The Britsh Supporting the confederates

[Rich]

Why should the economic value of slaves not be counted when looking at these figures? Slavery was not a "legal fiction"; it was the law of the land, and an economic reality. The fact that slavery has been been outlawed and that we now find it morally repugnant has little to do with the issue here. Would you ignore the value of corn to the economy of Iowa if we banned it?

 

No, not at all, but when the manufacturing "value" is measured in these analyses, it is the value of the output goods, not the value of the plant plus the goods? But for agriculture I guess a "special" measure that includes the value of the "plant" and it's output has to be used to show how "efficient" southern agriculture was? Horse hockey. I was addressing the simple fact that the two figures actually aren't comparable. And, as I said, I'll get to the value of farm output later, I'm busy with work right now

[Grant Whitley]

No, not at all, but when the manufacturing "value" is measured in these analyses, it is the value of the output goods, not the value of the plant plus the goods? But for agriculture I guess a "special" measure that includes the value of the "plant" and it's output has to be used to show how "efficient" southern agriculture was? Horse hockey. I was addressing the simple fact that the two figures actually aren't comparable. And, as I said, I'll get to the value of farm output later, I'm busy with work right now

 

Sorry, I don't follow your point. I merely don't see a reason to ignore the capital value of slaves when discussing relative wealth.

[Guest aevans]

Why should the economic value of slaves not be counted when looking at these figures? Slavery was not a "legal fiction"; it was the law of the land, and an economic reality. The fact that slavery has been been outlawed and that we now find it morally repugnant has little to do with the issue here. Would you ignore the value of corn to the economy of Iowa if we banned it?

 

Of course it was a legal fiction. People aren't property, no matter that the law allows them to be treated like property. Your own example contains within itself the proof -- corn is still corn, and still a comodity, even if it has to be sold at a premium as contraband; people are still people, and treat them as property though you will, their "capital" value can be eliminatated by legislative fiat (as in fact it was).

[Grant Whitley]

Of course it was a legal fiction. People aren't property, no matter that the law allows them to be treated like property.

 

This is fine as a moral position, but has nothing to do with the economic reality of the day. People were property, and did have value.

 

Your own example contains within itself the proof -- corn is still corn, and still a comodity, even if it has to be sold at a premium as contraband; people are still people, and treat them as property though you will, their "capital" value can be eliminatated by legislative fiat (as in fact it was).

 

I don't see the difference at all. Human trafficking still goes on today. Less so in our country than in others, but that's just a function of our enforcement mechanisms. My point here was that legislation can be used to affect the value of anything.

[Guest aevans]

This is fine as a moral position, but has nothing to do with the economic reality of the day. People were property, and did have value.

I don't see the difference at all. Human trafficking still goes on today. Less so in our country than in others, but that's just a function of our enforcement mechanisms. My point here was that legislation can be used to affect the value of anything.

 

Legislation can be used to affect the relative value of any commodity. (Or any value-added good, for that matter.) But the difference with humans is that they're not inadvertent participants in the process. They can affect their own value by their behaviors, and modify or put an end to the legal fiction of being property by their own actions. That is why there were phenomena such as the Spartacus revolt, "house n*****s" and "selling down the river", flight and pursuit, and eventually the USCT. Humans may be treated as property, but to think that they aren't making their own economic decisions in the process -- thus making them more than property -- is fallacious. It's not about what you or I might conceive of as morals, it's about what humans actually are as economic actors within the context of their lives that makes them as property a problematic proposition.

Edited October 2, 2007 by aevans

[67th Tigers]

Er, no, the per capita valuation of farms in the eleven southern states was higher, because included was the value of the property and its production, which included the slaves. That does not make them more "efficient", it makes them more valuable because it assesses the "value" of human beings as "property."

 

The parameter used was production per acre, and the paper in question showed that free southern farms were about 20% more efficient than northern farms, and slave southern farms are more efficient still, then correlates this with the average length of working day of a farm worker (free or slave).

 

Value of farms and farm production in the south averaged about $203.30 per capita, per annum. In the north it was about $133.41. (Border states of Missouri and Kentucky excluded.) I will calculate the value of farm output later.

Those figures seem low, but I think they're just for production sold on, not production consumed by the farm workers and their families, which would seem right. Remember, the pay of a good farm hand was $10-$25 per month (or obviously nothing for a slave, although the capital outlay is about $1,000**)

 

And manufacturing in the southern eleven states accounted for about 8.3 percent of the total; only if Missouri and Kentucky are included does it approach 10 percent, since they between them equaled more than half the manufacturing output of the entire eleven.

 

Aye, I checked my figures again.

 

The sum total of Southern* Manufactures and Agriculture (exc/ cotton) is $795m + ca $175m for cotton exports (cribbed off graph, could be closer to $200) = ca $970m = ca $109 pc, or $176 ea. for the white population (in fact it's skewed, the whites on average have a PC income of $135, and the slave $35 in earnings, exc cotton exports, yes the figures don't quite match as non-manufacure, non-agricultural goods weren't counted initially)

 

For the non-south it's $2,583m (over 22m = ca. $117 pc)

 

* Exc Missouri, Kentucky etc.

 

**Not strictly true, the slave population "earns" ca $3 pc pm

Edited October 2, 2007 by 67th Tigers

[Rich]

The parameter used was production per acre, and the paper in question showed that free southern farms were about 20% more efficient than northern farms, and slave southern farms are more efficient still, then correlates this with the average length of working day of a farm worker (free or slave).

 

That may be true as a microcosm, but considering that the area available for farming was relatively larger and more fertile, that the primary source of labor was cheaper, and the growing season longer, then that result is hardly unsurprising?

 

The actual breakdown is (Northern States/Southern States/Border States):

 

Total Population (1860) 19,742,716/9,103,332/2,337,696

Total Value of Farm Output* in $ 144,185,100/101,239,900/27,785,500

Total Value of Manufacturering Output in $ 1,640,685,200/155,531,400/79,713,900

Value per capita of Farm Output 7.30/11.12/11.89

Value per capita of Manufacturing Output 83.10/17.09/34.10

 

* Value of orchard product, market garden product, home-made manufacturers, and slaughter product

 

Note that the value of farm output is a fraction of the total valuation of the farms and thier output. For the north to produce $144-million in farm goods required a total capital outlay in farms of $2.490-billion in land, lifestock, and equipment, so less than a 6 percent (5.78) return on capital. In the south it was over 1.749-billion in investment to produce that $101-million, so....strangely enough, less than a 6 percent (5.77) return on investment. In that sense the northern farms were actually slightly more efficient. In that respect farming as a whole, in both north and south, was a highly inefficient operation.

 

Note also that the figures do not report another huge source of northern employment and income, fishing and whaling. It was an industry in New England states, while barely a subsistance living in some areas of the south. And of course in terms of manufacturing, there was no contest, although if you like I can give you the investment capital there as well.

 

Those figures seem low, but I think they're just for production sold on, not production consumed by the farm workers and their families, which would seem right. Remember, the pay of a good farm hand was $10-$25 per month (or obviously nothing for a slave, although the capital outlay is about $1,000**)

For farms that figure was assessed capital value plus product value, for manufacturing it was product value. But it is a given that farms generally support the farm workers, but that is subsistance, so has little to do with the value of production and nothing to do with an export value or efficiency of production.

 

The sum total of Southern* Manufactures and Agriculture (exc/ cotton) is $795m + ca $175m for cotton exports (cribbed off graph, could be closer to $200) = ca $970m = ca $109 pc, or $176 ea. for the white population (in fact it's skewed, the whites on average have a PC income of $135, and the slave $35 in earnings, exc cotton exports, yes the figures don't quite match as non-manufacure, non-agricultural goods weren't counted initially)

 

For the non-south it's $2,583m (over 22m = ca. $117 pc)

 

* Exc Missouri, Kentucky etc.

 

**Not strictly true, the slave population "earns" ca $3 pc pm

 

Er, no, the sum of southern manufacture was $155-million, not $795-million, where did you get that figure from? And given that farm ouput was $101-million for all products, I find a figure of $175-million for cotton alone somewhat doubtful, to say the least?

 

The combined per capita farm and manufacturing income in the north was $90.40, while in the south it was $28.21. As an aside, it is notable how critical the loss to the south of Missouri and Kentucky was.

[Rich]

And of course in terms of manufacturing, there was no contest, although if you like I can give you the investment capital there as well.

 

I see I do have the figures to hand. Manufacturing investment capital and cost of materials in the north was $1,763,539,700, in the south it was $182,518,500 and in the border states it was $86,436,500. Which makes the ratio of investment to output, 1.07, 1.17, and 1.08 respectively. That makes the south least efficient with the border states about the same as the northern states.

[Grant Whitley]

Legislation can be used to affect the relative value of any commodity. (Or any value-added good, for that matter.) But the difference with humans is that they're not inadvertent participants in the process. They can affect their own value by their behaviors, and modify or put an end to the legal fiction of being property by their own actions.

 

I still don't see how this is relevant. It's as if I said that the concept of livestock as property was invalid because livestock can escape or wander out of their pens. The inescapable reality here is that you absolutely could buy and sell human beings in the South at the time, so they had economic value.

Edited October 3, 2007 by Grant Whitley

[KingSargent]

During this period the RN coaled from Vancouver Island or Acapulco, no Californian coal was involved, as it was of very poor quality. Even the USN coaled from these sources. It was only when the RN switched to fuel oil they started to draw from California.

Then why was American coal used as in the Pacific War, and why did the Admiral on station inform the Admiralty that being dependent on US coal was a serious crimp in his operations? Not that you would know.

 

Nope, due to barnacles, all screw ships kept steam up constantly (even if only a fraction of full power), even if the sails were deployed as an auxiliary.

Somehow I trust Oscar Parkes over your unsupported assertion.

 

Nova Scotia had an output of 2 million tons of coal in 1862, this is bitumous coal, and not as good as Welsh anthracite, which was shipped out for some of the cruisers.

As somone has already asked, SOURCE PLEASE?!!

 

They could, where they chose to

Not according to the Admiral in command. They might have been able to cover where they CHOSE to, but they could not cover everything they WANTED or NEEDED to.

 

, but in 1862 the task is easier. The RN have fast steamers against US sailing vessels, and a smaller section of coast to blockade.

The US also has fast steamers, and coal supplies both greater and closer.

Also the RN has world-wide commitments and is not going to send the entire steam fleet to the US.

 

As I've said, loses in the West Indies at this time were ca 5 in 1,000 pa. The result of the improved healthcare (it was 10 times this 15 years previously).

No, you said losses on the NA&WI station were 0.05%; without any source, I might add. Seems to be habit. NA&WI includes much more than the West Indies.

There was also the issue of where the troops came from. The West Indies troops, being acclimated, had lower sickness rates, but there weren't enough of them to maintain a war with the US. European troops sent still had sick rates of 50% or higher.

Besides, if you send an army to the Caribbean, where do the rations come from?

[swerve]

Sorry, I don't follow your point. I merely don't see a reason to ignore the capital value of slaves when discussing relative wealth.

 

We're not discussing wealth, in the sense of the value of what's owned, we're discussing production.

 

Because capital value of slaves is an accounting fiction. It reflects a claim on their output by their owners, not a greater value of them compared to free workers. It's best seen as a transfer of value from the slaves to their owners. If you count the capital value of slaves, you should count the capital value of all workers & potential workers, slave or free. The difference between a slave & a free person is that the free person has the wealth inherent in their self, inalienably. Because it's inalienable, it's not valued in the market, but it's still there.

 

Livestock aren't relevant, since there is no such thing as a free, self-owned, cow counted as part of the population. The issue with slaves & capital value is that if you count them as assets, you must logically grant to each free person their own capital value. After all, you've accepted the principle of human capital, so in theory, it's tradable, & in some societies, it has been legal to sell oneself into slavery. All it would have taken was a minor legislative change for that to be true in Alabama . . .

Edited October 3, 2007 by swerve

[swerve]

...

The actual breakdown is (Northern States/Southern States/Border States):

 

Total Population (1860) 19,742,716/9,103,332/2,337,696

Total Value of Farm Output* in $ 144,185,100/101,239,900/27,785,500

Total Value of Manufacturering Output in $ 1,640,685,200/155,531,400/79,713,900

Value per capita of Farm Output 7.30/11.12/11.89

Value per capita of Manufacturing Output 83.10/17.09/34.10

 

* Value of orchard product, market garden product, home-made manufacturers, and slaughter product

...

 

Rich,

 

can you let me know what your source is, please? I'd like to get my hands on the full dataset, for reasons unrelated to this discussion. You know I collect this sort of thing.

 

Ta,

 

Paul

[Guest aevans]

I still don't see how this is relevant. It's as if I said that the concept of livestock as property was invalid because livestock can escape or wander out of their pens. The inescapable reality here is that you absolutely could buy and sell human beings in the South at the time, so they had economic value.

 

I was wondering if you'd get around to the livestock argument. The problem with that contention is that a certain, well known, amount of care does guarantee, for all practical purposes, the profitable retention of livestock. If humans refuse to be slaves, they can push the issue to the point of having to kill them, thus destroying their capital value. As I pointed out earlier, in my reference to the range of phenomena from outright slave rebellion to preferential treatment of slaves who we would in the modern venacular accuse of "selling out" (how appropriate a term is that!), humans make economic decisions about their value to slaveholders that animals can't make about their value to husbandmen.

[Rich]

As for Troops, 4 Corps de Armee (ca. 65,000 men) were under orders for British North America from the UK, to reinforce the Canadians (66,000 at the given date, with another 40,000 being raised) and the existing garrison (barely 10,000).

 

Somehow I missed this little bit of legerdemain in my first read through, I somehow must have supposed that all the times you have been previously corrected on this might have stuck? I suppose it's just more pie in the sky to accompany the other flavors you have already tried to foist on the gullible.

 

The simple fact of the matter is that the British military presence in Canada through 1861 amounted to some 5,500 officers and other ranks. In the immediate aftermath of the Trent Affair that was raised by the end of 1862 to about 18,000, before dropping again to some 12,000 by mid 1863, which remained the norm intil sometime after the end of the war when tensions began to ease.

 

And the Canadian contribution was virtually nil before 1862 and was - let me put this charitably - minor after that. Only three battalions of volunteers existed in 1860-1861, with four more formed in January 1862, five in February-March 1862, one in October 1862, one in December 1862, two in January 1863, and two in February 1863. The result was that Canada had 13,000 volunteers organized by May 1862. And, of course, there was no larger organization than battalions prior to 1866 and even the battalion was only an urban organization, the rural volunteers being organized only as companies (brigading with the British garrison battalions wasn't instituted until 1865 as well).

 

Granted the Monck Commission in September 1862 did recommend that fortifications be begun at 16 places to defend against a American advance on Collingwood, Windsor, the Niagara Peninsula, Prescott and Montreal initially, followed by Kingston and Quebec City, and the organization of 65,000 regulars and volunteers onto a war footing, but neither in fact was ever done , for one thing because Canada refused to contribute to the £1.6-million cost and Britain wasn't about to foot the bill alone. Even a measure shortly after in Canada to expand the militia at a cost of less than £95,000 failed and caused the fall of the government, and set off a storm in Parliament in London, since the expense of the Canadian garrison had gone from just £300,000 to £1-million from 1861 to 1862, all of it footed by the British. Eventually the new Canadian government did ramrod a bill forward for less than £47,000 to finance an increase in the militia to 25,000, which was reached by the end of 1862.

 

In 1863 the government authorized a further increase in the militia to 35,000 and even went so far as to authorize supplying uniforms to the volunteers (previously only weapons were provided by the government). Of course by that time they also concluded that the Monck Commission defensive recommendations - which had never been acted upon - were now tosh, because of the immense increase in American strength. Lieutenant-Colonel William Francis Drummond Jervois, RE headed a new effort to assess the requirements in 1863 and concluded that Canada West was indefensible, that "Kingston, Montreal and Quebec City could be made impregnable, but at an impossible political cost of some £1.7-million," and that less expensive plans still required very large expenses for the the fortification of Quebec and the south bank of the river, and the renovation of the defenses of Halifax, which were obsolete. He also noted that the lack of a Canadian national administration made it virtually impossible to organize and coordinate the defenses, even if funding could be made available and that virtually any defensive plan was compromised by the planning flexibility granted to the Americans by virtue of their extensive rail system and de facto control of the Great Lakes.

 

Boy, I can't wait until I can get back to Kew and find out what the reality of the "4 Corps de Armee (ca. 65,000 men)" might have been. In the meantime though I think your statement should be modified to "4 pie in the sky....to reinforce the Canadians, possibly 7,000, and the existing garrison of 5,500, a total of barely 12,500 under arms on the given date." That might just be accurate, assuming that your "given date" is at least by the end of January 1862?

Edited October 3, 2007 by Rich

[67th Tigers]

Somehow I missed this little bit of legerdemain in my first read through, I somehow must have supposed that all the times you have been previously corrected on this might have stuck? I suppose it's just more pie in the sky to accompany the other flavors you have already tried to foist on the gullible.

 

The simple fact of the matter is that the British military presence in Canada through 1861 amounted to some 5,500 officers and other ranks. In the immediate aftermath of the Trent Affair that was raised by the end of 1862 to about 18,000, before dropping again to some 12,000 by mid 1863, which remained the norm intil sometime after the end of the war when tensions began to ease.

 

And the Canadian contribution was virtually nil before 1862 and was - let me put this charitably - minor after that. Only three battalions of volunteers existed in 1860-1861, with four more formed in January 1862, five in February-March 1862, one in October 1862, one in December 1862, two in January 1863, and two in February 1863. The result was that Canada had 13,000 volunteers organized by May 1862. And, of course, there was no larger organization than battalions prior to 1866 and even the battalion was only an urban organization, the rural volunteers being organized only as companies (brigading with the British garrison battalions wasn't instituted until 1865 as well).

 

Granted the Monck Commission in September 1862 did recommend that fortifications be begun at 16 places to defend against a American advance on Collingwood, Windsor, the Niagara Peninsula, Prescott and Montreal initially, followed by Kingston and Quebec City, and the organization of 65,000 regulars and volunteers onto a war footing, but neither in fact was ever done , for one thing because Canada refused to contribute to the £1.6-million cost and Britain wasn't about to foot the bill alone. Even a measure shortly after in Canada to expand the militia at a cost of less than £95,000 failed and caused the fall of the government, and set off a storm in Parliament in London, since the expense of the Canadian garrison had gone from just £300,000 to £1-million from 1861 to 1862, all of it footed by the British. Eventually the new Canadian government did ramrod a bill forward for less than £47,000 to finance an increase in the militia to 25,000, which was reached by the end of 1862.

 

In 1863 the government authorized a further increase in the militia to 35,000 and even went so far as to authorize supplying uniforms to the volunteers (previously only weapons were provided by the government). Of course by that time they also concluded that the Monck Commission defensive recommendations - which had never been acted upon - were now tosh, because of the immense increase in American strength. Lieutenant-Colonel William Francis Drummond Jervois, RE headed a new effort to assess the requirements in 1863 and concluded that Canada West was indefensible, that "Kingston, Montreal and Quebec City could be made impregnable, but at an impossible political cost of some £1.7-million," and that less expensive plans still required very large expenses for the the fortification of Quebec and the south bank of the river, and the renovation of the defenses of Halifax, which were obsolete. He also noted that the lack of a Canadian national administration made it virtually impossible to organize and coordinate the defenses, even if funding could be made available and that virtually any defensive plan was compromised by the planning flexibility granted to the Americans by virtue of their extensive rail system and de facto control of the Great Lakes.

 

Boy, I can't wait until I can get back to Kew and find out what the reality of the "4 Corps de Armee (ca. 65,000 men)" might have been. In the meantime though I think your statement should be modified to "4 pie in the sky....to reinforce the Canadians, possibly 7,000, and the existing garrison of 5,500, a total of barely 12,500 under arms on the given date." That might just be accurate, assuming that your "given date" is at least by the end of January 1862?

 

Interesting, you've read some stuff, but missed a lot too.

 

The Canadians had 3 different auxiliary forces, the active militia (a paid body of 5,000 troops, mostly artillery and some cavalry, with 3 infantry battalions, those 3 "volunteer" battalions you mention), the volunteer militia (a similar but unpaid body only raised during the crisis, rising to 35,000 (and rising, the government couldn't process enlistments fast enough) in late December 1861, before falling back when to ca 25,000), and the militia. The militia itself was divided into several categories, the most forward of which were called out by General Militia Order on 20 Dec 61, yielding 39,015 troops. In addition there was the small Canadian "regular army", i.e. the Royal Canadian Rifles. When the US decided to surrender Mason and Sidell, Canada had put over 60,000 effective men into the field.

 

This of course excludes Nova Scotia command, which had another 40-50,000 effectives in the field.

 

Col Macdougall wrote the war organisation for the Canadians, when at Kew try and find his "on the prospect of war with the united states", it's basically the warplan.

 

Higher organisation was 18 unformed Divisions, 9 in each Quebec and Ontario. This was rationalised to 7 formed Divisions in 1866.

 

Vast quantities of military material were shipped to Canada as part of the buildup, including ca 100,000 stands of modern arms.

 

Perhaps the biggest indicator of military potential is the fact that Canada had half the population of the CSA, and effectively unlimited access to military materials...

 

Good luck at Kew!

[KingSargent]

Perhaps the biggest indicator of military potential is the fact that Canada had half the population of the CSA, and effectively unlimited access to military materials...

 

Good luck at Kew!

I'm not going to comment on the rest of your BS fantasies, but "effectively unlimited access to military materials" is too much more than a bit much, considering the distances involved and the Canadian transportation infrastructure (lack thereof).

 

And what does "half the population of the CSA (even if true, doubtful given the source)" have to do with anything? The Union fought the Civil War with one hand behind their backs in terms of personnel. There were plenty of people who would rather shoot furriners that other Americans (even if they were from the South).

 

Oh, and I'm sure Rich will have good luck at Kew. He is very experienced researcher.

[Rich]

I'm not going to comment on the rest of your BS fantasies, but "effectively unlimited access to military materials" is too much more than a bit much, considering the distances involved and the Canadian transportation infrastructure (lack thereof).

 

And what does "half the population of the CSA (even if true, doubtful given the source)" have to do with anything? The Union fought the Civil War with one hand behind their backs in terms of personnel. There were plenty of people who would rather shoot furriners that other Americans (even if they were from the South).

 

Oh, and I'm sure Rich will have good luck at Kew. He is very experienced researcher.

 

Pretty accurate analysis King, but it's just too damn late right now and I'm too damn tired to respond as he warrants - or maybe it's because I've finally reached the conclusion that he doesn't actually warrant an answer anymore? For one thing, it's pretty obvious he doesn't actually know much about the Canadian Militia, how it was organized, or how it was legislated, and prefers to just spin his fantasies. Which is pathetic, because 99 percent of the research required can be done online at the Department of Heritage and History (of course with that ineffable Canadian logic they just reorganized their website for no purpose and broke all their links ), the Kew reference was tongue in cheek.

 

Anyway, the Canadian population (Upper Canada, Lower Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Vancouver Island....just in case he tries the "you didn't count Nova Scotia horseshit again"). in 1861 was 3,174,442. So 34.871 percent of the south, just over one-third.

 

More tomorrow after a decent nights sleep I hope.

[JWB]

Before anybody beats me to the punch....

 

It is one thing to muster a horde of untrained rabble and have them stand against an invasion. It is another thing entirely to get them to attack across a national border.

[swerve]

...

Anyway, the Canadian population (Upper Canada, Lower Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Vancouver Island....just in case he tries the "you didn't count Nova Scotia horseshit again"). in 1861 was 3,174,442. So 34.871 percent of the south, just over one-third.

 

...

 

About half the non-slave population of the Confederacy, which may be what was meant.

[67th Tigers]

Pretty accurate analysis King, but it's just too damn late right now and I'm too damn tired to respond as he warrants - or maybe it's because I've finally reached the conclusion that he doesn't actually warrant an answer anymore? For one thing, it's pretty obvious he doesn't actually know much about the Canadian Militia, how it was organized, or how it was legislated, and prefers to just spin his fantasies. Which is pathetic, because 99 percent of the research required can be done online at the Department of Heritage and History (of course with that ineffable Canadian logic they just reorganized their website for no purpose and broke all their links ), the Kew reference was tongue in cheek.

 

Anyway, the Canadian population (Upper Canada, Lower Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Vancouver Island....just in case he tries the "you didn't count Nova Scotia horseshit again"). in 1861 was 3,174,442. So 34.871 percent of the south, just over one-third.

 

More tomorrow after a decent nights sleep I hope.

 

Special Reports 6 and 7 are on archive.org. Crack on.

 

Of course, they draw most of their material from Stacey's "Canada and the British Army 1846-1871", which is prettymuch a must read on the topic if you wanted to learn about the Canadian Militia etc. of the period.

 

In 1861 "Canada" consisted of Upper and Lower Canada, the other mentioned territories were not incorporated into it until 1867. More to the point, Canada Command (Williams) only includes the Province of Canada (and has been subdivided into 18 militia districts, which in turn have been formed into 5 departments, London, Toronto, Kingston, Montreal and Quebec, for the purposes of resisting the Union). Nova Scotia Command (Doyle) is a seperate command. The 3.2m citizens of "British North America"* are actually slightly more than half the 5.5m citizens of the CSA....

 

* i.e. the area covered by Canada Command and Nova Scotia Command

[67th Tigers]

About half the non-slave population of the Confederacy, which may be what was meant.

 

I believe the gentleman was being deliberately obtuse...

[DesertFox]

I was just thinking about something. A large number of Southern slaves had escaped to Canada and were living there. Then using using Canada as a stage for invading a nation in support of a slave holding nation. What kind of political fall out would there be? Mind it cause Canada to break with the U.K.?

[67th Tigers]

I'm not going to comment on the rest of your BS fantasies, but "effectively unlimited access to military materials" is too much more than a bit much, considering the distances involved and the Canadian transportation infrastructure (lack thereof).

 

And what does "half the population of the CSA (even if true, doubtful given the source)" have to do with anything? The Union fought the Civil War with one hand behind their backs in terms of personnel. There were plenty of people who would rather shoot furriners that other Americans (even if they were from the South).

 

Oh, and I'm sure Rich will have good luck at Kew. He is very experienced researcher.

 

The damage Shelby Foote did with that phrase, especially as it's taken out of context here (he was advocating the forced conscription of the entire adult male population, without exception, in the same manner the Soviet Union did*). Lets be clear. The Union was operating at the very limit of its capabilities from about October 1861 onwards.

 

As to the Canadian transport structure, it had 2 main flaws (which I'll guess you don't know, and have not the wit to guess ***), both relating to the St Lawrence. The first is it being unnavigable for months during winter, the other the location of the Beauharnois Canal (although there's an alternate on the northside, but too small for major warships).

 

* BTW, Lonn concludes one of the main reasons for the brittleness of the Union Army was a simple inability to keep it supplied with such necessities as boots, tents etc., or pay it. The effects are astounding. For example, at Antietam, the AoP was supposidly 180,000 strong, however 20,000 had gone sick and 70,000 had permanently absented** themselves. Within 3 hours of the battle finishing, another 30,000 Union soldiers permanently absented themselves leaving the AoP with barely 40,000 men.

 

** What we'd call deserted, what they called "desertion" in 1862 was leaving the Union Army to join the Confederates, a very common practice at the time

 

*** This is a quote from Mitchell and Webb, and is meant for amusement rather than offense.

[67th Tigers]

I was just thinking about something. A large number of Southern slaves had escaped to Canada and were living there. Then using using Canada as a stage for invading a nation in support of a slave holding nation. What kind of political fall out would there be? Mind it cause Canada to break with the U.K.?

 

Not a significant number, and remember, Canada was extremely pro-CSA...

[Guest aevans]

Lets be clear. The Union was operating at the very limit of its capabilities from about October 1861 onwards.

 

Let's see, In October 1861, First Manassas had just happened, a battle in which both sides couldn't muster 30,000 men apiece.

 

In 1863 the Union AoP had approximately 85-90,000 men on hand (not just on paper) at Gettysburg. At the same time, the Union had approximately 60,000 men laying siege to Vicksburg, and 60,000 more troops in Central Tennesse preparing to mount an advance into Georgia. And depots. And garrisons.

 

By 1865, the Union Army had 1,000,000 men under arms.

 

* BTW, Lonn concludes one of the main reasons for the brittleness of the Union Army was a simple inability to keep it supplied with such necessities as boots, tents etc., or pay it.

This is the realm of pure fantasy. In 1864-65, the Union army conducted a siege at Petersburg for ten months, with an army of up to 100,000. It could only do so because it had the unprecedented in human history (though the French and Birtish came close in the Crimea) technology and wealth to supply such a large army in place for almost a year.

 

The effects are astounding. For example, at Antietam, the AoP was supposidly 180,000 strong, however 20,000 had gone sick and 70,000 had permanently absented** themselves. Within 3 hours of the battle finishing, another 30,000 Union soldiers permanently absented themselves leaving the AoP with barely 40,000 men.

 

This is beyond the realm of fantasy.