The generalship of Mark Clark

[KingSargent]

 

Relief map of Slovenia.

Bit of a sticky wicket there, eh?

[swerve]

Bit of a sticky wicket there, eh?

 

That's the easy bit. It's a lot worse going north, directly into Austria.

[KingSargent]

That's the easy bit. It's a lot worse going north, directly into Austria.

SHHHHHH............

[Rich]

Now explain why in Sam Hill would the High Command send a mountain division to the hot flatlands of Texas if its training had not been completed?

Because there was no divisional maneuver training area in mountains.

 

A liitle more detail relating to this. The 10th Mountain Division was activated at Camp Hale, CO, on 15 July 1943 as the 10th Light Division (Pack, Alpine). Hale was suitable for light infantry and mountain basic training, and the company, battalion, and regimental training exercises that were required By the AGF standardized trianing program. Typically the sequence was the cadre assembled during activation, the intake and proceesing of recruits took between two and four weeks, basic took 12 weeks, and then company, battalion and regimental training took about 6 weeks each. As a result, in a perfect world after about 10 months a division was ready for full divisional exercises at one of the major exercise areas, would complete those and then Process for Overseas Movement at a major port, which in theory was only supposed to take a month. By 22 June 1944 the 10th was 11 months into its training cycle when it arrived at Camp Swift, TX, for its divisional exercises, which was pretty close to the ideal training timeline. But it then spent almost five months there before POMing to Camp Patrick Henry, VA 27 December and departing Hampton Roads 6 January 1945 (10 days is pretty fast processing and loading BTW, my Dad's battalion staged at Dix for over a month before loading). That seems to indicate that my initial assumption that the delay was due to shipping was wrong.

 

So something happened at Swift to knock them off schedule? Anybody have a clue what it was?

[KingSargent]

A liitle more detail relating to this. The 10th Mountain Division was activated at Camp Hale, CO, on 15 July 1943 as the 10th Light Division (Pack, Alpine). Hale was suitable for light infantry and mountain basic training, and the company, battalion, and regimental training exercises that were required By the AGF standardized trianing program. Typically the sequence was the cadre assembled during activation, the intake and proceesing of recruits took between two and four weeks, basic took 12 weeks, and then company, battalion and regimental training took about 6 weeks each. As a result, in a perfect world after about 10 months a division was ready for full divisional exercises at one of the major exercise areas, would complete those and then Process for Overseas Movement at a major port, which in theory was only supposed to take a month. By 22 June 1944 the 10th was 11 months into its training cycle when it arrived at Camp Swift, TX, for its divisional exercises, which was pretty close to the ideal training timeline. But it then spent almost five months there before POMing to Camp Patrick Henry, VA 27 December and departing Hampton Roads 6 January 1945 (10 days is pretty fast processing and loading BTW, my Dad's battalion staged at Dix for over a month before loading). That seems to indicate that my initial assumption that the delay was due to shipping was wrong.

 

So something happened at Swift to knock them off schedule? Anybody have a clue what it was?

AIUI, nobody wanted them. They were a specialist division with nowhere to operate specially. I think they were originally intended for a Norwegian op (one of Winnie's Wacky Wonders?) that got cancelled. They would be almost useless in France, and the WA were still hoping to keep the French mountain troops (the whole FEC FTM) in Italy, so there was no urgent need there either.

 

I wonder just how much sending the 4th Indian Division to Greece cost the Allies in Italy in mountain capability? They were good in mountains. BTW, just to show I am not completely prejudiced, I have to give AlanBrooke credit. He was completely opposed to the Greek venture and said it would be a manpower sink. His predictions about how much resources the 'simple' operation would eventually suck up were spot on, too

[Rich]

AIUI, nobody wanted them. They were a specialist division with nowhere to operate specially. I think they were originally intended for a Norwegian op (one of Winnie's Wacky Wonders?) that got cancelled. They would be almost useless in France, and the WA were still hoping to keep the French mountain troops (the whole FEC FTM) in Italy, so there was no urgent need there either.

 

Well, they wanted the manpower....but that may be the case. Of course by the time the 10th Mountain was theoretically ready in summer 1944, the whole FEC was in Italy, but was withdrawn from the front and retraining for ANVIL, so I doubt anyone was really holding any hope for keepingthem in Italy.

 

I wonder just how much sending the 4th Indian Division to Greece cost the Allies in Italy in mountain capability? They were good in mountains. BTW, just to show I am notcompletely prejudiced, I have to give AlanBrooke credit. He was completely opposed to the Greek venture and said it would be a manpower sink. His predictions about how much resources the 'simple' operation would eventually suck up were spot on, too

 

Yeah, a truly goofy idea.

[Junior FO]

...

Edited September 19, 2024 by Junior FO

[Rich]

Actually that's one question I've never found sensible answer for. Why the heck Greece...................

 

Pretty much the Germans dropped it like a hot potato, hoping someone would be silly enough to pick it up.

[Marek Tucan]

That's the easy bit.

 

I think it deserves addition of "relatively" into the sentence

[JWB]

 

Relief map of Slovenia.

Looks like the High Sierras. Nothing on that map proves that it would be impossible for the Allies to cross the Austrian border in 1944.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

 

King Sargent Fri 2 Nov 2007 0024

Because there was no divisional maneuver training area in mountains.

 

How much divisional maneuver combat area is there in mountain warfare?

[swerve]

Looks like the High Sierras. Nothing on that map proves that it would be impossible for the Allies to cross the Austrian border in 1944.

...

 

Nobody said "impossible". The disagreement is over whether it would be a walkover, as you claimed.

 

Note that this isn't Austria, it's a territory all of which has to be crossed to reach the Austrian border, to the north (i.e. where the land goes up, except in the far eastern sector - heading towards Hungary). The front is narrower than that in the Italian peninsula, & the terrain is, on average, tougher. There is no way round (as has been pointed out, this is the easiest route - the other one is arguably impossible), as there always was on the peninsula.

 

The defensibility of the Slovenian/Italian border was demonstrated in 1915-17, & I suggest that even a beaten German army of 1944 would be a damned tough proposition to get out of there, having fallen back on its supply lines gathering up rear area troops & supplies as it went.

Edited November 3, 2007 by swerve

[KingSargent]

Looks like the High Sierras. Nothing on that map proves that it would be impossible for the Allies to cross the Austrian border in 1944.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

How much divisional maneuver combat area is there in mountain warfare?

The divisional training was to teach the units and staffs of the division how to integrate, support each other, coordinate and call artillery, etc. It was what changed a division from a collection of small units to a fighting entity.

[KingSargent]

Actually that's one question I've never found sensible answer for. Why the heck Greece...................

It was mostly Churchill and went back to failures in 1941 and even to Gallipoli. He was always trying to push an Eastern Med/Balkan strategy, possibly so he could "prove" he'd been right earlier.

 

There were also the promises made to Greece in 1941. At least trying to "liberate" Greece would put a bit of credence back into the UK's diplomatic account. The UK had gotten them into trouble (Hitler wouldn't have intervened in the Greek-Italian fiasco except tha tBritiain was moving in), so at least they could get them out.

 

Finally, he wanted to make sure the Communists didn't end up in charge of Greece. That goes back centuries to England's always denying Russia access to the Med. Churchill had visions of a Communist Greece sprouting Soviet Naval bases in the Peleponnessus (?SP).

[JWB]

Rich Thu 1 Nov 2007 2102

Ten days to get the three divisions ashore.

Most of that time was spent just getting the vast amounts of supplies and transport vehicles in. Terracina-Gaeta would require little logistical support because it was a tactical operation while SHINGLE was meant to be a strategic operation. T-G would directly attack the Gustav line from behind and achieve a breakthrough. SHINGLE was meant to take and hold Rome or at least take the beach and hold it indefinitely.

 

Er, they have high ground with strong forces on it, that is closer and more dominant of the coast than were the hills ringing Anzio and Nettuno. The nearest substantial reaction forces were about 20 kilometers away from Terracina and consisted of the bulk of two divisions, the nearest reaction force to the Anzio-Nettuno landings were south of Rome and consisted of the partially formed 4. FJD or were 3. Pz.Gren.-Div. in the vicinity of Frosinone, both some 50 kilometers away. Yet they were able to march further to poorer positions and still execute a viable counterattack with initially weaker forces? Hmmmmm, something appears to be wrong with that picture?

It took 6 full fays for Hitler to get 70,000 men into Anzio which is closer to Rome than T-G.

 

The German counterattack at Anzio was not viable. A German counterattack at T-G would be even less viable. The front line at Anzio was mostly beyond the range of NGFS. At T-G the fighting would be close to the beach and well witin NGFS. At Anzio there were problems with CAS because of the difficulties in designating FFZs. At T-G this would not be a problem because the Allied force would not go inland of the coastal road. So everything beyond (but not including) the coastal road would be considered enemy.

 

10% of non battle casualties died? Hell's fire that is still more than 6,000 dead. I doubt T-G would have many more KIA than that. NEPTUNE OMAHA had less for crying out loud. Even if it totally failed it would still succeed. To actually drive the invasion back into the sea would cost so many German losses that Hitler wouldn't have enough manpower left to hold the Gustav line.

[Jim Martin]

AIUI, nobody wanted them. They were a specialist division with nowhere to operate specially. I think they were originally intended for a Norwegian op (one of Winnie's Wacky Wonders?) that got cancelled. They would be almost useless in France, and the WA were still hoping to keep the French mountain troops (the whole FEC FTM) in Italy, so there was no urgent need there either.

 

I wonder just how much sending the 4th Indian Division to Greece cost the Allies in Italy in mountain capability? They were good in mountains. BTW, just to show I am not completely prejudiced, I have to give AlanBrooke credit. He was completely opposed to the Greek venture and said it would be a manpower sink. His predictions about how much resources the 'simple' operation would eventually suck up were spot on, too

 

 

Errr, I know the 1st Special Services Force was intended for a Norwegian adventure which got canc'ed.

[Rich]

Most of that time was spent just getting the vast amounts of supplies and transport vehicles in. Terracina-Gaeta would require little logistical support because it was a tactical operation while SHINGLE was meant to be a strategic operation. T-G would directly attack the Gustav line from behind and achieve a breakthrough. SHINGLE was meant to take and hold Rome or at least take the beach and hold it indefinitely.

 

No, it was not, the unit landings were as I described, not as you are imagining. To give you a little persepctive, the actual landings and mobements of 22 January were:

 

H-Hour 0200-0230 initial wave:

1st (Br.) Div – 2nd Brigade Group

6615th Ranger Force – 1st, 3rd and 4th Rangers, 509th PIB

3rd (US) Div – 1-7th Inf, 3-15th Inf, 2-30th Inf, 3rd Div Cavalry Troop

 

By 0730:

509th PIB seized Nettuno, note that this is five hours after they landed and that Nettuno is approximately 1.2 miles from X-RAY YELLOW, where they landed - that is the speed at which amphibious landings proceeded.

 

By 0600 ashore were:

1st (Br.) Div – 3 infantry battalions

6615th Rangers – 2 infantry battalions

3rd US Div – 7 infantry battalions, 4 artillery battalions, 1 tank company, 1 TD company, 2 AAA-AW batteries

 

By evening ashore were:

1st Division – 2nd SS Bde., 24th Gds Bde, 2nd Bde, 1st Recce Rgt

3rd Division – all

Ranger Force – all, including 509th PIB and 504th PIR

 

And an operation at Terracina-Gaeta would require the same amount of supplies, that is governed by the size of the force. At least turnaround for shipping would be slightly faster, but the difference isn't significant, since the major limitations are the amount of amphibious shipping and the loading and unloading facilities. The situation might be releived a bit by opening highway 7 past Minturno and X Corps, except that the entire length of the highway would be exposed to observation from the Aurunci and the Fifth Army was already having enough problems supplying just 5 and 56 Division through that pipeline.

 

It took 6 full fays for Hitler to get 70,000 men into Anzio which is closer to Rome than T-G.

Do you actually have any idea where they all came from? And you still haven't absorbed the simple fact that 20,000 mobile troops were sitting 20 kilometers away from Terracina-Gaeta? So it took 6 days for the Germans to get 70,000 men to Anzio, it took the Allies 10 days to get 70,000 men there. Who won that race?

 

The German counterattack at Anzio was not viable. A German counterattack at T-G would be even less viable. The front line at Anzio was mostly beyond the range of NGFS. At T-G the fighting would be close to the beach and well witin NGFS. At Anzio there were problems with CAS because of the difficulties in designating FFZs. At T-G this would not be a problem because the Allied force would not go inland of the coastal road. So everything beyond (but not including) the coastal road would be considered enemy.

 

But there is no need for them to counterattack at Terracina-Gaeta, since a landing there is only an immediate threat to....Terracina and Gaeta.

 

BTW, you seem to have a mystical belief in the power of that almighty acronym NGFS. They had four cruisers to work with of which Penelope and Spartan were lost, 13 destroyers of which three were lost, 4 Hunts, and 2 Dutch gunboats. Not a lot and just what do they shoot at anyway? The Germans can just hang back in the hills and shell the beaches.

 

10% of non battle casualties died? Hell's fire that is still more than 6,000 dead. I doubt T-G would have many more KIA than that. NEPTUNE OMAHA had less for crying out loud. Even if it totally failed it would still succeed. To actually drive the invasion back into the sea would cost so many German losses that Hitler wouldn't have enough manpower left to hold the Gustav line.

 

Whoa! You really missed comprehending what I wrote if you came up with that lunacy? Where did 10% come from? Where did 6,000 dead come from? To repeat, "Those rates for Fifth Army in fact were somewhat low, the daily non-battle rate for units in the temperate zone during January was normally about 0.30 percent, decreasing to about 0.21 percent in April. Further, roughly 8 out of every 10 non-battle casualty were sick, while the remaining two were injured and of the sick roughly 0.01 percent died, while about 0.51 percent of injured died. That means that roughly 480 of the sick died, as did about 612 of the injured, which is still a terrible statistic, but not that much worse a morbidity than for anyone else at the time?"

 

0.01 percent is not "10%" as in one out of 10, it is one-hundreth of one percent, as in one out of 100. And with roughly 60,000 non-battle casualties in total and perhaps 1,100 of those dying, that is a mortality of roughly 1.8 percent.

 

And I'm not sure you comprehend that OMAHA was a single day, while those non-battle casualties I gave were over a period of 109 days? Or yet realize that the Germans have no real need to attempt to throw an invasion at Terracina-Gaeta into the sea, although it may have been more viable for them than at Anzio?

Edited November 3, 2007 by Rich

[JWB]

Rich Sat 3 Nov 2007 0434

H-Hour 0200-0230 initial wave:

1st (Br.) Div – 2nd Brigade Group

6615th Ranger Force – 1st, 3rd and 4th Rangers, 509th PIB

3rd (US) Div – 1-7th Inf, 3-15th Inf, 2-30th Inf, 3rd Div Cavalry Troop

 

By 0730:

509th PIB seized Nettuno, note that this is five hours after they landed and that Nettuno is approximately 1.2 miles from X-RAY YELLOW, where they landed - that is the speed at which amphibious landings proceeded.

 

By 0600 ashore were:

1st (Br.) Div – 3 infantry battalions

6615th Rangers – 2 infantry battalions

3rd US Div – 7 infantry battalions, 4 artillery battalions, 1 tank company, 1 TD company, 2 AAA-AW batteries

 

By evening ashore were:

1st Division – 2nd SS Bde., 24th Gds Bde, 2nd Bde, 1st Recce Rgt

3rd Division – all

Ranger Force – all, including 509th PIB and 504th PIR

How many trucks, jeeps and other transports?

 

And an operation at Terracina-Gaeta would require the same amount of supplies, that is governed by the size of the force.

Supply requirements are also dictated by the amount of time a force will be in combat, combat intensity, how much traveling will be done, etc..... A division that sits will use fewer supplies than a brigade that is involved in high intensity combat and maneuver. SHINGLE was designed to fight its way to Rome then fight to keep the city. The force involved had to supply itself. That is why 3200 vehicles were pushed into Anzio on day one. At least that is what WSC and FDR demanded.

 

It took 6 full days for Hitler to get 70,000 men into Anzio which is closer to Rome than T-G.

Do you actually have any idea where they all came from?

from > http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/romar/72-20.htm

 

" During the following weeks the combined Anglo-American corps established a 15-by-22-mile beachhead, forcing the Germans to divert the Fourteenth Army under General Eberhard von Mackensen from northern Italy to the south. Other German units had to be dispatched to Italy, weakening enemy forces in Germany, France, and the Balkans"

 

They came from a variety of places. Most of which were further from T-G than from Anzio.

 

Whoa! You really missed comprehending what I wrote if you came up with that lunacy? Where did 10% come from? Where did 6,000 dead come from?

 

You wrote: "roughly 8 out of every 10 non-battle casualty were sick, while the remaining two were injured"

 

This means 20% of non-combat casualties were injured.

 

Then you wrote "about 0.51 percent of injured died"

 

That means half of the injured died for a total of about 10% non-combat casualties died of injuries. Non-combat casualties were by your figures

Fifth Army (including VI Corps) in that period suffered 60,845 non-battle casualties, so roughly 558 per day,

So 10% of 60,845 non-battle casualties equals 6,848 dead for nothing.

 

Or yet realize that the Germans have no real need to attempt to throw an invasion at Terracina-Gaeta into the sea

 

Gosh, if there was no reason to push a more threatening T-G into the sea then why did the Germans try to push the Allies in a less thretening position at Anzio back into the sea?

Edited November 3, 2007 by JWB

[Rich]

How many trucks, jeeps and other transports?

 

I'll see if I can get back with that, but assault scales for vehicles for those units was very small, while unit residues often took some time to get ashore.

 

Supply requirements are also dictated by the amount of time a force will be in combat, combat intensity, how much traveling will be done, etc..... A division that sits will use fewer supplies than a brigade that is involved in high intensity combat and maneuver. SHINGLE was designed to fight its way to Rome then fight to keep the city. The force involved had to supply itself. That is why 3200 vehicles were pushed into Anzio on day one. At least that is what WSC and FDR demanded.

Er, SHINGLE was never intended to seize Rome, it was to close German access to Route 6 and the railway that supplied XIV Pz.K., forcing them to withdraw from the Liri Valley and then to the Appennines.

 

BTW, what does FDR have to do with anything? The plan was Alexander's and was promoted by Churchill, where does FDR come in?

 

" During the following weeks the combined Anglo-American corps established a 15-by-22-mile beachhead, forcing the Germans to divert the Fourteenth Army under General Eberhard von Mackensen from northern Italy to the south. Other German units had to be dispatched to Italy, weakening enemy forces in Germany, France, and the Balkans"

 

They came from a variety of places. Most of which were further from T-G than from Anzio.

 

The initial forces, HG, 71. Inf.-Div. and 3. Pz.Gren.-Div. were diverted from 10. Armee, as were many of the corps elements. I. Fs.J.K. headquarters was also taken from 10. Armee, where it was directing the battle with X Corps. All were closer or as close to Terracina-Gaeta as they were to Anzio. 4. Fs.J.D. was slightly further, but all the others were so much further, coming from northern Italy, southern France, Slovenia, and German that the difference of some 30 kilometers is negligible, especially given that the railheads are just as close.

 

You wrote: "roughly 8 out of every 10 non-battle casualty were sick, while the remaining two were injured"

 

This means 20% of non-combat casualties were injured.

 

Then you wrote "about 0.51 percent of injured died"

 

That means half of the injured died for a total of about 10% non-combat casualties died of injuries. Non-combat casualties were by your figures So 10% of 60,845 non-battle casualties equals 6,848 dead for nothing.

Lord spare me, I may die laughing. Yes, 20 percent of of non-combat casualties were injured. That means that roughly 12,000 of the 60,000 may be counted as injured (60,000 X 20 percent or 60,000 X 0.20 = 12,000). But 0.51 percent is one-half of one percent it is not 51 percent! Capiche? So the formula is 12,000 X 0.51 percent or 12,000 X 0.051 = 612. Or if you want to use the 60,845 it is 60,845 X 0.20 = 12,169 X 0.051 = 620.619. Call it 621.

 

Gosh, if there was no reason to push a more threatening T-G into the sea then why did the Germans try to push the Allies in a less thretening position at Anzio back into the sea?

 

Because Anzio was more threatening, not less.

 

A landing at Terracina-Gaeta threatened at most the right rear of 94. Inf.-Div., especially if the landing force could advance without hindrance to Itri-Fondi at speed....except that I Fs.J.K. was at Itri-Fondi. But even beyond that, such a landing was a tactical threat only, so could have been met by the committment of tactical reserves and movements, likely 94. Division would have had to refuse its right and withdrawn into the Aurunci, but that's about it, since there was no threat to it's left, safely anchored on 15. Pz.Gren.-Div. in the Liri. No matter how much force was placed in the five to 10 kilometer deep coastal flatlands Terracina-Gaeta, they would be limited in their deployments by that narrow coastal band, which is only about 10 by 20 kilometers.

 

But Anzio is a wide plain. 15 kilometers wide at its narrowest between Fiumicino and Colli Laziali to the northwest and at least as wide to the southeast and the defile between the Aurunci and the sea at Terracina (which makes a nice cork to the Appian Way).

Further, it is nearly 80 kilometers in extent, so lots of maneuver and deployment room and if - big if, but still if - sufficient forces could land to threaten Route 6 then the result would be strategic, either that force being landed had to be destroyed or contained or the result would be that the entire XIV. Pz.K. and ultimately the entire 10. Armee must withdraw.

Edited November 3, 2007 by Rich

[Junior FO]

...

Edited September 19, 2024 by Junior FO

[Marek Tucan]

@JWB

 

To illustrate your number of available choices when it comes to advancing through the Alps, here's a map of the Swiss part with all possible routes marked. Bear in mind that the available infrastructure has improved a bit over the last 60 years so some of those pass roads might not have been built yet.

 

http://map.search.ch/d/mfhmwezzm

 

Also each such a road can be reliably blocked by relatively small forces - heck, even such puny (as compared to Alps) mountains as Slovakian Carpathias posed enough problems for both Germans (when fighting partisans) and Soviets etc. (when fighting Germans)...

[KingSargent]

Also each such a road can be reliably blocked by relatively small forces - heck, even such puny (as compared to Alps) mountains as Slovakian Carpathias posed enough problems for both Germans (when fighting partisans) and Soviets etc. (when fighting Germans)...

How DARE you imply that American and British troops could be delayed by terrain and defenses that could delay German and/or Soviet troops?!!

[Rich]

Lord spare me, I may die laughing. Yes, 20 percent of of non-combat casualties were injured. That means that roughly 12,000 of the 60,000 may be counted as injured (60,000 X 20 percent or 60,000 X 0.20 = 12,000). But 0.51 percent is one-half of one percent it is not 51 percent! Capiche? So the formula is 12,000 X 0.51 percent or 12,000 X 0.051 = 612. Or if you want to use the 60,845 it is 60,845 X 0.20 = 12,169 X 0.051 = 620.619. Call it 621.

Because Anzio was more threatening, not less.

 

Ooops! Maybe the laugh is on me, I just realized that I dropped a decimal point....

 

That should be 62 died of injuries, not 621. And that should have been 48 died of disease, not 480. So perhaps 110 all told using the averages calculated Army-wide? I haven't tracked down my Fifth Army medical file yet, but I do have First Army in Europe for 6 June to 31 July 1944. They had a total of 16,167 admissions for disease in that period, of whom 14 died as well as 7,576 admitted for non-battle injuries of whom 43 died, for a total of 57 deaths out of 23,743 admissions. That would imply 146 deaths (probably 36 due to illness and 110 to injuries) as a possible total for Fifth Army out of the 60,845 admissions. I would use that figure until I can find the Fifth Army reports, since unlike the Army-wide percentages they do not include CONUS and other troops not debilitated by the effects of being in a combat zone.

[swerve]

@JWB

 

To illustrate your number of available choices when it comes to advancing through the Alps, here's a map of the Swiss part with all possible routes marked. Bear in mind that the available infrastructure has improved a bit over the last 60 years so some of those pass roads might not have been built yet.

 

http://map.search.ch/d/mfhmwezzm

 

Edit:

 

In fact there is only one major transalpine route outside of Switzerland and that's the Brenner pass. Below is a map with the routes through Tirol.

 

http://tirolatlas.uibk.ac.at/maps/interface/topo.py/index

 

Sterzing - signs said Vipiteno last time I was there. Though a lot of the locals preferred Sterzing - and that was also on the signs.

 

Been over some of those roads (I like skiing ). Without snowploughs working hard, the roads would close all winter - and the roads have all been built post-war. In some places, you can see stretches of old, bypassed road. Without the snow (& landslide) roofs, with narrow bridges which don't look capable of taking heavy vehicles, no way round except on foot or mule if the road's blown . . .

 

Even getting to some of them is quite a trip. Consider the roads which go from Valtellina into Switzerland. Valtellina is quite a broad valley, though flanked by steep mountains. But the exit, into the rest of Italy, is narrow as hell. The modern main road goes through tunnel after tunnel, bridge after bridge - like the road & railway up to Brenner.

[JWB]

Rich Sat 3 Nov 2007 0434

Those rates for Fifth Army...

I was writing in terms of the entire Allied force in Italy which numbered 434,680 men. At a daily loss rate of .3% that would mean 1304 casualties per day. So your figure of "1,100 dying" should be doubled. That real figure is a lot less than 6,000. But 2,200 men dying is still 2,200 men dying for nothing while 5th and 8th armies sit and wait for a build up that is not needed to carry out action that need not wait. You see, the point of the Italian campaign was not to take spots on a map. It was to kill Germans.

 

Er, SHINGLE was never intended to seize Rome

SHINGLE was to take Rome because FDR and WSC wanted it that way

 

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/anzio/72-19.htm

 

"To Churchill the quick liberation of Rome offered the key to the success of this strategy and the rapid capture of Rome implicitly required a landing at Anzio."

"Anzio was selected because it was considered the best site within striking distance of Rome."

"President Franklin D. Roosevelt also had his eye on Rome."

 

Because Anzio was more threatening, not less

T-G would be much more threatening. There were far greater Heeren near T-G available for killing than there were near Anzio.

 

I Fs.J.K. was at Itri-Fondi

That force would be destroyed. light infantry cannot stand up against armor.

 

94. Division would have had to refuse its right and withdrawn into the Aurunci

Absolute stroke of genius. Let BX Corps advance.

 

No matter how much force was placed in the five to 10 kilometer deep coastal flatlands Terracina-Gaeta, they would be limited in their deployments by that narrow coastal band, which is only about 10 by 20 kilometers.

 

That is a highly target rich environment for destroying Heeren.

 

But Anzio is a wide plain. 15 kilometers wide at its narrowest between Fiumicino and Colli Laziali to the northwest and at least as wide to the southeast and the defile between the Aurunci and the sea at Terracina (which makes a nice cork to the Appian Way).

Yes, it is wide open. There were few Heeren there to be killed.

 

Further, it is nearly 80 kilometers in extent, so lots of maneuver and deployment room

 

And no Germans to attack.

 

if - big if, but still if - sufficient forces could land to threaten Route 6

You go to war with the force you have and not the force you want.

 

that force being landed had to be destroyed

 

And it would be with a disasterous exchange rate steeply in favor of the Germans.

Running out of quote blocks>>>>>>>>

"BTW, you seem to have a mystical belief in the power of that almighty acronym NGFS. They had four cruisers to work with of which Penelope and Spartan were lost, 13 destroyers of which three were lost, 4 Hunts, and 2 Dutch gunboats. Not a lot and just what do they shoot at anyway? The Germans can just hang back in the hills and shell the beaches."

 

No they couldn't. The Alliea had the element of surprise and would be able to attack through Gaeta and into the XIV Korps rear before German artillery could make a difference. The movements at T-G would not be hindered as much as those at Anzio. The later had more swamps and bogs than the later. The beaches between Sperlonga and Gaeta are particularly splendid.

[KingSargent]

I was writing in terms of the entire Allied force in Italy which numbered 434,680 men. At a daily loss rate of .3% that would mean 1304 casualties per day. So your figure of "1,100 dying" should be doubled. That real figure is a lot less than 6,000. But 2,200 men dying is still 2,200 men dying for nothing while 5th and 8th armies sit and wait for a build up that is not needed to carry out action that need not wait. You see, the point of the Italian campaign was not to take spots on a map. It was to kill Germans.

Those are NON-combat illnesses and injuries. People get sick and have accidents whether they are overseas in uniform or not. Actually, the death rate is low compared to civilian deaths in the US at the time.

 

SHINGLE was to take Rome because FDR and WSC wanted it that way

 

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/anzio/72-19.htm

 

"To Churchill the quick liberation of Rome offered the key to the success of this strategy and the rapid capture of Rome implicitly required a landing at Anzio."

"Anzio was selected because it was considered the best site within striking distance of Rome."

"President Franklin D. Roosevelt also had his eye on Rome."

If they were so hot for it, they surely didn't do much to make it happen, did they? If Anzio was planned on what WSC and FDR wanted, FDR and WSC could have ensured the troop strength to carry it out.

Churchill wanted a "quick success" so he could write histories to "prove" the validity of the Soft Underbelly approach.

 

T-G would be much more threatening. There were far greater Heeren near T-G available for killing than there were near Anzio.

So you are going to attack them with fewer troops. Riiiiight...........

 

That force would be destroyed. light infantry cannot stand up against armor.

Fallschirmjaeger were by no means light infantry at this time. They were heavily-armed infantry with more AT assets than normal Heer divisions, and a degree of motorization (nothing horse-drawn for Goering's lads!). 4FJD had little in the way of organic artillery, but there were corps assets available.

BTW, Bastogne?

 

The rest is fatuous one-liners.