The generalship of Mark Clark

[Rich]

So that makes us even.

 

No, you cherry-picked one thing, I pulled up about a dozen.

 

It would have helped if the quote you provided had mentioned the smoke being deployed was German.

I did, you missed it.

Neillands, p. 291, [quoting John Williams, an officer with 99th Light AA Regiment, RA], “H-Hour for this attack was to be 2300 hours on 11 May, and the infantry assault began at 2345 hours, by which time a dense fog had overwhelmed the battlefield like one of the old London fogs. Once again the Hun had sprung a surprise and was swamping the battlefield with smoke shells so that we could not see, causing great confusion.”

 

"Hun" equals "Jerry" or "German."

 

No there was no front in January. There were three fronts.

Huh? Since when has three equalled "none"? Are you confusing yourself again? Prior to 0200 hours 2 January 1944 there was a single front in Italy, that of 15th Army Group running roughly from the Garigliano to the Rapido, across the mountains and then to the Sangro.

 

That was something they should already have known.

 

Why? What prior experience did they have in coordinating multi-corps battles?

 

Bingo!

Yep. It obviously rather helped that they had gotten it wrong three times, which is a pretty poor learning curve I suppose? But then I wasn't there at the time and wasn't subjected to the stress they were under, so I really don't know that we have a real measure of what the learning curve should have been? Good subject for a study though, wish we could get somebody to fund it.

 

It took you at least three days to comprehend what I had written in my first post on this particular part of the thread.

 

Your post thatt started this argument in the thread didn't make much sense, which is why I originally questioned it.

 

Had the Allies destroyed the Axis in Italy it would have been possible to march into Austria. That destruction could have been accomplished back in January 1944.

And it still doesn't make sense. Nor have you done much to clarify or correct it, except flailing away with the claim that it doesn't really say what it says? I'm more than a little curious to poll the other members of this grate sight that are following this with regards to the interpretation of those two sentences? Anyone?

 

As far as breaking the Gustav line there were other actions that could have been taken. One would have been to land a battalion of Shermans at the beach southeast of Terracina shortly after SHINGLE. They would roll east and attack the Gustav line from behind while the entire Gustav line is attacked by 5thA from the front. Slightly risky as a german unit was deployed several kms east of Terracina. But that force would be looking at Anzio.

 

Please explain how a single battalion of unsupported tanks will "roll east and attack the Gustav line from behind"? How are they going to be more effective than the one tank, one reconnaissance, 27-odd infantry, commando and Ranger, and six artillery battalions landed at Nettuno?

 

BTW, the 'german unit" at Terracina was Pz.A.A. 129, along with various coastal artillery and Alarm-einheiten similar to those encountered at Nettuno, but just a few miles further east were the bulk of 29. Pz.Gren.-Div. and about half of 90. Pz.Gren.-Div., preparing to counterattack X Corps.

 

So a bit more than "slightly risky."

 

BTW again, couldn't you just have begun to imagine that there may have been some reason for the selection of Anzio-Nettuno as opposed to Terracina for the landings?

[JWB]

It would have helped if the quote you provided had mentioned the smoke being deployed was German

 

Neillands, p. 291, [quoting John Williams, an officer with 99th Light AA Regiment, RA], “H-Hour for this attack was to be 2300 hours on 11 May, and the infantry assault began at 2345 hours, by which time a dense fog had overwhelmed the battlefield like one of the old London fogs. Once again the Hun had sprung a surprise and was swamping the battlefield with smoke shells so that we could not see, causing great confusion.”

 

Different quote.

 

"Hun" equals "Jerry" or "German."

No shit?

 

Huh? Since when has three equalled "none

 

Should have been no one front. 5thA attacked across three front seperate fronts.

 

Why? What prior experience did they have in coordinating multi-corps battles?

North Africa.

 

Yep. It obviously rather helped that they had gotten it wrong three times, which is a pretty poor learning curve I suppose? But then I wasn't there at the time and wasn't subjected to the stress they were under, so I really don't know that we have a real measure of what the learning curve should have been? .

 

Get it wrong once? OK it's a new experience. Get it wrong twice? You are FIRED

 

Had the Allies destroyed the Axis in Italy it would have been possible to march into Austria. That destruction could have been accomplished back in January 1944.

 

 

And it still doesn't make sense. Nor have you done much to clarify or correct it, except flailing away with the claim that it doesn't really say what it says? I'm more than a little curious to poll the other members of this grate sight that are following this with regards to the interpretation of those two sentences? Anyone?

It makes perfectly good sense. I have done vastly more than enough to clarify it. Look at the first sentence. Really hard. Really close. It says "Had the Allies destroyed the Axis in Italy it would have been possible to march into Austria." That means if the Axis in Italy had been destroyed there would have been nothing to prevent the Allies from marching into Austria. Does that make sense?

 

The second sentence says "That destruction could have been accomplished back in Jan 1944" Look also at this sentence very closely. It means the Allies had the ability to destroy the Axis forces in Italy in Jan 1944. Which leads to....

 

 

Please explain how a single battalion of unsupported tanks will "roll east and attack the Gustav line from behind"? How are they going to be more effective than the one tank, one reconnaissance, 27-odd infantry, commando and Ranger, and six artillery battalions landed at Nettuno?

 

Do you think Nettuno is in a slightly different place than the beaches south of Terracina?

 

a few miles further east were the bulk of 29. Pz.Gren.-Div. and about half of 90. Pz.Gren.-Div., preparing to counterattack X Corps.

Those units were also out of position and would have their attentions drawn to Anzio.

 

along with various coastal artillery and Alarm-einheiten similar to those encountered at Nettuno,

 

Like that vast German force that met met the Allies at 0200 Jan 22?

 

BTW again, couldn't you just have begun to imagine that there may have been some reason for the selection of Anzio-Nettuno as opposed to Terracina for the landings?

 

Disagreement at the high command. Churchill and Ike wanted to take Rome. Others (Lucas, et al) wanted to pull off amphibious hooks in order to climb up the Italian coast. Anzio was the northern most large port that was within Allied airpower. So the compromise.

[Rich]

Different quote.

 

No, the same, see my: Sun 21 Oct 2007 2004 Post #92

 

No shit?

You missed the quote, I was clarifying it for you.

 

Should have been no one front. 5thA attacked across three front seperate fronts.

 

Nonesense, and possibly even less coherent than before? VI Corps may be said to have attacked on a separate front after 22 January 1944, prior to that Fifth and Eighth Army had a single front in Italy. Perhaps you can define what you mean by three seperate fronts for Fifth Army? And when?

 

North Africa.

Who? Clark? He had no command prior to AVALANCHE, so had four months army operational command experience prior to January 1944. Leese? He had a month of army operational command experience in January 1944. Alexander? He had no army operational command experience.

 

Get it wrong once? OK it's a new experience. Get it wrong twice? You are FIRED

 

Nice thinking, but the Allies didn't have that many general officers at that time with the basic technical competence to run armies and learning operational skills for most appears to be an extended learning curve. And who do you blame? Arguably they were all Alexander's fault, or you could say 1st Cassino was Clark's fault, and 2nd and 3rd were Leese's fault. So do you fire Leese? Who replaces him?

 

It makes perfectly good sense. I have done vastly more than enough to clarify it. Look at the first sentence. Really hard. Really close. It says "Had the Allies destroyed the Axis in Italy it would have been possible to march into Austria." That means if the Axis in Italy had been destroyed there would have been nothing to prevent the Allies from marching into Austria. Does that make sense?

 

The second sentence says "That destruction could have been accomplished back in Jan 1944" Look also at this sentence very closely. It means the Allies had the ability to destroy the Axis forces in Italy in Jan 1944. Which leads to....

The rather natural assumption that you mean that if you believe that the Allies could have destroyed the Axis forces in Italy in January 1943 and if you believe that if Axis forces in Italy were destroyed, then it would have been possible for Allied forces to march into Austria, that then you believe it was possible for Allied forces to march into Austria in January 1944? It's a rather logical progression, except that you illogically inverted the two sentences.

 

Do you think Nettuno is in a slightly different place than the beaches south of Terracina?

 

Why yes, I do, which is why I asked why you thought a single unsupported tank battalion at Terracina was more valuable than an army corps at Nettuno?

 

BTW, the British X Corps tried a very similar tactic, during the Volturno crossing, without success.

 

Those units were also out of position and would have their attentions drawn to Anzio.

Er, you may want to look at a map? The bulk of the two divisions were in the region of Itri-Fondi, if their attention was "drawn" to Anzio and they had moved that way the best route was via Terracina. And since they were not actually drawn upon by HG C as part of the reaction to the Anzio-Nettuno landing, then no matter how much their attention was "drawn to Anzio" they would have been quite available to squash a battalion of armor landed at Terracina.

 

Like that vast German force that met met the Allies at 0200 Jan 22?

 

The nearest substantial reaction forces were about 20 kilometers away from Terracina and consisted of the bulk of two divisions, the nearest reaction force to the Anzio-Nettuno landings were south of Rome and consisted of the partially formed 4. FJD or were 3. Pz.Gren.-Div. in the vicinity of Frosinone, both some 50 kilometers away.

 

And it took all day for the Allies to get that force ashore at Anzio, because of problems getting off the British beaches - terrain problems, not command problems. The major problem with amphibious landings was that it took so long to unload, organize and move inland, by the time any real movement could be made the Germans had covering forces in place, and by the time enough force was ashore to begin a full advance the Germans had reached near parity in strength. I'm not sure how that would be different for a single tank battalion landed at Terracina?

 

Disagreement at the high command. Churchill and Ike wanted to take Rome. Others (Lucas, et al) wanted to pull off amphibious hooks in order to climb up the Italian coast. Anzio was the northern most large port that was within Allied airpower. So the compromise.

 

Yes, that was part of the problem and part of the reason for the compromise. Another was that the presence of I FJK and it's two divisions nearby was pretty well identified, Terracina was simply too risky. Otherwise, further up the coast ran into problems with air support and also put the landing at risk from the German theater reserves or reserves moving from other theaters, and even further from the Fifth and Eighth Army if their offensives weren't successful. And short hooks, such as were attempted on Sicily, and then on the Volturno and at Termoli in the fall, just weren't that successful. OTOH to be really succesful a major amphibious attempt needed to be stronger, with more troops and more landing craft, which wasn't going to happen with NEPTUNE in the wings. All in all probably the best decision would have been to scrap SHINGLE and continue with small-scale operations to improve positions along the main front, but conserve troops for a major effort in spring, when the weather was better and the Allies were stronger....or just wait a little bit longer and do ANVIL at Genoa in late summer? But that wouldn't guarantee freezing the German units in place in Italy.

 

But generals are an impatient lot as a rule and Clark was more impatient than most, which - apart from his personality - was probably his major failing? So that simple solution to the winter woes in Italy was ignored.

[JWB]

QUOTE

Should have been no one front. 5thA attacked across three front seperate fronts.

 

 

Nonesense, and possibly even less coherent than before? VI Corps may be said to have attacked on a separate front after 22 January 1944, prior to that Fifth and Eighth Army had a single front in Italy. Perhaps you can define what you mean by three seperate fronts for Fifth Army? And when?

 

The different corps attacked at different times on different fronts.

French attack January 12

X Corps on the left 17 January

II Corps in the center 20 January

II Corps north of Cassino 24 January

Clear enough

 

Get it wrong once? OK it's a new experience. Get it wrong twice? You are FIRED

 

 

Nice thinking, but the Allies didn't have that many general officers at that time with the basic technical competence to run armies and learning operational skills for most appears to be an extended learning curve.

 

The methodlogy had been determined by Monty at el-alamein.

 

The rather natural assumption that you mean that if you believe that the Allies could have destroyed the Axis forces in Italy in January 1943 and if you believe that if Axis forces in Italy were destroyed, then it would have been possible for Allied forces to march into Austria, that then you believe it was possible for Allied forces to march into Austria in January 1944? It's a rather logical progression, except that you illogically inverted the two sentences.

Nowhere did I write that the Allies could have marched into Austria in Jan 1944. It takes astounding leaps of logic to project that into my statement. It is like adding one plus one progressively until the number 10 reached then say "one plus one equals ten".

 

Why yes, I do, which is why I asked why you thought a single unsupported tank battalion at Terracina was more valuable than an army corps at Nettuno?

I never claimed a battalion at Terracina. I never claimed a battalion at Terracina would be better than a corps at Anzio. In fact I wrote "land a battalion of Shermans at the beach southeast of Terracina shortly after SHINGLE." You have accused me of statements that I didn't make. That is called trolling.

 

And it took all day for the Allies to get that force ashore at Anzio, because of problems getting off the British beaches - terrain problems, not command problems.

From Lone Sentry

"The battalion reached shore just after dawn on January 22nd. The first twenty-four hours were spent in unloading, moving to an assembly area, and de-waterproofing. Due to the marshy ground it took a lot of labor to reach the assembly area."

That battalion had to go through a swamp. The beaches ESE of Terracina didn't have swamps.

 

Terracina was simply too risky

Again Terracina. Try the area of Sperlonga-Gaeta.

[Rich]

The different corps attacked at different times on different fronts.

French attack January 12

X Corps on the left 17 January

II Corps in the center 20 January

II Corps north of Cassino 24 January

Clear enough

 

No, not really, since that is a single "front", but a phased attack by one of the two armies on that front. BTW, the French attack on the right on 12 January is usually considered part of the last phase of the Winter Line Campaign, rather than the start of the Gustav Line Campaign, and paused 16 January with the seizure of Sant' Elia. And the phasing was a bit more sophisticated than you make out, the X Corps attack opening on the far left with 5 and 56 Division the night of 17 January, followed by 46 Division the night of 19 February, the 36th Division of II Corps the night of 20 January. The French were also to continue their advance on 20 January, while the 34th Division was initially in reserve....and except for CCA, 1st Armored Division, was the only reserve of Fifth Army, which is why it wasn't committed until 24 January.

 

The methodlogy had been determined by Monty at el-alamein.

A methodology doesn't generate experience or competence. Nor was Monty's plan for El Alamein carried out as a coordinated multi-corps offensive; the offensive was by XXX Corps infantry, with XIII Corps executing a single-division limited objective feint and X Corps in reserve. And it developed into a series of single-corps penetrations.

 

Nowhere did I write that the Allies could have marched into Austria in Jan 1944. It takes astounding leaps of logic to project that into my statement. It is like adding one plus one progressively until the number 10 reached then say "one plus one equals ten".

 

I've gotten a good taste of what passes for "logic" from you, in future I will understand that everything you write are simply random, unrelated sentences.

 

I never claimed a battalion at Terracina. I never claimed a battalion at Terracina would be better than a corps at Anzio. In fact I wrote "land a battalion of Shermans at the beach southeast of Terracina shortly after SHINGLE." You have accused me of statements that I didn't make. That is called trolling.

 

The complete statement was:

 

One would have been to land a battalion of Shermans at the beach southeast of Terracina shortly after SHINGLE. They would roll east and attack the Gustav line from behind while the entire Gustav line is attacked by 5thA from the front. Slightly risky as a german unit was deployed several kms east of Terracina. But that force would be looking at Anzio.

How is a "beach southeast of Terracina" that different from "Terracina"? And how does that "battalion of Shermans" accomplish anything? How does it survive in the Terracina-Fondi-Gaeta triangle? With the better part of two German divisions less than 20 kilometers away? And how do they "attack the Gustav line from behind"? Via Fondi? Via Gaeta? Cross country to Itri? Is this planned as a suicide mission?

 

From Lone Sentry

"The battalion reached shore just after dawn on January 22nd. The first twenty-four hours were spent in unloading, moving to an assembly area, and de-waterproofing. Due to the marshy ground it took a lot of labor to reach the assembly area."

That battalion had to go through a swamp. The beaches ESE of Terracina didn't have swamps.

 

No, but there are also few roads leading directly inland and the direct route Sperlonga-Itri is criss-crossed by numerous small watercourses and while not mountainous is hilly. And further east around Gaeta is a maze of canals, watercourses, and marsh, all part of the lower Garigliano estuary. BTW, that would be the 601st TD Battalion you refer to, which landed over the better beaches at Nettuno?

 

Also, BTW, the major slowdown at Anzio for the unloading of 1st Division's 3rd Brigade was the soft beach sand encountered by 2nd Brigade and 24th Guards Brigade, which resulted in considerable numbers of vehicles bogging, as well as the shallowness of PETER Beach, which made maneauvering beaching craft difficult and slow. The marsh inland was an added problem, but then so was the lack of transports and craft; all of those factors could equally apply to the beaches at Sperlonga, except the marshland and that was replaced by restricted roads, watercourses, and hills. Six of this, a half-dozen of that.

 

Again Terracina. Try the area of Sperlonga-Gaeta.

 

Again a battalion of Shermans.

[KingSargent]

The methodlogy had been determined by Monty at el-alamein.

I suggest you check again if you think 2nd Alamein was a coordinated three-corps assault.

 

Damn. Rich beat me to it.

 

BTW Rich: "Had the Allies destroyed the Axis in Italy it would have been possible to march into Austria. That destruction could have been accomplished back in January 1944.

And it still doesn't make sense. Nor have you done much to clarify or correct it, except flailing away with the claim that it doesn't really say what it says? rolleyes.gif I'm more than a little curious to poll the other members of this grate sight that are following this with regards to the interpretation of those two sentences? Anyone?"

 

You are right, JWB is wrong.

[Brad Sallows]

>Had the Allies destroyed the Axis in Italy it would have been possible to march into Austria. That destruction could have been accomplished back in January 1944.

 

 

Yes, what does that mean? "Had the Allies destroyed the Germans on the beaches in Normandy it would have been possible to march into Germany." Except the Germans had a way of influencing operations, and were rather deft at reacting quickly.

[JWB]

Actually the attack by US 5A did succeed in a way. German casualties were about 20,000 with Allied casualties being about 54,000 for a ratio of about 2.7 in favor of the Germans. But the Allies had an advantage of about 3.4 to 1 wich results in an actual "productivity ratio" (for lack of a better term) of about 1.25 in favor of the Allies. Theoretically if the Allies had pushed the attack until its ultimate conclusion the Germans would have run out of men before tha Allies did. Unfortunately that couldn't have been done with the forces Clark had on hand. So it would have been better to keep the SHINGLE for as a reserve in 5A. The actual attack would kick off with a simultaneous attack across all sectors beginning 17 January 1944. Whichever corps was having the most success in slaughtering Heeren would be reinforced by VI Corps.

 

Another option would have been to VI Corps on the beaches west of Gaeta the same day that 5A attacks across the entire front (Jan 17) . The landings would have to forced and reminiscent of NEPTUNE/OMAHA. The landing force would suffer perhaps a thousand casualties but the implementation of Allied naval artillery would result in even more severe Germen casualties. The location of the invasion would put elements of VI Corps within marching distance of Gustav line. General von Senger would probably have panicked as his sector was being attacked from the south by a British force large enough to potentially breakthrough and a combined Allied force to his north capable of destroying his Korps. The only way Senger could have stopped the amphibious invasion to his north would have been redirect 29th and 90th Panzer Grenadier Divisions from the Rome area away from the Line and into the newly opened Gaeta sector. But that would prevent blocking the British assault allowing X Corps to breakthrough.

 

Unfortunately niether of the above actions were possible as VI Corps had been taken away by WSC.

 

So with VI Corps languishing at Anzio the only other viable course of action would be to land a tank battllion detatched from SHINGLE (1AD) at the beach west of Gaeta. After landing a few hours after the start of SHINGLE Senger would be compeled to pull units out of his Korps in order to block it. That is if he even knew the landing took place. It took a full hour for Kesselring to be told about the major operation at Anzio. A very small operation west of Gaeta would probably not be noticed at all. The TB would be less two hours away from the rear of the Gustav Line and could get there before sunrise. The combined effects of its own weapons and naval artillery would destroy enough of German XIVPK to allow a British breakthrough.

 

Rich Posted Fri 26 Oct 2007 1454

How is a "beach southeast of Terracina" that different from "Terracina"?

The beaches southeast of Terracina are closer to the Gustav Line than is Anzio. Therefore landing at between Terracina and Gaeta is more threatening to the Gustav Line.

 

With the better part of two German divisions less than 20 kilometers away?

An attack by those German divisions would result in both those divisions being destroyed by a combination of weapons organic to the TB and naval artillery.

 

Is this planned as a suicide mission?

Not any more than B-17 missions in 1943.

[RETAC21]

I suggest you check again if you think 2nd Alamein was a coordinated three-corps assault.

 

Damn. Rich beat me to it.

 

BTW Rich: "Had the Allies destroyed the Axis in Italy it would have been possible to march into Austria. That destruction could have been accomplished back in January 1944.

And it still doesn't make sense. Nor have you done much to clarify or correct it, except flailing away with the claim that it doesn't really say what it says? rolleyes.gif I'm more than a little curious to poll the other members of this grate sight that are following this with regards to the interpretation of those two sentences? Anyone?"

 

You are right, JWB is wrong.

 

 

Last time I checked there were some serious mountains called "The Alps" betweem Italy and Austria, whatever the Germans got out of that destruction would have been enough to stop an allied advance into Austria. The Italians found out that, the hard way, in WW1.

[JWB]

Last time I checked there were some serious mountains called "The Alps" betweem Italy and Austria, whatever the Germans got out of that destruction would have been enough to stop an allied advance into Austria. The Italians found out that, the hard way, in WW1.

I was waiting for someone to come around to that. > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Vittorio_Veneto

[BillB]

Last time I checked there were some serious mountains called "The Alps" betweem Italy and Austria, whatever the Germans got out of that destruction would have been enough to stop an allied advance into Austria. The Italians found out that, the hard way, in WW1.

Ah yes, the 247 Battles of the Isonzo...

 

BillB

[RETAC21]

I was waiting for someone to come around to that. > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Vittorio_Veneto

 

I see map reading is not your forte. Even against a decomposing enemy whose homeland was breaking apart, the maximum advance barely penetrated the into the mountains. Can you really compare the A-H of 1918 with the Germans of 1944?

[KingSargent]

An attack by those German divisions would result in both those divisions being destroyed by a combination of weapons organic to the TB and naval artillery.

Right. ONE US Tk Bn is going to destroy two German mobile divisions. No WONDER you think that clearing Italy by January 1944 would be so simple... :rolleyes:

 

BTW, NGFS might interdict your little beach, but "destroy" two divisions? Hardly. And just how much NGFS do you suppose your one bn is going to have? The ENTIRE Anzio initial force had US CL Brooklyn and 5 DDs for NGFS. RN contribution was CLs Penelope, Orion, and Spartan, with 6 fleet DDs, 4 'Hunts', and some smaller escorts.

[Marek Tucan]

An attack by those German divisions would result in both those divisions being destroyed by a combination of weapons organic to the TB and naval artillery.

 

My book on US TOE of WWII gives me for one independent TB these organic weapons:

6x 105mm M4 howitzer (Sherman-mounted)

53x75mm M3 gun (Sherman-mounted)

17x37mm M5 or M6 gun (Stuart-mounted)

3x81mm Mortar (halftrack-mounted)

 

Is that going to destroy two divisions and Gustav line?

 

As for the NGFS, KingSargent already pointed it out.

 

Not any more than B-17 missions in 1943.

 

Sorry? Even the 2nd Schweinfurth had losses 77 out of 291 planes, ie 26%. Hard to believe that a single TB dropped close to two German Panzerdivisions would get any better than Brit 1st Para Div in Market-Garden...

[Old Tanker]

Would there be any forseeable Allied advantage to stop the progress up the boot of Italy just north of Naples and do an amphib in the Trieste area instead of Anzio ?

Scrapping all plans for the invasion of southern France .

[Ken Estes]

Would there be any forseeable Allied advantage to stop the progress up the boot of Italy just north of Naples and do an amphib in the Trieste area instead of Anzio ?

Scrapping all plans for the invasion of southern France .

I'd say do less than that, OT. Italy changes sides at Salerno, The fleet is at Malta, the govt in Allied hands. Naples is the port in hand and the Foggia airfields are taken, basing the 15th AF for ops. No more was required. The Rome fixation defied military/strategic logic. The So. France landings neatly outflanked the boot of Italy, and the Germans remained in their lines at their peril. Sometimes we just don't know when to stop....

[swerve]

I was waiting for someone to come around to that. > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Vittorio_Veneto

 

Vittorio Veneto, fought when the Austrian army was already in a state of near-collapse as a result of the country falling apart behind it (note that large parts of the Empire declared independence during the battle, & Austria was unable to prevent them), is hardly supportive of your thesis.

 

As has been pointed out, the Italians had previously spent two years trying & failing to march into Austria, from a start line hundreds of kilometres closer to Austria than Anzio. They'd then been thrown back. Vittorio Veneto took them back to where they'd been at the start of the war, 3 years earlier, & where they'd been thrown back from in 1917.

[swerve]

I'd say do less than that, OT. Italy changes sides at Salerno, The fleet is at Malta, the govt in Allied hands. Naples is the port in hand and the Foggia airfields are taken, basing the 15th AF for ops. No more was required. The Rome fixation defied military/strategic logic. The So. France landings neatly outflanked the boot of Italy, and the Germans remained in their lines at their peril. Sometimes we just don't know when to stop....

 

Yep. Just pin down as many German troops as possible in Italy, instead of letting the Germans pin down as many Allied troops as possible, knock off Sardinia & Corsica, & land in southern France ASAP. Ignore all Churchills pleadings for Aegean diversions - though threatening the western coast of Greece, Albania & Dalmatia might induce the Germans to waste resources defending them.

Edited October 28, 2007 by swerve

[Marek Tucan]

Vittorio Veneto, fought when the Austrian army was already in a state of near-collapse as a result of the country falling apart behind it (note that large parts of the Empire declared independence during the battle, & Austria was unable to prevent them), is hardly supportive of your thesis.

 

Austria would hardly prevent them when it claimed independence two days before Czechoslovakia already

[swerve]

Austria would hardly prevent them when it claimed independence two days before Czechoslovakia already

 

Which must have been wonderfully motivating for any troops trying to stem the rout in Italy.

[JWB]

Right. ONE US Tk Bn is going to destroy two German mobile divisions. No WONDER you think that clearing Italy by January 1944 would be so simple... :rolleyes:

There you go again. Those two mobile divisons' were barely kampfgroups and had no real armor. Do you actually believe kubelwagenen and stolen Italian cars will be capable of defeating Shermans?

BTW, NGFS might interdict your little beach, but "destroy" two divisions? Hardly. And just how much NGFS do you suppose your one bn is going to have? The ENTIRE Anzio initial force had US CL Brooklyn and 5 DDs for NGFS. RN contribution was CLs Penelope, Orion, and Spartan, with 6 fleet DDs, 4 'Hunts', and some smaller escorts.

It might rquire two DDs

[JWB]

I see map reading is not your forte. Even against a decomposing enemy whose homeland was breaking apart, the maximum advance barely penetrated the into the mountains. Can you really compare the A-H of 1918 with the Germans of 1944?

Actually yes, to a point. But the AH-Heer was in worse shape in 1918 than was Sudheer in November 1944. The Allies in late 1944 were in better shape than was Italy in 1918. Sudheer was in a state collapse by late 1944 because of the vast destruction rained upon them the Allies through 1944. If not for the terrible weather and Alied logistical problems in Oct 1944 Sudheer would have been completely finished off by Nov 1944. At that point, without the bad, weather there would have been almost nothing available to Hitler to prevent the Allies from crossing the Po than moving east to Trieste and north into Austria. The map from Wiki shows how the Allies exploded through the Final german line and race with incredible speed in every possible direction. None of that could have happened had Sudheer not been in a state of collapse. Aslo it must be remembered the Allies in WW2 had airborne which cares little of mountains while the Italians in WW1 didn't.

 

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/comm...veItaly1945.jpg

 

The reason that didn't happen was because WSC and FDR went masturbating together while looking at a map of Anzio. Which is why the Gustav Line wasn't briken until May 1944. There wasn't enough time after that to both destroy Sudher and reach Trieste. Had the SHINGLE force been used to directly support the first series of assaults against the Gustav Line in Jan 1944 the Italian campaign would have been radically different.

[RETAC21]

I thought all this revolved around January 1944

 

Actually yes, to a point. But the AH-Heer was in worse shape in 1918 than was Sudheer in November 1944. The Allies in late 1944 were in better shape than was Italy in 1918. Sudheer was in a state collapse by late 1944 because of the vast destruction rained upon them the Allies through 1944. If not for the terrible weather and Alied logistical problems in Oct 1944 Sudheer would have been completely finished off by Nov 1944. At that point, without the bad, weather there would have been almost nothing available to Hitler to prevent the Allies from crossing the Po than moving east to Trieste and north into Austria. The map from Wiki shows how the Allies exploded through the Final german line and race with incredible speed in every possible direction. None of that could have happened had Sudheer not been in a state of collapse. Aslo it must be remembered the Allies in WW2 had airborne which cares little of mountains while the Italians in WW1 didn't.

 

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/comm...veItaly1945.jpg

 

The reason that didn't happen was because WSC and FDR went masturbating together while looking at a map of Anzio. Which is why the Gustav Line wasn't briken until May 1944. There wasn't enough time after that to both destroy Sudher and reach Trieste. Had the SHINGLE force been used to directly support the first series of assaults against the Gustav Line in Jan 1944 the Italian campaign would have been radically different.

 

You will note I have highlighted dates that don't exactly match the definition of "January 1944"...

 

As for airborne troops, this could only have 2 interpretations, that you intend to drop them in mountain passes (with an obvious disregard for broken arms, legs and skulls) or beyond the mountain passes, where they are completely isolated from own forces and unsupplied. Either of those ideas is suicidal.

 

You'll do better as a Jap commander, IMO.

[Rich]

There you go again. Those two mobile divisons' were barely kampfgroups and had no real armor. Do you actually believe kubelwagenen and stolen Italian cars will be capable of defeating Shermans?

 

Yeah, Kampfgruppen with Kubelwagen and Fiats, sure? You truly have absolutely no clue what you're talking about, do you?

 

The units concerned, and their positions were:

 

22 January:

 

Between the mouth of the Astura to Terracina:

Pz.Aufkl.Abtl. 129 (29 Pz.Gren.Div.)

Alarmeinheiten (small infantry contingents and seconded artillerymen manning Italian coast artillery positions);

 

Preparing to counterattack on the Garigliano under command of 10 AOK:

I Fsch.Jg. Korps with -

29 Pz.Gren.Div. (- Aufkl.Abtl. 129, II/Pz.Gren.Rgt. 71, 9/Art.Rgt. 29, and 2/Pz.Pi.Kp.)

90 Pz.Gren Div. (- KG von Bohr, II/Pz.Gren.Rgt. 200, III/Pz.Art.Rgt. 190 and FEB 190, which was deployed from Tarquinia to Rome)

 

29. Pz.Gren.-Div. as of 11 January had 35 StuG, 1 Befehlspanzer, and 20 s.Pak. It had suffered moderate casualties during December of about 225 KIA, 775 WIA, 296 MIA, and 323 Sick, a total of 1,619. During the month it received at least 10 replacements and 370 convalescents had returned. By 6 January it was short 1,621 from its authorized strength of 14,989 (on 9 January it had been 277 men overstrength), but on 7 January it received a draft of 700 replacements, followed by 200 more convalescents over the next few days. By 22 January it was complete in organization, was well equipped, but was probably understrength by 700-800 men. From that we must deduct the units deployed at Anzio-Nettuno (II/Pz.Gren.Rgt. 71, 9/Art.Rgt. 29, and 2/Pz.Pi.Kp.), which may have numbered as many as 1,200 or so.

 

90. Pz.Gren.-Div. as of 11 January had 9 Pz-III (7.5cm), 18 Pz-IV (l), 3 StuG, and 22 s.Pak operational. It had not suffered as badly in December as 29. Pz.Gren., having had 187 KIA, 558 WIA, 321 MIA, and 278 Sick, for a total of 1,344. However, it had been committed in a partly organized state in December and was short about 4,000 men before it had ever entered combat. By 6 January it was 5,468 short its 13,957-man authorization, but received 900 replacements the following day. By 1 February its strength was 10,787, after seeing virtually no combat during January, so probably at least another 1,800 replacements were received 8-31 January (after deducting roughly 300 sick). So it's strength by 22 January was something between 9,300 and 10,787. But we must deduct KG von Bohr, about 1/6 the infantry strength (not counting the Pz.A.A. and Pz.Pi.Btl.) as well as must consider that the bulk of replacements went into the FEB. All told the KG may have been around 3,000.

 

So roughly 19,000-21,000 men, with 65 medium armored vehicles and 42 75mm AT guns, in roughly 10 infantry battalions, two reconnaissance battalions, two engineer battalions, and five artillery battalions, that had been out of combat for three weeks versus....

 

A tank battalion, which had to be drawn from CCA, 1st AD since no other were available. Which meant three medium tank companies or two medium and one light company if the standard cross-attachment in 1st AD between medium and light tank battalions was followed. So either 53 medium tanks or 36 medium and 17 light tanks with 3 81mm mortars as artillery, and about 700 men.

 

Of course you also gotta get them there, which, considering that supplying VI Corps required all the amphibious lift and escorts available, was going to be a neat trick in and of itself. Yeah, sure.

 

BTW, I think I beat you in the rolleyes contest.

Edited October 29, 2007 by Rich

[Rich]

As for airborne troops,

 

Yep, all of four battalions of them in theater, the 504th PIR and the 509th PIB. At least they have a PFAB to support them!