There is still time to stop it...

[Murph]

What if Picket's Charge had not been made? What if Lee had listened to Longstreet, could the CSA have decisively beaten the Union Army at Gettysburg?

[DKTanker]

What if Picket's Charge had not been made? What if Lee had listened to Longstreet, could the CSA have decisively beaten the Union Army at Gettysburg?

The battle was lost the first day when the CSA failed to take the then empty high ground. After that the Union line became a bulwark the CSA could either bang their heads against, which they did, or concede they were out manuevered and cut their losses.

[KingSargent]

What if Picket's Charge had not been made? What if Lee had listened to Longstreet, could the CSA have decisively beaten the Union Army at Gettysburg?

Nevah hoppen GeeEye.

 

What is Lee going to do? Move to the right? Down one road within rifle shot of Union entrenchments, with his ammo trains, supply trains, and wounded (and he had a lot of wounded by July3)?

 

Move to the left? Same problem and worse terrain.

 

Of course if the US cooperated by doing something stupid like Sickles did on the 2nd, it might happen.

 

Lee could have broken off and retired and chewed up any Union pursuit. I doubt the AoP would be much faster off the mark at pursuit than they were historically, and Lee would have all the ammo and casualties that didn't get shot on the 3rd to maul them.

[Jim Martin]

The battle was lost the first day when the CSA failed to take the then empty high ground. After that the Union line became a bulwark the CSA could either bang their heads against, which they did, or concede they were out manuevered and cut their losses.

 

 

The battle was lost the first day when Lee got decisively engaged.

[DKTanker]

The battle was lost the first day when Lee got decisively engaged.

In fairness to Lee, he wasn't the one that decided to engage...that was a done deal before he showed up or even knew about it. However, after arriving and assessing the situation, yes, his decision to stay and fight from a tactical disadvantage all but ensured a tactical defeat.

[Guest aevans]

The battle was lost the first day when Lee got decisively engaged.

 

Actually, the battle was lost when Meade decided to abandon the Pipe Creek Circular as a concept of operations and support with the full army what had, up until that moment, been nothing but an affair of troops within range marching to the sound of the guns. (The Union and Confederate numbers actually engaged were close to equal on July 1, and the Confederates got the best of it.) Had the Union for whatever reason stuck to the Pipe Creek Circular, Gettysburg, if remembered at all, would be considered nothing but a delaying action while the Pipe Creek line was occupied.

[DesertFox]

How about it the 15th Alabama managed to defeat 20th Maine?

[Old Tanker]

Every time this topic comes up I usually get shot at heavy for my opinion.

 

Lee lost because his command team had been reshuffled after the loss of Stonewall Jackson.

What ended up being was equal quality leadership for both armies with the AoP having a solid base of quality leadership and soldiers.

Since it was more or less equal the advantage was to the defender. When it came down to the actual fight the ANV was more hesitant than the AoP.

Meade was the right man for the right job in the right place. Throw in additional Union commanders such as Chamberlain , Hancock and Buford that led highly competent troops and you have a Union victory. I don't follow the theory that it was doomed from the start as Chancellorville and Antietam were doomed from the start and the CSA was victorious in both.

[DKTanker]

How about it the 15th Alabama managed to defeat 20th Maine?

The bigger picture being if Longstreet could have rolled up Hancock's left flank. What Longstreet and Lee didn't appreciate is that Sykes had moved his forces well in front of Hancock's left front flank...this slowed down Longstreet's advance thus allowing Sickle's forces, of which 20th Maine was a part, time to move across the interior lines south to the Round Top heights.

 

Not to be overlooked of course is Abner Doubleday's, yes that Abner Doubleday*, orderly retreat of I Corps back to Cemetary Hill/Ridge area, while under pressure from A.P. Hill's forces, on July 1st, thus preserving the ever defensible high ground making the events of July 2nd possible.

 

*Abner Doubleday found himself in charge after General Reynolds was struck down the morning of July 1st. He was subsequently relieved by Winnie Hancock.

[Guest aevans]

How about it the 15th Alabama managed to defeat 20th Maine?

 

Vincent's admonition to Chamberlain that the loss of Little Round Top meant the loss of the AoP makes a good yarn, but there were plenty of uncommitted Union troops coming onto the battlefield as the afternoon wore on, and Warren probably didn't expect the position to hold, just to buy time.

[ThirteenFox]

Not to be overlooked of course is Abner Doubleday's, yes that Abner Doubleday*, orderly retreat of I Corps back to Cemetary Hill/Ridge area, while under pressure from A.P. Hill's forces, on July 1st, thus preserving the ever defensible high ground making the events of July 2nd possible.

 

*Abner Doubleday found himself in charge after General Reynolds was struck down the morning of July 1st. He was subsequently relieved by Winnie Hancock.

 

 

Actually, O.O. Howard was in overall command after Reynolds was killed. Doubleday was acting commander of I Corps.

 

Reynolds was the AoP's left wing commander, with overall responsibility for the I, III, and V Corps.

 

Howard arrived at Gettysburg ~1130 and was senior officer present until Hancock showed up ~1630. Hancock met Howard and informed him that Meade had put him in charge. Howard argued that he was senior in rank, and later maintained that he gave Hancock command of only part of the Union troops on the field at that time.

[DKTanker]

Actually, O.O. Howard was in overall command after Reynolds was killed. Doubleday was acting

Just had to rain on my much abridged parade, didn't ya.

[ThirteenFox]

Just had to rain on my much abridged parade, didn't ya.

 

Nope, not at all...just picking nits

[DesertFox]

Vincent's admonition to Chamberlain that the loss of Little Round Top meant the loss of the AoP makes a good yarn, but there were plenty of uncommitted Union troops coming onto the battlefield as the afternoon wore on, and Warren probably didn't expect the position to hold, just to buy time.

 

Besides, nothing like admonishing the troops that if they lose the fight, the whole battle is lost?

[Guest aevans]

Besides, nothing like admonishing the troops that if they lose the fight, the whole battle is lost?

 

It was a very dramatic age. Vincent was typical of its drama queens.

[KingSargent]

Just had to rain on my much abridged parade, didn't ya.

Speaking of picking rained-on nits, Vincent's brigade was part of Sykes' V Corps, not Sickles' III Corps.

 

Probably the smartest thing Meade ever did was to take the AoP under the condition that he could shuffle and appoint commanders regardless of seniority. Seniority squabbles had crippled the AoP since its inception.

[DesertFox]

It was a very dramatic age. Vincent was typical of its drama queens.

 

Yes, according to the audio book I have of "Killer Angels," the time was one of "Windy Phrases"

[Jim Martin]

As far as I'm concerned, Lee's best move was to leave on the night of the first. He'd knocked the Federals for a loop on their right flank, and they were in no mood to pursue. Buford's cavalry had been chewed up in the day's fighint, and wouldn't have been in much shape to shadow Lee's retreat, and the balance of Union cavalry hadn't arrived either. Breaking contact would have been a breeze. The question then becomes, after Lee breaks contact at Gettysburg, where does he go? Back into Maryland via Harper's Ferry? I belive that Gettysburg was the important road junction to penetrate deeper into PA, and he wouldn't have wished to go north, leaving the AOP on his LOC. Further west would have been rather a dead end, and risked leaving his retreat route via Harper's Ferry exposed. Does a failure at Gettysburg leave Lee no choice but retreat southward again, or does he have other options for maneuver?

[KingSargent]

As far as I'm concerned, Lee's best move was to leave on the night of the first. He'd knocked the Federals for a loop on their right flank, and they were in no mood to pursue. Buford's cavalry had been chewed up in the day's fighint, and wouldn't have been in much shape to shadow Lee's retreat, and the balance of Union cavalry hadn't arrived either. Breaking contact would have been a breeze. The question then becomes, after Lee breaks contact at Gettysburg, where does he go? Back into Maryland via Harper's Ferry? I belive that Gettysburg was the important road junction to penetrate deeper into PA, and he wouldn't have wished to go north, leaving the AOP on his LOC. Further west would have been rather a dead end, and risked leaving his retreat route via Harper's Ferry exposed. Does a failure at Gettysburg leave Lee no choice but retreat southward again, or does he have other options for maneuver?

I don't see what. Going east leaves him with the same problem as going south - the roads are within range of Union positions.

 

As far as Buford not being able to scout, Lee didn't have anybody right there either; which is another reason for Lee not maneuvering, he doesn't know what he is up against.

 

Lee could have gone further north, he was essentially floating in the wilderness and didn't have an LOC. He could have at least found someplace he could defend and see what was going on. The problem was anything at all moving through G-burg was within vision and range of Union guns. He also would not have wanted to go haring off anywhere until his army was up, including trains, or risk being destroyed in detail. Basically it would have been the 3rd before he could move safely, and that was with tired troops and horses.

[Old Tanker]

As far as I'm concerned, Lee's best move was to leave on the night of the first. He'd knocked the Federals for a loop on their right flank, and they were in no mood to pursue. Buford's cavalry had been chewed up in the day's fighint, and wouldn't have been in much shape to shadow Lee's retreat, and the balance of Union cavalry hadn't arrived either. Breaking contact would have been a breeze. The question then becomes, after Lee breaks contact at Gettysburg, where does he go? Back into Maryland via Harper's Ferry? I belive that Gettysburg was the important road junction to penetrate deeper into PA, and he wouldn't have wished to go north, leaving the AOP on his LOC. Further west would have been rather a dead end, and risked leaving his retreat route via Harper's Ferry exposed. Does a failure at Gettysburg leave Lee no choice but retreat southward again, or does he have other options for maneuver?

 

 

These debates have been going on for 150 years.

 

Questions :

 

= What would of happened if Sickle hadn't deployed forward but Longstreet attacked as he did ?

= On the third day what options did Lee have other than attack?

= Could he sit still and wait for Meade to go on the offensive , sitting still for 48 hours ?

 

Some hsitorians rate Sickle's forward deployment a plus for the AoP as it attritioned 2/3rds of Longstreet's corp to no end.

[Guest aevans]

These debates have been going on for 150 years.

 

Questions :

 

= What would of happened if Sickle hadn't deployed forward but Longstreet attacked as he did ?

 

Some hsitorians rate Sickle's forward deployment a plus for the AoP as it attritioned 2/3rds of Longstreet's corp to no end.

 

Walking the battlefield, it's easy to see that the line Sickles adopted, though on a lower piece of ground than Cemetary Ridge, actually providedthe better fields of fire. So it's understandable why Sickles did what he did. Unfortunately, the ground that had to be occupied to achieve these advantages was realtively clear and open, and this was 1863, when troops didn't create field fortifications out of habit like they would a year later. So the position was not as strong as it needed to be. Had that position been organized as it would have been just a year later, we probably wouldn't even be talking about the attrition it created, but about the futility of attacking across open ground against prepared defenses.

 

= On the third day what options did Lee have other than attack?

Withdraw over South Mountain into the Cumberland Valley, just like he eventually wound up doing.

 

= Could he sit still and wait for Meade to go on the offensive , sitting still for 48 hours ?

 

Meade wouldn't have done it. His mission was to cover Baltimore and Washington, a mission he was achieving as long as Lee farted around in Pennsylvania. He could wait longer for Lee to go away than Lee could wait for him to do something stupid. I think we underestimate Lee to think that he wouldn't have known that.