The generalship of Mark Clark

[Rich]

Although it is true that Lucas was to some degree the fall guy for mistakes made by Clark and Alexander as well as his own perceived caution during the first few days after the landing, my understanding is that the standard story on Anzio identifies the primary cause of his relief as his uninspiring performance once the beachhead came under heavy German attack.

 

Actually Colin, no, not from what I have found, he pretty much was the fall guy for Clark and Alexander, but he was also pretty much a willing fall guy. His leadership during FISCHFANG was pretty well faultless that I can tell and despite the cracks in the 45th Division and British 1st Division lines that occurred there was always a reserve in position to be committed or artillery available to smash the attack - I'm not sure what more can be asked for in terms of inspiration (the calumny in the Wiki article that he remained in an "underground bunker" during the battle is bovine fecal matter and appears to have conflated Fredendal in Tunisia with Lucas)? But it also left Lucas mentally and physically exhausted. Given that he died of a heart attack just five years later at the age of 59, that is probably an accurate assessment. And although he himself felt surprised at the relief, it is also telling that he made no effort to protest it at all.

 

Note that Lemnitzer and Clark both firmly believed that Alexander's initiative requesting the relief was due to the belief that Lucas was worn out from the strain of the three weeks unrelenting combat in the beachhead. Probably the most dispassionate analysis of the release and possible "failure" at Anzio is Martin Blumenson http://www.army.mil/CMH/books/70-7_13.htm

[Rich]

He also assumed that any German divisional pin on a map of France was a full-strength well-trained division. For example, his reports credited the 17th SS PzGr division with 260 tanks before OVERLORD.

 

Er, King, do you have a hard reference for that claim? Because the document that he would have been quoting from was the ULTRA strategic assessment, which says nothing of the sort - I can look up the actual tank strength given if you like. But the problem inthis case - unlike the shipping claim - is that the same assessment was also very well known to all the other BIGOTed officers reading that same ULTRA report. So something sounds truly fishy to me here.

[Colin Williams]

Actually Colin, no, not from what I have found, he pretty much was the fall guy for Clark and Alexander, but he was also pretty much a willing fall guy. His leadership during FISCHFANG was pretty well faultless that I can tell and despite the cracks in the 45th Division and British 1st Division lines that occurred there was always a reserve in position to be committed or artillery available to smash the attack - I'm not sure what more can be asked for in terms of inspiration (the calumny in the Wiki article that he remained in an "underground bunker" during the battle is bovine fecal matter and appears to have conflated Fredendal in Tunisia with Lucas)? But it also left Lucas mentally and physically exhausted. Given that he died of a heart attack just five years later at the age of 59, that is probably an accurate assessment. And although he himself felt surprised at the relief, it is also telling that he made no effort to protest it at all.

 

Note that Lemnitzer and Clark both firmly believed that Alexander's initiative requesting the relief was due to the belief that Lucas was worn out from the strain of the three weeks unrelenting combat in the beachhead. Probably the most dispassionate analysis of the release and possible "failure" at Anzio is Martin Blumenson http://www.army.mil/CMH/books/70-7_13.htm

 

Rich,

 

I should have been clearer with my "uninspiring" comment, as I certainly include the physical and mental exhaustion in that category (and was thinking in part of Blumenson's work at the time). The exhaustion wasn't the whole story, however. Bidwell and Graham highlight some of the problems - "By February 20 the 6th Corps had won a decisive defensive victory... The divisional commanders, concerned only with winning the battle and not rivalry, acted together. In fact they were forced to by a total lack of grip shown by Corps HQ. It is not the way to run a battle, but Truscott, Harmon, Templer and Penney assisted by Evelegh...seemed to have run the defence and counter-attack against FISCHFANG as a sort of syndicate...Lucas' reward for successfully steering a course between military realities and the conflicting wishes, vaguely expressed, of his masters was the sack. This 'solemn, grey-haired man who smoked a corn-cob pipe and looked older and smaller than he actually was' had preferred to wait for the enemy, for he was a counter-puncher by temperament. His diary reveals how he kept his force well-balanced, his reserve intact and his logistics tidy. In February he had counter-punched to some purpose and had won a defensive battle. However, this was not the whole story. That he lacked charisma was not his fault, but that he seldom visted the front, and that his staff remained entombed in an underground HQ...was his own choice. His divisional commanders all complained that they were never given adequate information about current operations, the enemy or Lucas' future intentions. They had carried him to victory. Left to himself he would have hesitated totally to commit his armour to the clinching counter-stroke. He had to go."

 

My take is that Lucas was a decent corps commander placed in circumstances that required a first-rate corps commander. If he had stayed with II Corps or found a similar appointment in NW Europe, he may have been remembered as a competent general.

[Rich]

Rich,

 

I should have been clearer with my "uninspiring" comment, as I certainly include the physical and mental exhaustion in that category (and was thinking in part of Blumenson's work at the time). The exhaustion wasn't the whole story, however. Bidwell and Graham highlight some of the problems - "By February 20 the 6th Corps had won a decisive defensive victory... The divisional commanders, concerned only with winning the battle and not rivalry, acted together. In fact they were forced to by a total lack of grip shown by Corps HQ. It is not the way to run a battle, but Truscott, Harmon, Templer and Penney assisted by Evelegh...seemed to have run the defence and counter-attack against FISCHFANG as a sort of syndicate...Lucas' reward for successfully steering a course between military realities and the conflicting wishes, vaguely expressed, of his masters was the sack. This 'solemn, grey-haired man who smoked a corn-cob pipe and looked older and smaller than he actually was' had preferred to wait for the enemy, for he was a counter-puncher by temperament. His diary reveals how he kept his force well-balanced, his reserve intact and his logistics tidy. In February he had counter-punched to some purpose and had won a defensive battle. However, this was not the whole story. That he lacked charisma was not his fault, but that he seldom visted the front, and that his staff remained entombed in an underground HQ...was his own choice. His divisional commanders all complained that they were never given adequate information about current operations, the enemy or Lucas' future intentions. They had carried him to victory. Left to himself he would have hesitated totally to commit his armour to the clinching counter-stroke. He had to go."

 

My take is that Lucas was a decent corps commander placed in circumstances that required a first-rate corps commander. If he had stayed with II Corps or found a similar appointment in NW Europe, he may have been remembered as a competent general.

 

Hi Colin, unfortunately, and with all due respect to Bidwell and Grahame, but that entire passage appears to be unmitigated nonsense and has no actual correspondence that I can see with any of the actual events? For one thing by 20 February there was absolutely zero evidence that FISCHFANG had run it's course and every bit of evidence that it hadn't, declaring it a decisive victory is totally ex post facto. I am further more than a bit curious to find out which headquarters at Anzio weren't "entombed in an underground HQ"? It was more than a bit the nature of the beast. Finally, I must say that there is no real evidence that I have found that indicate that a syndicate of generals ran the defense and am curious how the most important of the generals directly engaged in the defense - O'Daniel - did not get included in the laundry list of everybody that was important, while Truscott and Evelegh and to a lesser extent Penney, who had virtually no role whatsoever do?

[Colin Williams]

Hi Colin, unfortunately, and with all due respect to Bidwell and Grahame, but that entire passage appears to be unmitigated nonsense and has no actual correspondence that I can see with any of the actual events? For one thing by 20 February there was absolutely zero evidence that FISCHFANG had run it's course and every bit of evidence that it hadn't, declaring it a decisive victory is totally ex post facto.

 

I'll just focus on this for now and look into the rest later. The quote I gave doesn't say anything about anyone at the time recognizing the end of FISCHFANG on the 20th of February. Why would you interpret it that way? Of course it's ex post facto, but that's why it's called "history". For example here is a similar quote from a historian I know (see if you can guess who it is) about the same battle -

 

"But by that time the entire 45th Division and CCB/1st AD had landed and closed in the beachhead perimeter, so the prospects of ictory for the Germans was remote by that point, whatever their local success and their main attack 'Fischfang' on 14 February ended as a complete failure."

 

Is he suggesting that Lucas and company knew (or should have known) that the chances of German success were remote even before FISCHFANG? No, he is giving that judgement in retrospect.

[Rich]

I'll just focus on this for now and look into the rest later. The quote I gave doesn't say anything about anyone at the time recognizing the end of FISCHFANG on the 20th of February. Why would you interpret it that way? Of course it's ex post facto, but that's why it's called "history". For example here is a similar quote from a historian I know (see if you can guess who it is) about the same battle -

 

The implication by Bidwell and Grahame as it is written is that Lucas was somehow remiss in not knowing that by 20 February the Germans had been decisively defeated, which would have been a real surprise if "known" to the 3rd Division when hit by "FISCHFANG II" 28 February-3 March, which was the final quietus to the German effort.

 

Bidwell and Graham highlight some of the problems - "By February 20 the 6th Corps had won a decisive defensive victory... The divisional commanders, concerned only with winning the battle and not rivalry, acted together. In fact they were forced to by a total lack of grip shown by Corps HQ.

"But by that time the entire 45th Division and CCB/1st AD had landed and closed in the beachhead perimeter, so the prospects of ictory for the Germans was remote by that point, whatever their local success and their main attack 'Fischfang' on 14 February ended as a complete failure."

 

Yep.

 

Is he suggesting that Lucas and company knew (or should have known) that the chances of German success were remote even before FISCHFANG? No, he is giving that judgement in retrospect.

 

Yes, but the sensible efforts to ensure the security of the bridgehead are not presented as the tag-end of a comment about "some of the problems" either. I will grant you it's nuance, but it sort of goes along with the rest AFAICS, no substance, just implication.

[Old Tanker]

Hi Colin, unfortunately, and with all due respect to Bidwell and Grahame, but that entire passage appears to be unmitigated nonsense and has no actual correspondence that I can see with any of the actual events? For one thing by 20 February there was absolutely zero evidence that FISCHFANG had run it's course and every bit of evidence that it hadn't, declaring it a decisive victory is totally ex post facto. I am further more than a bit curious to find out which headquarters at Anzio weren't "entombed in an underground HQ"? It was more than a bit the nature of the beast. Finally, I must say that there is no real evidence that I have found that indicate that a syndicate of generals ran the defense and am curious how the most important of the generals directly engaged in the defense - O'Daniel - did not get included in the laundry list of everybody that was important, while Truscott and Evelegh and to a lesser extent Penney, who had virtually no role whatsoever do?

 

Wasn't Truscott the co. of the 3rd Herd until he replaced Lucas and that's when Iron Mike O'Daniel took over the 3rd ?

[baboon6]

Wasn't Truscott the co. of the 3rd Herd until he replaced Lucas and that's when Iron Mike O'Daniel took over the 3rd ?

 

Yes. O'Daniel was assistant commander of 3rd ID until then.

[JWB]

Rich your post #51 is as accurate as it is irrelevant. The 5th Army had enough of a force advantage to break the Gustav line in Jan 1944. I don't remember off the top of my head what the opposing forces sizes were. But I do know the Allies had a real advantage. AFA smoke I refer you to Barrage by Hogg. Or........

 

Smoke was begun May 12 and ended May 17. 135,000 155mm WP shells were expended and 1,800 tons of fuel oil was burned in smoke machines.

[Rich]

Rich your post #51 is as accurate as it is irrelevant. The 5th Army had enough of a force advantage to break the Gustav line in Jan 1944. I don't remember off the top of my head what the opposing forces sizes were. But I do know the Allies had a real advantage. AFA smoke I refer you to Barrage by Hogg. Or........

 

Smoke was begun May 12 and ended May 17. 135,000 155mm WP shells were expended and 1,800 tons of fuel oil was burned in smoke machines.

 

Oh dear, you "don't remember off the top of your head"? I suppose then I'll have to do it for you? Good project I suppose, let's see what the results are for the forces and the frontages, which were the other part of your magic formula?

 

I'll see what I can find on the ammunition expenditure too, that should be entertaining.

[JWB]

OK, in the Casino sector 5thA had about 105,000 men and Heer had about 80,000.

[Rich]

OK, in the Casino sector 5thA had about 105,000 men and Heer had about 80,000.

 

Well, I thought I had posted a reply already?

 

Always important when stating information like this....when?

 

As of 21 January 1944 the deployments were approximately thus:

 

Fifth Army - 215,895, Germans ~ 85,000, front ~ 56 kilometers

VI Corps - 48,899, Germans (end of month, including troops drawn from the Fifth and Eighth Army front as well as HG C reserves) ~ 55,000, front ~ 40 kilometers

Eighth Army - 169,886, Germans 42,214, front ~ 75 kilometers

 

As of 11 May it was:

Fifth Army - 263,056, Germans ~ 40,000, front ~ 28 kilometers

VI Corps (22 May) - 114,011, Germans ~ 113,000, front ~ 40 kilometers

Eighth Army - 289,485, Germans 79,687, front ~ 120 kilometers

 

Note that a major factor facilitating the success of BUFFALO in May was that DIADEM's success resulted in the Germans transferring a large part of their amor strength from 14. Armee to 10. Armee, going from 351 tanks as of 1 May to 167 as of 23 May (VI Corps had 777 and 774 respectively, including 192 light tanks in both instances).

 

An intangible though is the 60,000-odd German reinforcements from out of theater that SHINGLE generated by mid February, as is the simple fact that in January the Garigliano-Rapido line had not yet been effectively breached; the jumpoff line for January and May are significantly less favorable for the Allies.

 

So, all in all the real alternatives (deleting SHINGLE) appear to be:

 

January - Allies 434,680, Germans 127,214, front 131 kilometers

May - Allies 666,552, Germans 119,687, front 148 kilometers

 

So 3.42:1 versus 5.56:1

 

Now, it is possible to assume that Eighth Army could have extended it's front in January to say 103 kilometers to facilitate a similar concentration by Fifth Army as acheived in May, but I think that unlikely given the thinness that would have resulted in their line.

 

That's why I doubt that the methods that succeeded in May could have been done in January.

 

All in all an enjoyable exploration, I'll be happy to continue the discussion if you like. I'll try to revisit the ammunition question next week, I don't think I'll have time this weekend, hope you don't mind.

[JWB]

Now, it is possible to assume that Eighth Army could have extended it's front in January to say 103 kilometers to facilitate a similar concentration by Fifth Army as acheived in May, but I think that unlikely given the thinness that would have resulted in their line.

That so called "thinness" is not thin at all. "Eighth Army - 169,886, Germans 42,214, front ~ 75 kilometers"

3.42 to 1 force ratio is an overhelming advantage that should guarantee victory - if the men in charge don't f*ck up things. I blame the failure of the 3 separate assaults on Clark's megalomania and success on the fourth because Clark was disciplined into doing the right things.

Edited October 20, 2007 by JWB

[KingSargent]

Ah, so basically you have put your own spin on words taken, probably out of context, from his diary and the accusation of him faking figures comes from the fact that no-one has found their source. Sorry King, you'll have to try a bit harder than that, as it doesn't stack up to personal cowardice or deliberate misrepresentation from where I'm sitting.

 

BillB

Have YOU waded through the frigging thing? Put his words "in context" then. Show where there was ANY effort on his part to sort things out or follow any orders except "Run Like Hell." I'm not saying him trying would have done much good under the circumstances, but we'll never know, because he DID NOT TRY. He was ordered to and did not.

 

No the faking German strength figures comes from the fact that his statements of German division strength changed within the same conversation. If he knew, why couldn't he keep them straight?

 

As for the shipping figures, isn't it a bit strange that no one has found anything to support AB's assertions in 60+ years? And people with a lot more credentials than me have tried and failed or make the same complaint (Wilmott IIRC).

 

I feel about AB like you feel about Boy Browning, okay? AB was, however, in a position to do a lot more damage.

[KingSargent]

Er, King, do you have a hard reference for that claim? Because the document that he would have been quoting from was the ULTRA strategic assessment, which says nothing of the sort - I can look up the actual tank strength given if you like. But the problem inthis case - unlike the shipping claim - is that the same assessment was also very well known to all the other BIGOTed officers reading that same ULTRA report. So something sounds truly fishy to me here.

My point exactly. AB made it up.

[KingSargent]

Rich your post #51 is as accurate as it is irrelevant. The 5th Army had enough of a force advantage to break the Gustav line in Jan 1944. I don't remember off the top of my head what the opposing forces sizes were. But I do know the Allies had a real advantage. AFA smoke I refer you to Barrage by Hogg. Or........

 

Smoke was begun May 12 and ended May 17. 135,000 155mm WP shells were expended and 1,800 tons of fuel oil was burned in smoke machines.

And how many of those smoke shells and generators were in Italy in January 1944?

 

How many troops were down with trench foot in the mountains? How many were getting adequate rations?

 

How many large Italian ports were open? How many of the cardboard pieces on your Anzio game had food, warm clothes and ammunition?

[BillB]

Have YOU waded through the frigging thing? Put his words "in context" then. Show where there was ANY effort on his part to sort things out or follow any orders except "Run Like Hell." I'm not saying him trying would have done much good under the circumstances, but we'll never know, because he DID NOT TRY. He was ordered to and did not.

 

No the faking German strength figures comes from the fact that his statements of German division strength changed within the same conversation. If he knew, why couldn't he keep them straight?

 

As for the shipping figures, isn't it a bit strange that no one has found anything to support AB's assertions in 60+ years? And people with a lot more credentials than me have tried and failed or make the same complaint (Wilmott IIRC).

 

I feel about AB like you feel about Boy Browning, okay? AB was, however, in a position to do a lot more damage.

Actually, yes, I did read most of it a few years back when researching my thesis, and I don't remember getting any of the same impression that you are constantly harping on about, which is why I've had the temerity to challenge your constant and quite frankly ridiculously over the top assertions. I'm surprised at you, I hadn't put you down as so much of a hindsight second guesser because you know better. Alanbrooke was there on the ground in France in 1940 and he commanded troops against a fully functioning German force, which was a lot more than most of the folk he was dealing with at Casablanca on all sides I suspect, and cettainly more than you or I. Something to bear in mind before you start throwing accusations of being shit scared, whining like a bitch etc etc.

 

Regarding that, let's just review the thing shall we. If Alanbrooke 's performance in France pre and post Dunkirk really was as you characterise it, then why was he selected to command UK Home Forces in preparation for the expected German invasion? And I've reviewd the official documantation for that period, and there is nary a sign of Alanbrooke lacking the stomach for a fight. On the contrary he did a very good job of preoaring to fight the Germans and actually of fighting his corner in Whitehall to get what he needed done. Furthermore, Montgomery was one of his subordinate div commanders (3rd Div), and he didn't hide his light under a bushel when it came to criticising his superiors but I'm unaware of him going after Alanbrooke. More to the point, Alanbrooke was promoted to CIGS and then head of the CSC. If he was a cowardly and mendacious individual I very much doubt he would have received those promotions in the prevailing circumstances, and given his constant contact with Churchill he wouldn't have lasted very long either given the latter's ruthless attitude when it came to dismissing those he considered incompetent. The fact that he kept Alanbrooke in place despite their numerous disagreements suggests that he was actually very good at his job, which in turn undermines your criticisms/allegations I think. Finally, with regard to these diaries that you keep citing with such faith. First off, which version are you referring to? They were originally written as a private endeavour for his wife, which might explain some of the hyperbolic comments you seem so enmoured with, and the first version was heavily censored before publication in 1957 and 1959; the later 2001 version has also been edited so I'd be a wee bit wary of considering tht the unexpurgated version as well. I talked to someone a while back who was working with the Alanbrooke papers who told me there was a lot more in there than appears in the diaries, and I'm not surprised - I wasn't looking and I found a lot of stuff missing by edit when I compared the originals at Kew with Martin Gilbert's versions in his book on Churchill's war papers.

 

Ref the figs, has anyone (including you) actually seriously looked for them, rather than just pointing out apparent discrepancies that don't chime with peripheral perspectives and/or personal axe grinding? If not then it's not strange at all. What I do find strange, however, is your implicit assumption that Eisenhower and all the other US folk at Casablanca were naive, dopey rubes who were an easy mark for some cowardly British villain to hoodwink. Whereas all the evidence suggests that they were no such thing, and as Rich had pointed out, were privy to a lot of the same info and certainly enough to challenge any such blatant attempt to peddle untruths as you allege Alanbroooke did.

 

Ref the last part, first off, I don't have any feelings toward Browning, I just relayed the evidence I found. That's the key and crucial difference between your attitude to Alanbrooke and my comments regarding Browning - mine are based on solid, verifiable evidence, whereas yours seems to be based on not a lot at all apart from unsupported personal opinion dressed up with a lot of needless invective. I hold no brief for Alanbrooke one way or the other, so if you can show me some actual verifiable evidence to support your allegations and assertions then I'm quite happy to take them on board, but without it then sorry, no sale. As for the last sentence, see para 2 above, and again, lets see some evidence of him actually causing any damage, or indeed acting in a self-promoting manner that led directly to a lot of people getting killed and turned a major operation into a failure. Otherwise the comparison is null and void.

 

BillB

[BillB]

My point exactly. AB made it up.

No, not your point exactly. If I understand him correctly, Rich is saying that it would be impossible for Alanbrooke to "make things up" because the Americans at Casablanca were privy to the same info & sources and would therefore have been able to spot any porkies as a result. Which knocks a bit of a hole in your insistance that Alanbrooke was able to hoodwink the naive Yanks, I think.

 

BillB

[Rich]

No, not your point exactly. If I understand him correctly, Rich is saying that it would be impossible for Alanbrooke to "make things up" because the Americans at Casablanca were privy to the same info & sources and would therefore have been able to spot any porkies as a result. Which knocks a bit of a hole in your insistance that Alanbrooke was able to hoodwink the naive Yanks, I think.

 

BillB

 

I just have a second for a reply, so I hope this makes sense.

 

King stated that Brook claimed XXX tanks for 17. Panzergrenadier prior to D-Day. Since the division wasn't formed until February 1944 this has nothing to do with Casablanca. But, ULTRA developed the first report of it's strength on 25 May 1944 from a 19 May intercept, giving it - quite accurately - as 42 StuG and zero "tanks" with no tanks en route and none expected.

 

So that was my question to King, when did Brook supposedly make this comment and what was the number he supposedly claimed? If he made it prior to 25 May then everyone he made it to that was BIGOTed would have received the same info and must have wondered - and asked - where he got his info? But beyond that, the ULTRA comfirmations for the tank strength in Ob. West was fragmentary at best.

 

12. SS - tank strength was contained in a 20 April and 19 May intercept, but only the 19 May intercept was completely decrypted prior to D-Day, on 25 May (this same decrypt included similar data on 17. SS, 1. SS., 116. Panzer and 2. SS).

21. Pz.D. - no information on tank or personnel strength were known prior to D-Day, it was assumed, mostly from its position and lineage, to be one of the strongest formations in France. It wasn't until 7 June that a decrypt of a 5 May report was identified as being that of 21. Panzer.

Lehr - no information on tank or personnel strength were known prior to D-Day, but it was also assumed to be strong.

17. SS - see above, information from the 20 April intercept wasn't decrypted until long after D-Day.

2. Panzer - no information on tank or personnel strength were known prior to D-Day, worse, decrypts regarding it prior to D-Day were often confused with 2. SS, reducing its value.

1. SS - tank strength from intercept of 19 May, decrypted 25 May.

116. Panzer - tank strength from intercept of 19 May, decrypted 25 May.

9. Panzer - tank strength was only found long after D-Day in a previously undecrypted portion of the 20 April intercept.

11. Panzer - tank strength was only found long after D-Day in a previously undecrypted portion of the 19 May intercept.

2. SS - strength reports were intercepted 20 April and 19 May and decrypted on 29 April and 11 June respectively (this was the same decrypt that included 17. SS, 1. SS., 116. Panzer and 12. SS, but it wasn't clear 2. SS was meant until 11 June).

 

 

Given all that, I doubt Brook would have attempted to "fool" anyone, the fact that so little was actually known about German tank strengths was well known to all BIGOT personnel.

[Rich]

That so called "thinness" is not thin at all. "Eighth Army - 169,886, Germans 42,214, front ~ 75 kilometers"

3.42 to 1 force ratio is an overhelming advantage that should guarantee victory - if the men in charge don't f*ck up things. I blame the failure of the 3 separate assaults on Clark's megalomania and success on the fourth because Clark was disciplined into doing the right things.

 

Nonesense. And what in Gods name does Clark's "megalomania" have to do with deployments of British Eighth Army? Or the failures of assaults directed by 15th Army Group? The successful May assaults were possible because the German line remained the same - with considerable distractions, primarily armor, to Anzio - while the Allies gained sufficient increases of strength to permit the concentration that was required. Note that with the exception of Eighth Army operations in the Liri, the rest of the nearly 90 kilometers of Eighth Army front were also quiescent, because concentration had also been effected on the Liri positions, that is, in May the Eighth Army maintaining that 75-90 kilometer front were essentially the same as they had been in January.

 

I'll try to revisit this later, gotta run.

Edited October 20, 2007 by Rich

[JWB]

Rich Posted Sat 20 Oct 2007 1435

And what in Gods name does Clark's "megalomania" have to do with deployments of British Eighth Army?

Where in Sam Hill did I ever write anything like that at all? You need to learn to read!

 

..while the Allies gained sufficient increases of strength...

 

Those increases in strength would have resulted in increased Allied casualties and another failed offensive without the screening operation.

[JWB]

And how many of those smoke shells and generators were in Italy in January 1944?

Enough. The smoking op consumed about 100tons of WP shells per division-day. 6,000 tons total. That is a relatively small logistical issue considering the Allies were firing more HE than that. The plan for SHINGLE had been in the works many weeks. Clark sholud have simply got on the horn and requested WP and foggers from everywhere he could get it.

How many troops were down with trench foot in the mountains? How many were getting adequate rations?

How many troops were in fighting condition?

How many large Italian ports were open? How many of the cardboard pieces on your Anzio game had food, warm clothes and ammunition?That goes to your question above. Clark's attack in Jan. had far more Allied troops than did Kesselring. In fact the Allies suffered nearly triple the casualties suffered by the Axis. Hell's fire, Allied casualties were almost two-thirds the total Axis strength in the sector! Clearly there were no shortages of Allied able bodies.

[KingSargent]

No, not your point exactly. If I understand him correctly, Rich is saying that it would be impossible for Alanbrooke to "make things up" because the Americans at Casablanca were privy to the same info & sources and would therefore have been able to spot any porkies as a result. Which knocks a bit of a hole in your insistance that Alanbrooke was able to hoodwink the naive Yanks, I think.

 

BillB

The Yanks at Casablanca were privy to exactly what the British told them.

 

The Yanks at Casablanca were there to finalize plans for the 1943 invasion of France that had been agreed to by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. AlanBrooke and his contingent were there to scuttle it and came prepared with all sorts of presentations that the Americans couldn't refute. Whenever somebody said "That's bullshit," AB would open another folder that nobody else could review and spout off. In the course of this spouting off, he contributed at least three different divisional totals for German troops in France. At least two of his "unequivocal facts" had to be wrong.

 

AB did not say anything about the 17th SS at Casablanca, obviously. But he was CIGS until 1945 and had plenty of other chances to lie. IIRC the 260-tank figure was in an "appreciation" of German units that could respond immediately to a landing (besides being weaker than advertised, it obviously wasn't capable of rapid response either) that was passed to 21st AG. Also, bear in mind that ULTRA data was highly restricted. The people in a position to spot "inconsistencies" were few. The people senior enough to call "FOUL!!" were fewer, and constrained by "Allied harmony."

[KingSargent]

*

And how many of those smoke shells and generators were in Italy in January 1944?

Enough. The smoking op consumed about 100tons of WP shells per division-day. 6,000 tons total. That is a relatively small logistical issue considering the Allies were firing more HE than that. Perhaps because the HE was available? The plan for SHINGLE had been in the works many weeks. Clark sholud have simply got on the horn and requested WP and foggers from everywhere he could get it.

And where was he going to call them from? He was a bit low on the totem pole to order supply allocation changes. And just how long do you think it takes to get a request through and get it filled? The Brits wouldn't have huge stocks of WP or Smoke in US calibers, which meant if Clark wanted any it had to come from CONUS. Actually from January to May is about the time it would take to get an order for masses of ammo filled.

 

How many troops were down with trench foot in the mountains? How many were getting adequate rations?

How many troops were in fighting condition?

According to you, everyone. With plenty of winter gear, ammo, and rations too.

 

How many large Italian ports were open? How many of the cardboard pieces on your Anzio game had food, warm clothes and ammunition?

That goes to your question above. Clark's attack in Jan. had far more Allied troops than did Kesselring. In fact the Allies suffered nearly triple the casualties suffered by the Axis. Hell's fire, Allied casualties were almost two-thirds the total Axis strength in the sector! Clearly there were no shortages of Allied able bodies.

And clearly they were not able to to do the job with what they had available. So where do you get off saying they should have been all the way up the boot in January?

[Rich]

Where in Sam Hill did I ever write anything like that at all? You need to learn to read!

 

Pot to Kettle, Black, I say again, Black.

 

That so called "thinness" is not thin at all. "Eighth Army - 169,886, Germans 42,214, front ~ 75 kilometers"

3.42 to 1 force ratio is an overhelming advantage that should guarantee victory - if the men in charge don't f*ck up things. I blame the failure of the 3 separate assaults on Clark's megalomania and success on the fourth because Clark was disciplined into doing the right things.

 

Eighth Army - men in charge - blame the failure of 3 assaults on Clark's megalomania.

 

Clark was responsible for the "1st Battle" of Cassino, the "2nd Battle" was Operation AVENGER and was assigned to the New Zealand Corps of Eighth Army, the "3rd Battle" was also an Eighth Army affair, as was the "4th Battle," which was the primary Eighth Army role in DIADEM. Clark and Fifth had no responsibility for the 2nd or 3rd Battle, other than in a supporting role. At that time the "army" consisted of II Corps of two divisions (both badly battered in the 1st Battle)and the FEC, which was still forming (one division was fully operational in late November, early December, a second in January, and the third in February March). The result was that Fifth Army essentially sat out the 2nd and 3rd Battle while reconstituting and bringing in reinforcements.

 

I cannot help it if you can't write clearly enough so that your train of thought can be followed. From the structure of your statement it appeared you believed Clark was responsible for the "failure of 3 separate assaults"....wait, that's your quote....so what the heck do you think you meant? I count one.

 

Those increases in strength would have resulted in increased Allied casualties and another failed offensive without the screening operation.

 

I'll reserve judgment on that until I can dig a bit more thoroughly in the claims you made. So far I can say I'm a bit suspicious regarding the claim you made that "Smoke was begun May 12 and ended May 17. 135,000 155mm WP shells were expended" given that only 499,000 WP M110 CS rounds were manufactured for the M1 155mm Howitzer for the entire war (and only 26,000 prior to May 1944)? Another 642,000 rounds of WP Mk IIA1 and M105 were manufactured for the M1917-18 155mm Howitzer (all but 4,000 prior to March 43), but those were almost entirely out of service by DIADEM in Fifth Army. And there were 175,000 rounds of WP M104 manufactured for the M1 155mm Gun, but only 58,000 prior to May 44.

 

So did Fifth Army really expend nearly one-fifth of all 155mm WP ammunition production for the war to date in five days of firing during DIADEM? Not to mention I'm not sure that all 155mm rounds expended by Fifth Army during those five days cam close to "135,000" rounds?

 

Gotta run again.

Edited October 20, 2007 by Rich