WWI where England sits it out

[Murph]

Assume that for argument's sake, the King and PM decided not to join with the French. Also suppose the Kaiser elects to build cruisers with fewer dreadnaughts. What would happen to the French and Russians if the British sat out the war? Would the US have been suckered into it like we were, or would the US have sat it out in splendid isolation?

[KingSargent]

Assume that for argument's sake, the King and PM decided not to join with the French. Also suppose the Kaiser elects to build cruisers with fewer dreadnaughts. What would happen to the French and Russians if the British sat out the war? Would the US have been suckered into it like we were, or would the US have sat it out in splendid isolation?

I doubt it would have lasted long enough for the US to get suckered in, especially with no "freedom of the seas" issues (British Blockade, German U-boat campaign). We managed to stay out of the Franco-Prussian War, although that was so close after the ACW that the US would have gone to war again when the Prussians camped in Central Park.

 

I would give Germany the edge, but there are too many variables, especially in the diplomatic run-up too the war.

 

HIJACK ALERT!!!

 

Just for giggles, I tried some variants on my WW1 games (board, not computer) where France manages to piss EVERYBODY off and there is a war where all the European monarchies unite to rid themselves of those pesky republicans who keep de-stabilizing things.

 

Do the 1914 campaign with Britain, Belgium, and Italy allied with Germany and see how long France lasts. Great fun when Francophobia sets in............

[glenn239]

If Great Britain sits out, then France and Russia cannot win the war. This will make them....reasonable. The British also will not tolerate a German victory, which should make Berlin....reasonable. Bottom line might be a negotiated peace after 1 campaign. Happily, Serbia probably gets their teeth kicked in.

[WRW]

Irish Home Rule by 1920

[GdG**]

We managed to stay out of the Franco-Prussian War, although that was so close after the ACW that the US would have gone to war again when the Prussians camped in Central Park.

 

Huh? Could you tell me more about it? Maybe I didn't get one language subtility...

[Junior FO]

...

Edited September 19, 2024 by Junior FO

[zraver]

The only real way for England to sit it out is if France violates Belgium first. England was bound by (IIRC) the treaty of Vienna to safeguard Belgium. She probalby would not have gone to war vs France over it, but it was England's legal cassus belli in 1914.

 

Without the BEF forcing the German right wing to stumble at Mons France has major problems.not only does it increase the frontage of the French Army but it compensates for Moltkes panic and his sending extra corps to East Prussia thus restoring the relative strength of the German Right Wing and Schwerepunkt.

 

At the very least the battle would have reached Paris proper before the German infantry ran out of endurance. The race to the coast that followed would have been farther into France and over extended the French lines making French counter-offensives unlikely.

 

In a scenario where France is over extended but not willing to cede defeat Verdun in 1916 (assumign France lasted that long) might well have achieved its goal of bleeding the French white.

[Colin Williams]

Joffre accounted for the presence of the BEF in his planning, so it's likely he would have been more cautious in his actions during the first weeks of the war if Britain stayed out. A little prudence on Joffre's part could have compensated for the absence of the BEF, leading to a stalemate in northern France not unlike the actual result. The BEF didn't occupy a substantial part of the front until the run up to the Somme, but I can't see France holding out in 1916 without some kind of help. This help would have to come from some ally other than Britain, so the question is whether such an ally might have been available under other circumstances.

 

Beyond the Western Front, one potential outcome of British neutrality is continued Turkish neutrality. Germany would be very reluctant to bring Britain into the war, and Turkish belligerency would be considered provocative enough by the British to bring about a declaration of war. With the Turks out of the war, the French can save on the modest manpower demands for Gallipoli and might even be able to prop up the Serbs more effectively. If Italy still enters the war on the side of the Entente (perhaps unlikely without Britain in the war), the diversion of Italian troops to France could take up some of the slack on the Western Front, but certainly the combined Franco-Italian forces would have to stay on the strategic defensive while watching the Russians and Serbs get chopped to pieces by the Germans and Austro-Hungarians.

[KingSargent]

Irish Home Rule by 1920

The British were distracted by the Irish Question in the Summer of 1914, and were late in getting involved diplomatically in the prelude to the war.

[KingSargent]

Don't want to butt in but I think his point was that Prussians camping in Central Park would have been necessary for the US to go to war again so soon after the ACW.

Exactly.

[swerve]

The only real way for England to sit it out is if France violates Belgium first. ...

 

Or if Germany doesn't implement the Schlieffen plan, & so there is no German invasion of Belgium. That option was extensively discussed here some time ago.

[glenn239]

Quote: The only real way for England to sit it out is if France violates Belgium first. England was bound by (IIRC) the treaty of Vienna to safeguard Belgium. She probalby would not have gone to war vs France over it, but it was England's legal cassus belli in 1914.

 

Response:

 

"Excerpt from Vol VI, no. 559, page 731 of the British Documents:

 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

 

...If we were to promise Germany that we would remain neutral in the event of aggression against her, our hands might be tied when Germany was not really the victim of aggression. If, for instance, at a time when there was diplomatic tension between Germany and France, Germany concentrated troops upon Aix-la-Chapelle with the obvious intention of entering Belgium, France might be compelled to take the initiative."

 

His meaning here, when he says, 'take the initiative', is that France might invade Belgium should Germany concentrate troops at Aachen.

 

xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

 

Quote: Joffre accounted for the presence of the BEF in his planning, so it's likely he would have been more cautious in his actions during the first weeks of the war if Britain stayed out.

 

Response: Joffre's analysis was that he could not get at the German army by way of the Franco-German border alone. If England stayed out and Germany did not invade Belgium, then either a large part of the French army goes on vacation, or France invades Belgium to get them into contact with the enemy.

 

xxxxxxxxx

 

Quote: If Italy still enters the war on the side of the Entente

 

Response: As an ally of Germany, should Britain have remained neutral, Italy would either have joined with the Central Powers, or stayed out. She'd have never sided with France because the Germans would have come down with their 50 surplus divisions (not needed on the Western Front) and kicked the living crap out of them.

 

Quote: Or if Germany doesn't implement the Schlieffen plan, & so there is no German invasion of Belgium. That option was extensively discussed here some time ago.

 

Response: The British neutrality option in 1914 was to repeat the policy of 1870 - an offer of alliance with both Germany and France should the other violate Belgian territory. By 1905, the British General Staff had concluded that, in order for Germany to defeat France, the Germans sooner or later had to invade Belgium (The Continental Commitment, pg 42). If Germany had accepted a repeat of the 1870 Treaty, then by definition the defeat of France and the occupation of the Channel Ports became impossible. And all this accomplished without the loss of a single British soldier.

 

With Britain and Belgium neutral, the French could not deploy their entire army against Germany. Russia is therefore overmatched and the war ends happily; with Serbia getting crushed and the Russians backing down. If, alternatively, the Germans decided to try and wipe Russia out using Serbia as an excuse, then Great Britain, having carefully crafted an 'outl in their offer to Germany, could have declared war in the winter of 1914/1915. France would then have been free to invade Belgium, and in the meantime the British could use the breather to expand their army.

[Colin Williams]

Quote: Joffre accounted for the presence of the BEF in his planning, so it's likely he would have been more cautious in his actions during the first weeks of the war if Britain stayed out.

 

Response: Joffre's analysis was that he could not get at the German army by way of the Franco-German border alone. If England stayed out and Germany did not invade Belgium, then either a large part of the French army goes on vacation, or France invades Belgium to get them into contact with the enemy.

 

France was not going to invade Belgium, at least not in the early phases of a war. (One has to allow for changing attitudes in the midst of a major conflict.) From an online article by Robert Doughty, which mirrors his analysis in "Pyrrhic Victory" -

 

'After carefully considering French and German alternatives, Joffre sought permission at a meeting of the Superior Council of National Defense on January 12,1912, to advance into Belgium at the first news of a German attack. Composed of the President of the Republic, Premier, Minister of War, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Chief of the General Staff, the Superior Council was not a decision-making body, but the Premier, Joseph Caillaux, made it clear that French forces could not enter Belgium until after the Germans had violated its neutrality. Caillaux emphasized, "Not one French soldier will put a foot on the soil of Belgium if the Germans respect the treaties [of neutrality] ." After Raymond Poincare became Premier, Joffre again sought permission to enter Belgium. He argued that favorable terrain for an advance into Alsace and Lorraine did not exist and that an "infinitely more advantageous" opportunity for offensive action existed in Belgium. Poincare, however, refused to permit French forces to enter Belgium prior to Germany's violating its neutrality. After two premiers adamantly opposed violating Belgium's neutrality, Joffre had no choice but to accept their decision.'

 

http://www.worldwar1.com/france/jpff1914.htm

[glenn239]

After two premiers adamantly opposed violating Belgium's neutrality, Joffre had no choice but to accept their decision.'

 

Sir Edward Grey’s excerpted quote above was written one day after Poincare (not Joffre) sent word to London to the effect that, hypothetically speaking, German concentrations at Aachen might force France to pre-emptively move into Belgium,

 

"The essential thing is that England shall not undertake to remain neutral between France and Germany even in the hypothesis of the attack seeming to come from our act. To take but one example, could the responsibility for aggression be legitimately imputed to us if a concentration of German forces in the Aix-la-Chapelle region compelled us to cover our northern frontier by penetrating into Belgian territory." (Albertini, The Origins of the War, Vol 1, pp 338).

 

 

Joffre confirms that Poincare forced him to accept a situation whereby (in his term) France would not invade via the Ardennes a priori. But Poincare did admit that Joffre would be free to act in a situation where Germany, while not having ruptured the Belgian frontier, will have exercised a “positive menace” to this end. Joffre never received a working definition of what a “positive menace” was, and so proceeded on the apparent assumption that it would mean whatever was convenient when the time arrived. At the planning level, Joffre was able to delay until M+8 the decision of whether to activate the Belgian or regular variant. The purpose was to allow French politicians 8 days from the point of French mobilization to secure Great Britain to the side of France in a war. If and when this was accomplished, then France would be free to do whatever she pleased with respect to the Ardennes. (It being the case that Great Britain could not ‘undeclare war’ on Germany should France invade the Ardennes after a British DOW).

[zraver]

Joffre accounted for the presence of the BEF in his planning, so it's likely he would have been more cautious in his actions during the first weeks of the war if Britain stayed out.

 

 

That completely ignores the French mindset in the run up to the war. Elan was all, in the spirit of the bayonet kill-kill-kill!! and all that jazz. France had equipped her armies for offensive not defensive action she lacked machine guns, or heavy artillery but had a plethora of fast firing highly mobile 75mm breach loaders and bayonets. France had systematically built up an idealized belief in in French superiority as a form of mental overcompensation for 1870. France would ahve gone charging into the Alsace-Lorraine no matter what. Plus the regions annexed by Germany in 1870 accounted for a large part of Frances potential iron and coal reserves.

[Ken Estes]

Joffre accounted for the presence of the BEF in his planning, so it's likely he would have been more cautious in his actions during the first weeks of the war if Britain stayed out. A little prudence on Joffre's part could have compensated for the absence of the BEF, leading to a stalemate in northern France not unlike the actual result. The BEF didn't occupy a substantial part of the front until the run up to the Somme, but I can't see France holding out in 1916 without some kind of help. This help would have to come from some ally other than Britain, so the question is whether such an ally might have been available under other circumstances.

 

....

Well put, Colin. The performance of the French army in 1914 has been overshadowed and overlooked for too long, and apparently Doughty's book redresses it, but I have yet to receive it. Joffre did very well in the initial battles and his expert shuffling of the armies and corps to meet the new threats can be considered the real miracle of the Marne. It is even more remarkable if we consider that of the war plans, Germany's is the best [although almost impossible to execute] and France's the worst!

[KingSargent]

Well put, Colin. The performance of the French army in 1914 has been overshadowed and overlooked for too long, and apparently Doughty's book redresses it, but I have yet to receive it. Joffre did very well in the initial battles and his expert shuffling of the armies and corps to meet the new threats can be considered the real miracle of the Marne. It is even more remarkable if we consider that of the war plans, Germany's is the best [although almost impossible to execute] and France's the worst!

Even Schlieffen realized his plan was logistically unsupportable before he died. Making 'the right wing strong'(er) would have made it more impossible.

 

However, can a plan unworkable from the start be "best"?

[Ken Estes]

Even Schlieffen realized his plan was logistically unsupportable before he died. Making 'the right wing strong'(er) would have made it more impossible.

 

However, can a plan unworkable from the start be "best"?

 

One could never be sure it was impossible, but it did make extreme demands upon the troops, units. It was best in that it was the only one that

recognized the impossibility of frontal attacks. Howzzat?

[Colin Williams]

That completely ignores the French mindset in the run up to the war. Elan was all, in the spirit of the bayonet kill-kill-kill!! and all that jazz. France had equipped her armies for offensive not defensive action she lacked machine guns, or heavy artillery but had a plethora of fast firing highly mobile 75mm breach loaders and bayonets. France had systematically built up an idealized belief in in French superiority as a form of mental overcompensation for 1870. France would ahve gone charging into the Alsace-Lorraine no matter what. Plus the regions annexed by Germany in 1870 accounted for a large part of Frances potential iron and coal reserves.

 

Zraver,

 

You are repeating a stereotypical view that has been refuted by careful historical study. I will post some references when I get back from my current travels, but real differences in tactics among the major combatants were relatively modest, although still significant in some cases.

[Colin Williams]

Well put, Colin. The performance of the French army in 1914 has been overshadowed and overlooked for too long, and apparently Doughty's book redresses it, but I have yet to receive it. Joffre did very well in the initial battles and his expert shuffling of the armies and corps to meet the new threats can be considered the real miracle of the Marne. It is even more remarkable if we consider that of the war plans, Germany's is the best [although almost impossible to execute] and France's the worst!

 

 

Thanks Ken. Doughty's book is excellent on French strategy and operations. Someday I hope someone writes the complete story of the Western front, dealing with all the armies on an objective basis. Perhaps Hew Strachan's future volumes.

[KingSargent]

Zraver,

 

You are repeating a stereotypical view that has been refuted by careful historical study. I will post some references when I get back from my current travels, but real differences in tactics among the major combatants were relatively modest, although still significant in some cases.

I'll be interested in those references too. Just about everything I have read on the French Army in WW1 supports the "stereotype", which is why it is a stereotype of course. But being a stereotype does not necessarily mean that it is untrue, it just means it should be checked carefully.

[jakec]

From Fritz Fischer, the German side of things...

Bethmann-Hollweg: "...there seemed to him to be 'many indications which made it at least doubtful whether England would intervene actively if the provocation appeared to come directly from Russia and France'" and in July 1914 B-H was "primarily interested, not in saving the peace, but in saddling Russia with responsibility for the war, because his policy was based on the theory that Britain could be kept out of a continental war if Russia was made to appear the aggressor".

 

According to von Bernhardi three things were necessary for Germany's advance to a position of world power:

1) The diminition of France;

2) Foundation of a Central European federation under German leadership;

3) Acquisition of new colonies.

 

Germany, or more specifically Moltke made no plans for an initial advance in the East after 1913. Moltke expected a six weeks war in the West before transferring forces East. But he held the possibility of a settlement with Britain to be illusory.

 

In September 1914 B-H principles for an armistice with France via Rathenau, "only a Germany reinforced by 'Mitteleuropa' would be in a position to maintain herself as an equal world power between the world powers of Britain and the USA on the one side and Russia on the other". Hence a compromise with France and a complete customs union with Austria-Hungary was seen as the sensible approach rather than a "blind policy of annexations" as proposed by many in Germany such as the Alldeutscher Verband. Nevertheless B-H sought a continuous colonial empire in central Africa including Angola and northern Mozambique and north to the Niger River including the Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa. Possibly also British Nigeria. "France must be so weakened as to make her revival as a great power impossible for all time. Russia must be thrust back as far as possible from Germany's eastern frontier and her domination over the non-Russian vassal peoples broken". In general France was to be made economically dependent on Germany and to be used as a market for German exports. There would be a German dominated European economic association including France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Austria-Hungary, Poland and perhaps Italy, Sweden and Norway. The acquisition of the ore fields of the Briey basin by Germany would make French/Belgian industry dependent for their ore on Germany.

 

Unfortunately for the thesis of keeping Britain out, Tirpitz insisted that Belgium be a key war aim, and in particular the Belgian coastline. The Flemish were hoped to be natural allies. Krupp and Tirpitz felt that the establishment of Germany's power on the Channel could compel Britain to give Germany her 'friendship'; i.e. freedom of action for Germany. Throughout the various iterations of postwar plans for Belgium common themes were free passage for German troops, and German occupation of certain Channel ports.

 

Forcing Russia back to the frontiers which were hers before Peter the Great. A 'frontier strip' for Germany in Poland and the rest of Poland to Austria-Hungary (until in 1916 Germany decided Poland was to be hers). Buffer states in Ukraine, Finland, Caucasus including a neutral Caucasian Federation. Considered German annexation of the Baltic states. German war aims changed with the fortunes of war. After failure in the West in 1914 the prospect of a separate peace with Russia was considered in order to allow Germany to pursue aims in the West. This meant war aims in the East were scaled back. After success in the East in summer 1915 the old aims of detaching portions of Russia's western empire returned.

[Colin Williams]

I'll be interested in those references too. Just about everything I have read on the French Army in WW1 supports the "stereotype", which is why it is a stereotype of course. But being a stereotype does not necessarily mean that it is untrue, it just means it should be checked carefully.

 

 

I'll have to dig because the stuff is scattered all over the place, but let's start with a little quiz, open to anyone who can identify the sources of the following written regulations/instructions that were in effect in 1914 (hint: they are not French) -

 

Regarding infantry -

 

"In tandem with artillery its fire will batter the enemy. It alone breaks his last resistance. It carries the brunt of the combat and makes the greatest sacrifices. Consequently it garners the greatest glory. Infantry must nurture its intrinsic drive to attack aggressively. Its actions must be dominated by one thought: forward against the enemy, cost what it may!"

 

Or

 

"offensive action is the best method of obtaining our object; only thus can we seize the initiative and force the enemy to do what we wish."

 

Or

 

"A bayonet charge will normally be delivered in lines, possibly many deep, against a defending force also in lines, over rough ground...Single combat will therefore be the exception, while fighting in the mass will be the rule...In a bayonet fight the impetus of the charging line gives it moral and physical advantages over the stationary line. Infantry on the defensive should, therefore, always be ready to meet a bayonet charge with a counter-charge, if their fire fails to stop the assailant."

[KingSargent]

I'll have to dig because the stuff is scattered all over the place, but let's start with a little quiz, open to anyone who can identify the sources of the following written regulations/instructions that were in effect in 1914 (hint: they are not French) -

 

Regarding infantry -

 

"In tandem with artillery its fire will batter the enemy. It alone breaks his last resistance. It carries the brunt of the combat and makes the greatest sacrifices. Consequently it garners the greatest glory. Infantry must nurture its intrinsic drive to attack aggressively. Its actions must be dominated by one thought: forward against the enemy, cost what it may!"

 

Or

 

"offensive action is the best method of obtaining our object; only thus can we seize the initiative and force the enemy to do what we wish."

 

Or

 

"A bayonet charge will normally be delivered in lines, possibly many deep, against a defending force also in lines, over rough ground...Single combat will therefore be the exception, while fighting in the mass will be the rule...In a bayonet fight the impetus of the charging line gives it moral and physical advantages over the stationary line. Infantry on the defensive should, therefore, always be ready to meet a bayonet charge with a counter-charge, if their fire fails to stop the assailant."

Right, that sort of verbiage is universal. But the French STOPPED there. The pre-war doctrine did not deal with defense at all; if you were attacked, counterattack with elan. No trying to defend by fire and then counterattack if fire doesn't stop them, go to the bayonet right away.

 

French infantry had no entrenching tools; they were not supposed to entrench, that showed lack of elan.

 

To Grandmaison and others (like Foch) aggression and elan were everything.

[zraver]

Zraver,

 

You are repeating a stereotypical view that has been refuted by careful historical study. I will post some references when I get back from my current travels, but real differences in tactics among the major combatants were relatively modest, although still significant in some cases.

 

I am only repeating the truth. or do you deny that the French launched suicidal attacks into Lorraine with First Army (Dubail) and Second Army de Castlenau against prepared defenses in August and got smashed?

 

Or do you deny the Field Regulations enacted in October 1913 that had the following dictum

 

Battle are beyond everything else struggles of morale, defeat is inevitable as soon as the hope of conquering ceases to exist. Success comes not to him who has suffered the least, but to him whose will is firmest and will strongest.

 

Or perhaps the High command ignoring Col Grouard's, La Guerre Eventuelle with its passage "It is above all the German offensive through Belgium on which we ought to fix out attention."

 

Or Major Melotte's (Belgian military attache in Berlin) correctly guessing that the Germans were assigning a reserve corps to every active corps and his passing this onto France.

 

Now you can take issue with this but I am drawing this all directly from Barbara Tuchman's the Guns of August a properly cited/sourced and Pulitzer winning work.