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The future of naval fire support


Chris Werb

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But those still are hampered by range. That's why I commented on needing a nuclear warhead on these little puppies. Considering the space consumed by fuel mass needed for a rocket-boosted shell to go ~100 miles, you'll end up with no space for explosives left. After all, it isn't as though we can make shells any bigger. If we do, we're going to have to redo all reloading mechanisms to work with the elongated shells. But when you're rebuilding battlewagons, I guess that's a given. ;)

 

Have you seen LRLAP?

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Have you seen LRLAP?

 

I've only read a little on it, but I haven't gotten down how much explosives does it have in the warhead, despite my Google-fu. :(

 

That's kind of my stickler about super-duper long range rounds: We can toss them 100 miles, but how much HE are we putting on target? And if we're going to go through all this trouble to drop a little bit of explosives on a target, wouldn't it be easier just to toss a few 500lb PGMs on a Harrier and let them loose?

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Please correct me if I am wrong, but as far as using an Iowa class 16" gun, doens't the South African G6 outrange it? I know that trying to do damage to a BB with a 155 is well slightly dumb, but if you have anything less well armored, and that once it gets in range can massacre you, what does that get you?

Even a BB is going to be vulnerable to mission kills of its electronics. Look what happened to South Dakota when her circuit breakers blew in action at Guadalcanal. Even if 155mm hits can't sink a BB, they can destroy sensors and FCS and effectively cripple it.

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The NGFS mission is way over rated. Opposed Marine landings on beaches is also over rated at this time. I believe that the Navy needs a PG munition to be relevant in the game, as all the action is on land. Now the Navy can show that the ships are valuable by lobbing shells a long way to hit targets that aircraft could have hit just as easily. All of this supposed firepower from the Navy is only needed against China and, ah well, China. That's it. No one else to throw shells at..... Iran will be all done by the time DD1000 comes on board, so its kind of a cool gun, but it will not get much use....... better to get the LCS ship straightened out and buy the needed quantity. NGFS from the 1000, is just not a big deal for actual use. IMHO, SLAM-ER, Tactical Tomahawk, JDAM, JSOW and SDB are far more important.

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The NGFS mission is way over rated. Opposed Marine landings on beaches is also over rated at this time. I believe that the Navy needs a PG munition to be relevant in the game, as all the action is on land. Now the Navy can show that the ships are valuable by lobbing shells a long way to hit targets that aircraft could have hit just as easily. All of this supposed firepower from the Navy is only needed against China and, ah well, China. That's it. No one else to throw shells at..... Iran will be all done by the time DD1000 comes on board, so its kind of a cool gun, but it will not get much use....... better to get the LCS ship straightened out and buy the needed quantity. NGFS from the 1000, is just not a big deal for actual use. IMHO, SLAM-ER, Tactical Tomahawk, JDAM, JSOW and SDB are far more important.

 

And yet naval gunfire continues to be used over and over and over again, most recently in Somalia earlier this year. Sometimes there just aren't any Hornet's around it seems.

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Someone highlighted that there is a “problem” over the definition of what NGFS is intended to be, or what it is intended to do. I think this is the major part of the “problem”. There seem to be a lot of “solutions” looking for a “problem” to solve.

 

The US Marine requirement seems to be that (a) a target 13 miles inland can be hit from (B) a position 25 miles offshore, and a mission can be “on the way” within two and a half minutes.

 

Now, I may be wrong in this analysis, but here goes. Looking at various open access sources, these ranges seem suspiciously close to a broad average of what a 155mm class land-based weapon can reach with (a) conventional and (B) rocket assisted rounds. That is to say, the mission appears to distil down to “you should be able to counter-battery a clutch of ‘off the shelf’ 155mm weapons shelling the beach with normal rounds, out to their maximum range, whilst being safe from a 155mm RAP fired off the shoreline”.

 

To my mind this suggests a couple of things.

 

First, that NGFS is likely to be required as part of an initial attack, and that no other preliminary bombardment / reduction of enemy defences will have occurred (based on the assumption that someone is shooting back with a 155mm RAP from the shoreline).

 

Second, that the putative threat to naval forces isn’t expected to be a couple of gumbies in a fishing boat with homemade contact mines, but something vastly more dangerous. How much damage would a 155mm RAP do to a typical modern destroyer? My gut feeling is that the answer is “lots”, and it isn’t something anyone would want to find out.

 

Another option of course is a ship sufficiently protected to be able to not only survive being hit by 155mm fire, but actually continue to be “mission capable” whilst being hit.

 

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And yet naval gunfire continues to be used over and over and over again, most recently in Somalia earlier this year. Sometimes there just aren't any Hornet's around it seems.

 

Yup, just when you think we can go to an all missile force! There is just enough, use of Naval Guns (every 5 years or so..) to keep them going. They just wont die! Maybe we do need an 8 inch gun for diplomatic reasons.... :D

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Second, that the putative threat to naval forces isn’t expected to be a couple of gumbies in a fishing boat with homemade contact mines, but something vastly more dangerous. How much damage would a 155mm RAP do to a typical modern destroyer? My gut feeling is that the answer is “lots”, and it isn’t something anyone would want to find out.

 

The South Africans marketed a coast defence system based on 155s - however the sales literature showed them using DPICM. I think RETAC21 posted some info on the Spanish army using mobile 155s in a similar role to this day.

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The South Africans marketed a coast defence system based on 155s - however the sales literature showed them using DPICM. I think RETAC21 posted some info on the Spanish army using mobile 155s in a similar role to this day.

The Spanish Coast Guard is still (AFAIK) using 380mm guns at Gibraltar.

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The Spanish Coast Guard is still (AFAIK) using 380mm guns at Gibraltar.

 

Not the Spanish Coast Guard (we don't have one, BTW). The Spanish Army. There are a couple of guns in Tarifa, the souternmost point of the Iberian Peninsula

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OTO Melara is designing its own 5" guided long-range projectile, with pretty similar parameters to ERGM, but without rocket assisted propulsion. I like the extended range anti-ship capability.

 

From

http://www.armadainternational.com/06-5/article-full.cfm

 

Oto Melara is leading the Vulcano programme to develop 127 mm extended range ammunition for naval use and 155 mm ammunition for use on land. The Netherlands Ministry of Defence and Thales Nederland are co-operating in the development of the naval ammunition while Spain and Italy agreed in June to co-operate on the 155 mm programme. In both calibres the Vulcano rounds are being developed in unguided extended range (ER) – 70 km – and guided long range (LR) – 100 km – variants with unguided ammunition scheduled to be ready for serial production in 2008 and guided rounds in 2011. The guided rounds employ the canard-control technology that Oto Melara first developed for its Davide 76 mm guided ammunition. The Vulcano LR is a fin-stabilised, saboted, sub-calibre projectile fitted with control canards in the nose section. Using satellite/inertial guidance the Vulcano is expected to achieve a CEP of less than 20 metres while the incorporation of a semi-active seeker could reduce this to only 3 m.
From

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNIT_5-54_LW.htm

 

Vulcano

This is a fin-stabilized projectile and is essentially the OTO-Melara competitor to ERGM and BTERM, but it does not use rocket boost and the initial version will be unguided. Greater range is to be achieved by increasing the muzzle velocity, which may reduce the barrel life. OTO-Melara states that Vulcano can be used by both Compact and LW mountings, presumably via a retrofit to accommodate the longer projectile length.As of June 2005, OTO-Melara plans three versions of this munition. Using the standard 54 caliber barrel, these will be of the following types and ranges:

 

- Unguided multipurpose round with a ballistic range of about 38 nm (70 km)

- Terminally guided round with an on-board seeker (type unknown) intended for anti-ship engagements up to 38 nm (70 km)

- Ineritally guided system with GPS for the NSFS role and a maximum range of about 54 nm (100 km) - this may mean non-ballistic flight capabilities

 

Using the new 62 caliber barrel now under development will increase these ranges by approximately 20 percent. The Italian Army has decided to participate in the development of these munitions with the result that 155 mm versions will also be produced. Rounds with GPS and INS guidance are expected to achieve a CEP of less than 66 feet (20 m). The NSFS and 155 mm munitions will include a laser-seeker. As of June 2005, the service introduction of the 127 mm (5") unguided rounds is planned for 2007 with the guided round following in 2011.

 

And a promo video from OTO:

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I would like to thank tanker_karl for posting the Case Study in Solving the Naval Surface Fire Support Capabilities Gap Thesis. I am sure now that I am going to STRONGLY recommend that anyone & everyone truly interested in Naval Surface Fire Support take the time to actually READ this that the author [Colonel Welch], the thesis advisor [(retired Colonel) Dr. Melshen], the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) & the National Defense University Foundation are to all be considered discredited, unworthy sources since this document says SO MANY things which are in agreement with what I have said here (on TankNet) previously.

 

Note that this thesis was presented the National Defense University Foundation award as the 2007 JAWS Best Thesis. So while a few here (on TankNet) no doubt consider the entire thesis BS there is OBVIOUSLY a number of people who know a hell of a lot more than they do (or could ever hope to) that do not – and no, that does not mean that they are in full agreement with everything but it does mean they acknowledge that it does have significant merit.

 

There is so much there that it would be impossible for me to go through it all here (& again, I STRONGLY recommend that anyone & everyone truly interested in Naval Surface Fire Support take the time to actually READ THE ENTIRE THESIS) so what I will do instead is to list some pages to particular points.

 

But 1st what are perhaps the most important & telling words of the entire thesis…

 

This study was undertaken with the realization that my son, Specialist Adam Lloyd Welch, and son-in-law, Infantry Second Lieutenant Andrew White, may someday require timely, accurate and lethal Naval Surface Fire Support – the kind of fire support that comes only from a gun. It is my desire that this study stimulates serious action to create a viable and effective naval fire support capability within our Navy to support Soldiers and Marines.

 

My “point of view” regarding NSFS & the military in general comes from a similar realization. While I do not have a son or son-in-law (as of yet) in the military, I DO have friends & family who are & even if I didn’t, I feel that our servicemen & women deserve no less than to be thought of & regarded as if they are a member of one’s own immediate family. It is because of this that I am so adamant that they deserve better than they have been & are getting.

 

---

 

Page 2 (10)

 

Page 3 (11)

 

Page 15 (23)

 

Page 20 (27)

 

Page 22-24 (30-32) – including footnote 97, 102 & 105

 

Page 30 (38) – including footnote 125

 

Page 32 (40)

 

Page 35-37 (43-45) – including footnote 141 & 142

 

Page 41 (49)

 

Page 49 (57)

 

based on Table 3

lethal area of shell fragmentation pattern

05” = 005,250 – 018,000

06” = 011,875 – 025,500

08” = 030,000 – 123,750

12” = 090,000 – 400,000

16” = 150,000 – 600,000

 

05” -> 06” = 2.26-1.42 times larger

06” -> 08” = 2.53-4.85 times larger

08” -> 12” = 3.00-3.23 times larger

12” -> 16” = 1.67-1.50 times larger

 

05” -> 08” = 05.71-06.88 times larger

06” -> 12” = 07.58-15.69 times larger

08” -> 16” = 05.00-04.85 times larger

 

Page 52-54 (60-62) – including footnote 220

 

Page 59-62 (67-70)

 

Page 64-65 (72-73)

 

Page 72 (80) – Table 16

 

Page 82 (90) – Table 25

 

Page 98-107 (106-115) – including Table A-1 & A-3

 

Page 113 (121)

 

Page 116 (124) – including Table A-8

 

Page 123-129 (131-137) – including Table A-11, A-13

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1994 CNA NSFS COEA

 

Center for Naval Analysis (CNA)

Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS)

Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA)

 

Considered 30 guns, 100 projectiles & 7 missile systems.

 

The summary/conclusion report submitted to Congress & the GOA (neither where provided the full final report which remains classified to this day – although selected portions have been declassified) gave eight recommendations, five of which included a new advanced 155mm 60 caliber gun with advanced propellants & various missiles and three with 8” guns (55 cal with standard propellants, 55 cal with advanced propellants & 60 cal with advanced propellants). [strange how if the 155mm gun was SSSOOO great (cost-effective) that they would have even bothered to recommend any 8” guns. Also note that the 155mm guns received a SIGNIFICANT cost advantage through not only common development with land-based 155mm howitzers (which is/was a farce to begin with as the most expensive part – i.e. guidance – would be the same regardless of gun size) but ALSO though actually using shells common with land-based 155mm howitzers (thus comparatively less expensive), which not only affected wartime costs but peacetime costs as well.]

 

Of the two recommended guns, the 155mm and the 8” (203mm) guns, only the 8” guns had the ability to achieve the required range of 165.5 kilometers (102 statute miles). And not one of the guns could kill 95% of the targets due to the inability to kill command and control bunkers at long ranges. This was due to the extremely small size of the 8” projectiles at maximum range [given that the 155mm LRLAP has the same “warhead” as “standard” 155mm HE shells & achieves extended range via a rather large rocket rather than light weight, I wonder what an 8” LRLAP (instead of lighter extended-range projectiles) could have achieved]. A 16-inch long-range projectile is significantly larger at the same ranges.

 

CNA stated that because of sunk costs, Tomahawk land attack missile was the likely choice to fulfill the missile requirement.

 

As the gun bore size increases, the percentage of targets hit increases and the wartime cost per target decreases. This is due to the corresponding increasing maximum ranges and the increasing warhead weights of the rounds.

 

The finding that large caliber guns are more cost effective in wartime is significant, yet because peacetime cost analysis was priority in the COEA, this finding was not emphasized.

 

In wartime, the operational effectiveness and the high cost for missile replacement and large volumes of

less effective smaller caliber projectiles makes the major caliber gun, which is operationally the most effective, and also the most economical.

 

The CNA COEA considered aircraft as part of the overall mission set but did not provide an associated cost analysis linked to NSFS.

 

The CNA COEA based cost analysis upon a 20-year life cycle and replacement costs (stockpile replenishment or “wartime” costs) for individual missiles and projectiles expended in the scenarios examined. The 20-year life cycle includes development, procurement and peacetime operating and support costs.

 

The NSFS COEA determined that given the nature of targets likely to be encountered in OMFTS operations and assuming the level of conflict would not exceed two MRC level conflicts over a 20 year period, an advanced 155mm caliber gun in conjunction with TLAM was the most cost-effective option. A greater level of intensity, larger guns, 8” and up, performed more operationally and cost-effectively.

 

No 5” guns were recommended due to a lack of lethality (including being incapable of holding the SADARM munition) resulting in high wartime costs because of the larger number of rounds required. All guns greater than 8” were not recommended due to their being too large to be accommodated on existing or programmed ships [development of the next generation of surface combatants (SC-21), which have evolved into DDG-1000 & CG(X), began in 1991] & thus would require additional costs of dedicated [not programmed] ships.

 

The excursion (attachment) postulated a 10” gun design and determined that at range factor of 2 (twice the COEA ranges), the 10” gun and the most successful missile option (ATACMS ER) each satisfied the 95% of targets. It is also significant that at longer ranges the cost per target for the gun options increases steadily with range factor as more of the smaller, longer range shells are required to achieve the same results of the larger shells.

 

Desert/Mountain Scenario

gun_______targets__rounds__%__cost__cost/target__rounds/target

155mm/60 AP__221__2,433__94__$133,168__$603__11.0

203mm/55 SP__221__1,585__94__$110,579__$500__07.2

203mm/55 AP__224__1,531__95__$111,799__$499__06.8

203mm/60 AP__224__1,364__95__$101,222__$452__06.1

[note that as mentioned earlier the COEA used lighter shells to achieve extended range which quite likely prevented the 8” guns from defeating more (particularly hardened) targets at longer ranges]

 

155mm HE__100 lbs__$48

203mm HE__250 lbs__$63

[8” being 31% more expensive per shell but each shell having ~twice the payload]

155mm SADARM__100 lbs__$124

203mm SADARM__250 lbs__$145

[8” being 17% more expensive per shell but each shell having 1 or 2 more (155mm having 2) SADARM]

 

---

 

Recommended reading (in addition to Colonel Welch’s thesis)

 

GAO/NSIAD-95-160

Naval Surface Fire Support_Navy's Near-Term Plan Is Not Based on Sufficient Analysis

http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-95-160

 

GAO/NSIAD-99-91

Defense Acquisitions_Naval Surface Fire Support Program Plans and Costs

http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-99-91

 

GAO/NSIAD-99-225

Defense Acquisitions_Evaluation of the Navy's 1999 Naval Fire Support Assessment

http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-99-225

 

GAO-05-39R

Information on Options for Naval Surface Fire Support

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0539r.pdf

 

GAO-07-115

Challenges Remain in Developing Capabilities for Naval Surface Fire Support

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07115.pdf

 

CSBA-R.20070419

A New Transformation Plan for the Navy’s Surface Battle Line

http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Pu...ransformati.pdf

 

JP 3-0

Doctrine for Joint Operations

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf

 

JP 3-02

Amphibious Operations

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_02.pdf

 

JP 3-09

Joint Fire Support

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_09.pdf

 

NWP 3-09-1

Navy Strike and Fire Support

http://www.jfcm.jte.osd.mil/RD1_pdfs/3-09-...2005)_(NWP).pdf

 

Surface Combatant Naval Surface Fire Support Requirements 1999

http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/expeditionary/quinn.pdf

 

U.S. Marine Corps Naval Surface Fire Support Requirements 2002

http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2002artillery/milligan.pdf

 

Naval Surface Fire Support: Not Just a Substitute for Naval Gunfire!

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/lib.../1997/Stent.htm

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Now, before I go on with US NSFS, I think it prudent to express (again) my thoughts concerning NSFS for “lesser” navies. Obviously with their lesser resources & requirements, no other country (or group of countries) is likely to put forth the same kind of time, money & effort towards NSFS as the US. For them (not the US) I think the best solution for NGFS is a 155mm 52cal (Army) howitzer system either designed to be retrofitted to existing naval gun mounts (the French 100mm, British 4.5”, Italian 5” & US 5” naval gun mounts are all ABOUT the same size & weight) or in a “universal” naval gun mount adopted by all. The British have shown what can be done with their 4.5” naval gun mount & Germany has found out the hard way that trying to get a SPH turret to work is not as easy or inexpensive as thought (and have in fact abandoned the idea in favor of an Italian 5” naval gun). Of course like all collaborative projects, it would probably end in failure due to conflicts between the partners…

 

Land-based 155mm 52cal howitzer

30km (16.2nm) “standard/unassisted" projectiles

40km (21.6nm) Rocket Assisted Projectile (RAP) & Extended-Range Full-Bore Base Bleed (ERFB-BB)

60km (32.4nm) Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile

 

For NGFS, land-based 40km (21.6nm) RAP/ERFB-BB should be the “standard” naval projectiles backed up by a smaller number of 80km (43.2nm) ERGMs. Even longer range, perhaps up to 60km (32.4nm) RAP/ERFB-BB & 120km (64.8nm) ERGMs, would be nice but I am not so sure the costs/risks involved in getting such rounds out of a land-based 155mm 52cal howitzer without significant modification (additional costs/risks) to the gun itself & in so doing (likely resulting in a lower rifling twist & altered chamber dimensions) likely effecting the ability to fire land-based projectiles accurately, make it all that realistic. After all, the whole idea behind using a land-based 155mm 52cal howitzer is commonality with land-based howitzers…

 

For a missile component, something similar to the SM-4 Land Attack Standard Missile (LASM) would be preferable. Something that costs less than $500,000 (the closer to $250,000 the better) each with a range of 250-375km (135-203nm) & a 100-150kg (220.5-330.7 lb) warhead. The Storm Shadow/Scalp Naval & Tomahawk cruise missiles are on the order of $1 million each & more of a strike weapon than a NSFS weapon.

 

If they were willing to get REALLY serious about NSFS, they would not only collaborate on a new 155mm 52cal howitzer naval gun mount but they would make it a twin mount & develop it as part of 10,000+ ton “universal” NSFS ships. But of course we all know how unlikely that would be to succeed. In reality a “universal” single-barrel 155mm 52cal howitzer naval gun mount adopted by all is probably the most one could realistically hope for.

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I THINK we can all agree that what we (I mean the US) have now is inadequate. The current 5” guns do not have the range, accuracy or firepower required by US forces & thus we are overly reliant on more expensive missiles (Tomahawk) & airpower. The current “solution” of seven DDG-1000 (USMC says they need 24 to fulfill their needs) with two 155mm AGS firing only LRLAP (more accurately described as gun launched guided missiles) at a ROF of 10 rpm addresses the range & accuracy BUT hardly improves firepower to a significant degree (ESPECIALLY considering the amount of time, money & effort being/having been exhausted) & STILL leaves us overly reliant on more expensive missiles (Tomahawk) & airpower. Yes the DDG-1000 will have 80 VLS cells too & that NSFS is not the ONLY thing they are intended for (part of the problem in-&-of-itself), but an insufficient number of VLS cells IS NOT the problem.

 

I do not believe that a class of essentially 21st century Iowa BBs, as awesome as it would be, is the best solution, nor do I think the current “solution” is. As clearly demonstrated here on TankNet, there is A LOT of opposition to even the idea of a 21st century BB class and of course HIGHLY unlikely you are going to convince congress to fund any $10 billion 21st century BB even if it can be conclusively shown to actually be cost-effective. Regardless of the likelihood of a class of 21st century BBs ever becoming a reality, I do not believe that something THAT big or THAT powerful is the best solution. My contention has always been that the best solution would be something a bit less (but SIGNIFICANTLY more than the current “solution” – aka DDG-1000).

 

The “250 lb” Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) has shown just how far munitions technology/capability has progressed. Here you have a 285 lb bomb that has a 206 lb “warhead” containing 48 lbs of AFX-757 explosive [39% more powerful than Comp B] that was developed under the belief that a munition of its general characteristics could defeat ~80% of the most common targets on the modern battlefield. It has penetration capabilities similar to that of the 2000 lb BLU-109 heavy penetration bomb [note that the BLU-116 Advanced Unitary Penetrator (AUP) is said to have 2.0-2.5 times the penetration capability of the BLU-109] – and just how many targets on the battlefield can not be penetrated by a BLU-109. Given that the SDB is expected to be one of, if not THE, most common munition used by US airpower during the better part of this century & that the US is developing an all-new gun (with all-new ammunition) & an all-new warship SPECIFICALLY for NSFS, wouldn’t it be nice if said gun & warship could fire projectiles generally equal to that of the SDB? The GREAT thing about that is that if the troops on the ground call for fire support, it would not matter if it came from airpower or NGFS as the terminal effects of the munitions would be about the same. After all, one of the primary reasons for NGFS is that it is more economical than airpower or missiles/rockets…and if your NGFS can defeat ~80% of the most common targets on the modern battlefield, just think how much LESS you would HAVE to rely on more expensive airpower &/or missiles/rockets. Now what caliber of gun do we ALL KNOW OF that fired shells in the weight range of the SDB & that a modern gun of said caliber could/would fire long range naval projectiles equivalent in effect to a SDB…Note that I AM NOT saying firing a SDB from a gun but firing a projectile equivalent in effect to a SDB. This is what I think the MINIMUM of what US NGFS should be.

 

For the MAXIMUM…Given that the Tomahawk is said to be capable of defeating 95% of the most common targets on the modern battlefield (or at least that is what the 1994 NSFS COEA asserts), that seems like a fair MAXIMUM for NGFS to me. It would, after all, remove the NEED to use Tomahawk for NFS except where its very long range is required to reach the target (which really isn’t even NFS but naval strike). Early unitary warhead Tomahawks have a “1000 lb” WDU-25/B (essentially an upgraded AGM-12C Bullpup B warhead) while Block-III & later unitary warhead Tomahawks have “750 lb” WDU-36/B (actual weight 780 lbs). And of course using SDB improvements, a munition with a 750-1000 lb warhead would be significantly more effective vs many (especially hardened) targets than even a Tomahawk, perhaps closer to that of a 2000 lb “traditional” warhead with penetration capability (perhaps) similar to the BLU-116 AUP. Now what caliber of gun do we ALL KNOW OF that fired shells in the weight range of the 1000 lbs…

 

So...If for NGFS you want something about equal to a “250 lb SDB”, then you would use a gun of 8” (or there about) firing projectiles in the 250-500 lb range. If for NGFS you want something about equal to a “500 lb SDB” (or perhaps a “traditional” 1000 lb munition), then you would use a gun of 10” (or there about) firing projectiles in the 500-1000 lb range. [note that the 1994 NSFS COEA asserts that a 10” gun could defeat 95% of the targets at up to twice the range] If for NGFS you want something about equal to a “1000 lb SDB” (or perhaps a “traditional” 2000 lb munition), then you would use a gun of 12” (or there about) firing projectiles in the 1000-2000 lb range. [The low # representing the minimum weight for “standard” ballistic shells & the high # representing the maximum weight for ERGM type “projectiles”] Anything less & you are too reliant on more expensive missiles & airpower & anything more is likely overkill given the current state of munitions technology/capability.

 

And if you think the 155mm LRLAP is anywhere near equivalent to a “250 lb” SDB, you are VERY MUCH mistaken.

 

“250 lb” SDB

weight: 285 lbs

length: 70.8” long

“warhead”: 206 lb containing 48 lbs of AFX-757 explosive [39% more powerful than Comp B]

 

155mm LRLAP

weight: 246 lbs – 71 lbs (28.9%) of which is rocket - leaving 175 lbs of actual projectile

length: 88” - 48” (54.5%) of which is rocket - leaving 40” of actual projectile

“warhead”: equivalent to M795 [103 lbs] containing 23.8 lbs of explosive

 

So despite being of similar weight [sDB being 39 lbs (~16%) heavier], the SDB has TWICE the "warhead" & is specifically designed to have deep penetration capabilities.

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PFCEM, very nice posts. I was more involved information wise, in the late 90s with NGFS, and the entire topic is usually so screwed up, that I lost interest. Common sense and buying the "best" weapon has never seemed to be part of the whole issue. Politics, politics, Oh, did I say politics? and money have always seemed to be the deciding factor at the end of the day. This being why the DD-1000 will have 155 guns firing a special round with no commonality at all with other 155 guns. The issue stinks like a dumpster outside a seafood restaurant. That is why I have given up on Naval fire support, it wastes too much mental energy with no result.....

 

Great info in those posts. :)

 

 

Edited to add, I had forgotten much of the 90's decision making process on fire suport (other than I hated it) Your posts were a walk through time....

Edited by Gunguy
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Wow. Talk about a smashing TOT opening salvo. 4 big posts in less than 10 minutes. Must be some kind of TN record.

Things were a bit too quite anyway. :P

 

I reckon one long post was typed first then copied and pasted in parts. :)

 

 

Cool, lots of PDFs! Thanks! :)

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I have but one question.

 

What Target set can not be engaged by existing and proposed NSFS solutions, but an 8 inch weapon can?

 

Please note, I'm asking for a definitive target set.

 

Oh no, here we go again! :)

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Oh no, here we go again! :)

 

I'm hoping that this can actually be answered this time :). I've kept it short, and I've kept it sweet. So it should be perfect for a simple, one sentence answer.

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I have but one question.

 

What Target set can not be engaged by existing and proposed NSFS solutions, but an 8 inch weapon can?

 

Please note, I'm asking for a definitive target set.

 

Oh no, you really do not want to go there. :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol:

 

It is the question that will never be answered, for it has no answer and thus must be avoided so as to not crush a certain individuals carefully built-up but oh so fragile belief system.

Edited by FITZ
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