The generalship of Mark Clark

[KingSargent]

Actually, yes, I did read most of it a few years back when researching my thesis, and I don't remember getting any of the same impression that you are constantly harping on about, which is why I've had the temerity to challenge your constant and quite frankly ridiculously over the top assertions. I'm surprised at you, I hadn't put you down as so much of a hindsight second guesser because you know better. Alanbrooke was there on the ground in France in 1940 and he commanded troops against a fully functioning German force, which was a lot more than most of the folk he was dealing with at Casablanca on all sides I suspect, and cettainly more than you or I. Something to bear in mind before you start throwing accusations of being shit scared, whining like a bitch etc etc.

And what did he accomplish in 1940? A lot of whining and a withdrawal.

Just what would you call his reponse to his "promotion" to command British troops in France? Can you provide any evidence that he actually did anything to fulfill his mission?

 

Regarding that, let's just review the thing shall we. If Alanbrooke 's performance in France pre and post Dunkirk really was as you characterise it, then why was he selected to command UK Home Forces in preparation for the expected German invasion?

Who else was there?

 

And I've reviewd the official documantation for that period, and there is nary a sign of Alanbrooke lacking the stomach for a fight. On the contrary he did a very good job of preoaring to fight the Germans and actually of fighting his corner in Whitehall to get what he needed done.

Apparently AB did sort out Home Forces, although I don't see how from his descriptions of the way he worked. As you say the original diary was written as a sort of long letter to his wife, so maybe he left out everything except when he ate lunch with what friends she knew.

 

Furthermore, Montgomery was one of his subordinate div commanders (3rd Div), and he didn't hide his light under a bushel when it came to criticising his superiors but I'm unaware of him going after Alanbrooke. More to the point, Alanbrooke was promoted to CIGS and then head of the CSC.

Once again, who else was there?

 

If he was a cowardly and mendacious individual I very much doubt he would have received those promotions in the prevailing circumstances, and given his constant contact with Churchill he wouldn't have lasted very long either given the latter's ruthless attitude when it came to dismissing those he considered incompetent. The fact that he kept Alanbrooke in place despite their numerous disagreements suggests that he was actually very good at his job, which in turn undermines your criticisms/allegations I think.

Churchill couldn't fire everybody, and if he did fire AB where would he get a replacement? The fact that AB may have been the best choice available to Churchill doesn't mean he was good, it simply points up the appalling condition that the British Army had been forced into.

If you will recall, lots of people (including WSC) wanted to get rid of Monty and it was politically impossible. Most of the Allies would have buried DeGaulle in a cesspool if they could have. Lots of our posters think MacArthur should have been cashiered in 1942, but it took ten years and Harry Truman to get rid of him.

So longevity in a position depends on a lot of factors.

 

Finally, with regard to these diaries that you keep citing with such faith. First off, which version are you referring to? They were originally written as a private endeavour for his wife, which might explain some of the hyperbolic comments you seem so enmoured with, and the first version was heavily censored before publication in 1957 and 1959; the later 2001 version has also been edited so I'd be a wee bit wary of considering tht the unexpurgated version as well. I talked to someone a while back who was working with the Alanbrooke papers who told me there was a lot more in there than appears in the diaries, and I'm not surprised - I wasn't looking and I found a lot of stuff missing by edit when I compared the originals at Kew with Martin Gilbert's versions in his book on Churchill's war papers.

I am aware that there are discrepancies. AB did some editing himself, that he alludes to. It might be imperfect, but it is what I have. I didn't make my impressions up. Perhaps my emphasis is that I went into the diary more or less on a dare from one of British Hagiographic Posters who kept bringing up AB's diary as Gospel I'm pretty sure he hadn't read it all the way through, his "citations" looked like footnotes from another source - in any case, he shut up when I informed him I had read the whole thing and started asking questions about what was said on specific pages.

So I didn't go into it panting to see what the Great Man said, I went into it critically, and I was appalled at how bad it was. Maybe that is why my "vitriol." Like I said, I don't cut McClellan any slack, why should I cut AB slack? In fact, the AB - McClellan thing makes an interesting parallel. McClellan and AB both took a FUBARed defeated army and got it organized in a time of crisis. Both were apparently the best available choices (THE BEST, given knowledge at the time). Both consistently overestimated enemy strength, and apparently both were reluctant to order their creations into danger - at least that is a pretty common interpretation of Little Mac, and one that might explain a lot about AB.

 

Ref the figs, has anyone (including you) actually seriously looked for them, rather than just pointing out apparent discrepancies that don't chime with peripheral perspectives and/or personal axe grinding?

I am afraid the Library at UAF is a tad lacking in archival sources on WW2. Not being able to pop down to Kew (and wherever one is in the UK, Kew is a day trip compared to how far I would have to go to find decent archives), I find it difficult to dig up original sources. If you know of a good treatment on WW2 shipping patterns, I'd love to know about it it.

 

If not then it's not strange at all. What I do find strange, however, is your implicit assumption that Eisenhower and all the other US folk at Casablanca were naive, dopey rubes who were an easy mark for some cowardly British villain to hoodwink. Whereas all the evidence suggests that they were no such thing, and as Rich had pointed out, were privy to a lot of the same info and certainly enough to challenge any such blatant attempt to peddle untruths as you allege Alanbroooke did.

Ah, "the US knew everything" has downgraded to "the US was privy to a lot."

The US certainly could have caught AB out, just from his changing German TOE figures. Maybe they did, but didn't want to call him a frigging liar in public at a conference with FDR and WSC drinking in the next villa. I do know they took anything AB said with a very large grain of salt thereafter.

And my conclusions are not made up either, they come from a lot of sources (most of which feel the Brits put one over on the US, BTW).

 

Ref the last part, first off, I don't have any feelings toward Browning, I just relayed the evidence I found.

Excuse me? Well, if you say so. In any case, I'm just relaying what I found about AB.

 

That's the key and crucial difference between your attitude to Alanbrooke and my comments regarding Browning - mine are based on solid, verifiable evidence, whereas yours seems to be based on not a lot at all apart from unsupported personal opinion dressed up with a lot of needless invective.

My personal opinions are supported by a lot of authors. As I said, I am handicapped at providing primary sources.

 

I hold no brief for Alanbrooke one way or the other, so if you can show me some actual verifiable evidence to support your allegations and assertions then I'm quite happy to take them on board, but without it then sorry, no sale.

Well, I show the man's writings and you say you "read most of it a few years ago" and didn't get the same impression I did. What Is A Mother To Do?

 

As for the last sentence, see para 2 above, and again, lets see some evidence of him actually causing any damage, or indeed acting in a self-promoting manner that led directly to a lot of people getting killed and turned a major operation into a failure. Otherwise the comparison is null and void.

I absolve him of self-promoting, at least on a Montgomery scale.

Whether his actions at Casablanca were correct in sending the Western Allies of on the "soft underbelly" tangent or not is a major debate. Very likely France in 1943 wasn't possible; but the US JCS came prepared to examine it and see what they could do to make it work. AB came determined to scuttle it.* Maybe the US JCS would have agreed that the problems were too great - they weren't exactly dumb people. Maybe the Conference would have found a way to overcome them (well, it's possible...). In any case the CCS schedule called for France in 1943, and that should have been examined, not bulldozed unilaterally.

 

It's hard to point to an operation that AB screwed up, because he did his damnedest to avoid operations. It is hard to fail when you don't ever try. Check out Wilmott's Grave of a Dozen Schemes for AB's scuppering of everything Churchill proposed in the Far East. WSC did put forth a lot of screwball ideas, but some of them deserved better than his subordinates flatly refusing to even consider them.

 

 

*I have read at least one conclusion that the disasters of 1942 (Singapore, Tobruk, the Gazala Gallop) had made WSC and AB leery of the performance to be expected of the British Army. Since the main contributer in 1943 would be the CW they didn't want to risk it with a "flawed tool." I have nothing except one author's pseudopsychologic evaluation to back it up, so it is in the "HMMMMM...." File and not the "Lookee Here!" File.

[BillB]

Two parter as the software says there's too many quotes...

 

And what did he accomplish in 1940? A lot of whining and a withdrawal.

Just what would you call his reponse to his "promotion" to command British troops in France? Can you provide any evidence that he actually did anything to fulfill his mission?

I wouldn't call it anything because I haven't looked at it apart from reading his diaries looking for something else. Like I said, it's easy to throw shit about with the benefit of hindsight, especially without bothering to actually look at what you are throwing about in any depth. What would you have had him do in the circumstances, lead a Kamikaze charge or commit suicide maybe. Ref the last bit, not beholden on me to provide any evidence, either. As you're the one throwing all the assertions about that's on you, and you ain't doing too well so far.

 

Who else was there?

I dunno, you're the expert apparently, you tell me. But I seriously doubt they gave Alanbrooke the job merely because there wasn't anyone else, and I think you are reaching to suggest such a thing

 

Apparently AB did sort out Home Forces, although I don't see how from his descriptions of the way he worked. As you say the original diary was written as a sort of long letter to his wife, so maybe he left out everything except when he ate lunch with what friends she knew.

No apparently about it, he did. Mebbe the fact that you have to admit it without knowing how from the single source you are citing should tell you something?

 

Once again, who else was there?

see above. And this doesn't address the fact that you are supposed to be providing some evidence to back up your constant but unsupported assertions/accusations of cowardice, lying etc etc.

 

Churchill couldn't fire everybody, and if he did fire AB where would he get a replacement? The fact that AB may have been the best choice available to Churchill doesn't mean he was good, it simply points up the appalling condition that the British Army had been forced into.

Again, see above. And even a superfical examination of Alanbrooke's career shows that he was good, as you have grudgingly admitted above with regard to his stint with HomeFor Command

 

If you will recall, lots of people (including WSC) wanted to get rid of Monty and it was politically impossible. Most of the Allies would have buried DeGaulle in a cesspool if they could have. Lots of our posters think MacArthur should have been cashiered in 1942, but it took ten years and Harry Truman to get rid of him.

So longevity in a position depends on a lot of factors.

Don't know enough about MacArthur to comment, but getting rid of Montgomery would have been dumb because of his proven competence whatever the politics. But this isn't really relevant to your assertions that Alanbrooke was a coward, a liar and now apparently the best of a bad job, is it.

 

I am aware that there are discrepancies. AB did some editing himself, that he alludes to. It might be imperfect, but it is what I have. I didn't make my impressions up. Perhaps my emphasis is that I went into the diary more or less on a dare from one of British Hagiographic Posters who kept bringing up AB's diary as Gospel I'm pretty sure he hadn't read it all the way through, his "citations" looked like footnotes from another source - in any case, he shut up when I informed him I had read the whole thing and started asking questions about what was said on specific pages.So I didn't go into it panting to see what the Great Man said, I went into it critically, and I was appalled at how bad it was. Maybe that is why my "vitriol." Like I said, I don't cut McClellan any slack, why should I cut AB slack? In fact, the AB - McClellan thing makes an interesting parallel. McClellan and AB both took a FUBARed defeated army and got it organized in a time of crisis. Both were apparently the best available choices (THE BEST, given knowledge at the time). Both consistently overestimated enemy strength, and apparently both were reluctant to order their creations into danger - at least that is a pretty common interpretation of Little Mac, and one that might explain a lot about AB.

So if that's all you have, would it not be sensible to refrain from extrapolating so much or indeed at all from a source that you acknowledge to be flawed? And I assume yiou have some concrete examples of Alanbrooke being leery of ordering his creation into danger a la McClellan then, as opposed to treating a resourceful and highly competent enemy with the respect they warranted.

[BillB]

Second part:

 

I am afraid the Library at UAF is a tad lacking in archival sources on WW2. Not being able to pop down to Kew (and wherever one is in the UK, Kew is a day trip compared to how far I would have to go to find decent archives), I find it difficult to dig up original sources. If you know of a good treatment on WW2 shipping patterns, I'd love to know about it it.

So that's a long winded way of admitting you haven't, and don't know of anyone else that has either, yes? Which might suggest that there is actually nothing to look for, perhaps? And even if you did dig thru archives and find that Alanbrooke had overegged the pudding at Casablanca, so what? A politician (because that what soldiers are obliged to become when operating at that level) used a bit of spin to achieve his aim at high level negotiations. Hardly an earthshaking revealation there, even if it was true. FWIW I think you are making a lot of fuss about not a lot.

 

Ah, "the US knew everything" has downgraded to "the US was privy to a lot."

Whoa right there, Sparky. I never said any such thing in the sense you are portraying it there. I have no idea what folk knew at Casablanca, frankly have no interest in bothering to find out, and have never suggested otherwise. That seems to put me on par with you though, given the paucity of evidence you've produced to support your assertions.

 

The US certainly could have caught AB out, just from his changing German TOE figures. Maybe they did, but didn't want to call him a frigging liar in public at a conference with FDR and WSC drinking in the next villa. I do know they took anything AB said with a very large grain of salt thereafter.

What German TOE figures? The only ones I've seen you cite is the 17SS, and Rich has pretty much blown that one out of the water. It doesn't seem to have occurred to you (or you are simply uinwilling to entertain the notion) that maybe they couldn't call him a frigging liar because what he said gelled with the info the US folk had too.

 

And my conclusions are not made up either, they come from a lot of sources (most of which feel the Brits put one over on the US, BTW).

And all of whom are, let me guess, Americans, right? So what sources, and what do they say exactly.

 

Excuse me? Well, if you say so. In any case, I'm just relaying what I found about AB.

Yes, I do say so. And everything I found about Browning is footnoted, whereas all you have on Alanbrooke still appears to come from your unsupported personal opinion of a diary written for his wife that you don't like for personal reasons.

 

My personal opinions are supported by a lot of authors. As I said, I am handicapped at providing primary sources.

Second time you've said that, so stop being coy and lets have some names and precisely what they say and their evidence for saying it then. And you don't need primary sources, if there's any weight to your assertions then there should be plenty of secondary stuff to support them, just as there was about Browning. All you need is a bit of objectivity and some critical thinking. Assuming that there is some stuff to look at, of course.

[BillB]

And the third part

 

Well, I show the man's writings and you say you "read most of it a few years ago" and didn't get the same impression I did. What Is A Mother To Do?

No, you've provided your unsupported take on what the man wrote in a diary for his wife. As for what to do, well putting the assertions and accusations on hold until you've got some actual evidence or more than a single source might be a good idea.

 

I absolve him of self-promoting, at least on a Montgomery scale.

Big of you, I'm sure his reputation is all aquiver with relief. Now how about doing the same with your accusations that he was a coward and a liar, until you come up with some actual evidence

 

Whether his actions at Casablanca were correct in sending the Western Allies of on the "soft underbelly" tangent or not is a major debate. Very likely France in 1943 wasn't possible; but the US JCS came prepared to examine it and see what they could do to make it work. AB came determined to scuttle it.* Maybe the US JCS would have agreed that the problems were too great - they weren't exactly dumb people. Maybe the Conference would have found a way to overcome them (well, it's possible...). In any case the CCS schedule called for France in 1943, and that should have been examined, not bulldozed unilaterally.

A major debate that you lost IIRC, something to do with shipping. And again you fall back on your implicit assumption that the Yanks at Casablanca were rubes that Alanbrooke was able to hoodwink or bulldoze unilaterally, which I simply think doesn't hold water.

 

It's hard to point to an operation that AB screwed up, because he did his damnedest to avoid operations. It is hard to fail when you don't ever try. Check out Wilmott's Grave of a Dozen Schemes for AB's scuppering of everything Churchill proposed in the Far East. WSC did put forth a lot of screwball ideas, but some of them deserved better than his subordinates flatly refusing to even consider them.

Ah, so you can't actually back up one of your latest assertions and are trying to camouflage it by making another. So where's the evidence that he went out of his way to avoid and scupper operations then. I haven't read Wilmott so I can't really comment, but as he is looking at naval matters in the Far East after 1943 I don't really see what that has to do with Casablanca and matters in Europe.

 

*I have read at least one conclusion that the disasters of 1942 (Singapore, Tobruk, the Gazala Gallop) had made WSC and AB leery of the performance to be expected of the British Army. Since the main contributer in 1943 would be the CW they didn't want to risk it with a "flawed tool." I have nothing except one author's pseudopsychologic evaluation to back it up, so it is in the "HMMMMM...." File and not the "Lookee Here!" File.[/b]

Which begs the question of why you didn't put Alanbrooke's diaries in the Hmmmm File too then, I should have thought. Ref the rest, sounds like bollocks at worst or someone taking things out of context for some reason at best, considering the BA performance at other points in the desert war (Operation COMPASS springs to mind), that the disaster at Tobruk was largely a South African thing, that the same charges can be levelled at Rommel etc etc etc

 

BillB

[BillB]

The Yanks at Casablanca were privy to exactly what the British told them.

 

I find that hard to believe, and if it were so then they deserved to get screwed. And they didn't have to dumbly agree to it either, did they?

 

The Yanks at Casablanca were there to finalize plans for the 1943 invasion of France that had been agreed to by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. AlanBrooke and his contingent were there to scuttle it and came prepared with all sorts of presentations that the Americans couldn't refute. Whenever somebody said "That's bullshit," AB would open another folder that nobody else could review and spout off. In the course of this spouting off, he contributed at least three different divisional totals for German troops in France. At least two of his "unequivocal facts" had to be wrong.

This would be the 1943 invasion that was an impossibility, yes? And if this spouting off were so obviously flawed, then how come someone on the Yank side not call him on it at the time? Couldn't possibly be because they were also convinced by the actual arguments too, could it?

 

AB did not say anything about the 17th SS at Casablanca, obviously. But he was CIGS until 1945 and had plenty of other chances to lie. IIRC the 260-tank figure was in an "appreciation" of German units that could respond immediately to a landing (besides being weaker than advertised, it obviously wasn't capable of rapid response either) that was passed to 21st AG. Also, bear in mind that ULTRA data was highly restricted. The people in a position to spot "inconsistencies" were few. The people senior enough to call "FOUL!!" were fewer, and constrained by "Allied harmony."

 

I'm sorry, but I think this is complete nonsense. First, any commander that did not operate on the worst case basis when estimating/appreciating enemy capabilities on incomplete intelligence was taking a big chance and would have been guilty of criminal negligence IMO. If Alanbrooke ahd done that then you'd doubtless be in here complaining about his alleged incomptence from that angle. Second, let's have some actual concrete evidence of Alanbrooke telling porkies. You started by making unsupported assertions about Alanbrooke in 1940 and at Casablnaca, for which you haven't provided a shred of credible evidence. Now you've graduated to extrapolating irrelevant examples out of context and drawing all sorts of tenuous to non-existent connections and excuses right up to 1945, again with nothing to support them but wishful thinking. Your positions got more holes in it than a sieve. Either provide some actual concrete evidence or give it up.

 

BillB

[Rich]

AB did not say anything about the 17th SS at Casablanca, obviously. But he was CIGS until 1945 and had plenty of other chances to lie. IIRC the 260-tank figure was in an "appreciation" of German units that could respond immediately to a landing (besides being weaker than advertised, it obviously wasn't capable of rapid response either) that was passed to 21st AG. Also, bear in mind that ULTRA data was highly restricted. The people in a position to spot "inconsistencies" were few. The people senior enough to call "FOUL!!" were fewer, and constrained by "Allied harmony."

 

King, I'm sorry, but you may not have understood, there was no "appreciation" made of German tank strength prior to 25 May, although the number and location of formations was well known. But that was 10 Panzer and 1 Panzergrenadier division and I hardly think that anyone was going to accept "260"? OTOH if it was "divisions" that could respond "immediately" it was 21. Panzer, but again, "260" is not a number that would have been used. Or, perhaps "immediately" meant 21. Panzer, 12. SS, and Lehr? But that again doesn't make sense.

 

And given that these appreciations - and the shortfalls in them, there was quite a bit of anxiety about that - were very well known prior to the invasion by the NEPTUNE commanders and staffs, it remains unlikely that Brook would get away with such a thing. Basically, the BIGOT intelligence estimates were available to all BIGOTed officers, which was a pretty large number, but that didn't mean they all knew the source of the intelligence, ULTRA knowledge was basically restricted to the army-level commanders and above and a few of their senior staff. Again, the story as you tell it simply doesn't make any sense, on any level, something is truly screwy here? And, BTW, I am not accusing or implying that you pulled an "AB" I think I've known you long enough to know that you wouldn't pull such a thing - you might be wrong occassionally or suffer CRS (Christ I wish I had a buck for every time I've suffered from that lately....dammit, I STILL can't figure out where I put Harry Yeide's Steel Victory, it's damn embarrassing!) - but you do not MSU*.

 

So all in all I'm very curious about details on exactly what Brook said, when it was said, and who Brook "lied" to using it?

 

* Make Shit Up

[Rich]

I find that hard to believe, and if it were so then they deserved to get screwed. And they didn't have to dumbly agree to it either, did they?

 

Hi Bill,

 

The whole Casablanca affair left the whole American military contingent there with a bad taste in their mouth. They went to the conference thinking they would be discussing the details of things they thought had already been decided, so were pretty much only prepared to discuss those. But the dastardly minions of perfidious Albion were clever enough to prepare arguments as to why some of those things shouldn't actually have already been decided and managed to get some of them undecided.

 

Shit happnes, they had nobody to blame but themselves for their own shoddy staffwork in preparation, and it's about time that historians - especially American ones - finally get over it, and in any case, on the primary point - the 1943 French invasion plans - the Brits were right. But it doesn't mean that we have to like what happened.

[KingSargent]

So all in all I'm very curious about details on exactly what Brook said, when it was said, and who Brook "lied" to using it?

All I know is that 21 AG got told 17th SS was on the way and they had 260 tanks. It stuck with me because of the impossibility of the figure. I totally agree it was an incredible mistake.

 

Hi Bill,

 

The whole Casablanca affair left the whole American military contingent there with a bad taste in their mouth. They went to the conference thinking they would be discussing the details of things they thought had already been decided, so were pretty much only prepared to discuss those. But the dastardly minions of perfidious Albion were clever enough to prepare arguments as to why some of those things shouldn't actually have already been decided and managed to get some of them undecided.

 

Shit happnes, they had nobody to blame but themselves for their own shoddy staffwork in preparation, and it's about time that historians - especially American ones - finally get over it, and in any case, on the primary point - the 1943 French invasion plans - the Brits were right. But it doesn't mean that we have to like what happened.

Whether the Brits were right or not remains an open question. They probably were, as we determined a few months ago - it wasn't logistically feasible after the TORCH detour. But the Yanks came with data to support the decisions of the CCS (and possibly with the knowledge that the data said it couldn't be done). We can't know if the Yank staffwork was shoddy or not, as it was never presented.

 

Possibly the difference is in differing views on how command works. The American view has been, "Well it's a crappy job but we've been told to do it, let's see if there is a way to make it work."

The British (or AB's) view was that orders were items for debate, and could be ignored if the subordinate felt like it.

[JWB]

Rich Posted Sat 20 Oct 2007 2027

 

I'll reserve judgment on that until I can dig a bit more thoroughly in the claims you made. So far I can say I'm a bit suspicious regarding the claim you made that "Smoke was begun May 12 and ended May 17. 135,000 155mm WP shells were expended" given that only 499,000 WP M110 CS rounds were manufactured for the M1 155mm Howitzer for the entire war (and only 26,000 prior to May 1944)? Another 642,000 rounds of WP Mk IIA1 and M105 were manufactured for the M1917-18 155mm Howitzer (all but 4,000 prior to March 43), but those were almost entirely out of service by DIADEM in Fifth Army. And there were 175,000 rounds of WP M104 manufactured for the M1 155mm Gun, but only 58,000 prior to May 44.

You can be suspicious all you want but that only proves you are factually incorrect. I will believe Hogg before I will believe anything you post.

 

 

KingSargent Posted Sat 20 Oct 2007 2008

 

And where was he going to call them from? He was a bit low on the totem pole to order supply allocation changes. And just how long do you think it takes to get a request through and get it filled? The Brits wouldn't have huge stocks of WP or Smoke in US calibers, which meant if Clark wanted any it had to come from CONUS. Actually from January to May is about the time it would take to get an order for masses of ammo filled.

 

The Allies already had most of it on hand. Very early in the campaign it was found that shells could not destroy the German positions that were dug into hard rock. So they came up with the tactic of using smoke shells to mark where the German positions were so that medium bombers could do the blasting.

 

According to you, everyone. With plenty of winter gear, ammo, and rations too.

Never wrote any such thing.

 

And clearly they were not able to to do the job with what they had available. So where do you get off saying they should have been all the way up the boot in January?

Never wrote that either.

 

"On 12th May, as dawn broke, an artillery smoke was fired onto slopes of the mountain to blind the observation posts, machine gun gunners, and mortar positions overlooking Allies in the valley below. This was not particularily unusual , and the German defenders stood to their weapons to await the attack which they confidentely expected would follow the smoke screen.

 

But the attack didn't come - just more smoke. Two divisions - worth of guns, British and polish, simply continued to feed the screen all day. Down in the valley mechanical smoke generators, vaporising oil to generate a thick fog, were occupied in screening river crossings, roads, gun areas and similar potential targets in case the artillery screen on the mountains faltered....the esso generators in the valley as insurance......every day until the 17th....Polish 3rd Carpathian division were up the mountain .....and at the defenders before they had a chance to organise defensive fire."

 

Hogg

[KingSargent]

You can be suspicious all you want but that only proves you are factually incorrect. I will believe Hogg before I will believe anything you post.

I've caught Hogg in more mistakes than I've caught Rich in.

Hey Rich, maybe if you change your allegiance to the Queen you can become Gospel too.

 

The Allies already had most of it on hand.

And I will believe Rich's figures on shell production before I believe your unsupported assertions. If it was already on hand, tell us where it was, when it was made, and when it was sent.

 

Very early in the campaign it was found that shells could not destroy the German positions that were dug into hard rock. So they came up with the tactic of using smoke shells to mark where the German positions were so that medium bombers could do the blasting.

Too bad that didn't work either. For one thing flying conditions were pretty crappy in January, when you say all this should have happened.

 

Never wrote any such thing.

You must have assumed it if you thought the boot could be cleared in January 1944.

 

Never wrote that either.

You, 16 October 2007:

"Had the Allies destroyed the Axis in Italy it would have been possible to march into Austria. That destruction could have been accomplished back in January 1944."

 

Which immodest assertion begs the question of how they were going to get over the Alps. The Brenner Pass is very pretty, but a tad constricted for combat movement by an Army Group.

 

 

"On 12th May, as dawn broke, an artillery smoke was fired onto slopes of the mountain to blind the observation posts, machine gun gunners, and mortar positions overlooking Allies in the valley below. This was not particularily unusual , and the German defenders stood to their weapons to await the attack which they confidentely expected would follow the smoke screen.

 

But the attack didn't come - just more smoke. Two divisions - worth of guns, British and polish, simply continued to feed the screen all day. Down in the valley mechanical smoke generators, vaporising oil to generate a thick fog, were occupied in screening river crossings, roads, gun areas and similar potential targets in case the artillery screen on the mountains faltered....the esso generators in the valley as insurance......every day until the 17th....Polish 3rd Carpathian division were up the mountain .....and at the defenders before they had a chance to organise defensive fire."

 

Hogg

I don't believe Hogg is saying that could have been done in January, he is saying it was done in May after everything was in place.

[BillB]

Hi Bill,

 

The whole Casablanca affair left the whole American military contingent there with a bad taste in their mouth. They went to the conference thinking they would be discussing the details of things they thought had already been decided, so were pretty much only prepared to discuss those. But the dastardly minions of perfidious Albion were clever enough to prepare arguments as to why some of those things shouldn't actually have already been decided and managed to get some of them undecided.

 

Shit happnes, they had nobody to blame but themselves for their own shoddy staffwork in preparation, and it's about time that historians - especially American ones - finally get over it, and in any case, on the primary point - the 1943 French invasion plans - the Brits were right. But it doesn't mean that we have to like what happened.

 

Thanks for that, Rich. That's about what I figured, based on my superficial knowledge. But I don't see anyone getting over it any time soon as it's too good a tool for pushing personal/national prejudices. Like perfidious Samdom having the temerity to make us pay for financial assistance like any other customer straight after WW2...

 

BillB

[BillB]

Whether the Brits were right or not remains an open question. They probably were, as we determined a few months ago - it wasn't logistically feasible after the TORCH detour. But the Yanks came with data to support the decisions of the CCS (and possibly with the knowledge that the data said it couldn't be done). We can't know if the Yank staffwork was shoddy or not, as it was never presented.

 

Possibly the difference is in differing views on how command works. The American view has been, "Well it's a crappy job but we've been told to do it, let's see if there is a way to make it work."

The British (or AB's) view was that orders were items for debate, and could be ignored if the subordinate felt like it.

You just cannot help yourself, can you. The second part is again a total misrepresentation of the situation based yet again on nothing more than your personal prejudice(s). It would just as accurate to say thay the American way was to behave like slavish robots once a decision has been made, irrespective of its wisdom or correctness, while the British view was to act like thinking men rather than automatons. Which would be equally inaccurate as a blanket assertion, of course.

 

I suspect the more accurate version would be that the Americans were overconfident of their capabilities because they had no real grasp of what they were getting into, while the British/Alanbrooke knew exactly what they were getting into based on lots of personal experience.

 

BillB

[KingSargent]

You just cannot help yourself, can you. The second part is again a total misrepresentation of the situation based yet again on nothing more than your personal prejudice(s). It would just as accurate to say thay the American way was to behave like slavish robots once a decision has been made, irrespective of its wisdom or correctness, while the British view was to act like thinking men rather than automatons. Which would be equally inaccurate as a blanket assertion, of course.

One of the common criticisms of 8th Army in the Desert (by British authors) was that the generals acted they were a debating society.

Not that yanks didn't debate, of course, but IMHO the debate was usually about how to accomplish something, not whether to do it or not.

 

I suspect the more accurate version would be that the Americans were overconfident of their capabilities because they had no real grasp of what they were getting into, while the British/Alanbrooke knew exactly what they were getting into based on lots of personal experience.

 

BillB

And equally possibly it is because the US Army's institutional experience of fighting Germans was as winners, even if supercilious Brits said they didn't know how to fight. I speak of 1918 as well as WW2. Sure the US had taken on the Germans in 1918 after they had been thoroughly minced by the British and the French. I'm not saying the US confidence was 100% valid, I'm saying it existed and was a different attitude from that prevailing in the British Army.

 

Naturally the British were overcautious based on personal experience. They had spent years getting their butts kicked* and whether it was their fault or not (I blame HMG, not the Army) it frightened them and they saw Germans as supermen - sort of like the way the Army of the Potomac felt about Lee's ANV during the ACW.

 

* This is most definitely not to say that the US wouldn't have spent years getting their butts kicked if they had been shovelled into a Continental war that they were told they would never have to fight, and had not trained or equipped for one because HMG told them they were police and not an army for 20 years. I shudder to think of what would have happened had the US Army been swapped out for the British Army in 1938.

[KingSargent]

Thanks for that, Rich. That's about what I figured, based on my superficial knowledge. Just how superficial is your knowledge about it? Are you saying I am displaying nationalistic hubris and prejudice when you haven't investigated to see whether I might be RIGHT? But I don't see anyone getting over it any time soon as it's too good a tool for pushing personal/national prejudices. Like perfidious Samdom having the temerity to make us pay for financial assistance like any other customer straight after WW2...

 

BillB

Hey, how about Perfidious Samdom being convinced that Perfidious Albion had dragged us into the last war that wasn't our business?

 

How about Albionese who think that they are the only people who know how to run a military (or diplomacy.... :rolleyes: )?

 

How about them Albionese who claim USians are fukkups after they were placed in impossible positions by Albionese generals (not that the senior US guy on the spot didn't go along with the stupid positioning)?

 

I cud og no nad on....

 

Actually, I can sympathize with the Brits being PO'd about WW2 war debts. The US spent zillions building up the people who had lost the friggin' war, and didn't cut our best ally any slack. We should have included Albion in the Marshall Plan, and right at the top of the list.

[Rich]

You can be suspicious all you want but that only proves you are factually incorrect. I will believe Hogg before I will believe anything you post.

 

Official Munitions Production of the United States: by Months, July 1, 1940 - August 31, 1945, Initiated and Prepared by the U.S. War Production Board, J.A. Krug, Chairman, Program and Statistics Bureau, Bertrand Fox, Director. From data submitted by the War Procurement Agencies under standards established by the Advisory Committee on Official Production Statistic. Completed by the Civilian Production Administration, John C. Houston, Jr., Commissioner, Bureau of Demobilization, David Novick, Director. Issued May 1, 1947.

 

Ammunition for Artillery, Mortars and Naval Guns

Artillery and Tank Gun

Page 169 155-mm Gun, M1

Page 170 155-mm Howitzer, M1

Page 171 155-mm Howitzer, M1917-18

 

Just which pages of your Ballantine's Illustrated History are you using?

 

"On 12th May, as dawn broke, an artillery smoke was fired onto slopes of the mountain to blind the observation posts, machine gun gunners, and mortar positions overlooking Allies in the valley below. This was not particularily unusual , and the German defenders stood to their weapons to await the attack which they confidentely expected would follow the smoke screen.

 

But the attack didn't come - just more smoke. Two divisions - worth of guns, British and polish, simply continued to feed the screen all day. Down in the valley mechanical smoke generators, vaporising oil to generate a thick fog, were occupied in screening river crossings, roads, gun areas and similar potential targets in case the artillery screen on the mountains faltered....the esso generators in the valley as insurance......every day until the 17th....Polish 3rd Carpathian division were up the mountain .....and at the defenders before they had a chance to organise defensive fire."

 

Hogg

 

Unfortunately this bears little relationship to the actual battle, where the Poles struggled for some three days before finally capturing the heights overlooking the Liri, and in the process suffered some 1,000 killed and 4,000 wounded. It also ignores XIII Corps, which finally managed to bridge the Rapido south of Cassino of the town, opening the Liri valley to tanks of the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade. Or of course the breakthrough by the FEC through the Aurunci and II Corps along the coastal corridor, which compromised the German defense, negating their ability to counterattack to restore the situation at Cassino.

 

Hogg must have been on a real deadline when he wrote that, but then it's pretty typical of the Ballantine journalistic style, so he may not have been to blame.

 

Oh, BTW, if his description is of the Commonwealth and Polish attack at Cassino, how did they expend "135,000" rounds of 155mm?

[JWB]

KingSargent Posted Sun 21 Oct 2007 0816

You must have assumed it if you thought the boot could be cleared in January 1944.

I never thought it possible to clear the boot in Jan 1944. I never wrote any such thing. Thank you for misquoting me again.

 

Had the Allies destroyed the Axis in Italy it would have been possible to march into Austria. That destruction could have been accomplished back in January 1944."

 

What the feck does that have to do with marching into Austria in Jan 1944?

 

I don't believe Hogg is saying that could have been done in January, he is saying it was done in May after everything was in place.

I never claimed Hogg said it could be done in Jan. I am simply trying to explain how it could have been done in Jan.

 

 

Rich Posted Sun 21 Oct 2007 1449

Official Munitions Production of the United States: by Months, July 1, 1940 - August 31, 1945, Initiated and Prepared by the U.S. War Production Board, J.A. Krug, Chairman, Program and Statistics Bureau, Bertrand Fox, Director. From data submitted by the War Procurement Agencies under standards established by the Advisory Committee on Official Production Statistic. Completed by the Civilian Production Administration, John C. Houston, Jr., Commissioner, Bureau of Demobilization, David Novick, Director. Issued May 1, 1947.

 

Ammunition for Artillery, Mortars and Naval Guns

Artillery and Tank Gun

Page 169 155-mm Gun, M1

Page 170 155-mm Howitzer, M1

Page 171 155-mm Howitzer, M1917-18

 

So what.

 

Just which pages of your Ballantine's Illustrated History are you using?

106 - 109

"On 12th May, as dawn broke, an artillery smoke was fired onto slopes of the mountain to blind the observation posts, machine gun gunners, and mortar positions overlooking Allies in the valley below. This was not particularily unusual , and the German defenders stood to their weapons to await the attack which they confidentely expected would follow the smoke screen.

 

But the attack didn't come - just more smoke. Two divisions - worth of guns, British and polish, simply continued to feed the screen all day. Down in the valley mechanical smoke generators, vaporising oil to generate a thick fog, were occupied in screening river crossings, roads, gun areas and similar potential targets in case the artillery screen on the mountains faltered....the esso generators in the valley as insurance......every day until the 17th....Polish 3rd Carpathian division were up the mountain .....and at the defenders before they had a chance to organise defensive fire."

 

Unfortunately this bears little relationship to the actual battle....

 

Actually it is an excellent description of the beginnings of the offensive.

 

Hogg must have been on a real deadline when he wrote that, but then it's pretty typical of the Ballantine journalistic style, so he may not have been to blame.

Hogg wrote this when he was about your age now.

 

Oh, BTW, if his description is of the Commonwealth and Polish attack at Cassino, how did they expend "135,000" rounds of 155mm?

 

Because it is not his description of the Commonwealth and Polish attack at Cassino. It is a description of a smoking operation carried out by all the forces involved.

[Rich]

I never thought it possible to clear the boot in Jan 1944. I never wrote any such thing. Thank you for misquoting me again.

 

Really?

 

QUOTE(JWB @ Tue 16 Oct 2007 1838)

Had the Allies destroyed the Axis in Italy it would have been possible to march into Austria. That destruction could have been accomplished back in January 1944.

Please explain what is misquoted.

 

What the feck does that have to do with marching into Austria in Jan 1944?

 

But that is exactly what your statement says.

 

QUOTE(JWB @ Tue 16 Oct 2007 1838)

Had the Allies destroyed the Axis in Italy it would have been possible to march into Austria. That destruction could have been accomplished back in January 1944.

Are you not stating that if the "destruction" could have been accomplished "back in January 1944" then "it would have been possible to march into Austria"? That certainly appears to be the gist of your statement?

 

I never claimed Hogg said it could be done in Jan. I am simply trying to explain how it could have been done in Jan.

 

Wait a minute, could it or could it not have been done? Make up your mind.

 

So what.

Brilliant riposte. You bring a whole new meaning to the old saw that "ignorance is bliss."

 

106 - 109

"On 12th May, as dawn broke, an artillery smoke was fired onto slopes of the mountain to blind the observation posts, machine gun gunners, and mortar positions overlooking Allies in the valley below. This was not particularily unusual , and the German defenders stood to their weapons to await the attack which they confidentely expected would follow the smoke screen.

 

But the attack didn't come - just more smoke. Two divisions - worth of guns, British and polish, simply continued to feed the screen all day. Down in the valley mechanical smoke generators, vaporising oil to generate a thick fog, were occupied in screening river crossings, roads, gun areas and similar potential targets in case the artillery screen on the mountains faltered....the esso generators in the valley as insurance......every day until the 17th....Polish 3rd Carpathian division were up the mountain .....and at the defenders before they had a chance to organise defensive fire."

 

Actually it is an excellent description of the beginnings of the offensive.

 

Er, no, it is not I'm afraid, the bombardment actually began at 2300 hours, with the infantry attacks beginning at 2345 hours, 11 May. In other words the attack had already come by dawn of 12 May. And the smoke operations that morning were mostly designed to obscure visibility from Monastery Hill of the crosssing points of the 4th Division, south of Sant Angelo. It was continued into 13 May.

 

Parker, p. 311, “With not a single bridge built to take tank and antitank support over to the forward troops, the situation for the British 4th Division on the Rapido on the morning of 12 May was desperate. Pioneer officer F.G. Sutton remembers that as dawn came, the fog cleared and the men in the shallow bridgehead were in full view of the monastery. Immediately the Allied artillery started firing smoke shells at Monastery Hill, and soon, Sutton says, “It looked as if the whole big mountain was steaming.””

 

Parker, p. 316, “The opening of the bridge [across the Rapido in the 4th Division zone at 0445 13 May] was the turning point of the battle opposite the Liri Valley, and arguably of the whole Cassino offensive. It had cost the engineers 83 casualties out of the 200 men involved….”

 

Parker, p. 318, “The mist on the morning of 13 May added to the confusion, but also prevented German antitank guns from finding targets.”

 

Parker, p. 326, “The continual smoke shells fired at the monastery to prevent observation of the troops below added to the choking atmosphere.”

 

But that had virtually no effect in the zone of the 2nd Polish Corps, who were attacking along the ridgeline well above the valley, and suffered some 860 killed, 102 missing, and 3,684 wounded in the process. Nor was smoke a panacea or even a one-sided tool in the battle.

 

Neillands, p. 291, [quoting John Williams, an officer with 99th Light AA Regiment, RA], “H-Hour for this attack was to be 2300 hours on 11 May, and the infantry assault began at 2345 hours, by which time a dense fog had overwhelmed the battlefield like one of the old London fogs. Once again the Hun had sprung a surprise and was swamping the battlefield with smoke shells so that we could not see, causing great confusion.”

 

This is also widely mentioned by 4th Division participants and by Maloney, the "fog and smoke" was blamed for the confusion that prevented the division from seizing its objectives on the night of 11/12 May that resulted in them being stuck in a narrow bridgehead over the Rapido, landmarks were lost, even the taped paths through minefields couldn't be seen, but it had little effect on the beaten zones the Germans had preplanned for their machineguns and only a minor effect on their mortar and artillery defensive fires.

 

And the description doesn't even begin to match either the intent of the operation or it's most critical features (it may be sad, but the Polish assault on the monastery was probably unneccessary and was less important to the outcome than the success of the FEC and 13th Corps).

 

D’Este, p. 329, “Alexander remained under intense pressure to break the stalemate at the earliest possible Opportunity. The original target date of April soon proved impossible. With few exceptions, most of the Allied divisions were tired and in need of rest, reorganization, and refitting. Moreover, the ground was still far two wet for a major offensive in which armor would play a key role.”

 

D’Este, p. 330-331, “Alexander believed he would need a three-to-one infantry superiority, which was the accepted norm in World War II, to successfully break the Gustav Line. The Allies could only muster a maximum twenty-eight divisions in central Italy, leaving their numerical superiority over the Germans at a slender one and one-quarter to one.”

 

D’Este, p. 334, “Harding created the strategy for a plan, code-named DIADEM, to break the Gustav Line. Its crux was to annul once and for all the penny-packet tactics and mentality that had characterized the first three battles of Cassino. Instead Harding opted to apply a huge concentration of force at a decisive point. He proposed a sweeping realignment of forces that would concentrate Leese’s Eighth Army opposite Cassino for the main attack. With thre corps (13th British, 1st Canadian, and 2nd Polish), Leese’s mission was to unleash a massive force against Cassino. The Fifth Army was to be shifted to the Garigliano sector and would be joined there by General Alphonse Juin’s Corps Expéditionnaire Franąais, while the Polish II Corps took over the former French sector on the Eighth Army right flank.”

 

What part of that matches your rather confused claim that,

 

DIADEM worked because it was across a wide enough front and made use of far greater amounts of screening smoke. Victory in WW2 was achieved by wide front offensives against confused defenders.

?

 

In fact, victory was acheived because six divisions of Fifth Army and nine divisions of Eighth Army were concentrated in a zone that previously had seen no more than about four divisions attacking.

 

D’este, p. 348, “During the first six days of DIADEM, the artillery supporting the British 13th Corps fired an incredible total of 476,413 rounds of artillery in support of its operations to rupture German defenses at the mouth of the Liri Valley. Despite the great surprise and the vast edge in Allied firepower, however, the first three days of DIADEM were ominously reminiscent of previous failed operations.”

 

Hogg wrote this when he was about your age now.

 

Really? How old am I? How old is he?

 

Because it is not his description of the Commonwealth and Polish attack at Cassino. It is a description of a smoking operation carried out by all the forces involved.

 

But where is the mention of this "smoking operation" in Moloney, D'Este, Parker, Neillands, Majdalaney, or any of the other well-known authors who have written about this operation? Or for that matter where is it in the Fifth Army and II Corps histories, which include extensive documentation on the artillery fire plan? And if it is "135,000" 155mm smoke shells that were expended 12-17 May where did they come from? In that period the US II Corps expended a grand total of 40,531 155mm howitzer and 5,650 155mm gun round of all kinds from a total of eight howitzer and two gun battalions, given that the FEC had about the same number and that the Commonwealth forces only had a few batteries of 155mm guns, and that there simply weren't all that many WP rounds manufactured, I'm still wondering where all those smoke rounds you claim could have come from?

Edited October 21, 2007 by Rich

[DB]

Is it just me, or is anyone else thinking of "History Today"?

 

David

[Rich]

Is it just me, or is anyone else thinking of "History Today"?

 

David

 

[JWB]

QUOTE(JWB @ Sun 21 Oct 2007 1906)

I never thought it possible to clear the boot in Jan 1944. I never wrote any such thing. Thank you for misquoting me again.

 

 

But that is exactly what your statement says.

 

QUOTE(JWB @ Tue 16 Oct 2007 1838)

Had the Allies destroyed the Axis in Italy it would have been possible to march into Austria. That destruction could have been accomplished back in January 1944.

 

Nowhere in that statement could anybody with have a brain cell take that to mean the Allies marching into Austria in January. Nowhere does that statement say "march into Austria in January 1944". There are two different sentences. The first complements the second.

 

Brilliant riposte. You bring a whole new meaning to the old saw that "ignorance is bliss."

 

Official Munitions Production of the United States: by Months, July 1, 1940 - August 31, 1945, Initiated and Prepared by the U.S. War Production Board, J.A. Krug, Chairman, Program and Statistics Bureau, Bertrand Fox, Director. From data submitted by the War Procurement Agencies under standards established by the Advisory Committee on Official Production Statistic. Completed by the Civilian Production Administration, John C. Houston, Jr., Commissioner, Bureau of Demobilization, David Novick, Director. Issued May 1, 1947

 

The reason I say "so what" is because you are using government statisics which are rarely reliable. The government had lost dozens of armored vehicles, aircraft and multitudes of other items including VX shells in the past. US Army has little idea how many fought in the BIC theatre. So why should I trust this?

 

As for the rest take it up with Ballantine.

[Rich]

The reason I say "so what" is because you are using government statisics which are rarely reliable. The government had lost dozens of armored vehicles, aircraft and multitudes of other items including VX shells in the past. US Army has little idea how many fought in the BIC theatre. So why should I trust this?

 

Hm, things generally "get lost" after they exist....and although "government statistics" may be more or less reliable than any other statistics, in a democracy they are at least theoretically accountable, except with regards to "black" projects and budgets, except that none of these in question were (even the numbers of gas shells for the different artillery produced are recorded, although not the production amounts or types of filler manufactured for them - that was a secret that tended to get "lost").

 

As for the rest take it up with Ballantine.

 

Another brilliant riposte that furthers the discussion no end.

 

You may want to note that what Hogg described is quite obviously the smoking operation that attempted to conceal operations in the valley and most especially the bridging operation south of Sant Angelo, I suspect the "135,000 155mm WP rounds" may actuallu be the total number of all CS rounds fired along the Fifth and Eighth Army front, which, given that the total fired in the six days was over 1.5-million isn't really unusual.

 

And yes, the tactic was successful, if not as perfect as is made out. Nor was it especially innovative or "battle winning" as you imputed, similar tactics were attempted in the earlier battles, but failed not because of the absence or presence of the smoke, but because of other factors. For one thing, in the first battle the fall and winter rains had left much of the approaches to the Rapido waterlogged and impassable to engineering vehicles, so all boats and bridge materials had to be carried forward by hand, slowly, over nearly a mile of exposed ground. Worse, the river itself was so swollen that working on the banks tended to break them down, causing even more flooding in the area being worked in, and the current made boat and bridge work difficult to near impossible at times. The result was that only two footbridges could be emplaced and one of those partially collapsed almost immediately after it opened after being hit by debris in the current and remained only intermittantly usable, the other was hit by small arms, mortar, and artillery repeatedly as the Germans bombarded the tiny bridgehead it supported and eventually was swept away as the engineers were unable to keep up with the damage.

 

Smoke simply wasn't a panacea any more than any other weapon or tactic.

Edited October 22, 2007 by Rich

[Rich]

QUOTE(JWB @ Tue 16 Oct 2007 1838)

Had the Allies destroyed the Axis in Italy it would have been possible to march into Austria. That destruction could have been accomplished back in January 1944.

 

Nowhere in that statement could anybody with have a brain cell take that to mean the Allies marching into Austria in January. Nowhere does that statement say "march into Austria in January 1944". There are two different sentences. The first complements the second.

 

Coherence and logic simply aren't your strong suites are they?

 

Yes indeed, the first "complements" the second, the first stating that the prerequisite for the ability of the Allies to "march into Austria" was the destruction of the Axis in Italy (timeframe indeterminant). The second states that prerequisite could have been acheived in "January 1944" (timeframe determined). Logically they are two sentences that complement one another.

[JWB]

As for the rest take it up with Ballantine

Another brilliant riposte that furthers the discussion no end.

Yes well I was running out of time and should have elaborated instead of being terse.

 

The refs to Parker, Neillands, and D’Este is simply another example of cherry picking data to fit a position. But here is something I would like you to explain:

 

D’Este, p. 330-331, “Alexander believed he would need a three-to-one infantry superiority, which was the accepted norm in World War II, to successfully break the Gustav Line. The Allies could only muster a maximum twenty-eight divisions in central Italy, leaving their numerical superiority over the Germans at a slender one and one-quarter to one.”

As I recall you calculated the Allies have some 3.42 to 1 advantage.

 

This is also widely mentioned by 4th Division participants and by Maloney, the "fog and smoke" was blamed for the confusion that prevented the division from seizing its objectives on the night of 11/12 May

A prime example of command incompetency. Smoke is to be used during the day. The night provides its own cover.

 

What part of that matches your rather confused claim that,

 

DIADEM worked because it was across a wide enough front and made use of far greater amounts of screening smoke. Victory in WW2 was achieved by wide front offensives against confused defenders

 

Actually it wasn't confused, just incomplete. It should have been

"DIADEM worked because it was across a wide enough front and made use of far greater amounts of screening smoke. Victory in WW2 was achieved by simultaneous offensives across against confused defenders." In the first assault X corps attacked 17 Jan then II 20 Jan then II corps tries again Jan 24 .....

 

 

In that period the US II Corps expended a grand total of 40,531 155mm howitzer and 5,650 155mm gun round of all kinds from a total of eight howitzer and two gun battalions, given that the FEC had about the same number and that the Commonwealth forces only had a few batteries of 155mm guns, and that there simply weren't all that many WP rounds manufactured, I'm still wondering where all those smoke rounds you claim could have come from?

I think you explained that here:

You may want to note that what Hogg described is quite obviously the smoking operation that attempted to conceal operations in the valley and most especially the bridging operation south of Sant Angelo, I suspect the "135,000 155mm WP rounds" may actuallu be the total number of all CS rounds fired along the Fifth and Eighth Army front, which, given that the total fired in the six days was over 1.5-million isn't really unusual.

 

 

Coherence and logic simply aren't your strong suites are they?

 

Comprehension isn't yours.

[Rich]

Yes well I was running out of time and should have elaborated instead of being terse.

 

Fair enough.

 

The refs to Parker, Neillands, and D’Este is simply another example of cherry picking data to fit a position.

Er, pulling a single, somewhat incomplete, reference from a single source and expanding it as a general doctrinal asumption isn't "cherry picking"?

 

But here is something I would like you to explain:

 

As I recall you calculated the Allies have some 3.42 to 1 advantage.

 

Sure, happy to.

 

1) One figure and ratio is based upon total personnel strength, whereas Alexander was talking about "infantry" strength. Apples and oranges.

2) The Germans were a tougher nut than Alexander imagined.

 

To expand on 1). briefly, in January in II Corps both the 34th and 36th Division were exhausted and rifle company strength was low in many battalions or had just been made up by fresh replacements. In X Corps the 46th and 56th Division were in even worse shape and it seems lekely they had lost there edge as far back as the Volturno battles in October; for them reinforcements were becoming few and far between. But the opposite held true in May, in II Corps the 84th and 88th Division were fresh, as was the FEC, the XIII Corps had been only lightly engaged since January, and the Poles, although small divisons, were also fresh. So instead of the infantry of some 36 fought-out battalions, there were some 79 fresh battalions, not including the Goums and the 1eme Division of the FEC.

 

A prime example of command incompetency. Smoke is to be used during the day. The night provides its own cover.

Wait a minute! Either the plan was genius and won the battle partly because of the use of smoke as you maintained earlier or the use of smoke was screwed up; which was it? I don't think you can have it both ways?

 

Seriously, I think you misunderstood the quote and the circumstances, the confusion that night was caused by a combination of "smoke" and fog. The fog was natural, while the "smoke" was a combination of things, the dust and smoke created by the massive HE bombardment and smoke rounds fired by the Germans to add to the confusion. None of which can be blamed on command incompetency.

 

Actually it wasn't confused, just incomplete. It should have been

"DIADEM worked because it was across a wide enough front and made use of far greater amounts of screening smoke. Victory in WW2 was achieved by simultaneous offensives across against confused defenders." In the first assault X corps attacked 17 Jan then II 20 Jan then II corps tries again Jan 24 .....

 

Again, you miss the simple fact that the "front" was effectively the same in January and May, what changed was the concentration on that front. And, yes, the coordination of multi-corps offensives was something it took the Allies some time to learn, but in all fairness that was partially driven by the enormous logistical requirements a doctrinal Allied (especially Commonwealth) corps offensive required, especially with regards to artillery ammunition, and all that having to be shipped into theater. And yes, in January too much use was made of phased timing, but the assumption of course was that the timing from the coast inland would draw in German reserves away from Anzio-Nettuno, which was horribly flawed reasoning since they never figured on what would happen if the attacks were so uncoordinated and/or unsuccessful as a result that they failed to draw in any German reserves. That lesson at least was learned in the May plan, were Alexander rightly insisted that the Garigliano-Rapido front attack open the night of the 9th (albeit still phased west to east by some hours) well before BUFFALO began on the 23rd. OTOH it did give too much latitude for Clark then to claim that the 10. Armee had "gotten away" so that he could turn his attention to Rome.

 

I think you explained that here:

What I "explained" was that the use of smoke in DIADEM (probably some 135,000 rounds of all calibers out of over 1.5-million expended, so less than 9 percent) was pretty much doctrinal in terms of numbers expended and how they were used (I have yet to find an actual report from the Allied Tac Air Forces that describes using "medium bombers" on targets designated by smoke as you claimed Sun 21 Oct 2007 0716). US Army CS companies regularly used generator trucks to screen river assaults and bridging operations, they were part of the plan in January as well, as were CS artillery rounds, but they simply didn't work very well because of the weather conditions; cold, damp, and windy are not conditions that facilitate smoking operations.

 

Comprehension isn't yours.

 

Let's see, so far you failed to comprehend that Clark was not commanding at 2nd and 3rd Cassino, that the use of smoke in 4th Cassino was not really terribly innovative or even decisive, that the Allied strengths and capabilities in January 1944 were not the same as they were in May 1994, that Alexander was addressing a 3-to-1 ratio of infantry not total personnel strength, that the width of front for the 1st offensive in January was not really different from that of the 4th offensive in May, and....

[JWB]

Rich Posted Wed 24 Oct 2007 1534

Er, pulling a single, somewhat incomplete, reference from a single source and expanding it as a general doctrinal asumption isn't "cherry picking"?

So that makes us even.

 

"fog and smoke" was blamed for the confusion that prevented the division from seizing its objectives on the night

It would have helped if the quote you provided had mentioned the smoke being deployed was German.

 

Again, you miss the simple fact that the "front" was effectively the same in January and May

No there was no front in January. There were three fronts.

 

And, yes, the coordination of multi-corps offensives was something it took the Allies some time to learn

 

That was something they should already have known.

 

That lesson at least was learned in the May plan, were Alexander rightly insisted that the Garigliano-Rapido front attack open the night of the 9th (albeit still phased west to east by some hours) well before BUFFALO began on the 23rd. OTOH it did give too much latitude for Clark then to claim that the 10. Armee had "gotten away" so that he could turn his attention to Rome.

Bingo!

 

Let's see, so far you failed to comprehend that Clark was not commanding at 2nd and 3rd Cassino, that the use of smoke in 4th Cassino was not really terribly innovative or even decisive, that the Allied strengths and capabilities in January 1944 were not the same as they were in May 1994, that Alexander was addressing a 3-to-1 ratio of infantry not total personnel strength, that the width of front for the 1st offensive in January was not really different from that of the 4th offensive in May, and....

 

It took you at least three days to comprehend what I had written in my first post on this particular part of the thread.

 

 

As far as breaking the Gustav line there were other actions that could have been taken. One would have been to land a battalion of Shermans at the beach southeast of Terracina shortly after SHINGLE. They would roll east and attack the Gustav line from behind while the entire Gustav line is attacked by 5thA from the front. Slightly risky as a german unit was deployed several kms east of Terracina. But that force would be looking at Anzio.