The generalship of Mark Clark

[Rich]

The Dieppe Raid forecast the extreme difficulty of invading northern France.

There is a Conspiracy Theory that Dieppe was deliberately FUBARed to create that impression. If the mistakes were not deliberate, then the IGS was more incompetent than the Iraqi staff in 2003.

 

Er, I hate to rain on your parade Sarge, but 99 percent of all conspiracy theories are crap.

 

And I'm not sure that Dieppe did anything of the sort? The old saw that it was the difficulties with Dieppe that led to the brilliant adaptations for NEPTUNE is pretty much hogwash too. The concept of the AVRE actually predated JUBILEE and the assumption that the losses at Dieppe "taught" the Allies not to attack heavily fortified ports directly is only partially correct, since they went ahead and directly assaulted the most heavily defended sectors of the beaches in between the ports instead. And I do mean direct assault, every single assaulting battalion was intended to be landed directly opposite the strongest German defenses guarding the principal beach exits on every single beach. All the cases where they did not do so was accidental.

 

Dieppe was ultimately an operation undertaken on a shoestring, by a rump division, and for a short term, but I don't think the Allies actually needed any lessons to teach them that was not a recipe for getting forces ashore and forming a permanent beachhead in France.

[Harry Yeide]

Hi Harry,

 

That is true, but I think it simply illustrates how far out of touch Fifteenth Army Group was as well. The actual order given to Lucas was to to land and “secure the beaches extending north and south of Anzio, for a distance of about six miles in each direction. After securing the initial objectives it was to be prepared to advance across the flat hinterland in the direction of the Colli Laziali (Alban) hill mass which rises to a height of 3,000 feet and controls all routes from the south toward Rome." At least according to Ellis. The key words being "after securing" and "be prepared to advance." And of course George Patton gave his good friend Lucas the famous advice to "not stick your neck out" and Clark himself gave him similar warnings; all three men knew that such an operation was simply incapable of acheiving those results with the forces at hand. The intended line (roughly Ardea-Albano Laziali-Artena-Frosinine-Sezze-Borgo Latina) would have left the three divisions of VI Corps holding something like 125 kilometers (I calculated it a long time ago, but couldn't remember it, thank goodness for Google Earth ), with both flanks completely open. Given that the bulk of 29. and 90. Panzergrenadier were assembled at Terracina on 22 January preparing for an attack on the British bridgehead over the Garigliano, and given that within about seven days of the landings the German forces already ounumbered the VI Corps, I think the result of such a headlong advance is pretty much forordained?

 

I think I may have the original VI Corps order at work, I'll try to check tomorrow?

 

Oh, I agree with your analysis of the fatal implications that an immediate thrust into the Alban hills would have produced, Rich. I was only pointing out that Lucas had orders from Fifteenth Army Group to do just that. Lucien Truscott was one of the US Army's most audacious commanders, and even he thought it was a dumb idea. Martin Blumenson relates that Fifth Army issued vaguer language personally interpreted to Lucas by Brig. Gen. Brann that left Lucas the option of securing a beachhead first and advancing into the Alban Hills when Lucas deemed it prudent. Still, everybody knew what the point of the operation was supposed to be.

[BillB]

And I'm not sure that Dieppe did anything of the sort? The old saw that it was the difficulties with Dieppe that led to the brilliant adaptations for NEPTUNE is pretty much hogwash too. The concept of the AVRE actually predated JUBILEE and the assumption that the losses at Dieppe "taught" the Allies not to attack heavily fortified ports directly is only partially correct, since they went ahead and directly assaulted the most heavily defended sectors of the beaches in between the ports instead. And I do mean direct assault, every single assaulting battalion was intended to be landed directly opposite the strongest German defenses guarding the principal beach exits on every single beach. All the cases where they did not do so was accidental.

 

Dieppe was ultimately an operation undertaken on a shoestring, by a rump division, and for a short term, but I don't think the Allies actually needed any lessons to teach them that was not a recipe for getting forces ashore and forming a permanent beachhead in France.

 

Methinks you are trying to have your cake and eat it there, Rich. If they couldn't land at the ports or the beaches, where were they supposed to land? Where there were no beach exits I assume, if we go by the above. Or have you come up with some information that got overlooked by COSSAC et al at the time. Prior to Dieppe amphib thinking, such as it was, was based around seizing a port at the outset of any landing, based on events at Gallipoli IIRC because that was all anyone had to go on at that time. The point of Dieppe was that it showed that seizing a port was was not as simple or indeed achievable as had been assumed, and that going up against a defended port was likely to be riskier and more costly than going up against beach defences. Which is why Le Havre and Cherbourg did not feature in the OVERLORD target list. Consequently, I don't think it was a matter of making adaptations, it was a matter of choosing the least worst option because the Germans had built or were in the process of constructing defences everywhere that mattered.

 

@ King: I assume that you have some actual, verifiable evidence that Alanbrooke was personally afraid of the Germans to the point of cowardice and incontinence? Or are you just being bilious because you've been obliged to accept that he was in fact right?

 

BillB

[Murph]

Yes, he should have been relieved and sent packing for that fiasco! It even makes the Big Mac look like a good commander.... Patton would not have made that mistake, you can be sure.

 

I think the one thing Clark did which was undeniably cause for removal was his move on Rome, rather than cutting off German troops after breaching the Gustav Line. Once you've destroyed German forces in Italy, you can take Rome whenever you like, jerk.

[Marek Tucan]

Yes, he should have been relieved and sent packing for that fiasco! It even makes the Big Mac look like a good commander.... Patton would not have made that mistake, you can be sure.

 

Would if there would be danger Montgomery would get to Rome first

[Rich]

Methinks you are trying to have your cake and eat it there, Rich. If they couldn't land at the ports or the beaches, where were they supposed to land? Where there were no beach exits I assume, if we go by the above. Or have you come up with some information that got overlooked by COSSAC et al at the time. Prior to Dieppe amphib thinking, such as it was, was based around seizing a port at the outset of any landing, based on events at Gallipoli IIRC because that was all anyone had to go on at that time. The point of Dieppe was that it showed that seizing a port was was not as simple or indeed achievable as had been assumed, and that going up against a defended port was likely to be riskier and more costly than going up against beach defences. Which is why Le Havre and Cherbourg did not feature in the OVERLORD target list. Consequently, I don't think it was a matter of making adaptations, it was a matter of choosing the least worst option because the Germans had built or were in the process of constructing defences everywhere that mattered.

 

Hi Bill,

 

No, not at all, I think you are just misconstruing what I said. Dieppe may have taught them that attempting a landing within the confines of a port was a bad idea, but that appears to be about it. And, of course the alternative to landing at a port is landing at the beaches in between, but that does not imply the requirement that those beach assaults need be directed squarely at the most heavily fortified parts of the beach.

 

But the overriding necessity was to get the assault done as quickly as possible, because it was perceived - from the experience in HUSKY, AVALANCHE, and SHINGLE - that the critical point was the German counterattack to defeat the establishment of the beachhead. Which meant getting the maximum number of troops and equipment ashore in the shortest time to establish the defenses against such an attack. Thus, the direct beach assaults on the fortifications guarding the exit points. So it was a requirement of NEPTUNE, but had nothing to do with lessons learned from Dieppe, other than assault beach, not port.

 

And of course Cherbourg did feature very prominently in the NEPTUNE target list, I am a little suprised you say it did not? It's just that the actual lesson that was apparently learned from Dieppe - don't directly assault fortified ports - was learned.

 

Some of the other possible "lessons"?

 

AVRE - I just reviewed my notes and it is intriguing that the genesis of the armored engineering tank concept appears to be near simultaneous with JUBILEE, so I may have been incorrect, it seems impossible to establish exactly which predates which? Certainly the first exercise use of a mockup AVRE was February 1943, but the date the engineering study for the vehicle began is more hazy? Something worth digging into further.

 

Gunfire support for the landing - this certainly was a lesson learned from Dieppe, but the "solutions" arrived at LCG (L), LCT ®, beaching "drenching" fire, and so forth, actually did little to solve the problem and simply added more bangs, for little result.

 

Air support - a bit of a no brainer and not really directly applicable to the tactical problem.

[JWB]

I think the one thing Clark did which was undeniably cause for removal was his move on Rome, rather than cutting off German troops after breaching the Gustav Line. Once you've destroyed German forces in Italy, you can take Rome whenever you like, jerk.

Had the Allies destroyed the Axis in Italy it would have been possible to march into Austria. That destruction could have been accomplished back in January 1944.

[Rich]

Had the Allies destroyed the Axis in Italy it would have been possible to march into Austria. That destruction could have been accomplished back in January 1944.

 

Really? How?

[Guest Bob II]

as for invading france you are forgeting that whille they could do it in 1943 if not for torch both the UK and the US are democratic nations so they needed to show the public they where fighting.

[DB]

Really? How?

Well, when you get to the top, you turn right...

 

David

[KingSargent]

@ King: I assume that you have some actual, verifiable evidence that Alanbrooke was personally afraid of the Germans to the point of cowardice and incontinence? Or are you just being bilious because you've been obliged to accept that he was in fact right?

 

BillB

How about his own words? Read his diary. He was scared spitless of going back. After he got out at Dunkirk, he was shipped back to command British forces in France and spent his time there screaming on the telephone to be brought back. He was "physically ill" (his words) at the thought of invading NWE.

 

He chortles about confounding Ike with inflated "data" on German strength. He presented faked figures at the Casablanca conference - at least no one has found where they came from or presented data to back them up AFAIK.

[KingSargent]

There is a Conspiracy Theory that Dieppe was deliberately FUBARed to create that impression. If the mistakes were not deliberate, then the IGS was more incompetent than the Iraqi staff in 2003.

Er, I hate to rain on your parade Sarge, but 99 percent of all conspiracy theories are crap.

Your estimate is too small by a factor of 99%.

 

And I'm not sure that Dieppe did anything of the sort? The old saw that it was the difficulties with Dieppe that led to the brilliant adaptations for NEPTUNE is pretty much hogwash too. The concept of the AVRE actually predated JUBILEE and the assumption that the losses at Dieppe "taught" the Allies not to attack heavily fortified ports directly is only partially correct, since they went ahead and directly assaulted the most heavily defended sectors of the beaches in between the ports instead. And I do mean direct assault, every single assaulting battalion was intended to be landed directly opposite the strongest German defenses guarding the principal beach exits on every single beach. All the cases where they did not do so was accidental.

I am aware.

 

Dieppe was ultimately an operation undertaken on a shoestring, by a rump division, and for a short term, but I don't think the Allies actually needed any lessons to teach them that was not a recipe for getting forces ashore and forming a permanent beachhead in France.

My point exactly. I do not see how an operation can be that screwed up without it being deliberate. No air? No NGFS? Frontal assaults on the defenses? They confused Canuckistanis with Jarheads?

 

As you say, it certainly taught nothing that was not already known.

 

But it did muzzle the "Free France in '42" crowd.

[JWB]

Really? How?

You do understand how the Allies smashed the Gustav line in May of 1944?

[Rich]

You do understand how the Allies smashed the Gustav line in May of 1944?

 

Er, yeah, rather just a bit, having two additional American divisions, one very good, and a full-strength French Corps available for commitment, and a rather more sensible plan helped....but what does any of that have to do with January 1944, which was your original statement?

[JWB]

Er, yeah, rather just a bit, having two additional American divisions, one very good, and a full-strength French Corps available for commitment, and a rather more sensible plan helped....but what does any of that have to do with January 1944, which was your original statement?

Evidentally you don't.

[BillB]

How about his own words? Read his diary. He was scared spitless of going back. After he got out at Dunkirk, he was shipped back to command British forces in France and spent his time there screaming on the telephone to be brought back. He was "physically ill" (his words) at the thought of invading NWE.

 

He chortles about confounding Ike with inflated "data" on German strength. He presented faked figures at the Casablanca conference - at least no one has found where they came from or presented data to back them up AFAIK.

Ah, so basically you have put your own spin on words taken, probably out of context, from his diary and the accusation of him faking figures comes from the fact that no-one has found their source. Sorry King, you'll have to try a bit harder than that, as it doesn't stack up to personal cowardice or deliberate misrepresentation from where I'm sitting.

 

BillB

[Richard Lindquist]

In "Army at dawn" it is especially Fredenall that gets the knife, but it is interesting how positively Fredenall (and Mark Clark) are seen upon by their superiors before the campaigns.

 

 

Umm, that is a pretty much universal failing. Look at how George McLellan, John Pope, PGT Beauregard, and "Prince John" Magruder were viewed in the American Civil War before they took troops into combat.

[Rich]

Evidentally you don't.

 

Really? Enlighten me then and explain just exactly how the Allies could have done it in January 1944, which was your original statement?

 

(JWB @ Tue 16 Oct 2007 1838)

Had the Allies destroyed the Axis in Italy it would have been possible to march into Austria. That destruction could have been accomplished back in January 1944.

 

Of course I'm also curious how you think the Gustav was penetrated in May as well?

[Colin Williams]

The Med was not "secured for shipping" until the Germans had been cleared from Greece, the Aegean, and to some extent the Balkans. Traffic (some, not all) still went around Africa, even in 1945.

 

The famous "saving two million tons of shipping" was a big part of AlanBrooke's con job at Casablanca. He never backed the claim up then and nobody has since AFAIK.

 

Generally, someone challenging conventional wisdom has the obligation to produce relevant facts and figures, not the other way around. If you think Brooke and company won their point at Casablanca with a con job, why not find something to back it up? I imagine the figures are out there. For example, in 1939-40, 2971 merchant vessels called at Cape Town and Durban. The Med was officially closed to shipping by the RN in January, 1941 (effectively closed much earlier). The numbere of merchant vessels calling at Cape Town and Durban rose to 4523 in 1942-43 and fell to 2030 in 1943-44, during which time the Med had been reopened and convoys starting moving across the Med and through the Suez Canal. Although one would have to allow for changes in strategic priorities for British shippiing over the course of the war, it does seem that the reopening had a significant effect on shipping.

[JWB]

Really? Enlighten me then and explain just exactly how the Allies could have done it in January 1944, which was your original statement?

Of course I'm also curious how you think the Gustav was penetrated in May as well?

The first, second, and third assaults failed because they were across fronts that were too narrow or the attacks themselves were uncoordinated. DIADEM worked because it was across a wide enough front and made use of far greater amounts of screening smoke. Victory in WW2 was achieved by wide front offensives against confused defenders.

[Colin Williams]

Although it is true that Lucas was to some degree the fall guy for mistakes made by Clark and Alexander as well as his own perceived caution during the first few days after the landing, my understanding is that the standard story on Anzio identifies the primary cause of his relief as his uninspiring performance once the beachhead came under heavy German attack.

[KingSargent]

Generally, someone challenging conventional wisdom has the obligation to produce relevant facts and figures, not the other way around. If you think Brooke and company won their point at Casablanca with a con job, why not find something to back it up? I imagine the figures are out there. For example, in 1939-40, 2971 merchant vessels called at Cape Town and Durban. The Med was officially closed to shipping by the RN in January, 1941 (effectively closed much earlier). The numbere of merchant vessels calling at Cape Town and Durban rose to 4523 in 1942-43 and fell to 2030 in 1943-44, during which time the Med had been reopened and convoys starting moving across the Med and through the Suez Canal. Although one would have to allow for changes in strategic priorities for British shippiing over the course of the war, it does seem that the reopening had a significant effect on shipping.

Check on the convoys to India and Oz (and Lend-Lease to Iran/USSR), not the ones rounding the Cape. Before Tunisia fell the log chain for 8th Army was around Africa. When 8th Army moved to Sicily and Italy it made very little sense to ship their supplies around Africa. That accounts for a lot of the drop right there.

 

Maybe if I ever need a dissertation (hah!) I'll do all the research. At this point, AlanBrooke said "two million tons" at Casablanca and nobody has ever backed it up. Is an unsupported assertion by the CIGS "conventional wisdom?" Do you slavishly believe McClellan was right when he didn't want to fight during the ACW?

[BillB]

Check on the convoys to India and Oz (and Lend-Lease to Iran/USSR), not the ones rounding the Cape. Before Tunisia fell the log chain for 8th Army was around Africa. When 8th Army moved to Sicily and Italy it made very little sense to ship their supplies around Africa. That accounts for a lot of the drop right there.

 

Maybe if I ever need a dissertation (hah!) I'll do all the research. At this point, AlanBrooke said "two million tons" at Casablanca and nobody has ever backed it up. Is an unsupported assertion by the CIGS "conventional wisdom?" Do you slavishly believe McClellan was right when he didn't want to fight during the ACW?

Come on King, you are reaching now. An unsupported assertion about an allegedly unsupported assertion do not proof make and you know it. And I'm still waiting for some proof that Alanbrooke was personally and physically afraid to face the Germans. Or was "shitting himself" intended as a shorthand term for something like "healthy respect beased on personal experience of what they were dealing with"?

 

BillB

[Rich]

The first, second, and third assaults failed because they were across fronts that were too narrow or the attacks themselves were uncoordinated. DIADEM worked because it was across a wide enough front and made use of far greater amounts of screening smoke. Victory in WW2 was achieved by wide front offensives against confused defenders.

 

Er, sorry, but no, DIADEM succeeded mostly because the earlier attacks had failed in their ultimate objective (which failure was due to quite a few more factors than too narrow frontages - which I don't really recall either, seems to me it was the opposite actually in most cases, or a narrow front caused by having to first assault over a river, but it's been a while since I measured those frontages - can do so if you like?), but had worn away the defenses and gained the ground neccessary for a jump off point. Plus, the arrival of the 85th and 88th Division allowed the transfer of the 34th and 36th Division and the entire 1st Armored Division into the Anzio-Nettuno Bridgehead, along with the British 5th Division reinforcing the 1st Division, making the VI Corps effectively a seven-division army and a major threat to the German flank and rear, which it wasn't in January-February 1944. And meanwhile the German counteroffensives of February and March at Anzio had pretty much eroded the German mobile counterattack capability in Italy and left those divisions, especially 3. and 29. Panzergrenadier and 26. Panzer, exhausted.

 

The result was that on the DIADEM frontage of Fifth and Eighth Army, the US II Corps and the FEC were able to deploy effectively five divisions against the German 71. and 94. Infanterie Division, both of which had significant detachements to 14. Armee facing VI Corps. Plus, courtesy of hard fighting by the British X Corps in fall and winter 1943/1944, a significant bridgehead over the Garigliano had been acheived, negating the strength of the riverline that had had such an effect on operations in October-December 1943 (and, in similar hard fighting by the 34th Division and then the New Zealand Corps, the Rapido had been pretty much negated as well). Further, the US 88th Division was an excellently trained unit, led by one of the best division commanders produced by the US Army in World War II, it was well supported by artillery, and had been in the line long enough to gain some seasoning. The FEC also added immeasurably to Allied capabilities, since it contained significant numbers of well-trained and experienced light infantry capable of operations in the mountainous terrain of the Aurunci, which also helped negate another significant advantage granted the Germans in fall/winter 1943. Overall, artillery capability was stronger than earlier as well, but I haven't found any significant mentions of chemical smoke leading to victory or any mentions of extraordinary amounts of CS being expended? I'll see if there is anything in the artillery studies related to DIADEM on that?

 

Finally of course there was the effects of STRANGLE, which while not as effective as hoped, did have an eefect on German logistical capability, reducing their ability to reconstitute units weakened in the hard fighting of January-March 44.

 

The result was that when the offensive jumped off on 9 May, the German XIV. Panzerkorps was only able to initially check the assault by II Corps, while their commitment of elements of 29. Panzergrenadier Division was unable to check the onrush when first 94. Infanterie and then 71. Infanterie collapsed, allowing the US 88th Division and major elements of the FEC free reign to advance up the Aurunci hills. And, by that time 15. Panzergrenadier and 26. Panzer were simply too weak to provide more than rear guards, especially as the development of the Eighth Army attack finally collapsed the Liri position. By 23 May, when BUFFALO in the Anzio bridgehead jumped off, the Germans were already pretty much reconciled to retreat.

[KingSargent]

Come on King, you are reaching now. An unsupported assertion about an allegedly unsupported assertion do not proof make and you know it.

Then why are AB's unsupported assertions about shipping and TOEs accepted as gospel? He couldn't even keep his lies about German strength in France straight; when the number of divisions he reports changes several times daily in meetings where people are not running in to interrupt with the latest intelligence data, some of the figures he was spouting have to be bogus.

 

He also assumed that any German divisional pin on a map of France was a full-strength well-trained division. For example, his reports credited the 17th SS PzGr division with 260 tanks before OVERLORD. Historians laugh at Hitler for that sort of fantasy, AB gets a ride? Historians say McLellan should have known he wasn't outnumbered two to one by Lee in 1862, Ab shouldn't have bothered to say, "Wait a minute, that division was just destroyed at Stalingrad! So how is it full TOE and ready to go?"

 

And I'm still waiting for some proof that Alanbrooke was personally and physically afraid to face the Germans. Or was "shitting himself" intended as a shorthand term for something like "healthy respect beased on personal experience of what they were dealing with"?

What does "physically ill" (his words) from fear signify to you? IME, it usually involves bowel disorders.

 

Um, please explain to me where AlanBrooke had any sort of personal experience (during WW2) of combatting Germans? He futzed around totally lost while his corps was retreating to Dunkirk (admittedly the retreat was ordered and the total confusion was not his fault - not that I find any mention of him doing anything to straighten it out), got out while heaving great sighs of relief, and screamed like a scalded bitch when he got shipped back. I found no evidence in his diary (or in any history) that he did anything except scream it was all useless and he wanted to go home. He drove madly around France, not looking for his troops or planning their deployment, but looking for a telephone to call London and snivel. He records meetings with unit commanders and there is no, "All right chaps, it's not good but we have a job to do," it was "Run for your lives." These are not the actions of combative soldier trying to do his duty.

 

Even Percival TRIED to do something in Malaya, and Percival was very well aware just how he had been left to hang - he had been involved in defense planning in Malaya pre-war, knew what minimum resources had been called for, and knew how far he was from getting those minimums.