The generalship of Mark Clark

[Murph]

I am reading Rick Atkinson's excellent book THE DAY OF BATTLE, and must say that my opinion of Mark Clark has lowered even further than it was previously. I wonder how a better commander such as Bradley, Devers, Truscott, or even Ridgeway would have done in the Italian theater. Also it seems that the British sold the US a load of goods when they forced the Italian strategy upon the allies. If you haven't read the book, get it, its excellent.

 

Why is it that generals named Clark (Mark, Wesley, etc) are completely f**ked up?

[Jim Martin]

I am reading Rick Atkinson's excellent book THE DAY OF BATTLE, and must say that my opinion of Mark Clark has lowered even further than it was previously. I wonder how a better commander such as Bradley, Devers, Truscott, or even Ridgeway would have done in the Italian theater. Also it seems that the British sold the US a load of goods when they forced the Italian strategy upon the allies. If you haven't read the book, get it, its excellent.

 

Why is it that generals named Clark (Mark, Wesley, etc) are completely f**ked up?

 

 

What should we have done sans the Italian campaign? Are you including Sicily as part of the "bill of goods" that was the Italian Campaign? I'd say it at least had value in knocking an Axis partner out of the war, and securing the Mediterranean for British shipping from and to Suez.

[Kensuke]

What should we have done sans the Italian campaign? Are you including Sicily as part of the "bill of goods" that was the Italian Campaign? I'd say it at least had value in knocking an Axis partner out of the war, and securing the Mediterranean for British shipping from and to Suez.

 

Go to France. Go directly to France. Do not pass Go. Do not collect $200.

 

Comrade Stalin will thank you.

 

- John

[DKTanker]

What should we have done sans the Italian campaign? Are you including Sicily as part of the "bill of goods" that was the Italian Campaign?

I seem to recall that one or both Sardina and Corsica were potential invasion sites. Especially Corsica would have put the allies ever so much closer to the industrial Italian north, cutting off forces to the south. With both Sicily and Corisca in allied hands Italy is cut off with no necessity to slog up the Italian boot wasting lives for a year and a half. Wasn't it Churchill that said Italy was the soft underbelly of Europe?

[KingSargent]

What should we have done sans the Italian campaign? Are you including Sicily as part of the "bill of goods" that was the Italian Campaign? I'd say it at least had value in knocking an Axis partner out of the war, and securing the Mediterranean for British shipping from and to Suez.

The Med was not "secured for shipping" until the Germans had been cleared from Greece, the Aegean, and to some extent the Balkans. Traffic (some, not all) still went around Africa, even in 1945.

 

The famous "saving two million tons of shipping" was a big part of AlanBrooke's con job at Casablanca. He never backed the claim up then and nobody has since AFAIK.

[JWB]

Go to France. Go directly to France. Do not pass Go. Do not collect $200.

 

Comrade Stalin will thank you.

 

- John

Go into France directly? Where, the Riviera? That will require taking Sardinia and Corsica first. That could have been started shortly after AK surrenders in Tunis. But if the Allies have an invasion force on Corsica in say July 1943 then Hitler would be forced to abandon Sicily and southern Italy in order to prevent and Allied coup de main through La Spezia. Which means the Allies could go into southern Italy in an almost bloodless walk in.

[Redbeard]

The Med was not "secured for shipping" until the Germans had been cleared from Greece, the Aegean, and to some extent the Balkans. Traffic (some, not all) still went around Africa, even in 1945.

 

The famous "saving two million tons of shipping" was a big part of AlanBrooke's con job at Casablanca. He never backed the claim up then and nobody has since AFAIK.

 

At least it saved the allies from a disaster in France 1943 - con job or not - and shipping was a major problem for the allies.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[Redbeard]

I am reading Rick Atkinson's excellent book THE DAY OF BATTLE, and must say that my opinion of Mark Clark has lowered even further than it was previously. I wonder how a better commander such as Bradley, Devers, Truscott, or even Ridgeway would have done in the Italian theater. Also it seems that the British sold the US a load of goods when they forced the Italian strategy upon the allies. If you haven't read the book, get it, its excellent.

 

Why is it that generals named Clark (Mark, Wesley, etc) are completely f**ked up?

 

I haven't got "The day of battle" yet, but I'm almost finished with "Army at dawn". My impression is that Rick Atkinson is very critical to any allied commander, and can back that attitude with a lot of details, facts and anecdotes. The consequent focus on the things that went wrong is a good balance to earlier praising, but you sometimes from Atkinson get an impression of the Germans being thrown out of Afirca by a row of allied disasters.

 

In "Army at dawn" it is especially Fredenall that gets the knife, but it is interesting how positively Fredenall (and Mark Clark) are seen upon by their superiors before the campaigns. In the context of this thread I have a supsicion that any US commander would have been a failure in 1942-43, as the main problem wasn't the personality of the Generals, but the immatureness of the US Army. And in 1944-45 the US Army had not only matured, but also grown to a size that really made daunting generalship superflous (if not dangerous), as long as you had a certain amount of caution and a methodical approach.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[Ariete!]

By the time of the invasion of Italy, the allies were clearly on the offensive and therefore had the initiative. You can “what if” all you want but it’s difficult to show that a Sardinia/Corsica/Riviera route would have been workable. Effectively, you are talking about much more extended sea routes.

 

Would a pre-mid-’44 French invasion been practical? If not, at least the Italian campaign ground the Germans down as much as the Allies (who could better afford attrition).

 

Also, don’t forget Tunisia and North Africa; notwithstanding simplistic mythology, having the Ities on board meant significant naval potential and rapidly improving aircraft and even some good army formations. With Italy still in the War the Allies’ job would have been a bit harder.

 

As for Clark, in the books I’ve read (most recently ‘Anzio’) he’s mainly faulted for grandstanding and symbolic goals, rather than efficiently defeating the Germans, but not overall such poor generalship. I think that, rather, it was a case of Kesselring and his subordinates being very good.

 

DO you guys agree with the general view that Trustcott messed up big time at Anzio )through over-caution)?

[Tim the Tank Nut]

Army at Dawn does kind of give the impression that the Allies bumbled through NA and just happened to bump the Axis out.

I tend to believe that the Med was a useful proving ground for the Allies.

I thought "Path to Victory" by Porch was a good book.

 

I am going to see Atkinson at a lecture at the end of this month. Should be interesting.

[Old Tanker]

DO you guys agree with the general view that Trustcott messed up big time at Anzio )through over-caution)?

 

Lucas not Truscott get's the blame for being too slow and cautious . Lucas was replaced by Truscott for the breakout battles. Truscott had been CO of the 3rd ID.

[Marek Tucan]

Would a pre-mid-’44 French invasion been practical? If not, at least the Italian campaign ground the Germans down as much as the Allies (who could better afford attrition).

 

Got me thinking whether it would be possible to use the Torch forces to make a landing in Northern France, and to make a defendable beachhead (say Cotentin peninsula) there... But frankly, don't know whether that would be a) possible and b ) hepful to the war effort. Though such landing might say convince Vichy forces to join Allies?

[Old Tanker]

Got me thinking whether it would be possible to use the Torch forces to make a landing in Northern France, and to make a defendable beachhead (say Cotentin peninsula) there... But frankly, don't know whether that would be a) possible and b ) hepful to the war effort. Though such landing might say convince Vichy forces to join Allies?

 

That's what the American command wanted but the Brits were againist it , rightfully so as I read history.

The Dieppe Raid forecast the extreme difficulty of invading northern France.

 

I also agree that the American forces weren't in the Big Leagues yet with many mistakes in North Africa including extreme separation of units but lessons of tactics and command and control were being absorbed.

[Ken Estes]

The range of tactical air cover limits all these initiatives. So it is first Sicily, then Italy [so of Naples] and so forth. Sardinia [not Corisca] remained an option, but then what do you do from its inadequate ports and bases?

 

The best view [20-20 hindsight] would be to take Italy as far as Rome [for prestige] and then go over to economy of force/defensive. The Foggia air bases and port of Naples are the military objectives, already taken in the drive for Rome.

[Ken Estes]

The range of tactical air cover limits all these initiatives. So it is first Sicily, then Italy [s. of Naples] and so forth. Sardinia [not Corisca] remained an option, but then what do you do from its inadequate ports and bases?

 

The best view [20-20 hindsight] would be to take Italy as far as Rome [for prestige] and then go over to economy of force/defensive. The Foggia air bases and port of Naples are the military objectives, already taken in the drive for Rome.

[Rich]

DO you guys agree with the general view that Lucas messed up big time at Anzio )through over-caution)?

 

No, the "general view" is completely assinine and simply ignores the forces available to each side, the timings of their arrival, and the nature of the terrain. Lucas followed his written and verbal orders exactly, made a measured, sensible, and accurate analysis of the probable German reaction, and acted accordingly. Fundamentally, if Lucas - or any other Allied general at the time - had followed the recommendations of the "general view" postwar armchair crowd, the most likely result would have been Leros on a grand scale, with the majority (everything that couldn't be Dunkirked off the beaches) of the 1st British Division, the 3rd US Division and most of the 45th US Division, and possibly CCB, 1st US Armored Division going into the bag.

[Guest aevans]

Go to France. Go directly to France. Do not pass Go. Do not collect $200.

 

Comrade Stalin will thank you.

 

- John

 

Ever hear of the concept of a concentric offensive? The Allies had the resources to dominate on every front, no matter how many fronts they fought on. The war ends quicker the more they stretch the Germans' resources by lengthening the total battle front. (I know that few if any conceived of what they were doing in those terms, but that was the major effect -- and arguably the critical one -- of fighting in Italy and Southern France.)

[KingSargent]

Got me thinking whether it would be possible to use the Torch forces to make a landing in Northern France, and to make a defendable beachhead (say Cotentin peninsula) there... But frankly, don't know whether that would be a) possible and b ) hepful to the war effort. Though such landing might say convince Vichy forces to join Allies?

We did this a while ago and I was all for it, but Rich and others convinced me that the logistics for it were just not there.

[KingSargent]

No, the "general view" is completely assinine and simply ignores the forces available to each side, the timings of their arrival, and the nature of the terrain. Lucas followed his written and verbal orders exactly, made a measured, sensible, and accurate analysis of the probable German reaction, and acted accordingly. Fundamentally, if Lucas - or any other Allied general at the time - had followed the recommendations of the "general view" postwar armchair crowd, the most likely result would have been Leros on a grand scale, with the majority (everything that couldn't be Dunkirked off the beaches) of the 1st British Division, the 3rd US Division and most of the 45th US Division, and possibly CCB, 1st US Armored Division going into the bag.

Bravo.

[Harry Yeide]

In a piece he wrote for the Washington Post on "The War," Atkinson said, "Scholars will find occasional annoyances: The assertion that Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas, the American commander at Anzio, was ordered to move inland from the beaches in January 1944 to cut German supply lines south of Rome is simply wrong. The truth is more nuanced, and far more intriguing." I haven't had a chance to read his new opus yet, but I'll be curious to see what he thinks the orders said. I was recently looking at some of those orders. Fifteenth Army Group’s “Operation Instruction No. 32,” issued 2 January 1944, clearly specified, “Fifth Army will prepare an amphibious operation. . . with the object of cutting the enemy lines of communication and threatening the rear of German 14 Corps.” Fifteenth Army Group optimistically entitled its operation instruction issued on 12 January “The Battle for Rome.” Alexander told his subordinates:

 

The enemy has suffered considerable losses in recent operations especially on Eighth Army front. . . . Fifth Army have now started upon a series of operations on their present front designed to break through the enemy’s main defensive positions in the area south of Cassino, and to draw in his reserves. These operations will culminate with an attack by 2 Corps across the Rapido River on or about 20 January. Fifth Army are also preparing an amphibious operation to land a corps of two divisions and the necessary corps troops, followed by a strong and fully mobile striking force based on elements of a third division, in the Nettuno area. The object of this operation will be to cut the enemy’s main communications in the Colle Laziali [Alban Hills] area south east of Rome, and to threaten the rear of German 14 Corps. Weather permitting, this amphibious operation will be launched on 22 January. . . . Commander Fifth Army will conduct his operations as to force the enemy to withdraw north of Rome, and at the same time inflict the maximum losses on the German forces in the area south of Rome.

Commander Eighth Army will maintain sufficient ressure on the enemy forces on his front to prevent the enemy from moving any troops from 76 German Corps to reinforce those opposing Fifth Army.

 

???

[KingSargent]

That's what the American command wanted but the Brits were againist it , rightfully so as I read history.

AlanBrooke was scared shitless of going back to France and "modified" intelligence reports to paint the Germans much stronger than they were. Baghdad Bob was channeling AlanBrooke.

 

The Dieppe Raid forecast the extreme difficulty of invading northern France.

There is a Conspiracy Theory that Dieppe was deliberately FUBARed to create that impression. If the mistakes were not deliberate, then the IGS was more incompetent than the Iraqi staff in 2003.

 

I also agree that the American forces weren't in the Big Leagues yet with many mistakes in North Africa including extreme separation of units but lessons of tactics and command and control were being absorbed.

Please to recall that the US forces in Tunisia were under British 1st Army, and the wide separation of units and screwed-up C&C were GEN "God Will Help Us So I Can Be Dumb As I Want" Anderson's idea of how war should be fought. US officers at the time bytched mightily, but they were "amateurs" and ignored by the war-wise Brits.

 

Anderson FUBARed his British and French troops with insane C0Cs and separation of units too, so this isn't just Yankee snivelling. He was proposed to command OVERLORD too, wouldn't THAT have been fun...........

[Murph]

YEs, but Clark also should have been court martialled for the death of the 36th Division at the Rapido. Clark deserves all the calumny foisted upon him.

[Rich]

In a piece he wrote for the Washington Post on "The War," Atkinson said, "Scholars will find occasional annoyances: The assertion that Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas, the American commander at Anzio, was ordered to move inland from the beaches in January 1944 to cut German supply lines south of Rome is simply wrong. The truth is more nuanced, and far more intriguing." I haven't had a chance to read his new opus yet, but I'll be curious to see what he thinks the orders said. I was recently looking at some of those orders. Fifteenth Army Group’s “Operation Instruction No. 32,” issued 2 January 1944, clearly specified, “Fifth Army will prepare an amphibious operation. . . with the object of cutting the enemy lines of communication and threatening the rear of German 14 Corps.”

 

Hi Harry,

 

That is true, but I think it simply illustrates how far out of touch Fifteenth Army Group was as well. The actual order given to Lucas was to to land and “secure the beaches extending north and south of Anzio, for a distance of about six miles in each direction. After securing the initial objectives it was to be prepared to advance across the flat hinterland in the direction of the Colli Laziali (Alban) hill mass which rises to a height of 3,000 feet and controls all routes from the south toward Rome." At least according to Ellis. The key words being "after securing" and "be prepared to advance." And of course George Patton gave his good friend Lucas the famous advice to "not stick your neck out" and Clark himself gave him similar warnings; all three men knew that such an operation was simply incapable of acheiving those results with the forces at hand. The intended line (roughly Ardea-Albano Laziali-Artena-Frosinine-Sezze-Borgo Latina) would have left the three divisions of VI Corps holding something like 125 kilometers (I calculated it a long time ago, but couldn't remember it, thank goodness for Google Earth ), with both flanks completely open. Given that the bulk of 29. and 90. Panzergrenadier were assembled at Terracina on 22 January preparing for an attack on the British bridgehead over the Garigliano, and given that within about seven days of the landings the German forces already ounumbered the VI Corps, I think the result of such a headlong advance is pretty much forordained?

 

I think I may have the original VI Corps order at work, I'll try to check tomorrow?

[Rich]

YEs, but Clark also should have been court martialled for the death of the 36th Division at the Rapido. Clark deserves all the calumny foisted upon him.

 

Not quite, or not perhaps not precisely? Alexander, Clark, Keyes, and even Walker, share the blame for what happened. Alexander and Clark failed between them to come up with a workable plan for breaching the Garigliano-Rapido line, perhaps trusting too much in the possible effect of SHINGLE (which Clark at least I believe had no real faith in). But Keyes bungled things too, as did Walker, a serious failure by a good officer and talented general, but whose heart obviously wasn't in the operation. That led directly to serious failings in the tactical planning, especially in regards to the use of engineer assets (to call the engineer plan "perfunctory" may actually give the plan too much credit) and decsions as to where and when to attempt the crossing. Frankly, I think the real choice - no matter how odious I think Clark was as a person and how much he may have deserved being thrown out on his ear - was to either put them all in front of a court martial, which wasn't practical, or do what was done, nothing.

[Jim Martin]

I think the one thing Clark did which was undeniably cause for removal was his move on Rome, rather than cutting off German troops after breaching the Gustav Line. Once you've destroyed German forces in Italy, you can take Rome whenever you like, jerk.