The Britsh Supporting the confederates

[Grant Whitley]

I was wondering if you'd get around to the livestock argument. The problem with that contention is that a certain, well known, amount of care does guarantee, for all practical purposes, the profitable retention of livestock. If humans refuse to be slaves, they can push the issue to the point of having to kill them, thus destroying their capital value.

 

You can take measure to minimize the chances of slaves escaping, as well. The base of your argument seems to be that a slave's value can be suddenly and unexpectedly reduced to nothing, but this is true of anything that has value. Animals escape, machines and tools break, crops fall victim to pests and the weather. I don't see why the sentience and free will of the slave makes any difference in this context.

 

If escape/rebellion/etc. were really a huge problem, they would have undermined the slave economy to the point that it wasn't practical. But this did not happen, because the slaveholders were able to minimize these occurrences.

[Rich]

Special Reports 6 and 7 are on archive.org. Crack on.

 

Gee, maybe you should take your own advice, since it's pretty evident you have read neither....or perhaps you did read them but just suffer from a failure of comprehension?

 

Of course, they draw most of their material from Stacey's "Canada and the British Army 1846-1871", which is pretty much a must read on the topic if you wanted to learn about the Canadian Militia etc. of the period.

Er, no, Hitsman referenced Stacey's "Canada and the British Army" just four times, plus a few references to his journal articles. Otherwise a wide variety of primary and secondary sources were used, although he seems to have missed Chambers, which may be the best.

 

In 1861 "Canada" consisted of Upper and Lower Canada, the other mentioned territories were not incorporated into it until 1867. More to the point, Canada Command (Williams) only includes the Province of Canada (and has been subdivided into 18 militia districts, which in turn have been formed into 5 departments, London, Toronto, Kingston, Montreal and Quebec, for the purposes of resisting the Union).

 

Er, no again, "Canada" consisted of Canada East and Canada West as of the promulgation of the Militia Act of 1855, but that act retained the former designations of Upper and Lower Canada for Militia affairs. Sir Williams was the Lieutenant-General Commanding in North America, not the commander of "Canada Command", there was no such thing. The Militia Districts numbered 11 in Lower Canada and 10 in Upper Canada by late 1862, but the department system wasn't instituted until the passing of the Militia Act of 1868 following Confederation. By that point I'm not sure why such an action would be considered as being for the purpose of "resisting the Union"?

 

Nova Scotia Command (Doyle) is a seperate command. The 3.2m citizens of "British North America"* are actually slightly more than half the 5.5m citizens of the CSA....

 

* i.e. the area covered by Canada Command and Nova Scotia Command

 

I see, so slaves "count" if they are part of "wealth" but they don't count of they are part of "population"? I see you are maintaining the flexibility of your definitions.

Edited October 4, 2007 by Rich

[Guest aevans]

You can take measure to minimize the chances of slaves escaping, as well. The base of your argument seems to be that a slave's value can be suddenly and unexpectedly reduced to nothing, but this is true of anything that has value. Animals escape, machines and tools break, crops fall victim to pests and the weather. I don't see why the sentience and free will of the slave makes any difference in this context.

 

If escape/rebellion/etc. were really a huge problem, they would have undermined the slave economy to the point that it wasn't practical. But this did not happen, because the slaveholders were able to minimize these occurrences.

 

Actually, escape and the potential of rebellion did drive the slave economy in North America towards marginalization, by forcing it to expend more resources on security and living condition concessions (which made the economic calculus of the slave a little less desparate and therefore less prone to escape and/or rebellion). Animal husbandry has no comparison. In fact, it turns out that penning animals in more efficient but less natural conditions than the free range actually increases their economic value. Try that with humans and you either sacrifice more than you gain by way of investing in security, or (as in the case of nazi Germany, where it was actually planned) you wind up working your slaves into despair and eventual death, meaningyour slave labor economy only lasts as long as you can capture more slaves.

[67th Tigers]

Let's see, In October 1861, First Manassas had just happened, a battle in which both sides couldn't muster 30,000 men apiece.

 

In 1863 the Union AoP had approximately 85-90,000 men on hand (not just on paper) at Gettysburg. At the same time, the Union had approximately 60,000 men laying siege to Vicksburg, and 60,000 more troops in Central Tennesse preparing to mount an advance into Georgia. And depots. And garrisons.

 

By 1865, the Union Army had 1,000,000 men under arms.

 

No, it had just over 1m names on rolls, that does not mean 1m men.

 

Of those 1m, 350,000 had taken furlough and never returned, 200,000 had absented themselves without permission, sick, wounded and under arrest account for another 100,000 or so (this figure is generalised by me, these categories normally accounted for 20-30% of the roll), leaving 350,000 (or whom ca. 120,000 are temporary militia and ca 100,000 are employed as CSS (by Sherman's Memoirs, he reduced the CSS element to 25% of strength)). This leaves about 150,000 combatants in the field, which tallies with Sherman's Memoirs ISTR.

 

This is about the typical strength of the Union Army (ca 350,000, inc CSS), but by 1865 the situation is so poor a massive draft of militia is needed to keep the combined armies of the Potomac, Cumberland and James upto 150,000 all arms.

 

This is the realm of pure fantasy. In 1864-65, the Union army conducted a siege at Petersburg for ten months, with an army of up to 100,000. It could only do so because it had the unprecedented in human history (though the French and Birtish came close in the Crimea) technology and wealth to supply such a large army in place for almost a year.

 

See, the only field army you admit is ca 100,000, but you repeat the 1m figure. Where were they all (retorical question)?

 

It shows a remarkable parocialism that you're unaware of any previous army of 100,000 remaining in the field, supplied from elsewhere....

 

This is beyond the realm of fantasy.

 

Nope, see Ella Lonn's "Desertion during the Civil War", http://www.amazon.com/Desertion-during-Civ...n/dp/0803279752

 

http://www.etymonline.com/cw/lonn.htm for the intro and conclusion

 

or

 

http://www.etymonline.com/cw/desertion2.htm for a study of a few Union Regiments

[Old Tanker]

I don't believe the political will was there for the Brits to support the CSA in as much as to get tactically involved.

They were doing fine in Asia and dominated world trade as in why rock the boat in N.A. You'll notice Canada became a dominion soon after the ACW.

[Guest aevans]

Sorry, Tigger, but you just lost what little credibility you had left by linking to an openly Southern apologist site. Have fun in the echo chamber.

[67th Tigers]

Er, no again, "Canada" consisted of Canada East and Canada West as of the promulgation of the Militia Act of 1855, but that act retained the former designations of Upper and Lower Canada. Sir Williams was the Lieutenant-General Commanding in North America, not the commander of "Canada Command", there was no such thing.

 

A simple perusal of the Army List would show differently.

 

Maj Gen Williams is "Lieutenant General on the Staff in North America" commanding "Canada", Doyle is "Major General on the Staff in North America" commanding "Nova Scotia". Hell, my 3rd hit on google confirms this:

 

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents...vol2.4_14_e.pdf

 

The Militia Districts numbered 11 in Lower Canada and 10 in Upper Canada, but the department system wasn't instituted until the passing of the Militia Act of 1868 following Confederation. By that point I'm not sure why such an action would be considered as being for the purpose of "resisting the Union"?

 

I see you haven't read the articles you aluded too. If you had you'd find a list of 18 (or 19 by Bourne's "Britain and the Balance of Power in North America", maybe another was later created) militia districts existant in 1861

[Grant Whitley]

Actually, escape and the potential of rebellion did drive the slave economy in North America towards marginalization, by forcing it to expend more resources on security and living condition concessions (which made the economic calculus of the slave a little less desparate and therefore less prone to escape and/or rebellion). Animal husbandry has no comparison. In fact, it turns out that penning animals in more efficient but less natural conditions than the free range actually increases their economic value. Try that with humans and you either sacrifice more than you gain by way of investing in security, or (as in the case of nazi Germany, where it was actually planned) you wind up working your slaves into despair and eventual death, meaningyour slave labor economy only lasts as long as you can capture more slaves.

 

All I see you pointing out is that a slave was a riskier investment than many other things at the time. I agree with that, but it's a difference in degree, not the sort of difference in kind that would compel us to leave slaves out of the economic calculus altogether.

[Guest aevans]

All I see you pointing out is that a slave was a riskier investment than many other things at the time. I agree with that, but it's a difference in degree, not the sort of difference in kind that would compel us to leave slaves out of the economic calculus altogether.

 

Nobody said anything about leaving the slave out of the economic calculus. Chattel slavery was what the Civil War was all about. I was only pointing out that humans as property is a legal fiction. You can't point and say, "That person is my property," without a law that says you can. Inanimate chattels and even livestock can be possessed -- and are possessed every day -- without any law to say so. If you think about it, to some degree sophisticated codes of law historically begin with serfdom and slavery.

[Rich]

Interesting, you've read some stuff, but missed a lot too.

 

Funny, I was thinking rather the same of you.

 

The Canadians had 3 different auxiliary forces, the active militia (a paid body of 5,000 troops, mostly artillery and some cavalry, with 3 infantry battalions, those 3 "volunteer" battalions you mention), the volunteer militia (a similar but unpaid body only raised during the crisis, rising to 35,000 (and rising, the government couldn't process enlistments fast enough) in late December 1861, before falling back when to ca 25,000), and the militia. The militia itself was divided into several categories, the most forward of which were called out by General Militia Order on 20 Dec 61, yielding 39,015 troops. In addition there was the small Canadian "regular army", i.e. the Royal Canadian Rifles. When the US decided to surrender Mason and Sidell, Canada had put over 60,000 effective men into the field.

Lordy, give me strength! No, Canada did not have any "auxiliary forces", I'm not sure what you might mean by that, they had a militia that consisted of an "Active Militia" and a "Sedentary Militia" (all males 18-60), the distinction being created by the Militia Act of 1 July 1855.

 

The Sedentary Militia was divided into "service men" and "reserve men:, the service men being 18-40 years of age and being further divided into a 1st (unmarried men and widowers without children) and 2nd (married men and widowers with children) class. Only the Service Men were required to muster, once a year, on the Queen's Birthday, but even that requirement was discontinued by an amendment on 1856. That remained unchanged until the Militia Act of 15 October 1863 that permitted the Sedentary Militia to be called out for drill up to 6 days a year, however, "not one single company of militia had been organized, or received even the six days drill which was the maximum permitted, not enjoined, by the new bill" until the autumn of 1864, although 88,000 were enrolled.

 

The Active or Volunteer Militia was "4,047 all ranks, comprising 16 troops cavalry, seven field batteries and five foot companies of artillery, and 50 companies of riflemen" the whole to be armed at government expense, but "Volunteers should pay for their own uniforms, there should be a clothing allowance; officers and other ranks should be paid for annual training and any period of service in aid of the power." Annual training was fixed at 20 days for artillery and 10 days for others. However, the financial crisis of 1857 forced the reduction of 5 foot artillery and rifle companies, while training was reduced to 12 days for artillery and 6 for the others. It wasn't actually until June 1862 that annual training was raised from 6 to 12 days per year for a maximum of 10,000 Volunteers.

 

The Volunteer battalions I mentioned were simply groupings of the independent companies that were recommended by the act of 1859 and was applied really only to the "urban" companies, the rural companies for the most part remained independent until the Militia Act of 1868. In other words, there was nothing "different" about them at all. Thus, on 17 November 1859 the First Battalion Volunteer Militia Rifles of Canada was organized with 9 companies and on 26 April 1860 the Second Volunteer Militia Rifles of Canada with 6 companies was organized, and so on, the third in precedence was actually numbered the 63rd, but then it was from Halifax and was formed on 14 May 1860 (yes, I actually did know the Maritimes were different from "Canada" ).

 

The actual strength of the Canadian Volunteers (Active Militia) in April 1862 was 829 officers and 13,390 OR organized in 34 troops of cavalry, 27 batteries of artillery, 182 companies of rifles, and 5 engineer companies. By December 1862 a total of 29 volunteer units with an authorized strength of 1,450 all ranks had been disbanded in 1862, while some 13,070 recruits for continuing and new corps had increased the volunteer total to 25,000 (25,839) effectives.

 

The total of "39,015" troops supposedly "yielded" by 20 December 1861 and the "60,000 effective men into the field" is pure fantasy, for one thing there simply weren't that many arms in the province, in the parlimentary discussion of the abortive Militia Act of 1863 it was mentioned by the government that at the time of the Trent Affair only 7,000 Enfields were in the province and that the 30,000 shipped with the British reinforcement were held at Halifax by the ice (as were about half the troops, although 6,800-odd went on in sledges. For another that is the number of voluntary enrolments for the volunteers and for balloting by the sedentary militia (i.e., those who volunteered to be liable for training).

 

And, of course the Royal Canadians were an Imperial unit, their strength was already counted.

 

This of course excludes Nova Scotia command, which had another 40-50,000 effectives in the field.

 

Actually, no, it does include the organizations, see the 63rd Rifles, above. But your numbers are fantasy again. By April 1860 the Nova Scotia volunteers consisted of 32 effective companies in the province (2,341) and 11 in Halifax (868). On 31 December 1867 Colonel R. Bligh Sinclair's report on the provincial forces remarked that the "organization is the result of about six years work, commencing first with the military instruction of volunteers and militia officers, the men not being called out till the latter were fit to instruct, in 1863" and that "as the final returns are not complete at the date of commencing this report, I take the returns of 1866 as a base for remarking, that the aggregate training for that year (45,767 men for five days) was equivalent

to 223,835 days. This is equal to training 5,720 men for six weeks." Total strength of the Nova Scotia Militia (Sedentary) in 1866 was: first class enrolled 58,031; trained 45,767.

 

New Brunswick's militia consisted of all males 16-60, until 1862 when a revision to the Militia Act divided men into an Active Militia (all those 18-45) and Sedentary Militia (45-60) and further divided the Active Militia into Class A, B, and C. Class A (Volunteers) drilled 6 days a year, Class B (unmarried and widowers without children) and Class C (married and widowers with children) were to muster once a year (note the same distinctions with different terminology from Canada). By 1867 the number of Volunteers was 2,079.

 

Col Macdougall wrote the war organisation for the Canadians, when at Kew try and find his "on the prospect of war with the united states", it's basically the warplan.

 

Higher organisation was 18 unformed Divisions, 9 in each Quebec and Ontario. This was rationalised to 7 formed Divisions in 1866.

No you are confusing yourself, and adding things. There were originally 18 Military Districts in Upper and Lower Canada according to the 1855 Act, and they were only "uniformed" at their own expense, a uniform allowance was granted, but uniforms were not supplied by the government until much later. And 4 more were added, while they weren't "rationalised" in 1866 (it was 1868) and the districts were kept - and expanded again, they were simply grouped organizationally into Departments (not divisions), both of which - districts and departments - were administrative entities only.

 

Vast quantities of military material were shipped to Canada as part of the buildup, including ca 100,000 stands of modern arms. (snip)

 

Fantasy, it was 30,000 to augment the 7,000 Enfields already in the province.

Edited October 4, 2007 by Rich

[Rich]

A simple perusal of the Army List would show differently.

 

Maj Gen Williams is "Lieutenant General on the Staff in North America" commanding "Canada", Doyle is "Major General on the Staff in North America" commanding "Nova Scotia". Hell, my 3rd hit on google confirms this:

 

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents...vol2.4_14_e.pdf

 

I see the confusion, you were using shorthand. BTW, did you read the article yourself, how exactly were - what was it "63,000 in four corps de armee" -supposed to make that trek from London to Halifax and inland in time to do anything in the winter of 1862?

 

I see you haven't read the articles you aluded too. If you had you'd find a list of 18 (or 19 by Bourne's "Britain and the Balance of Power in North America", maybe another was later created) militia districts existant in 1861

 

Oh, do you mean:

 

"The same Militia General Order dated July 9, 1855, divided the Province into 18 Military Districts on primarily county basis:

 

LOWER

No 1 - Gaspé, Bonaventure and Magdalen Islands.

No 2 - Rimouski, Temiscouata, Kamouraska, L'Islet, Montmagny and Bellechasse.

No 3 - Lotbinière, Lévis, Dorchester, Megantic and Beauce.

No 4 - Nicolet, Drummond, Athabaska, Wolfe, Sherbrooke, Compton, Shefford, Stanstead Missiquoi.

No 5 - Yamaska, Richelieu, St. Hyacinthe, Bagot, Rouville and Iberville.

No 6 - Beauharnois, Huntington, Laprairie, Vercheres, Chambly, Chateauguay, Napierville St. Johns.

No 7 - Chicoutimi, Tadoussac, Saguenay, Montmorency, Quebec County and City, and Champlain.

No 8 - St. Maurice, Three-Rivers, Maskinonge Berthier, Joliette, Montcalm, L'Assomption,

Terrebonne and Laval.

No 9 - Pontiac, Ottawa, Argenteuil, Two Mountains Vaudreuil, Soulanges, Island and City Montreal.

 

UPPER

No 1 - Renfrew, Lanark, Carleton, Russell, Prescott and Ottawa City.

No 2 - Leeds, Grenville, Dundas, Stormont, Glengary and Prescott Town.

No 3 - Hastings, Prince Edward, Frontenac, Lennox and Addington, and Kingston City.

No 4 - Victoria, Durham, Peterborough, Northumberland and Cobourg Town.

No 5 - Simcoe, Peel, York, Ontario and Toronto City.

No 6 - Huron, Perth, Bruce, Waterloo, Wellington, Grey and Guelp Town.

No 7 - Haldimand, Lincoln, Welland, Wentworth, Halton and Hamilton City.

No 8 - Middlesex, Elgin, Oxford, Norfolk, Brant and London City.

No 9 - Essex, Kent, Lambton and Chatham Town." (Paragraph 166)

 

And "There were now 11 Military Districts in Lower Canada and 10 in Upper Canada. The 46 British sergeants sent to Canada at the time of the Trent Affair were still instructing volunteers. During 1863 arrangements were made to obtain additional sergeants from the British Army in Canada: 28 train city corps and 40 for rural corps. These instructors were paid by the Canadian Government. British garrisons at Quebec, Montreal, Kingston, Toronto, Hamilton and London set up Boards Officers to examine volunteer officers on their ability to command battalions or companies: Class I Class II certificates were issued to the successful candidates." (Paragraph 191)?

 

Sorry, should have said "3 additional" (oddly enough I think I typed that first and then changed it).

[swerve]

You can take measure to minimize the chances of slaves escaping, as well. The base of your argument seems to be that a slave's value can be suddenly and unexpectedly reduced to nothing, but this is true of anything that has value. Animals escape, machines and tools break, crops fall victim to pests and the weather. I don't see why the sentience and free will of the slave makes any difference in this context.

 

If escape/rebellion/etc. were really a huge problem, they would have undermined the slave economy to the point that it wasn't practical. But this did not happen, because the slaveholders were able to minimize these occurrences.

 

Grant,

 

I find it interesting that you have not addressed my point, i.e. that it is inconsistent to count slaves as having value, but not free people. Why not? Surely a free person has at least as much value as a slave. Likely to work more effectively, for a start. The only difference is who owns that wealth.

 

Or on the other hand, you can choose not to count human capital. But whatever, be consistent. You are advocating inconsistency. Why?

[67th Tigers]

Then why was American coal used as in the Pacific War, and why did the Admiral on station inform the Admiralty that being dependent on US coal was a serious crimp in his operations? Not that you would know.

 

The answer is obvious, he didn't. They coaled from Vancouver etc.

 

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-3931...%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F

 

Somehow I trust Oscar Parkes over your unsupported assertion.

 

I assume you're refering to "British Battleships", which doesn't even cover the subject. I'd suggest "Battleships in Transition" and "Warrior" by Andrew Lambert

 

http://www.amazon.com/Battleships-Transiti...0/dp/0870210904

 

They could, where they chose toNot according to the Admiral in command. They might have been able to cover where they CHOSE to, but they could not cover everything they WANTED or NEEDED to.

 

They effectively shut down trade everywhere bar New England, which continued to trade with the UK, so was unblockaded.

 

, but in 1862 the task is easier. The RN have fast steamers against US sailing vessels, and a smaller section of coast to blockade.The US also has fast steamers, and coal supplies both greater and closer.

Also the RN has world-wide commitments and is not going to send the entire steam fleet to the US.

 

Not as many steamers, and not as good. The US could not produce "high pressure" (for the time) steam engines, and their power/weight ratios were appauling. British manufactured engines were particularly prized for their superior performance.

 

The US merchant marine consisted of (in 1859) 100,000 tons of steamers and 2.4 million tons of sail (plus 770,000 tons of river steamers and 1.33m tons of sail), hardly any of these were large, oceangoing steamers (in fact I know of none). The ACW caused half the merchant marine to reflag to the UK. The British oceangoing merchant fleet was 500,000 tons of steamers and 3.8m tons of sail

 

As I've said, loses in the West Indies at this time were ca 5 in 1,000 pa. The result of the improved healthcare (it was 10 times this 15 years previously).No, you said losses on the NA&WI station were 0.05%; without any source, I might add. Seems to be habit. NA&WI includes much more than the West Indies.

There was also the issue of where the troops came from. The West Indies troops, being acclimated, had lower sickness rates, but there weren't enough of them to maintain a war with the US. European troops sent still had sick rates of 50% or higher.

Besides, if you send an army to the Caribbean, where do the rations come from?

 

0.5%, which is 5 in 1,000, and this is the figure for European troops.

 

As for where the rations come from, see the tonnage above.

[67th Tigers]

I see the confusion, you were using shorthand. BTW, did you read the article yourself, how exactly were - what was it "63,000 in four corps de armee" -supposed to make that trek from London to Halifax and inland in time to do anything in the winter of 1862?

 

No, the government alerted 25,000 troops to transit to BNA immediately (I attach the list of units), with the objective of raising Canada to 10,000, with the rest to remain immediately in NSC (the bulk of the units in NSC moved to reinforce Canada). 50,000 men were prepared in the UK to steam directly up the St Lawrence when it thawed. The forward wave never completed deployment, to the extent that units boarding ships in Southampton when news reached Britain that M&S would be surrendered got back off their ships and returned to barracks.

 

Sorry, should have said "3 additional" (oddly enough I think I typed that first and then changed it).

 

I appologise if I came over as offensive. FWIW I can't remember whether Hamilton was organised into a District, and I've lost my Oxford login, and haven't got an Imperial one yet to look it up.

 

 

Appendix 1: Units alerted to transit to BNA in Dec-Jan 61/2

 

 

Cavalry

The Lancer Brigade:

9th Lancers

12th Lancers

16th Lancers

(plus an unnamed RHA Bty I'd assume)

 

Military Train

1st Bn, Military Train

3rd Bn, Military Train

 

Infantry (all to be augmented to war establishment of 1,200 R&F)

1/ Grenadier Gds

2/ Coldstream Gds

2/ Scots Fus Gds

1/10th

1/11th

2/12th

1/15th

1/16th

2/16th

1/17th

2/20th

36th

45th

55th

76th

58th

96th

1/ Rifle Brigade

 

Artillery

A Bty, 4RA

B Bty, 4RA

E Bty, 4RA

F Bty, 4RA

G Bty, 4RA

H Bty, 4RA

A Bty, 8RA

1 Bty, 10RA

2 Bty, 10RA

3 Bty, 10RA

4 Bty, 10RA

5 Bty, 10RA

6 Bty, 10RA (for New Brunswick)

7 Bty, 10RA

8 Bty, 10RA

2 Bty, 15RA (for Bermuda)

3 Bty, 15RA (for Bermuda)

(The lettered Btys of 4 and 8RA are field btys with 6x 12pdr Armstrong Rifles, the numbered Btys of 10 and 15RA are Garrison and Heavy Btys)

 

Engineers

2nd Coy, RE

4th Coy, RE

5th Coy, RE

7th Coy, RE

15th Coy, RE

18th Coy, RE

34th Coy, RE

 

Appendix 2: Staff of Canada Command on station Jan 62

 

Maj Gen (Lt Gen in BNA) William Fenwick Williams (On the staff, commanding Canada Command and nominal CinC BNA)

 

Col Wetherall (Chief of the Staff)

Col Hon Robert Rollo (Military Secretary)

Col (Lt Col) Daniel Lysons (Assistant Adjutant General)

Lt Col Garnett Wolseley (Assissant Adjutant General)

Col (Lt Col) Kenneth Douglas MacKenzie (Deputy QMG)

 

Maj Gen Randell Rumley (On the staff)

Maj Gen Lord Frederick Paulet (On the staff)

Maj Gen George TC Napier (On the staff)

Maj Gen (Lt Col) Randal Ramley (On the staff)

Maj Gen (Lt Col) David Russell (On the staff)

 

Col (Lt Col) Alexander Low (Particular Service, Organising Cavalry)

Col (Lt Col) Charles F Fordyce (Particular Service)

Capt and Lt Col Augustus Henry Lane Fox (Particular Service)

Lt Col Henry Ralph Brown (Particular Service)

Lt Col Thomas Rose (Particular Service)

Lt Col Edward Newdigate (Particular Service)

Lt Col Henry Hope Creadlock (Particular Service)

Lt Col GB Shakespear (Particular Service, organising artillery)

Lt Col RP Mountain (Particular Service, organising artillery)

Maj Chas. F Torrens Daniell (Particular Service)

Maj Fitzwilliam F Hunter (Particular Service)

Maj Taylor Lambard Mayne (Particular Service, organising cavalry)

Maj John Wimburne Laurie (Particular Service)

 

(i.e. 9 Infantry Brigadiers, 2 Artillery Brigadiers and 2 Cavalry Brigadiers for the Canadian Militia)

 

Col FM Eardley Wilmott (Commanding Artillery Brigade, Montreal)

Col DW Paynter (Commanding Artillery Brigade, Quebec)

Col JW Gordon (Commanding, RE)

Col H Servante (Commanding RE at Montreal)

Lt Col W Menzies (Commanding RE at Quebec)

Lt Col CD Robinson (Commanding RE at Kingston)

Lt Col J Conolly (DAG at Montreal)

Col KD Mackenzie (DQMG at Montreal)

 

Editted for mong spelling

Edited October 4, 2007 by 67th Tigers

[Rich]

The US merchant marine consisted of (in 1859) 100,000 tons of steamers and 2.4 million tons of sail (plus 770,000 tons of river steamers and 1.33m tons of sail), hardly any of these were large, oceangoing steamers (in fact I know of none). The ACW caused half the merchant marine to reflag to the UK. The British oceangoing merchant fleet was 500,000 tons of steamers and 3.8m tons of sail

 

Why yes, as a matter of fact and curiously enough, your reference Claussen (who doesn't quite say what you said he says ) actually addresses this at some length from the British merchants point of view, which was essentially "if we can do it to them, then they can do it to us." Quite simply the prevalent view was that a new war with the US would be a disaster equally for both the Union and for Britain. It was that simple fact - in addition to the rather more important display of good sense on both sides - that went a long way to cool heads in London (see pp. 517-518).

[KingSargent]

The answer is obvious, he didn't. They coaled from Vancouver etc.

And where did the coal in Vancouver come from?

 

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-3931...%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F

I assume you're refering to "British Battleships", which doesn't even cover the subject. I'd suggest "Battleships in Transition" and "Warrior" by Andrew Lambert

Read them, also Ironclads at War which covers coaling problems on the South American station (doesn't cover them, just says they had problems and the Admiral bitched).

Parkes, p.111 "And so passed the lonely Zealous, which never sailed in company with another British battleship and passed most of her service with cold boilers."

 

They effectively shut down trade everywhere bar New England, which continued to trade with the UK, so was unblockaded.

Come back when you know what you are talking about. Some NE ships (and from other areas) sailed under British license (or the Peninsular Army would have been in deep shit, except they would have nothing to shit with). The coasts still needed to be blockaded for unlicensed trade.

 

Not as many steamers, and not as good. The US could not produce "high pressure" (for the time) steam engines, and their power/weight ratios were appauling. British manufactured engines were particularly prized for their superior performance.

SOME British engines were prized. Others fell apart and cost the RN millions.

 

The US merchant marine consisted of (in 1859) 100,000 tons of steamers and 2.4 million tons of sail (plus 770,000 tons of river steamers and 1.33m tons of sail), hardly any of these were large, oceangoing steamers (in fact I know of none).

So? The US did not have to support an army and a fleet across the Atlantic, The UK did - or would have had to.

 

The ACW caused half the merchant marine to reflag to the UK.

The part that was Southern, and anyone wanting breaks on insurance - Confederate raiders made insurance rates on US-flagged ships atrocious.

 

The British oceangoing merchant fleet was 500,000 tons of steamers and 3.8m tons of sail

And they had an Empire's commerce to carry.

 

0.5%, which is 5 in 1,000, and this is the figure for European troops.

SOURCE PLEASE!!!

 

As for where the rations come from, see the tonnage above.

Yeah right. The food is grown on the decks of merchant ships? You are going to use that tonnage to move food from the US to Britain (assuming you can buy any) then turn it around and ship it back to the NA&WI and Canada as rations?

Britain being cut off from US food would be a Godsend to South American agriculture, but even more shipping would be necessary to move SA produce.

[DesertFox]

From others than 67th Tigers,

What was the Canadian and British stance...was there really any interest in getting involved.

My understanding was the best they ever even considered was acknowledging the south........

[Rich]

From others than 67th Tigers,

 

Why's that? Don't tell me you suspect his impartiality in the matter?

 

What was the Canadian and British stance...was there really any interest in getting involved.

My understanding was the best they ever even considered was acknowledging the south........

 

Actually it was quite a bit more complicated than that and Trent was quite serious and might have led to war except for the fact that Lincoln wasn't an idiot and neither was most of his cabinet (I've always wondered if Seward's almost irrational bellicosity may have been an early version of "bad cop" to Lincoln's "good cop", but there simply is no evidence for that. It also helped that although Britain was not dependent on American grain, America and Britain were already co-dependent economically, as were America and Canada. Essentially it was Lincoln's common sense and the fear of the money-men in New York and London about what would happen to their piles of cash, that kept things from hitting the fan.

 

But otherwise there was simply no way. Canada developed some sympathy for the "underdog" south, but a lot of that was simple fear about the security of the border because of Union sabre-rattling during Trent. Otherwise New England and Canada, especially Frencophone Canada were actually pretty close. In England there may have been some partiality shown by the establishment to the south, but the south managed to screw that up themselves with their own "King Cotton" BS - ever wonder why when you go to a store all the luxury, high thread-count, super-expensive cotton bedding is always advertised as "Egyptian" cotton? They would have done better to just keep their mouths shut, kept cotton prices artificially low and ship as much as they could get out, then hoped for the best. Morons (and I aplogize to my Southern brethern on this board for that, but the simple truth is that most of the southern leadership had about as much common sense as a litter of puppies or what could be found in Lincoln's little finger). And anyway, the only thing that really made England as a whole hesitate at all was the delay by the Union in advocating abolition, since slavery was pretty generally detested in England.

 

And it was to a large extent the patriotic jingoism in the Union immediately after the firing on Sumter that made Trent possible in the first place. The perceived ambivalence of England sparked a lot of irratiional newspaper and political rhetoric, that probably led directly to Wilkes action. And, BTW, Wilkes probably should have been brought before a court martial, his idiot action alone could have screwed the Union - and not because the British would have had a cake-walk over the Union - the more likely result would have been the destruction of both British and American commerce and the probable splitting of the US into two unstable states (the Union likely couldn't have lost, but they also couldn't have won). AFAICS it was an early bad example for the USN that didn't need to be made.

[67th Tigers]

Why's that? Don't tell me you suspect his impartiality in the matter?

 

I started debating this issue in 2003, believing the Union could probably win, 4 years later and I now know the only thing that saved the Union was a large British overestimate of their capabilities.

 

 

Actually it was quite a bit more complicated than that and Trent was quite serious and might have led to war except for the fact that Lincoln wasn't an idiot and neither was most of his cabinet (I've always wondered if Seward's almost irrational bellicosity may have been an early version of "bad cop" to Lincoln's "good cop", but there simply is no evidence for that. It also helped that although Britain was not dependent on American grain, America and Britain were already co-dependent economically, as were America and Canada. Essentially it was Lincoln's common sense and the fear of the money-men in New York and London about what would happen to their piles of cash, that kept things from hitting the fan.

 

Might? The local commanders had conditional war orders to commence hostilities (sometime around early-mid Jan 1862) if not countermanded. Lets be clear, had Lincoln not surrendered Mason and Sidell, the British would have declared war.

 

This is the 2nd potential intervention crisis, but perhaps not the most serious, which was the post-Antietam crisis (see http://www.google.com/books?id=Q7Ziz0lp4MY...ntcover#PPP1,M1 )

[67th Tigers]

The answer is obvious, he didn't. They coaled from Vancouver etc.

And where did the coal in Vancouver come from?

 

From the mine next to Vancouver?

 

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-3931...%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F

I assume you're refering to "British Battleships", which doesn't even cover the subject. I'd suggest "Battleships in Transition" and "Warrior" by Andrew Lambert

Read them, also Ironclads at War which covers coaling problems on the South American station (doesn't cover them, just says they had problems and the Admiral bitched).

Parkes, p.111 "And so passed the lonely Zealous, which never sailed in company with another British battleship and passed most of her service with cold boilers."

 

That had more to do with the War of the Triple Alliance disrupting the Brazilian coal trade?

 

Not as many steamers, and not as good. The US could not produce "high pressure" (for the time) steam engines, and their power/weight ratios were appauling. British manufactured engines were particularly prized for their superior performance.SOME British engines were prized. Others fell apart and cost the RN millions.

 

Millions? For 1m pounds the RN could build 3 1st class Ironclads. The entire RN budget is only 15m...

 

As for performance, there were a couple of dogs, and they simply replaced the engines.

 

The US merchant marine consisted of (in 1859) 100,000 tons of steamers and 2.4 million tons of sail (plus 770,000 tons of river steamers and 1.33m tons of sail), hardly any of these were large, oceangoing steamers (in fact I know of none).So? The US did not have to support an army and a fleet across the Atlantic, The UK did - or would have had to.

 

The US did sustain large armies by sea, at comparitively similar distances in some cases.

 

The ACW caused half the merchant marine to reflag to the UK.The part that was Southern, and anyone wanting breaks on insurance - Confederate raiders made insurance rates on US-flagged ships atrocious.

 

True, but they were all northern.

 

The British oceangoing merchant fleet was 500,000 tons of steamers and 3.8m tons of sailAnd they had an Empire's commerce to carry.

 

Yes and no. Large parts of the steam fleet were involved in exporting goods to the US and returning with Cotton.

 

0.5%, which is 5 in 1,000, and this is the figure for European troops.SOURCE PLEASE!!!

 

That 5 in 1,000 is 0.5%, err, I think I've a Key Stage 3 Maths book somewhere....

 

The first google result is:

 

http://www.jstor.org/view/09595341/di99254...mp;config=jstor

 

Mortality due to all causes in the West Indies in 1859:

Barbadoes: 6 per 1,000

Jamaica: 14 per 1,000

Guiana: 14 per 1,000

Trinidad: 90 per 1,000

 

If you really want to labour the point I've seen the figures for 1862, and could try and find them.

 

As for where the rations come from, see the tonnage above.Yeah right. The food is grown on the decks of merchant ships? You are going to use that tonnage to move food from the US to Britain (assuming you can buy any) then turn it around and ship it back to the NA&WI and Canada as rations?

Britain being cut off from US food would be a Godsend to South American agriculture, but even more shipping would be necessary to move SA produce.

 

I'd suggest you read the last link, which includes details of the commisiariat's supplies.

 

Britain at this point remains a net exporter of agricultural goods, and will until for a while. The decline in Corn prices, caused by significant US exports, begins in 1878, which is still some way off from 1861. (That's even on the wikipedia)

[Grant Whitley]

Grant,

 

I find it interesting that you have not addressed my point, i.e. that it is inconsistent to count slaves as having value, but not free people. Why not? Surely a free person has at least as much value as a slave. Likely to work more effectively, for a start. The only difference is who owns that wealth.

 

I didn't deliberately ignore it, I've just been online sporadically, sometimes with only th energy for pithy one-liners on FFZ.

 

To answer your post above, I was originally responding to a series of posts about GDP and relative wealth. In a chattel slavery system, a slave obviously isn't the equivalent of a free man. A free man's economic impact can be measured by his consumption, investment, etc. But since a slave had no income and no economic freedom and thus could not consume or invest or undertake any other normal economic activity on anything but the smallest of scales, I think we have to look at them as capital investments, which is exactly how slaveholders saw them and what they in fact were.

[Rich]

I started debating this issue in 2003, believing the Union could probably win, 4 years later and I now know the only thing that saved the Union was a large British overestimate of their capabilities.

 

Really, is that supposed to impress me? I started debating this issue around 1973, believing the British would almost certainly win, 34 years later and I now suspect (sorry, but it is impossible to "know" with absolute certainty how a counter-factual would have turned out, you can only speculate, which is why nobody ever "wins" these debates) that the result would have been a disaster for both the Union and the British. Which might have left the South as the only "winner", which would probably have been ephemeral at best; the Confederacy simply wasn't very stable.

 

And you appear to have replaced the large British overestimate of Union capabilities in spring 1862 with a rather similar overestimate of British capabilities and an extrordinary overestimate of Canadian capabilities.

 

Might? The local commanders had conditional war orders to commence hostilities (sometime around early-mid Jan 1862) if not countermanded. Lets be clear, had Lincoln not surrendered Mason and Sidell, the British would have declared war.

Why yes, "might" as in it didn't, so we have no means of knowing if it would have or would not have. Oddly enough, you and most others seem to think that I am Harry Turtledove and believe the Union would walk all over the British - I don't. Nor do I believe that the British would wipe the floor with the Union. Nor do I think it would be a "quick" war, which appears to be the fallacy that many fall into - "Milne home by Easter" anyone?

 

This is the 2nd potential intervention crisis, but perhaps not the most serious, which was the post-Antietam crisis (see http://www.google.com/books?id=Q7Ziz0lp4MY...ntcover#PPP1,M1 )

 

Yeah, the second crisis may not even rate a "might" have resulted in a war? Thanks for the link though, I'll put that into my ILL queue, it looks interesting.

[Grant Whitley]

Nobody said anything about leaving the slave out of the economic calculus.

 

In post #31, you said:

 

"Move the slave from the "property" to the "people" column, and the South is a not very affluent place."

 

I was only pointing out that humans as property is a legal fiction. You can't point and say, "That person is my property," without a law that says you can. Inanimate chattels and even livestock can be possessed -- and are possessed every day -- without any law to say so. If you think about it, to some degree sophisticated codes of law historically begin with serfdom and slavery.

 

Correct me if I'm wrong, but my understanding is that slavery functioned on the same basis. There weren't laws specifically allowing it where it existed- to the contrary, it had to be specifically prohibited in the North(where it had previously existed), and ultimately by the 13th Amendment.

Edited October 5, 2007 by Grant Whitley

[Guest aevans]

In post #31, you said:

 

"Move the slave from the "property" to the "people" column, and the South is a not very affluent place."

 

That doesn't exclude the slave from economic calculations, it just changes where he figures in them. Take away slavery and you don't take away the people that were slaves.

 

Correct me if I'm wrong, but my understanding is that slavery functioned on the same basis. There weren't laws specifically allowing it where it existed- to the contrary, it had to be specifically prohibited in the North(where it had previously existed), and ultimately by the 13th Amendment.

 

You're kidding, right? Ever heard of the Fugitive Slave Law? Or all of the Southern statutes against servile rebellion and regulating the slave's status? In a civilized society, in order to hold other humans in bondage, you have to have laws that support and sanction the force it takes to do so.

[67th Tigers]

That doesn't exclude the slave from economic calculations, it just changes where he figures in them. Take away slavery and you don't take away the people that were slaves.

 

When slavery was taken away, the now free black population found themselves poorer, and subject to being killed almost at will.

 

As one African-American academic recently pointed out on BBC4's "Racism: A History"*, in a kind of perverse way the black population of the south were better off under the servile system. Most fo the attrocities attributed to the servile system appear to have been committed decades after the ACW

 

*http://video.google.co.uk/videoplay?docid=-6868982609514988707&q=%22racism%3A+a+history%22&total=23&start=0&num=10&so=0&type=search&plindex=5