The Soviet Union Surrenders in 1941

[KingSargent]

According to TCDD (Turkish State Railways, there were trains through to Baghdad until the service was suspended in March 2003.

 

http://www.tcdd.gov.tr/tcdding/ortadogu_ing.htm

 

It's what we've been discussing, along with the other tracks laid between the wars by the Turks, which by the late 1930s provided alternative routes to Diyarbakir, not far from the Iraqi border.

And how many roadless mountains are included in that "not far?"

[swerve]

And how many roadless mountains are included in that "not far?"

 

None. It's pretty flat, open country. Been there, seen it. Urfa, Gaziantep & Diyarbakir sit on the northern edge of the plain that rolls south to Basra. I think it fits the classic definition of "good tank country".

 

A view south from Mardin (which sits on a hill for defensibility, of course) -

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/comm...mian_plains.jpg

 

Countryside near Diyarbakir, showing the old Tigris bridge -

http://www.turkeyvision.com/turkeyinformat...diyarbakir9.jpg

 

As well as the transport links being much better than Libya, the local resources were far greater, so less would have to be shipped from Germany. Plenty of water, all year round (this is where the Tigris & Euphrates come from) & much more local food production.

[Richard Lindquist]

Agreed about the impracticality of extra PanzerKorps in Libya.

 

They weren't fishing villages. My 1930s Larousse says they both had populations in the low tens of thousands (1920s data). Mersin, AFAIK, was nothing but a port: it was (& is) the port of the much larger city of Adana. Iskenderun was & a smaller port.

 

Right about the railways, but limited capacity isn't no capacity, & the railways were (& still are) used below capacity. No doubt the Reichsbahn could have helped the Turks increase throughput.

 

Regardless of the population of a coastal city, port capacity is based on deep water piers, cargo handling facilities, transportation for clearing the port of cargo, lighterage facilities, lighterage avaialblility, protected deep water anchorages, etc. You can compute the throughput capacity in tons per day doing a port analysis.

[swerve]

Regardless of the population of a coastal city, port capacity is based on deep water piers, cargo handling facilities, transportation for clearing the port of cargo, lighterage facilities, lighterage avaialblility, protected deep water anchorages, etc. You can compute the throughput capacity in tons per day doing a port analysis.

 

Of course it is, but I don't have that data. Size of town is a very rough proxy, in the absence of anything better. Qualified, of course, by any other information we may have about the functions of the town. In the case of both Mersin & Iskenderun, & especially Mersin, we know they were first & foremost ports, the regional centres being Adana & Antakya, a little inland.

[Ken Estes]

Regardless, guys, if the Germans depended so much on captured/converted rail in the Russo-German War, they certainly would have benefitted from whatever lines existing in the M.E. and N.A.

[philgollin]

Not without building a new harbor larger than Tripoli you won't. Crappy Axis logistics in Africa were not due solely to interference from Malta, the infrastructure was inadequate to handle what did get through.

 

Anybody fantasizing about a bunch of PanzerKorps swamping Africa and the Middle East had better figure out what they are going to do for fuel, rations, and potable water.

 

This only applies if you wish to follow the Italians (and later Germans) real life inability to actually think about logistics and use what facilities and resources they had.

 

There were plenty of small ports (maybe better described as large fishing harbours) along the North African coast. The Italians could have utilised their own coastal vessels and even larger barges to move supplies along that coast going from port to port. They didn't and modern apologists have since claimed that logistics were impossible. Strangely enough the British managed to supply a beseiged Tobruk despite all the opposition. They also managed to keep coastal traffic going through the channel. It's amazing what you can do if you actually understand what maritime logistics can acheive.

 

If you don't use what resources you have you don't have a chance to win.

[Ken Estes]

Hi Paul, There is something wrong about the Lithuanians in the German schema, but I can't put my finger on it. Himmler refused to accept them into the W-SS, for which the Estonian and Latvians were, so that was my initial cut-out. The story must be in Norman Rich, Hitler's War Aims, Vol II the Establishment of the New Order, but I don't have it in hand at the moment. Your last point, of course, is spot-on.

 

p.s. - I have a faint recollection that in the New Order, Lith was to be broken up between greater Latvia and an expanded General Government.

I have it now, and was off by a bit. According to Norman Rich, Reichskommissariat Ostland is est. on July 17, 1941 (among several secret decrees), encompassing the three Balts plus White Russia, renamed White Ruthenia, with Hitler insisting at the same time, continuing his desire [voiced since Jul40] that the entire area be annexed to the Reich. The latter two were foreseen as a racially insufficient in their Germanness, to be corrected by priority colonization. The capital was Riga, but autonomy had to be extended to so vast a territory, with intact police and civil service etc. That measure became official in Mar42, extended to districts and cities of all Ostland in May, June42. However, H. remained immovable, insisting in Nov43 thathe would never give up Estonia and Latvia. Famous last words....

[Guest Bob II]

so we are ignoring the fact that the Royal Navys warships that where escorting the artic convoys can now move into the med and the fact that Italys merchent fleet was in tatters. Remember that the Royal Navy was much better then Italys fleet the Iltalian fleet had no radar but the royal navy did. Also the brits where much better then the Iltalians at night fighting and on top of all this be have the fact that Italys navy was commanded by people who never risked there heavy ship after the Warspite put a 15in shell into one at exterme range (by the time we invaded sicily they had lost 74 destoyers but only one battleship) even getting the man and tanks to the ports whould be a major problem much less getting all the ammo and fule they need

[WRW]

There are railroads and there are railroads. There was a RR in Algeria; it was inadequate to serve the civilian population, much less an Allied Army. I seriously doubt that that the RRs in Turkey and the ME had anything like the carrying capacity of RRs in Europe and the US.

 

What was the capacity of those ports you mention? You aren't going to supply an army through fishing villages.

 

 

Some ports would be usable in Turkey but I have serious doubts about the railway - although you can always build one

[swerve]

so we are ignoring the fact that the Royal Navys warships that where escorting the artic convoys can now move into the med and the fact that Italys merchent fleet was in tatters. Remember that the Royal Navy was much better then Italys fleet the Iltalian fleet had no radar but the royal navy did. Also the brits where much better then the Iltalians at night fighting and on top of all this be have the fact that Italys navy was commanded by people who never risked there heavy ship after the Warspite put a 15in shell into one at exterme range (by the time we invaded sicily they had lost 74 destoyers but only one battleship) even getting the man and tanks to the ports whould be a major problem much less getting all the ammo and fule they need

 

No, we're allowing for the extreme difficulty those battleships will have surviving, let alone operating, facing the full strength of the Luftwaffe, in the relatively confined waters of the Mediterranean - even with Enigma.

[swerve]

Some ports would be usable in Turkey but I have serious doubts about the railway - although you can always build one

 

The railways to SE Turkey were new then. Transfer a few key people from the Reichsbahn to help operate them, & they would have been very useful, even though they'd not have had anything like the throughput of W. European railways. A bit of judicious double-tracking (where cheap, quick & easy to do so) might have been feasible.

 

Nowadays they're underused, neglected, & as far as I can tell, mostly a way of getting some central government money into the poor SE, largely by employing rather more locals than are actually needed to keep them running.

[WRW]

The railways to SE Turkey were new then. Transfer a few key people from the Reichsbahn to help operate them, & they would have been very useful, even though they'd not have had anything like the throughput of W. European railways. A bit of judicious double-tracking (where cheap, quick & easy to do so) might have been feasible.

 

Nowadays they're underused, neglected, & as far as I can tell, mostly a way of getting some central government money into the poor SE, largely by employing rather more locals than are actually needed to keep them running.

 

 

Have not seen any serious double tracking - single line to Kurtalan in south and similar in centre to Van - also I understand we have narrow and wide gauges

[swerve]

Have not seen any serious double tracking - single line to Kurtalan in south and similar in centre to Van - also I understand we have narrow and wide gauges

 

I know. But considering the resources the Germans put into the Russian railways, some rapid - and smaller-scale - improvements in Turkey were surely feasible.

 

BTW, the lines to Kurtalan & Van were built around the time we're discussing. Seems to have been a time of quite rapid railway building in Turkey.

 

Turkish rail network maps, from 1917 onwards. 1937 & 1941 are most relevant here.

 

http://www.trainsofturkey.com/maps.htm#old

Edited October 18, 2007 by swerve

[Olof Larsson]

Thus a world war ensues of unimaginable proportions, as bad as the real War II had been, and nothing can be left out as a possibility. It surely lasts another 5+ years.

 

Well the japanese would probably be starved to death before that,

and how many nukes could the USA drop prior to august/sempember 1950?

 

With the historical production i get it to 5 Mk-1's, 120 Mk-3's

and then mayby 100-200 Mk-4's .

All in all 200-300 nukes.

 

550 produced from 3/49 to 5/51 with production-pace probably increasing during the production run.

 

With the US headstart in the development of nukes and very heavy bombers (and intercontinental bombers)

I really can't se a war going on beyong the mid 1940's.

[Ken Estes]

Well the japanese would probably be starved to death before that,

and how many nukes could the USA drop prior to august/sempember 1950?

 

With the historical production i get it to 5 Mk-1's, 120 Mk-3's

and then mayby 100-200 Mk-4's .

All in all 200-300 nukes.

 

550 produced from 3/49 to 5/51 with production-pace probably increasing during the production run.

 

With the US headstart in the development of nukes and very heavy bombers (and intercontinental bombers)

I really can't se a war going on beyong the mid 1940's.

You are now mixing 'what-if' with 'what-was'. I guess there is no harm, but one would have to assess the axis anew

with the disappearance of the USSR as we knew it. In particular, a successful alliance and joint strategy by the Germans and Japanese remains especially worrisome. US priorities rewritten from 1942 onward might not have supported the Manhattan

Project in the way it turned out. Enuf said, it is all too speculative.

[WRW]

I know. But considering the resources the Germans put into the Russian railways, some rapid - and smaller-scale - improvements in Turkey were surely feasible.

 

BTW, the lines to Kurtalan & Van were built around the time we're discussing. Seems to have been a time of quite rapid railway building in Turkey.

 

Turkish rail network maps, from 1917.

 

http://www.trainsofturkey.com/maps.htm#old

 

Trainsofturkey - this www is amazing - much appreciate the link

[Olof Larsson]

With the US in the war - thanks Japanese - the precarious condition of the UK might be preserved, as most of the Commomwealth, but the dangerous concept of cooperation between Japan and Germany might lead to the loss of the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf before the Allies become effective.

 

If the USSR surrenders in the fall of 1941, their is obviously the possibillety

that japan doesn't go to war with the US.

 

If she could get russian oil from the germans,

the dutch East Indies becomes less of a priority

and therefore the US positions on the PI becomes less of a threat.

 

Not without building a new harbor larger than Tripoli you won't. Crappy Axis logistics in Africa were not due solely to interference from Malta, the infrastructure was inadequate to handle what did get through.

 

Anybody fantasizing about a bunch of PanzerKorps swamping Africa and the Middle East had better figure out what they are going to do for fuel, rations, and potable water.

 

According Michael Tammelander in the book Malta,

neither the RAF and RN on Malta, nor the harbours in north africa was the limiting factor.

They hade more goods coming in to Tripoli, then going away to the front.

The problem was the distances from Tripoli to DAK, and not havig sufficient numbers of trucks available.

 

I doubt they could send in and supply an additional corp though.

Sending more trucks to properly supply the one they allready had, they might do.

 

You are now mixing 'what-if' with 'what-was'. I guess there is no harm, but one would have to assess the axis anew

with the disappearance of the USSR as we knew it. In particular, a successful alliance and joint strategy by the Germans and Japanese remains especially worrisome. US priorities rewritten from 1942 onward might not have supported the Manhattan

Project in the way it turned out. Enuf said, it is all too speculative.

 

Isn't all "what-if's" based on knowledge from "what-was"

We assume industrial output i ockupied USSR based on idustrial output in ockupied Poland.

We assume the relative strenght or the Luftwaffe,

and the vulnerbilety of battleships based on what was and so on.

 

Now, if USSR surrenders, many unforseen things might happen.

(Turkey and Spain joining the war, Japan buying oil from Germany and not going to war with the US etc. etc.)

Either way Brittain is far more exposed then historicaly.

That meens that the original reason for the B-35/B-36 (bombing Europe from CONUS or Canada)

becomes more likely, so therefore more resourced would probably be invested in those projects.

 

Futhermore, with USSR out of the game (and brittain risking invasion),

liberating Europe by conventional means would be a harder of even possible.

 

So you're in a situation where you might be the only worthwile democracy left in the world.

You might be in a situation were you can not win the war with conventional means,

or where winning with conventional means might take so long time,

that the germans might win the A-bomb race.

 

It seems to me, that the motives for B-29/B-32, B-35/B-36 and Manhattan

would only be stronger, with the USSR out of the game.

 

Now, it certainly doesn't meen that the US will get the bomb.

Mayby they make some non-historical mistake along the line, which delays the project,

but then mayby, one of all those plots against Hitler might suddenly succeed,

with the generals taking power, shooting the remaining nazi-leaders etc. etc.

[KingSargent]

According Michael Tammelander in the book Malta, neither the RAF and RN on Malta, nor the harbours in north africa was the limiting factor.

The dockside cranes were inadequate for heavy loads (like Tiger tanks), they could only handle about four-five ships at a time (reason for small convoys), and there was no fuel transport infrastructure except trucks, which burn too much fuel while delivering what is left to Egypt.

 

They hade more goods coming in to Tripoli, then going away to the front.

Um, well, yes, people in Tripoli liked to eat too.....

 

The problem was the distances from Tripoli to DAK, and not havig sufficient numbers of trucks available.x

Like I said, no infrastructure.

 

I doubt they could send in and supply an additional corp though.

So did they.

 

Sending more trucks to properly supply the one they allready had, they might do.

And those trucks would have burned more fuel and needed more parts and personnel who needed food, which would mean still more trucks to supply the new trucks.

Not to mention hundreds of miles of two-lane road is not really a very good logistical source.

[Guest Bob II]

dont forget that the luffwaffa had 65% of its planes involved in the invasion of the USSR so that means you have a lot more planes to fight elsewhere

Edited October 22, 2007 by Bob II

[Marek Tucan]

dont forget that the luffwaffa had 65% of its planes involved in the invasion of the USSR so that means you have a lot more planes to fight elsewhere

 

AFAIK this applies just to a month or about so just after Barbarossa, otherwise majority of LW combat planes was fighting Western Allies.