted by how such a sortie would render your proposed policy untenable, having previously implicitly accepted that Britain would be indifferent to it (you argued that the French navy would be free to operate in the North Sea). You claim that the German merchant fleet would cease to exist, until confronted by German naval superiority over France, then fall silent. You assume that British policy is based on zero-sum thinking, when we know it wasn't.

[swerve]

Blocking the Channel does not mean that Germany cannot use its fleet against France. On the contrary. Dunkerque could still be subjected to bombardment and raids from the North Sea (depends on the definition of the "English Channel" of course).

...

 

I did say that I expected one condition of British neutrality would be the HSF not doing that sort of thing. The UK was very wary of the German navy & what it might be used for, & I can imagine the reaction if the HSF turned up in the Channel approaches - we'd probably be at war before anyone had time to think.

 

End result IMO is the war being concluded in 1916, with a CP victory. Serbia was punished, Germany (and even Austria) acquiring some additional colonies on the expense of the French. All the warring powers exhausted, indebted either to UK or USA(Germany). German and French navy attrited, not posing any danger to Great Britain, and financial constraints preventing a similar buildup for another 15-20 years.

 

Sounds credible.

[zraver]

I've taken as a given the defeat of both the Russian offensive into East Prussia & the French offensive into Alsace-Lorraine. So what? Under the scenario we're postulating, any German invasion of France would have to be via the relatively narrow, heavily-defended Alsace-Lorraine front. Defensible terrain, with a much higher density of French troops than was attainable on the real Western Front. We know what machine guns & barbed wire did in actuality. Why should it be different, in circumstances more favourable to the defence, & with France better-armed from her own industries? By what mechanism do you see French armies being pushed back? Remember that the purpose of the Schlieffen plan was to outflank the formidable defences of Alsace-Lorraine. You're saying that frontal assaults will work. I doubt it.

 

Germany reverted to fire and cover tactics via thier storm troopers long before the French figured out that marching to death was suicide.

 

Manpower was still heavily weighted against Germany & AH, by Russia, & France had scope to use colonial manpower.

French and Russian generals proved incapable of making effective use of that manpower.

 

Yes, Germany had an industrial advantage, but with French industry intact & neither Belgian or any French industry in German hands, the preponderance was much less than that with which the Allies took 4 years to to win. In the real war, the Germans couldn't accept withdrawing from their initial conquests until driven out of them, & the French & British, with material & numerical superiority, would not accept a peace on terms of defeat when they expected to win. We are postulating a very different situation.

 

Most of Frances industry was not taken by the German advance, the rela loss to France occurred in 1870.

 

 

You argued that the French navy would be able to sweep Geman ships from the North Sea.

No I didn't, I said the FN would be able to sweep German merchantmen from the sea, ie coming from America, or up the coast of Africa.

 

 

That implies British indifference to the HSF sortieing, since to permit the French to operate in the North Sea but bar the Germans from a sortie would be an overt act of war against Germany.

 

Please stop accusin me of things I never said.

 

You said-

I did say that I expected one condition of British neutrality would be the HSF not doing that sort of thing. The UK was very wary of the German navy & what it might be used for, & I can imagine the reaction if the HSF turned up in the Channel approaches - we'd probably be at war before anyone had time to think.

Under your scenario the HSF bottles itself up and all Britain doe sis hold them to that promise.

 

 

Permitting the Germans to sortie would cut the French off from vital resources such as Welsh coal. Therefore, you implicitly assumed France would be deprived of access to British industry. But I can see that you didn't realise it was a necessary consequence of what you were arguing for.

 

can you please qui with the strawman arguments?

 

This is very frustrating. You're backing & filling all the time. You accept that the HSF sortieing would be impermissible by Britain, but only when confronted by how such a sortie would render your proposed policy untenable, having previously implicitly accepted that Britain would be indifferent to it (you argued that the French navy would be free to operate in the North Sea). You claim that the German merchant fleet would cease to exist, until confronted by German naval superiority over France, then fall silent. You assume that British policy is based on zero-sum thinking, when we know it wasn't.

 

You really have a problem adding things to what people actually wrote don't you.

 

1-As a precondition of the the UK staying out you offered the HSF staying in port- it bottles itself up.

 

I have argued consistently that it would benefit the UK the most for a long brutal war that resulted in a non-decisive victory making England stronger vs all the other great powers and not giving even more of an edge to American industry by giving them an even larger wartime demand.

 

2- I never said the North Sea.

[KingSargent]

I did say that I expected one condition of British neutrality would be the HSF not doing that sort of thing. The UK was very wary of the German navy & what it might be used for, & I can imagine the reaction if the HSF turned up in the Channel approaches - we'd probably be at war before anyone had time to think.

Given that Britain almost went to war with Russia when Rozhdevenskiy(sp?) went down the Channel during the Russo-Japanese War (and shot up the Hull fishing fleet), I would say that were a mite touchy about "their" Channel.

[capt_starlight]

Given that Britain almost went to war with Russia when Rozhdevenskiy(sp?) went down the Channel during the Russo-Japanese War (and shot up the Hull fishing fleet), I would say that were a mite touchy about "their" Channel.

 

Zinovy Petrovich Rozhestvensky. The Dogger Bank incident (also known as Incident of Hull or The Russian Outrage) 21 October 1904. More likely (in this case) "touchy" about their fishermen being killed and their vessels being sunk. It did not help that, officially, the UK was allied to Japan.

[Dave Clark]

After reading this I thought I remembered that there were some troops not trained or equipped to entrench, and I finally found the answer in "The Kaiser's Army - The Politics of Military Technology in Germany during the Machine Age 1870-1918" by Eric Dorn Brose.

 

**SNIP**

 

Colin,

 

thanks for your mention of this - my copy arrived today (the wonders of Internet ordering!).

 

My first impression, after a preliminary browse, is that it looks very interesting.

[Argus]

AFAIK French Naval dispositions in prior to 1914 had been made under a nod-wink agreement with London that the RN would carry the weight in the North Sea/Atlantic and the MN could/would concentrate its resources in the Med. So if the UK was to stay out the war though a spirit of conflict limitation and Germany respecting a few British diplomatic tripwires - like not invading Belguim. The keeping the HSF in port and restricting the naval war to the Med would have to be another concession by the Germans, the KM might get away with raiders on distant stations too. But basicly Britannia is not going to stand for any monkey business in her yard (be it front, back or side) IMHO.

 

Yet the Ottomans present an awkward little problem for the UK, delivering their battleships offers no certainty they would keep out of the war, but it would make the Mn's job a lot harder, and there's some potential for them to do a 'Pearl Harbour' and have a go at the Suez Canal (its half French) if they did go to war

 

zraver

It has been suggested that British merchantmen would carry goods for Germany in thier hulls. As far as loans go, the UK wants to make the war long (France builds up debt) and hard so that post war Germany has to mortage/sell off parts of the HSF to get the loans she needed during and after the war.

Yes, and British ships would also be carrying trade from the US and China too, but the goods have to be bought and paid for. No money, credit or material for sale = no toys.

 

As far as loans go, I'd suggest you are not a banker (neither am I). The idea is to fleece your sheep closely but not let them freeze to death. A mountain of debt is not much use of the debetor is in no position to repay. Oh killing off competition from Paris would be nice, but but another 1870 would not be good for business. As for the HSF... well are you suggesting a country in hock to its eyeballs is going to dispose of the only stick it has left to threaten its principal creditor? This is the Germans in full Imperial mode we're talking about, anyone they can't bully is a threat.

 

Sweve

 

I have to admit I've been thinking on an alt history for some time that I call France F'ed Over, looking at the Schif plan working and Germany having the same sucess in 1914 that they had in 1940. A bit artificial perhaps but interesting all the same.

 

Frankly, I'd rather not see a German victory, but I'd rather see a limited & painful German win than what Europe (& the UK) actually went through.

 

Agreed, but then we're not French and I'd suspect they might have a different take on it considering they'd be taking the bulk of the hit for such a change.

 

1) We would defend Belgian neutrality.

2) We would defend France if attacked, but were not willing to support France if it attacked first.

3) We would not tolerate interference with British trade, or naval action in British waters.

4) We would oppose the extension of the war.

5) We would consider our position if hostile action was taken against any neutral, including attacks on their shipping.

 

I'd go along with that list too, but I'm not sure if would have the impact needed in Berlin. I mean the initial expectaion for almost everyone was a short war, and the British Empire only becomes a serious factor in an extended conflict. If 1914 was a come as you are party and the Germans are only counting Divisions then the BEF is a dispicable little army, and its not like the RN can do anything more than blockade the HSF if it never sails. The financial and trade aspects including the British blockade of German trade are yet more medium to long term threats, of little account if the war is going to be over by Christmas. The only real hostages Britain holds are the German Colonys, which are of no consequence.

 

In essence Britannia is another fat old lady like the Russian 'Steamroller' and if the lean mean Honenzollern war machine plans to just nip in get out PDQ, the threat is there, but is it scary enough?

 

I'd go along with the rest of your proposition too, its holds together for me, but it all come back to how much stick the UK has in Berlin.

 

shane

[FlyingCanOpener]

AFAIK French Naval dispositions in prior to 1914 had been made under a nod-wink agreement with London that the RN would carry the weight in the North Sea/Atlantic and the MN could/would concentrate its resources in the Med. So if the UK was to stay out the war though a spirit of conflict limitation and Germany respecting a few British diplomatic tripwires - like not invading Belguim. The keeping the HSF in port and restricting the naval war to the Med would have to be another concession by the Germans, the KM might get away with raiders on distant stations too. But basicly Britannia is not going to stand for any monkey business in her yard (be it front, back or side) IMHO.

 

I'm not too sure about the idea of the HSF sortieing itself being a tripwire, unless it was the whole fleet going out a la Jutland. I would think the Royal Navy would stand ready to smack both sides if they caused too much mischief in the North Sea or the English Channel.

 

And interesting corollary to this would be that France could be blockaded by surface forces relatively easily, and as a result submarine development by the Germans would be quite stunted.

[Xavier]

I'm not too sure about the idea of the HSF sortieing itself being a tripwire, unless it was the whole fleet going out a la Jutland. I would think the Royal Navy would stand ready to smack both sides if they caused too much mischief in the North Sea or the English Channel.

 

And interesting corollary to this would be that France could be blockaded by surface forces relatively easily, and as a result submarine development by the Germans would be quite stunted.

and how would ze Germans blockade anything west of Le Havre/Cherbourg: Brest, Bordeaux, St-Nazaire & the ports in the med...

a bit risky to get your light cruisers and TB there through the channel isn't it and going round the British isles means you can't stay long with the few cruisers who have the necessary range

[swerve]

and how would ze Germans blockade anything west of Le Havre/Cherbourg: Brest, Bordeaux, St-Nazaire & the ports in the med...

a bit risky to get your light cruisers and TB there through the channel isn't it and going round the British isles means you can't stay long with the few cruisers who have the necessary range

 

IF the RN does not object to the HSF passing through the Straits of Dover, it would be very easy for them to bombard every port & sink every French ship in harbour on the Channel & Atlantic coasts. Any subsequent blockade could be maintained by light vessels. Civilian agents keeping watch on the Straits of Gibraltar should give plenty of warning if the main French fleet left the Med for the light vessels to scuttle back to the welcoming arms of the HSF steaming west.

 

The Germans could not maintain a blockade of the French Mediterranean ports, & maintaining a blockade of all the Atlantic coast might need more ships than they could muster. But a full blockade of the Channel ports, & partial blockade of the Atlantic coast, would cost France dear. Bulk imports such as coal would almost certainly be much reduced, & greatly increased in cost, & the railway system would struggle to move even reduced quantities from where they were landed to where they were needed.

 

Where does the risk to German ships in the Channel come from, if the RN is leaving them be?

 

All this is predicated on the German navy being permitted by the RN to pass Dover. If not, no blockade of the French coast would be possible, though commerce-raiding would be. My opinion is that the whole "Britain stays out of WW1" idea is dependent on the German fleet not venturing out in force (at least, not out of local waters - though the Baltic should be free for them to operate in), or sending ships through the Channel.