WWI where England sits it out

[Colin Williams]

French infantry had no entrenching tools; they were not supposed to entrench, that showed lack of elan.

 

You mean these?

 

"L'Outil Individuel (company E-tool) -- Sometimes called Outil Individuel d'Escouade (individual squad E-tool), these tools however, were issued by the company, not the squad. Each member of the company was issued a different type of E-tool. In 1914, each company was supposed to be issued 80 shovels, 40 double-headed pickaxes, 40 single-headed picks, 8 axes, 1 folding saw, 4 pair of wire cutters, and 12 serpes for a total of 185 tools. Later during the war, some of this was modified with other specialty tools also being added. And of course, each one of these tools had its own canvas or leather cases that protected the tools when it was not being used."

 

http://www.reenactor.net/units/151ri/8-une.html

[KingSargent]

You mean these?

 

"L'Outil Individuel (company E-tool) -- Sometimes called Outil Individuel d'Escouade (individual squad E-tool), these tools however, were issued by the company, not the squad. Each member of the company was issued a different type of E-tool. In 1914, each company was supposed to be issued 80 shovels, 40 double-headed pickaxes, 40 single-headed picks, 8 axes, 1 folding saw, 4 pair of wire cutters, and 12 serpes for a total of 185 tools. Later during the war, some of this was modified with other specialty tools also being added. And of course, each one of these tools had its own canvas or leather cases that protected the tools when it was not being used."

 

http://www.reenactor.net/units/151ri/8-une.html

Note red emphasis. Also, guess what got thrown away on the march first?

 

And were troops or officers trained to entrench?

[capt_starlight]

One effect that seems to have been missed is Naval co-operation between UK and France.

 

The RN was to concentrate in the North Sea with the French working on the Mediterranean. French fleet dispositions, supplies and bases were predicated on "accommodation" between the powers - designed to have the French watch the Italians and Turks (though there would always be a RN Mediterranean squadron).

 

If the UK did not enter into the war the French would have severe problems looking after both "flanks" (as Italy was still one of the Central Powers).

[glenn239]

If the UK did not enter into the war the French would have severe problems looking after both "flanks" (as Italy was still one of the Central Powers).

 

The Germans offered to keep their fleet in port if Great Britain remained neutral.

[Colin Williams]

Note red emphasis. Also, guess what got thrown away on the march first?

 

And were troops or officers trained to entrench?

 

It certainly seems so -

 

"Otto von Moser, commanding a Wurttemberg infantry brigade, found as the German 4th army cleared the Ardennes that the French infantry were already using trenches on 26 August..." - Hew Strachan

 

The French also made extensive use of trenches in defending the Grand Couronne in front of Nancy.

[Colin Williams]

I am only repeating the truth. or do you deny that the French launched suicidal attacks into Lorraine with First Army (Dubail) and Second Army de Castlenau against prepared defenses in August and got smashed?

 

Or do you deny the Field Regulations enacted in October 1913 that had the following dictum

 

Battle are beyond everything else struggles of morale, defeat is inevitable as soon as the hope of conquering ceases to exist. Success comes not to him who has suffered the least, but to him whose will is firmest and will strongest.

 

Or perhaps the High command ignoring Col Grouard's, La Guerre Eventuelle with its passage "It is above all the German offensive through Belgium on which we ought to fix out attention."

 

Or Major Melotte's (Belgian military attache in Berlin) correctly guessing that the Germans were assigning a reserve corps to every active corps and his passing this onto France.

 

Now you can take issue with this but I am drawing this all directly from Barbara Tuchman's the Guns of August a properly cited/sourced and Pulitzer winning work.

 

You are following in the track of others in confusing myriad issues of tactics, operations, strategy and intelligence. Joffre's failure to properly account for a large-scale German move west of the Meuse has nothing to do with French offensive doctrine, so the last three sentences of your post aren't relevant to the issue of whether the French commitment to the offensive was grossly exaggerated in comparison to other combatants. There is no question that the French believed in the power of the offensive, but the issue is typically portrayed as if, on a scale of 1 to 10, the French were at 10 and the Germans no higher than 3. In reality, if the French were at 10, the Germans easily qualified for an 8 or higher.

 

Tuchman's book is a good general history but out-of-date when it comes to a sober analysis of the 1914 campaign. Here, for example, are some excerpts from Hew Strachan's history "The First World War - Volume I: To Arms".

 

"French military thought - and action - in 1914 was presented as the victim of a semi-mystical belief that the will to win was sufficient to achieve victory. Ferdinand Foch, in his lectures at the Ecole Superieure de Guerre, had declared 'A battle won is a battle in which one will not confess oneself beaten.' Thus, the argument ran, in August 1914 the French armies rushed forward, drums beating, with cries of 'a la baionette', only for their red-trousered infantry to fall, casualties of twentieth-century firepower.

 

Foch was one of two inspirational professors at the Ecole Superieure de Guerre in the late 1890s and early 1900s. The other was Charles Lanzerac. Stung by the surprise and speed of defeat in 1870, their operational watchword was security and their solution the doctrine of advance guards. They were not the metaphysical advocates of superior morale suggested by selective use of Foch's more tub-thumping and inspirational dicta. Instead, they presided over a rational analysis of warfare that produced a generation of professionally competent officers, immersed in the pursuit of practical solutions, and exposed to a high level of military debate. Much of this was, inevitably, concerned with the most problematic area of warfare, the tactical offensive...The broad solutions were for the attack to approach under cover, to close up by breaking into small groups, advancing in bounds, and then to build up fire superiority. Once the attackers had gained fire superiority the final rush forward could follow. But both the last two stages were fraught with difficulties.

 

...French tactical thought, therefore, became a blend of realism and unavoidable wishful thinking. In a booklet published in 1906 Colonel Loyzeaux de Grandmaison emphasized the role that artillery support would play in giving attacking infantry fire superiority, and stated categorically that a frontal attack across open ground was impossible. On the other hand, infantry had to believe that they could succeed if they were to attack at all. the conquest of fear through discipline and morale became central to tactical possibilities.

 

...In all this, French tactical thinking was little different, and no less perplexed by the problems of firepower, than that of most other European armies on the eve of the First World War. Like other armies, that of France possessed many officers who were respectful of firepower, recognized the inherent superiority of the defensive, but were trying to integrate fire and movement in order to be able to sustain the attack. Thus, like other armies, its tactical thinking in 1914 was in a state of flux.

 

...In February 1911 Grandmaison gave two conferences for the general staff derived from his observation of Germany's manoeuvres and the latter's preference for envelopment...The French, therefore had, to remember the need to upset the enemy's plans, to press home their own attack on the decisive sector. They should echelon their reserves for that purpose, and not in order to secure or to seek the flanks: taking the initiative would provide its own security. Grandmaison's lectures were designed to inject impetuousity and boldness into French operational thought...The 1913 edition of the instructions for the conduct of large formations was his work. At a tactical level, these echoed the themes he had voiced in 1906: the need for method and preparation in the attack, and the impossibility of attacking over open ground. But the regulations specifically failed to distinguish between the strategic offensive-defensive and the tactical. Grandmaison failed to provide clarification in the one area where it was most needed.

 

(Much later in the book.)

 

...Lackadaisical leadership had characterized the battles in Alsace, in the Ardennes, and on the Sambre. But the defeats were not entirely the fault of the generals. The tactical instructions issued both by GQG on 16 and 18 August and also by individual army commanders reflected pre-war precepts about the difficulties of the offensive. Stress was put on artillery support, on the need to develop fire superiority, on the combination of artillery with infantry, and on immediately entrenching once ground was gained. In the event, the infantry did not wait, did not prepare their attacks with method. This was less a consequence of the 'spirit of the offensive' and more of a lack of training. The three-year law had not only come too late, it had also been implemented by taking two classes in 1913 rather than retain the 1911 class for a further year. Therefore, in July 1914 two-thirds of the conscripts then serving had been in uniform for less than a year, and none of them had been on manoeuvres...Nor was this inexperience confined to the most junior ranks...In 1913 the French army was short 6000 sergeants and 23,000 corporals...In August 1914 the excitement of action overtook professional wisdom.

 

...The change from the offensive to the defensive is the best explanation for the transformation in tactical performance. Joffre's tactical instructions of 24 August, so often cited as the cause of the transformation in the French army's performance, were little different from those of 16 and 18 August. He reiterated the need not to launch the infantry prematurely or from too great a distance. Above all, he emphasized that the role of the artillery was not only to support but also to prepare the attack...it is remarkable how quickly French fighting methods improved."

[Junior FO]

...

Edited September 19, 2024 by Junior FO

[zraver]

You are following in the track of others in confusing myriad issues of tactics, operations, strategy and intelligence. Joffre's failure to properly account for a large-scale German move west of the Meuse has nothing to do with French offensive doctrine, so the last three sentences of your post aren't relevant to the issue of whether the French commitment to the offensive was grossly exaggerated in comparison to other combatants. There is no question that the French believed in the power of the offensive, but the issue is typically portrayed as if, on a scale of 1 to 10, the French were at 10 and the Germans no higher than 3. In reality, if the French were at 10, the Germans easily qualified for an 8 or higher.

 

Actually those last three sentences are important and relevant. Despite ample warning of German doctrine and plans, and despite being outnumbered for the initial mobilization France still committed herself for an attack into the Alsace and Lorraine. She didn't have to, she could have screened the frontiers and launched her counter punch into the flank of the German advance. That was the smart thing to do, Germany could not cut France off from the world or starve her out, because if she sortied her navy the UK would be forced to act. Germany on the other hand had to attack or die specially with the UK sitting like a vulture with a massive navy. That stand off allowed even the smaller French fleet to cripple German trade while French Colonies and trade supported her war efforts. meanwhile every wasted day gave Russia more time to mobilize and after 6 weeks Germany would have lost her ability to attack at all if the Bear was able to set in force instead of being rushed to save France.

[capt_starlight]

This thread is referring to WWI. I doubt that the A-H navy would have been a problem and the Turkish one was marginal at best.

 

My bad - Italy was part of the "Triple Alliance" not the later Central Powers but did not "declare its hand" (and thereby effectively dissolve the Triple Alliance) until after the war was on in earnest. Accordingly there was some doubt about the position of Italy and, in particular its attitude to passage of the Straits of Otranto by the A-H Fleet. This fleet had 4 rather modern capital ships (to which you could add Goeben and Breslau)......

[swerve]

Actually those last three sentences are important and relevant. Despite ample warning of German doctrine and plans, and despite being outnumbered for the initial mobilization France still committed herself for an attack into the Alsace and Lorraine. She didn't have to, she could have screened the frontiers and launched her counter punch into the flank of the German advance. That was the smart thing to do, Germany could not cut France off from the world or starve her out, because if she sortied her navy the UK would be forced to act. Germany on the other hand had to attack or die specially with the UK sitting like a vulture with a massive navy. That stand off allowed even the smaller French fleet to cripple German trade while French Colonies and trade supported her war efforts. meanwhile every wasted day gave Russia more time to mobilize and after 6 weeks Germany would have lost her ability to attack at all if the Bear was able to set in force instead of being rushed to save France.

 

You're not taking into account the effects of British neutrality.

 

Germany didn't have to attack or die, because if the UK was neutral, the North Sea remained open for traffic - unless you think France would attack British ships trading with Germany. German colonies would be vulnerable, but they were economically insignificant. German shipping would have to hastily re-flag or risk being swept up by the French, but that wouldn't affect German ability to trade, as British neutrality, & British objections to France disrupting British trade, would keep the seas safe for neutral shipping as well as British. I think British neutrality would involve a lot of activity by the RN.

 

The UK also controlled the bulk of the submarine cables (a major disadvantage for Germany in the real WW1), so German communications with the rest of the world would be untouched.

[zraver]

You're not taking into account the effects of British neutrality.

 

Germany didn't have to attack or die, because if the UK was neutral, the North Sea remained open for traffic - unless you think France would attack British ships trading with Germany. German colonies would be vulnerable, but they were economically insignificant. German shipping would have to hastily re-flag or risk being swept up by the French, but that wouldn't affect German ability to trade, as British neutrality, & British objections to France disrupting British trade, would keep the seas safe for neutral shipping as well as British. I think British neutrality would involve a lot of activity by the RN.

 

The UK also controlled the bulk of the submarine cables (a major disadvantage for Germany in the real WW1), so German communications with the rest of the world would be untouched.

 

 

I am discounting British neutrality for a very good reason. If Germany sallied its fleet out it would smash the French navy and force the British to take over majority duty in the Med. Where are these ships going to come from? The obvious candidate is the Grand Fleet who would loses ships thus losing its strategic advantage and would face a full German fleet already out of port and into open water? This is an unacceptable strategic risk to Britain, or so Germany must assume and so Germany must attack and win early. No such burden hangs over Frances head, she has the time to let the German plan develop and then strike when the timing is right, offensive from the beginning is fundamentally flawed for France.

[KingSargent]

I am discounting British neutrality for a very good reason. If Germany sallied its fleet out it would smash the French navy and force the British to take over majority duty in the Med. Where are these ships going to come from? The obvious candidate is the Grand Fleet who would loses ships thus losing its strategic advantage and would face a full German fleet already out of port and into open water? This is an unacceptable strategic risk to Britain, or so Germany must assume and so Germany must attack and win early. No such burden hangs over Frances head, she has the time to let the German plan develop and then strike when the timing is right, offensive from the beginning is fundamentally flawed for France.

You are assuming that the French were capable of rational long-term planning and sticking to it. After the hoopla of going to war in the first place, any delays in prosecution of the war would have resulted in cries of "TREASON!!", governments falling, internal war in Paris, people strangling each other in the Chamber of Deputies, all those fun French pastimes.

 

If you think I exaggerate, look at what had happened during the 1870 war.

[swerve]

I am discounting British neutrality for a very good reason. If Germany sallied its fleet out it would smash the French navy and force the British to take over majority duty in the Med. Where are these ships going to come from? ...

 

But what if the High Seas Fleet remains in port, making no preparations to sally, while Germany assures the United Kingdom that it will do nothing provocative? The Germans could move much of their fleet into the Baltic, & use it to support operations against Russia, keeping only enough for coastal defence in the North Sea, & scrupulously remaining within the barrier of the Friesian islands - it'd be in their interests to do so, & should reassure the UK.

 

The Germans would be - were, in reality, we know - aware that the UK wouldnot accept any attempt by the High Seas Fleet to sail through the Channel. Why do what they knew was against their own interests? Why threaten their own trade? Why not get the British to protect German shipping lanes, as part of protecting British trade, & keep the French fleet out of the North Sea?

 

BTW, discounting British neutrality does rather go against the intention of this thread.

Edited November 6, 2007 by swerve

[glenn239]

Accordingly there was some doubt about the position of Italy and, in particular its attitude to passage of the Straits of Otranto by the A-H Fleet. This fleet had 4 rather modern capital ships (to which you could add Goeben and Breslau)......

Austria-Hungary had 2 dreadnoughts at the start of the war, with another 2 under construction.

 

No such burden hangs over Frances head, she has the time to let the German plan develop and then strike when the timing is right, offensive from the beginning is fundamentally flawed for France.

 

France was legally bound to the military protocols of the Franco-Russian Dual Alliance. These conditions allowed no delay in France undertaking offensive operations. The strategic purpose of this arrangement for France was to ensure that Russia would not bog off her responsibility to put pressure on the Germans as quickly as possible.

 

But what if the High Seas Fleet remains in port, making no preparations to sally, while Germany assures the United Kingdom that it will do nothing provocative?

This is precisely the assurance Berlin made to London on August 3rd, 1914.

 

The Germans would be - were, in reality, we know - aware that the UK would not accept any attempt by the High Seas Fleet to sail through the Channel. Why do what they knew was against their own interests? Why threaten their own trade? Why not get the British to protect German shipping lanes, as part of protecting British trade, & keep the French fleet out of the North Sea?

 

Um, because the British refused to do it?

 

Sir Edward Grey had morally bound Great Britain to France’s side with the exchange of notes in November 1912, along with the arrangements made in the naval arrangement of the same year. On August 1st, 1914, Grey served notice to the French Ambassador that he would advise cabinet on the morrow to activate the naval guarantee. While he did so with a French promise in hand not to invade Belgium, the actual navy pledge was open ended and unconditional. This had the effect of binding British hands – it was contrary to the spirit and intent of the Anglo-French discussions for Britain to then turn around and protect German interests or trade.

[swerve]

...

This is precisely the assurance Berlin made to London on August 3rd, 1914.

 

But invaded Belgium, & the UK joined the war.

 

Um, because the British refused to do it?

 

Why would the British refuse to protect British shipping in the seas around Britain? Or refuse to permit other nations to turn those waters into a war zone, to the detriment of British trade?

 

Sir Edward Grey had morally bound Great Britain to France’s side with the exchange of notes in November 1912, along with the arrangements made in the naval arrangement of the same year. On August 1st, 1914, Grey served notice to the French Ambassador that he would advise cabinet on the morrow to activate the naval guarantee. While he did so with a French promise in hand not to invade Belgium, the actual navy pledge was open ended and unconditional. This had the effect of binding British hands – it was contrary to the spirit and intent of the Anglo-French discussions for Britain to then turn around and protect German interests or trade.

 

You're missing the point. A NEUTRAL Britain would protect German interests & trade as a by-product of protecting BRITISH interests & trade. I'm not suggesting that Britain would lift a finger to help Germany, but that the RN would act in British interests, within the limits imposed by neutrality. The fact that German trade would thereby remain relatively unhindered (but not completely - the French could & would clear many seas of German shipping, forcing German trade to go in neutral - e.g. British - bottoms) is a mere side-effect.

 

What you're arguing is that the premise of the thread is invalid, because it isn't what happened, & that Britain would side with France, as it did. What I'm doing is accepting the premise, & arguing from there, which is, after all, what an alternative history speculation is. Frankly, I don't see the point in participating in this discussion only in order to say "It didn't happen so it wouldn't".

[glenn239]

What you're arguing is that the premise of the thread is invalid, because it isn't what happened.

 

The premise can be whatever it wishes to be - if a different British or German government had been in place, neutrality might have been preserved. However, it is also of some interest to keep track of what actually occured, to keep a gauge on the historical track record of various suggestions. You wrote,

 

But what if the High Seas Fleet remains in port, making no preparations to sally, while Germany assures the United Kingdom that it will do nothing provocative?

 

This suggestion was made - it was ineffective.

 

You wrote,

 

A NEUTRAL Britain would protect German interests & trade as a by-product of protecting BRITISH interests & trade.

 

I wrote,

 

it was contrary to the spirit and intent of the Anglo-French discussions for Britain to then turn around and protect German interests or trade.

 

Meaning that I don't think Sir Edward Grey would have permitted relations of such an intimate character to develop with the French if it were his intention that Great Britain would then provide aid to France's enemy in wartime. Had he done so, then a major and immediate consequence would have been a first-class blowout with France and Russia, two powers that would have considered themselves utterly betrayed and England's word worthless. Sometimes such tensions can be overcome. Other times, they lead to estrangements that last decades. In either case, the consequence for Britain in 1914 would be a need to associate with Germany in order to counterbalance a re-ignited rivalry with Russia.

[zraver]

But invaded Belgium, & the UK joined the war.

Why would the British refuse to protect British shipping in the seas around Britain? Or refuse to permit other nations to turn those waters into a war zone, to the detriment of British trade?

You're missing the point. A NEUTRAL Britain would protect German interests & trade as a by-product of protecting BRITISH interests & trade. I'm not suggesting that Britain would lift a finger to help Germany, but that the RN would act in British interests, within the limits imposed by neutrality. The fact that German trade would thereby remain relatively unhindered (but not completely - the French could & would clear many seas of German shipping, forcing German trade to go in neutral - e.g. British - bottoms) is a mere side-effect.

 

I don't think Britain would bat an eye as the French navy swept German merchantmen from the sea. it is in Britain's interest to let the French do it. Nor do I think Britian would carry German trade, a defeated France is not in Britain's long term interests. Britain if anything would remain totally out of it except for making sure the High Seas fleet stays bottled up, thus helping France on the cheap.

[Colin Williams]

Actually those last three sentences are important and relevant. Despite ample warning of German doctrine and plans, and despite being outnumbered for the initial mobilization France still committed herself for an attack into the Alsace and Lorraine. She didn't have to, she could have screened the frontiers and launched her counter punch into the flank of the German advance. That was the smart thing to do, Germany could not cut France off from the world or starve her out, because if she sortied her navy the UK would be forced to act. Germany on the other hand had to attack or die specially with the UK sitting like a vulture with a massive navy. That stand off allowed even the smaller French fleet to cripple German trade while French Colonies and trade supported her war efforts. meanwhile every wasted day gave Russia more time to mobilize and after 6 weeks Germany would have lost her ability to attack at all if the Bear was able to set in force instead of being rushed to save France.

 

But you are comingling strategy, operations and tactics in your characterization of the French Army in 1914. Joffre did not have the Schlieffen Plan sitting on his desk in 1914. The French knew that the Germans would attack into Belgium. What they didn't know was that the German right wing would be strong enough to extend beyond the Meuse in force. French intelligence analysts consistently ruled out the possibility that the Germans would use their reserve formations alongside their active formations. Consequently, when Joffre realized that the Germans were sending strong forces into Belgium, he launched an attack into the Ardennes, mistakenly believing that the strength on the right and left required a weak center. He was wrong, and in hindsight it is clear that the French would have been better served by a counterattacking strategy as envisioned in earlier plans. On the other hand, there were commitments to the Russians and concerns about leaving the initiative entirely with the Germans. Even the counterattacking strategy required French forces to attack at some time, and I still stand by my original statement that the French Army was not significantly out of step with the other major armies when it came to offensive tactics or to emphasis on the offensive in operations.

[Colin Williams]

And were troops or officers trained to entrench?

 

After reading this I thought I remembered that there were some troops not trained or equipped to entrench, and I finally found the answer in "The Kaiser's Army - The Politics of Military Technology in Germany during the Machine Age 1870-1918" by Eric Dorn Brose. Here is his description of part of the Battle of the Marne -

 

"Into the gaping 45 to 50 kilometer hole between First and Second Armies, moreover, Kluck inserted only 1 infantry brigade and 2 cavalry divisions. Bulow had 2 cavalry divisions on the other side of the gap...Moving against the German screening force - slowly and deliberately at first, then more boldly - were 8 allied infantry and 4 cavalry divisions. The German horsemen would be asked to fight on foot, a task that the regulation issue of small quantities of carbine ammunition made next to impossible. To make matters even worse, entrenching tools were unavailable to cavalry units because prewar exercises had emphasized dismounting and firing but not digging in."

 

So the Germans lost the Battle of the Marne in part because they preferred providing their cavalry troopers with lances instead of shovels and carbine ammunition! What backward, fanatical believers in the offensive!!

[dpapp2]

Austria-Hungary had 2 dreadnoughts at the start of the war, with another 2 under construction.

NB, France had only two worked-up dreadnoughts, with France commissioned July 15, Jean Bart August 1, 1914.

 

Naval situation in the Med without the RN is much more interesting. Assuming Italy stays Neutral for a while.

 

But there were another 20 relatively moder modern (Charles Martel and after) predreadnoughts, against three Austrians. The French fleet have to keep some of the fleet against Germany in the Atlantic, just in case. I'd expect some German CLs to do some commerce raiding - they, after all, are not the HSF battleline threatening England with shore bombardment.

Now the considerably weaker than historical French fleet is not stationed at Malta but in Tunis, 200nm further, giving the AH Navy somewhat bigger flexibility.

The Adriatic is as good as closed for France, but AH not bottled up at all, with large number of TBs and destroyers available while most of the French TBs and destroyers would be out of range. (Tunis ~500nm).

 

It a bit surprising, but the French had no turbine cruisers in the Great War*. In this scenario, the Central Powers have 1 BC and 4+1 fast cruisers (although weaker than the French protected cruisers equipped with 163mm guns) in the Med. I see some crazy maneuvering in the Eastern Med, with the Goeben and the cruisers hunting French merchants dodging the slow French PCs and ACs, with even some fleet action in the Ionian (until inevitable losses would force AH back in the Adriatic as historical).

 

The French would have to consider rerouting their Far East shipping around the Cape, and not risk the Mediterranean.

 

Subs: Austria had only 7 Uboote, all 250t petroleum/gasoline coastal types.

 

 

*AFAIK only UK, Germany, Italy(3) and Austria(4) and Russia(9) had laid down turbine cruisers before the Great War. Of the 9 Russian, only 3 were finished, after 1925.

[swerve]

I don't think Britain would bat an eye as the French navy swept German merchantmen from the sea. it is in Britain's interest to let the French do it.

Firstly, nobody - absolutely nobody - has suggested that the RN would protect German merchantment. So what are you on about? Secondly, how is it in the interest of a neutral Britain? Fairly irrelevant to Britains interest, perhaps - but not positively beneficial.

 

Nor do I think Britian would carry German trade, a defeated France is not in Britain's long term interests. Britain if anything would remain totally out of it except for making sure the High Seas fleet stays bottled up, thus helping France on the cheap.

 

You think Britain, the great champion of free trade & freedom of the seas, would impose a blockade on Germany? What you are saying, like Glenn, is that you can't accept the premise.

 

A conquered France would certainly not be in Britains long-term interest, & nor would complete German domination of the Continent. But imposing a blockade on Germany would mean joining the war. There's no such thing as refusing to carry German trade - British shippers were free agents, & expected the RN to protect their freedom of navigation. For the government to bar them from trading with Germany (would have needed new legislation, which would have been interesting) would, in any case, merely have made a lot of Dutch & Danish harbours very busy with British ships - also expecting protection from the RN.

 

You're doing the same as Glenn. You're arguing against the premise of a neutral Britain, & therefore attacking any argument which starts from that assumption.

[swerve]

The premise can be whatever it wishes to be - if a different British or German government had been in place, neutrality might have been preserved. However, it is also of some interest to keep track of what actually occured, to keep a gauge on the historical track record of various suggestions. You wrote,

 

But what if the High Seas Fleet remains in port, making no preparations to sally, while Germany assures the United Kingdom that it will do nothing provocative?

 

This suggestion was made - it was ineffective.

 

You wrote,

 

A NEUTRAL Britain would protect German interests & trade as a by-product of protecting BRITISH interests & trade.

 

I wrote,

 

it was contrary to the spirit and intent of the Anglo-French discussions for Britain to then turn around and protect German interests or trade.

 

Meaning that I don't think Sir Edward Grey would have permitted relations of such an intimate character to develop with the French if it were his intention that Great Britain would then provide aid to France's enemy in wartime. Had he done so, then a major and immediate consequence would have been a first-class blowout with France and Russia, two powers that would have considered themselves utterly betrayed and England's word worthless. Sometimes such tensions can be overcome. Other times, they lead to estrangements that last decades. In either case, the consequence for Britain in 1914 would be a need to associate with Germany in order to counterbalance a re-ignited rivalry with Russia.

 

The ineffective suggestion was made in a different context, in which Britain went to war with Germany after the invasion of Belgium. For this discussion to be more than a recounting of actual history, we have to assume that Britain did not join the war. For me, the attack on France through Belgium was the critical step, after which Britain could not stay out, & any discussion should begin with the assumption that the Germans initially stand on the defensive in the west. Incompatible with all their pre-war planning, I know, but for Britain to stay out, some counter-factual assumption has to be made, & I think this is the minimum necessary one.

 

In that case, Britain would have no treaty obligation to aid France, as Italy had no obligation to aid Austria-Hungary after its attack on Serbia (there was an Italian obligation to help A-H if it was attacked), & could morally & legally not be faulted for neutrality.

 

I agree, staying out would provoke Russian & French hostility, which would affect Britains post-war relations, & there's much ground for interesting speculation there.

 

BTW, why do you keep going on about Britain providing aid to Frances enemy? As I've said more than once, I have not suggested that Britain provide one iota of aid to Germany, & I don't understand why you insist on reading "neutral" as "aiding Germany". All I am saying is what is obvious: a neutral Britain would be better for Germany than a Britain at war with Germany, because German overseas trade would be able to flow fairly freely if Britain acted as a strict (but self-protective) neutral.

[swerve]

...The French would have to consider rerouting their Far East shipping around the Cape, and not risk the Mediterranean.

...

 

Another great opportunity for British shipping: carrying French trade from the Far East. Y'know, staying neutral looks like being good for the economy.

[glenn239]

For me, the attack on France through Belgium was the critical step, after which Britain could not stay out, & any discussion should begin with the assumption that the Germans initially stand on the defensive in the west. Incompatible with all their pre-war planning, I know, but for Britain to stay out, some counter-factual assumption has to be made, & I think this is the minimum necessary one.

Then for your AH, the point of departure is Lichnowsky’s interview with Sir Edward Grey on the afternoon of August 1st, 1914. In response to the British inquiry on the status of Belgium, Lichnowsky asks if Grey could guarantee British neutrality towards Germany should Germany respect her obligations under the 1839 Treaty. Rather than the historical denial, Grey instead confirms that he has already consulted cabinet and can assure the Germans that the British would offer a repeat of the 1870 neutrality treaty with Prussia.

 

But the question which arises is why he’d leave off a neutrality option until so late in the crisis. That is to say, stripped of all the glitz, Great Britain essentially went to war to help Russia protect a terrorist cell in Serbia (the leader of which the Serbs themselves later executed on false charges in 1917). Instead of selling Russia down the river in August, why wouldn’t Grey just tell St. Petersburg on July 24th that if Russia goes to war she was on her own? That way, Grey could have his neutrality without the intense bitterness from his allies.

 

BTW, why do you keep going on about Britain providing aid to Frances enemy? As I've said more than once, I have not suggested that Britain provide one iota of aid to Germany, & I don't understand why you insist on reading "neutral" as "aiding Germany".

 

Because any situation whereby Britain, directly or indirectly, is of assistance in seeing German trade continue to flow on the high seas (in the ships of any country) helps the Central Powers and hurts France and Russia. Irrespective of any British yabber-jabber, what the French would see is the British, having “led them on” against Germany, then stabbing them in the back and leaving them high and dry when the gun goes off.

 

All I am saying is what is obvious: a neutral Britain would be better for Germany than a Britain at war with Germany, because German overseas trade would be able to flow fairly freely if Britain acted as a strict (but self-protective) neutral.

A neutral Britain was certainly much better for Germany, were it attainable. One additional suggestion that they didn’t try might have been to offer a “pledge” squadron. Instead of keeping the HSF locked up, send 8 of the latest BB’s to England as a promise of Germany’s good behaviour. Make the offer public, so that when it was refused, there would be an uproar in Great Britain.

 

 

I don't think Britain would bat an eye as the French navy swept German merchantmen from the sea.

 

She’d have cheered them on. No doubt all information relating to the location of German vessels would be passed on to France in as timely a manner as possible.

 

The Adriatic is as good as closed for France, but AH not bottled up at all, with large number of TBs and destroyers available while most of the French TBs and destroyers would be out of range.

Unless pressured by Germany, Austria-Hungary would not have declared war on France. It can be assumed that if Britain were neutral, France would not wish to make war upon Austria. There is a distinct possibility that there would be no war in the Mediterreanean.

 

You're doing the same as Glenn. You're arguing against the premise of a neutral Britain, & therefore attacking any argument which starts from that assumption.

 

I think that you might be overestimating the latitude for choice in the British position, as it existed by August 1st 1914. If Grey thought neutrality desirable, he’d have forced the Russians to swallow Halt in Belgrade the week before, and that would have been that.

[swerve]

...

I think that you might be overestimating the latitude for choice in the British position, as it existed by August 1st 1914. If Grey thought neutrality desirable, he’d have forced the Russians to swallow Halt in Belgrade the week before, and that would have been that.

 

But I didn't pick that date - you did.

 

I'm not particularly interested, at the moment, in discussing the fine detail of exactly how Britain avoids fighting, though clearly it's necessary to choose which counter-factual assumptions to make, to provide a starting point. I've been seeking to discuss what might happen after that point.

 

We can imagine many things being said, or not being said, in July 1914. Grey seems to have vacillated - see here. And that was on July 31st. It seems likely that throughout the crisis, Grey was uncertain how to proceed.

 

Let us imagine that instead of being vague, Grey had told the Germans clearly that as far as he was concerned an attack on France or the violation of Belgian neutrality would be considered a casus belli. We can then imagine Germany amending its plans accordingly, with the intent of keeping down the forces arrayed against it.

 

If he'd also told the French the same thing, they couldn't accuse him of betrayal when the UK did not enter the war. The Russians would also be hard-pressed to claim betrayal, at least according to Grey, who told Parliament on August 3rd that we had no obligations to Russia -

 

Greys speech to Parliament

 

If we take Greys apparent preoccupation in that speech with trade, the Mediterranean, & the undefended French Atlantic coasts, let us assume a statement made at the same time as the earlier hypothetical warning to Germany, that Britain would consider any attempt by the German or French fleets to pass through the Channel to be a hostile act, & would defend the Channel against such an attempt. Would that be a pro-German act? They might see it as pro-French. But it would be perfectly understandable as an attempt to keep war as far from our shores as possible, & keep our seaborne trade, our economic lifeblood (& most of our food!) safe, and perfectly in accordance with what Grey said at the time.

 

There we are: we've got to a situation where the UK is neutral, the Channel closed to the ships of nations at war, & Germany dissuaded from attacking France, particularly through Belgium. Not so hard, was it?

 

Just spotted this -

Unless pressured by Germany, Austria-Hungary would not have declared war on France. It can be assumed that if Britain were neutral, France would not wish to make war upon Austria. There is a distinct possibility that there would be no war in the Mediterreanean.

- which fits very well with what Grey said on August 3rd. Edited November 7, 2007 by swerve