Idealized 1865 Regiment

[Paul in Qatar]

Preparing myself for the upcoming National Novel Writing Month, I am drinking lots of fluids and contemplating and idealized Infantry regiment of the year 1865 or so. I will add to it as my time-travelling character makes tweaks.

 

Remember, three regiments make a brigade, three brigades make a division. Battalions and platoons are ad hoc.

 

12 Companies

100 Other Ranks

1 Captain

2 Lieutenants

2 pack animals

 

Subtotal of companies:

1,236 personnel

24 animals

 

1 Headquarters

15 Other Ranks

1 Colonel

1 Lieutenant Colonel

1 Major

2 Captains

6 draught animals

5 chargers

1 3-ton wagon

 

Subtotal of Companies and Headquarters:

1,246 personnel

35 animals

1 wagon

 

Now we add some non-historical stuff:

 

Attached Cannon Company

60 Other Ranks

1 Captain

3 Lieutenants

72 draught animals

6 cannon (w/ caissons)

6 3-ton wagons

 

Attached Regimental Hospital

15 Other Ranks

1 Captain-surgegon

2 Lieutenant-surgeon

3 Ambulances

2 3-ton wagons

3 chargers

24 draught animals

 

Commissary Support with the Regiment

4 Other Ranks

1 3-ton wagon

3 heads of beef

6 draught animals.

 

Grand total:

1,294 Other Ranks

1 Colonel

1 Lieutenant Colonel

1 Major

16 Captain

26 Lieutenants

 

We have to allow for at least one Lieutenant and one Captain to be at school, the Old Army requirement. We will have no Lieutenants or Captains above regiment, those extra staff guys will come out of hide. Still, that is a hell of a jump from Captain to Major. I suppose I ought to add an attached Sapper company. Anything else?

 

Oh yes, "November Company," a bobtail unit back in the home state to handle depot and basic training functions. The biggest weakness of the US Army in the Civil War period was the inability of the state (except Wisconsin) to bring replacements to their regiments.

[Guest aevans]

Ten companies were enough. It gives you four regiments to a brigade vice three, which was more in tune with the tactical realities of the time. (Brigades often fought in two lines, which would ideally be of equal strength.)

 

They tried attaching artillery batteries to brigades at the beginning of the war. They found out that division and even corps level artillery was more efficient, given the available technology. Artillery at the regimental level would have made no sense. By 1865 a Gatling gun battery at the brigade level might have made some sense.

 

Given the density of troops on most ACW battlefields, regimental level medical detachments would be inefficient. A formal hosptial structure below division would be overkill, except perhaps for detached brigades in garrison somewhere.

[67th Tigers]

It's immensely "underlogisticed".

 

A typical ACW regiment will have about 30-50 wagons of it's own ISTR, and have also detached roughly 20% of its strength to the commisiariat department to drive the ammunition, sustenance, engineer etc.s wagons.

 

However, ACW regiments were remarkable oversupplied with wagons. Under Sherman logistics was reorganised as a British style Flying Column which increased mobility and decreased the vast number of men leeched off to non-combatant duties immensely, reducing the number of wagons to 50 per 1,000 men (see: http://www.strategypage.com/articles/defau...militaryart.htm )

 

PS: See http://books.google.com/books?id=hg7UfLDHB...ITziMk#PPA73,M1

Edited September 28, 2007 by 67th Tigers

[67th Tigers]

Ten companies were enough. It gives you four regiments to a brigade vice three, which was more in tune with the tactical realities of the time. (Brigades often fought in two lines, which would ideally be of equal strength.)

 

10 companies was a historical aberation. The manuals and tactics were designed for 8 company battalions (with 3 to a brigade, 2 brigades to a divisions and 2 divisions to an Army Corps). The 9th and 10th companies were flank companies, and were supposed to be detached as skirmishers. 10 centre companies caused some real problems in the evolutions of a battalion.

 

They tried attaching artillery batteries to brigades at the beginning of the war. They found out that division and even corps level artillery was more efficient, given the available technology. Artillery at the regimental level would have made no sense. By 1865 a Gatling gun battery at the brigade level might have made some sense.

The batteries were concentrated as there simply weren't enough officers competant to handle artillery on the battlefield. So the regulars centralised and controlled divisional battalions in the manner they would batteries.

 

Brigade Gatling Gun companies seems a little silly. The Gatling gun is a pretty poor weapon, is slow to move and requires a large train. It would compromise the brigade.

 

Given the density of troops on most ACW battlefields, regimental level medical detachments would be inefficient. A formal hosptial structure below division would be overkill, except perhaps for detached brigades in garrison somewhere.

 

Yet they had medical detachments IRL, although not the size of this one (usually only one surgeon per regiment etc.)

[Paul in Qatar]

I am basing this on the discussion near the end of Sherman's Memoirs.* He called for a dozen line companies to yield three battalions of four companies. He also preferred a very light regiment. Only one 'real' tent, at regiment. Everyone else gets a 'fly' (that is a shelter half). Darn light. Hard to see it work in rainy Europe.

 

A 1,000 man regiment eats a three-ton wagon a day, or every three days if the beef comes on the hoof (as in this case).

 

Still, I am not overly-defending it. I agree, it looks darn thin. I am also not happy with the rank distribution. I want to keep them short of officers, for a Starship Troopers sort of thing. But then we have this huge jump from a dozen O-3 trying to get to the one O-4 slot. That is tough.

 

 

*The book is missing, sometimes the houseboy steals things. What he would make of Sherman's book is a mystery to me.

[67th Tigers]

Online at: http://books.google.com/books?id=_HM3v19TA...TUWdTMmHq4PwbNI

[67th Tigers]

Online at: http://books.google.com/books?id=_HM3v19TA...TUWdTMmHq4PwbNI

 

Specifically, see pg 1259

 

BTW: Surgeon and 2 assistants is just that, one surgeon and 2 orderlies, not 3 surgeons (see pg 1271)

[Paul in Qatar]

I found my copy. Let me find the right page. Page 876 ...

 

"In olden times the regiment was composed of eight battalion companies and two flank companies. The First and Tenth were armed with rifles and were styled and used as "skirmishers;" but during the war they were never used ... in fact no distinction existed between them and the other eight companies."

 

"The ten-company organization is awkward in practice ...the infantry regiment should have .... twelve companies."

 

"Three regiments would compose a brigade, three brigades a division, and three division a corps. Then by allowing an infantry corps a brigade of cavalry and six batteries of field-artillery we would have an efficient corps d'armee of thirty thousand men ..."

 

 

Darn WTS wrote pretty.

[Guest aevans]

10 companies was a historical aberation. The manuals and tactics were designed for 8 company battalions (with 3 to a brigade, 2 brigades to a divisions and 2 divisions to an Army Corps). The 9th and 10th companies were flank companies, and were supposed to be detached as skirmishers. 10 centre companies caused some real problems in the evolutions of a battalion.

 

Real problems in the parade ground evolutions of the battalion. In the field -- which is where it counted -- drill was stripped down to facing a company column into line and reforming company column again, with companies marching in the battalion column in the order they would be in line.

 

The batteries were concentrated as there simply weren't enough officers competant to handle artillery on the battlefield. So the regulars centralised and controlled divisional battalions in the manner they would batteries.

Really? Are you sure this isn't an excuse made up by historians that don't understand how the weapons were used? ACW artillery performed the mission we would assign to machineguns today. (To the point that gunners were even taught to aim low so that cannister misses would bounce balls into the target, just like we train machinegunners to aim low so that misses will bounce bullets into the target.) So it's hard to believe that the battery officers couldn't learn tactics regularly taught to a modern sergeant. (And from what I've read, they certainly did understand these tactics.) There were plenty of perfectly valid management reasons to consolidate artillery into battalions -- being able to control when and where rifled pieces would be available, being able to create large concentrations more readily (simply because it's easier to attach down the CoC when necessary than it is to consolidate up the chain), and consolidating maintenance activities.

 

Brigade Gatling Gun companies seems a little silly. The Gatling gun is a pretty poor weapon, is slow to move and requires a large train. It would compromise the brigade.

 

But field artillery batteries at the brigade level (if only those poor benighted redleg captains and lieutenants could learn how to use their weapons ) wouldn't compromise the brigade. You can't have it both ways.

Edited September 28, 2007 by aevans

[Paul in Qatar]

Tigers, thank you so much for the link. I never before encountered Plain Label Books. Now I have to see if I can download stuff from it.

[KingSargent]

Ten companies were enough. It gives you four regiments to a brigade vice three, which was more in tune with the tactical realities of the time. (Brigades often fought in two lines, which would ideally be of equal strength.)

Since the units were understrength, how they were broken down didn't matter a lot. What difference if your two-line regiment had three companies at 80% strength in one line and six companies at 40% strength in the other? - the men per line would be the same (I assume the other company(s) is skirmishing).

 

They tried attaching artillery batteries to brigades at the beginning of the war. They found out that division and even corps level artillery was more efficient, given the available technology. Artillery at the regimental level would have made no sense. By 1865 a Gatling gun battery at the brigade level might have made some sense.

Before the war, the Army almost never operated in units larger than brigades, so attaching a battery per brigade was normal. In the East (read ANV area) combining the batteries made sense; for one thing it concentrated the support equipment like battery wagons and forges at battalion level, decreasing overhead.

In the Western theater the terrain and roads split the armies up during movement, so the "battery to a brigade" organization hung on. The brigade might run into something while fumbling down narrow unmapped roads. If the armies could find a place to do battle with good visibility (ie, NOT Chickamauga), then the batteries could be be concentrated under a battalion or brigade HQ.

 

Given the density of troops on most ACW battlefields, regimental level medical detachments would be inefficient. A formal hosptial structure below division would be overkill, except perhaps for detached brigades in garrison somewhere.

I wonder here if Paul means "1865 Regiment while the ACW is still on" or if he means "1865 Regiment when the Army returns to independent units at Small Posts after the War."

[Redbeard]

I'd say your organisation appear pre-Napoleonic - 12 companies under one commander would be a very cumbersome affair. I'd recommend fewer companies in each battalion, 4 or 6 (larger companies) like in the Prussian and French Armies respectively.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[Paul in Qatar]

Well the sad, sad truth is I am toying with another time-travel story. So how ought the US Army of the Civil War period been organized? Just fixing the broke-dick method of handling replacements that occurred in timeline would make a very major difference.

 

The Cannon Company attached to the regiment has a number of advantages. First off, habitual association is the basis for better coordination. Next, having infantrymen around protects the guns from raiders. Finally, I like the idea of having some extra wagons and powder on hand for the infantry.

[Suhiir]

Well the sad, sad truth is I am toying with another time-travel story. So how ought the US Army of the Civil War period been organized? Just fixing the broke-dick method of handling replacements that occurred in timeline would make a very major difference.

 

The Cannon Company attached to the regiment has a number of advantages. First off, habitual association is the basis for better coordination. Next, having infantrymen around protects the guns from raiders. Finally, I like the idea of having some extra wagons and powder on hand for the infantry.

 

Make that cannon company 12lb smoothbores.

Fairly light guns and the grapeshot would be murder at musket range.

I'd be inclined to skip the gattling guns and just go with 12lb'rs there too.

Much easier to make and maintain then a gattling, would use the same supply as the other guns.

Edited September 29, 2007 by Suhiir

[67th Tigers]

Sherman's suggestions (made in the 1880's remember) seem to be:

 

The Army Corps should be the unit of operations, with:

 

3 Divisions of 3 Brigades of 3 Regiments of 3 Battalions of 4 Companies

1 Cavalry Brigade of 3 Regiments of 3 Battalions of 4 Troops

6 Batteries of Field Artillery

 

The Regiment is to be ca. 1,000 men on campaign, for a Brigade of 3,000 which would have a frontage of 1 mile in a single line.

 

Thus 27,000 infantry per corps, ca 2,400 cavalry and ca 600 artillery.

 

As per Sherman, 25% of this strength would be detached to the commisiariat.

[Paul in Qatar]

It seems to me, he was accounting for a general 25% of all 'ash & trash' to include the commissariat.

 

I was thinking, an Engineer company of the period could be quite small, say fifty guys with wagons with plenty of hand tools. And a barrel of copper coins to pay civilians to do the non-skilled stuff.

 

 

Or not.

 

ow about rapid-reloading organ guns in lieu of gatlings?

[Guest aevans]

Make that cannon company 12lb smoothbores.

Fairly light guns and the grapeshot would be murder at musket range.

I'd be inclined to skip the gattling guns and just go with 12lb'rs there too.

Much easier to make and maintain then a gattling, would use the same supply as the other guns.

 

The cannon company, even one made up of maountain howitzers or some equally lightwieght design, represents just too much logistics tail for a regimental sized unit. Presumably you would need some field artillery too, probably rifles. Now you're getting into eight or nine guns per 1,000 men territory, especially since units would never be at full strength. That's just too much, for logistics reasons alone -- where are you going to find all of those horses and fodder?. And aside from the logistics impracticalities, where are you going to find frontage for all of those guns? Even a compressed battery would occupy 40-50 yards of front.

 

Gattling guns were more complicated, but they were more responsive (no waiting for a reaload), aimable without manipulating the carriage, and, because they relied on small arms manufacturing techniques, potentially easier to produce and replace than field artillery tubes.

[Guest aevans]

ow about rapid-reloading organ guns in lieu of gatlings?

 

Why? Gatlings leveraged the technical capabilities of Union industry. Organ guns, once you fired all of your barrels, were just the same old muzzle-loading filed artillery problems divided into many more pieces.

[Guest aevans]

The Cannon Company attached to the regiment has a number of advantages. First off, habitual association is the basis for better coordination. Next, having infantrymen around protects the guns from raiders. Finally, I like the idea of having some extra wagons and powder on hand for the infantry.

 

Extra wagons represent extra horses. See my comments about the logistics impracticality of that many guns to begin with. Also, by 1865 the trend was clearly towards breech loaders firing metallic cartridges, so extra powder (and artillery powder is generally different from small arms powder anyway) would have been of no practical help.

[Guest aevans]

Sherman's suggestions (made in the 1880's remember) seem to be:

 

The Army Corps should be the unit of operations, with:

 

3 Divisions of 3 Brigades of 3 Regiments of 3 Battalions of 4 Companies

1 Cavalry Brigade of 3 Regiments of 3 Battalions of 4 Troops

6 Batteries of Field Artillery

 

The Regiment is to be ca. 1,000 men on campaign, for a Brigade of 3,000 which would have a frontage of 1 mile in a single line.

 

Thus 27,000 infantry per corps, ca 2,400 cavalry and ca 600 artillery.

 

As per Sherman, 25% of this strength would be detached to the commisiariat.

 

The "battalions" in this scheme would be only about twice the size of continental European companies of the ame period. It would make more sense to reduce the regiment itself to eight companies, and have four such regiments per brigade, each regiment fighting tactically as a single battalion.

[67th Tigers]

The "battalions" in this scheme would be only about twice the size of continental European companies of the ame period. It would make more sense to reduce the regiment itself to eight companies, and have four such regiments per brigade, each regiment fighting tactically as a single battalion.

 

The brigades of the late ACW had a fairly strong resemblance to a Prussian Battalion by accident, with the Regiments forming Prussian style "double companies". Everyone else prettymuch retained 75-100 man coys.

 

This formation, after deductions for commisariat, sick, absent etc. would probably field battalions of about 250 (i.e. Prussian coys), with 9 per brigade.

[Guest aevans]

The brigades of the late ACW had a fairly strong resemblance to a Prussian Battalion by accident, with the Regiments forming Prussian style "double companies". Everyone else prettymuch retained 75-100 man coys.

 

This formation, after deductions for commisariat, sick, absent etc. would probably field battalions of about 250 (i.e. Prussian coys), with 9 per brigade.

 

Except that the Prussians had twelve, not nine companies per regiment and 24 per brigade (though only two brigades per division). Also, the late war regiments didn't fight like Prussians did, and after the war they hardly ever fought in groups larger than four or five fifty man companies, even on campaigns where several regiments were present.

[Unreal John]

All these can be downloaded at no cost. The lower half of the list is non-fiction.

 

http://www.gutenberg.org/wiki/US_Civil_War_%28Bookshelf%29

[Paul in Qatar]

I want to apologize for typing without the source documents in front of me.

 

Each wagon is 3,000 lbs, about 1200KG. Not twice that. Each wagon has six animals. A regiment eats a wagon a day if using prepared beef, a wagon every two days if beef on the hoof is provided.