The Britsh Supporting the confederates

[Rich]

Britain mostly, and a small quantity from the Upper Michigan ore lode processed in New England (an industry which pre-war was declining due to the lowering of the Tariff in 1857).

 

Huh? Iron ore production in the US in 1860 was concentrated in the middle states, as was raw iron production. 51,700 tons were mined in New England, 734,500 tons in New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland. Ohio produced 2,100 tons and Michigan 130,000. New England produced a grand total of 1,400 tons of iron bloom, the middle states 43,619, Ohio 35 tons and southern and western states (Missouri, Kentucky, Virginia, and Tennessee) 6,236 tons. Pig iron production was also centered in the middle states, 736,869 tons, compared to 26,600 tons in New England, 187,300 tons in western states (including Missouri and Kentucky), and 36,790 tons in southern states.

 

So the "small quantity from the Upper Michingan ore lode" in fact comprised only about 16 percent of the total US ore production and the "ore lode processed in New England" was about 3 percent of the total US processing.

 

As for Cotton, none obviously, but in 1860 Cotton accounted for half the US exports by value, the balance being Tobacco, Rice, Corn and Wheat, again much of these being southern crops.

 

For corn, wheat and rye southern states produced 316,271,656 bushels, compared to 716,727,388 for the other states. Perhaps surprisingly 177,377,972 of the total of 434,209,491 pounds of tobacco produced were grown in northern states or border states that remained effectively under northern control. OTOH the bulk of the 93,000 tons of rice was produced in the south (except for small amounts in California, Michigan, and Minnesota)

[Rich]

[*]1860 988,000 395,000

 

And by 1869 iron production had expanded to 3.395-million tons.

[67th Tigers]

Remind us again why the North was relatively rich while the south relatively poor. Everything you've presented, it's a wonder that the North didn't just concede defeat after Ft. Sumter was captured.

 

By PC GDP, the Southern states were richer, by a considerable margin. However, the gap between rich and poor was fairly large. Of course, being an export based economy, the Unions decision to blockade the South was masterful.

 

 

Let's recap, shall we? North had little industry (South had none to speak of but we'll ignore that for the moment) had no exports worth mentioning and basically was a land of wayward farmers. Yikes, it's a wonder, is it not, that Lincoln actually thought the North might win.

 

The South had some, concentrated around NC, GA and southern VA. The north had more, but was still not exactly a powerhouse, that's another 30 years into the future

[67th Tigers]

Excuse me? Where are these ships coming from?

 

The Pacific Squadron, the Northern Division at Esquimault to be precise.

 

The British squadrons in the eastern Pacific were dependent on US coal. The FLAGSHIP of the British North Pacific station, a steam ironclad, spent her whole deployment without raising steam.

 

Ironclad? I think you're living about 20 years past the ACW.

 

Maitland's flag was Bacchante, and she had a very active career...

 

http://www.pdavis.nl/ShowShip.php?id=75

 

As for the ones in the Atlantic, where is their coal coming from? How are you going to keep squadrons operation in the Caribbean without losing 50% of the crews and troops (if you have any) to disease?

 

Nova Scotia, or from coiliers, and the disease question is not particularly relevent, since annual disease loses of ships on the the NA&WI station is ca 0.5% pa, this isn't the 18th century...

[Guest aevans]

By PC GDP, the Southern states were richer, by a considerable margin. However, the gap between rich and poor was fairly large. Of course, being an export based economy, the Unions decision to blockade the South was masterful.

 

You're forgetting that -- depending on the particular estimate of productivity you choose to accept -- 25-50% of the South's "capital" account was based on the legal fiction that a black man was property. Move the slave from the "property" to the "people" column, and the South is a not very affluent place.

 

The South had some, concentrated around NC, GA and southern VA. The north had more, but was still not exactly a powerhouse, that's another 30 years into the future

 

Actually, by 1865 the future had already arrived. The war stimulated industrial development to an enormous degree. While there was considerable growth in absolute terms during the period 1865-1895, the post-war years were a de facto recession compared to the intra-war boom.

 

And Southern industry was so productive that while the Union had already authorized and begun construction on a trans-continental railroad, the South was canibalizing rails from roads they didn't have the industrial capacity to put locomotives on, in order to armor ironclads that they didn't have the capacity to armor any other way.

Edited September 30, 2007 by aevans

[67th Tigers]

Depends on nature of the involvement. The British (and Europe in general) sold vast quantities of arms and military stores to both sides. The blockade didn't have much of an effect until fairly late war as more and more Confederate ports fell.

 

Perhaps a more serious effect would be if the British embargoed the export of military goods to the Union. All of the Unions supply of powder, most of it's uniforms, blankets etc. either came from the UK or were manufactured from British supplied materials.

Source please.

 

To which? I've already provided a source on the powder.

 

If it's the massive dominance of imported small arms: http://cdl.library.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/moa...s=1&view=50

 

 

If the British maintain the embargo placed on such goods placed in December 1861 then the Union would have to conceed in May 1862 as it would have nothing available to fight with.And just what munitions were used up in the ACW between December 1861 and May 1862?

And if the US retaliated by embargoing food to Britain, you'd starve.

 

Actually, the powder had prettymuch been used up by Nov 61, there was no reserve remaining to replace powder used by the army, navy or to equip the forts.

 

The US accounted for 6% of British food consumption, in a fairly elastic market. If the US stops trading the British could buy from Europe or Argentina etc. for a slight increase in price.

 

 

Don't know much about US Coast Defenses, eh? Come back when you know something.[/b]

 

Oh, I do. I've read Totten's reports on the state of US coastal defences in Dec 61. The Coast had many casemated forts, none of which were manned or armed to any appriciable degree. What guns there were in the forts in 1860 were mostly removed to the Washington defences in Summer 1861.

 

In NY only the Governor's Island works are fully armed (and heavily armed, 613 guns, mostly 24's and 32's), and there are less than 10 guns are present at Throng's Neck and essentially none on Staten Island. The only other well armed fort in the Northern States is Ft McHenry in Baltimore Habor (146 guns), aside from Ft Monroe (464) and Ft Alcatraz (87), the only other armed forts are in the state of Florida.

 

 

And just what British force is going to be doing this raiding?[/b]

 

Who knows, but the most heavily defended point to be raided (Rouses Point) was defended by 2 companies.

[67th Tigers]

You are talking through your hat again. There were more RN ships than that blockading the US in 1814 and the blockade leaked like a sieve.[/b]

 

Well, the British didn't blockade New England at all, so I suppose there it did "leak like a seive", elsewhere it effectively destroyed the export of US agricultural goods.

 

Fantasy, fantasy. When did the British EVER field a force of that size in the 19th century? You are sending more than Wellington's Peninsular Army, and he told Whitehall that he could not maintain his army without American food.

If there were 66,000 Canadians under arms, who was feeding them?[/b]

 

Peninsula (>250,000 supplied, including the Portuguese, Spanish, Sicilian etc. armies)

Crimea (140,000 troops supplied in the Crimea in Jan 56)

Mutiny (75,000 Crown troops, plus the Company troops, loyal Sepoys and troops of the Princely States)

2nd Boer War (500,000 troops)

 

Again, ignoring the smaller, single Corps deployments such as China, Abysinia, Egypt etc.

 

As for feeding, Canada was of course a food exporter....

 

 

Whoopee shit. And what were the Union rail systems like? How many troops could be moved to the Canadian frontier before your fantasy army unloads and gets there?[/b]

 

Pretty bad actually. The US rail system is not integrated into a telegraph system (although in a few years it will be, due to the military necessity of adopting the European system), has a lot of single track lines, and the lines can't take the loads that a European line could.

 

If we fast forward to 1863 (with a fully operating US Military Railroads dept etc.), we can find some relatively okay movements of 20,000 troops fairly long distances. This isn't 1863.

 

Nope, a wagon can carry enough material to support the drives and animals for 10-20 days, if it's entire cargo is used to feed them....Wrong again. The figure is 40 days before there can be no payload.

 

So the early manuals (direct translations of French manuals) say, but they assume that more than 50% of forage can be taken from the land. The Union tried this and ended up with a lot of dead animals, since this isn't rich open European farmland.

[bad-dice]

Wow! I'm enjoying this thread. Lots of stuff coming out I'd never considered before.

[Guest aevans]

If we fast forward to 1863 (with a fully operating US Military Railroads dept etc.), we can find some relatively okay movements of 20,000 troops fairly long distances. This isn't 1863.

 

Really? How did the South concentrate for Shiloh?

[DesertFox]

How much import of food did the British get from the Northern United States?

[Rich]

To which? I've already provided a source on the powder.

 

Really? It seems to be contradicted by your own source below? As was your supposed "facts" for iron mining and production, which challenges you haven't responded to.

 

If it's the massive dominance of imported small arms: http://cdl.library.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/moa...s=1&view=50

Actually, the powder had prettymuch been used up by Nov 61, there was no reserve remaining to replace powder used by the army, navy or to equip the forts.

 

I see you're still picking and choosing your "facts" to fit your argument. Did you bother to read the other pages of Ripley's 30 June 1862 report? For example page 852-853, "the resources of our country are ample to supply for an indefinite period all our posible wants for such munitions of war as are provided through the Ordnance Department, and the longer the demand for them shall continue the more will those resources be developed and enlarged." The requirement of "586,476 pounds of coppper, the supplies of that material from within our own mineral regions have been about 11,590,000 pounds...." "The only article of ordnance supplies for which we depend in a great measure on importation from abroad is saltpetre. Long previous to the breaking out of the rebellion, and simply as a prudent precaution, the Ordnance Department had been collecting a stock of that article, and had in its arsenals on the 4th of March 1861, a supply of 3,822,704 pounds. Notwithstandingthe very large quantaties of gunpowder which have since been obtained, and which we are still obtaining without difficulty, it has not been found necessary to draw upon that reserve stock; but on the contrary it has been increased, and now amounts to over 9,000,000 pounds, sufficient to make 12,000,000 pounds of gunpowder. It may therefore be confidently asserted that we have made ourselves of importation for the essential supplies of rams and ordnance stores...."

 

WRT small arms, the report summary only notes the amount purchased from US manufacturers and foreign sources for the fiscal year June 1861-June 1862 and does not report the expansion of small arms manufacturing capability in the US. That is on page 852, wher he reports that the annual production capacity of the two government arsenals prior to the conflict and the loss of Harpers Ferry as 22,000 stand of arms, to an annual capacity of 200,000 stand of arms as of the report date, projects the monthly capacity of the Springfield arsenal as of 1 January 1863 as 24,000 stand of arms, and that in the second six months of 1862 projections were that capacity would expand to 350,000 muskets and rifles and 115,000 other small arms per year.

 

The US accounted for 6% of British food consumption, in a fairly elastic market. If the US stops trading the British could buy from Europe or Argentina etc. for a slight increase in price.

Is your "proof" for that better than the other "proofs" you have presented?

 

Oh, I do. I've read Totten's reports on the state of US coastal defences in Dec 61. The Coast had many casemated forts, none of which were manned or armed to any appriciable degree. What guns there were in the forts in 1860 were mostly removed to the Washington defences in Summer 1861.

 

And of course by spring-summer of 1862 when operations might be practicable, none of those would have been replaced or reinforced and Totten's report would have been ignored, especially if your posited "British threat" was looming?

[67th Tigers]

I see you're still picking and choosing your "facts" to fit your argument. Did you bother to read the other pages of Ripley's 30 June 1862 report? For example page 852-853, "the resources of our country are ample to supply for an indefinite period all our posible wants for such munitions of war as are provided through the Ordnance Department, and the longer the demand for them shall continue the more will those resources be developed and enlarged." The requirement of "586,476 pounds of coppper, the supplies of that material from within our own mineral regions have been about 11,590,000 pounds...."

 

From the upper peninsula of Michigan, moved via Canada.

 

"The only article of ordnance supplies for which we depend in a great measure on importation from abroad is saltpetre. Long previous to the breaking out of the rebellion, and simply as a prudent precaution, the Ordnance Department had been collecting a stock of that article, and had in its arsenals on the 4th of March 1861, a supply of 3,822,704 pounds.

In fact, this was acquired during the Mexican War, and had sat in armories ever since.

 

 

WRT small arms, the report summary only notes the amount purchased from US manufacturers and foreign sources for the fiscal year June 1861-June 1862 and does not report the expansion of small arms manufacturing capability in the US. That is on page 852, wher he reports that the annual production capacity of the two government arsenals prior to the conflict and the loss of Harpers Ferry as 22,000 stand of arms, to an annual capacity of 200,000 stand of arms as of the report date, projects the monthly capacity of the Springfield arsenal as of 1 January 1863 as 24,000 stand of arms, and that in the second six months of 1862 projections were that capacity would expand to 350,000 muskets and rifles and 115,000 other small arms per year.

 

The various small arms factories in the Union were working as fast as they could, but simply didn't have the capability in 1861-2. The machine tools to ramp up production were imported (want to guess from where?), and by FY1863-4 a reasonable number of rifle-muskets are being churned out. Even so, large numbers of smoothbores continued to be used by the Union Armies until well in 1864.

 

Is your "proof" for that better than the other "proofs" you have presented?

see: MP Claussen, Peace Factors in Anglo-American Relations 1861-5, Mississippi Valley Historical Review; Vol 26 No 4 pgs 511-522

 

The British didn't need to buy US grain, but the US needed to sell grain to the UK. "King Corn" is not even mentioned in the copious state papers on Anglo-American Relations, or the Mark Lane Express (the Journal of the Grain Trade), but it is discussed a lot in the Union (as in, who else will buy our grain?).

 

 

And of course by spring-summer of 1862 when operations might be practicable, none of those would have been replaced or reinforced and Totten's report would have been ignored, especially if your posited "British threat" was looming?

 

As I've mentioned before, I'm sure, Milne's squadron was operating under sealed orders to commence hostilities in January. Dunlop was only 10 days from striking the blockading squadron at Galveston.

 

"“I had an interview with Commodore Dunlop, who commands the British forces, ashore as well as afloat. Almost his first words touched upon the vital point of interest between us. He said that happily the threatened danger of hostilities had passed away; he was glad to see me here, “ for,” said he, with the utmost frankness, “when I came down here I confidently expected that in ten days I should have had my squadron operating against you on the coast.” This acknowledgment will not fail to convey to you two weighty facts—first, that the contingent war orders had been given to the British naval chiefs; secondly, that the

assemblage of the fleet at Vera Cruz, as against Mexico, was only a cover to the real purpose, to wit, a convenient basis of hostilities against our line of blockade, the western end of which is only three days’ sail from Vera Cruz.”

- Capt Powell, USN commanding USS Potomac to the Secretary of the Navy

 

these orders being

"proceed forthwith to take in detail the several blockading squadrons off Texas, the mouth of the Mississippi, Mobile, Pensacola etc., or if the United States should, as is more than likely, abandoned the Blockades and united all their Gulf Ships, the force at the disposal of the Commodore may I trust prove sufficient to enable to capture them or prevent their return to the Atlantic Coast, to form a junction with the other Blockading Squadrons, which I shall use every exertation to intercept so soon as possible to prevent their entrance into the Chesapeake."

- RAdm Milne commanding NA&WI Station to Commodore Milne commanding Division at Veracruz

 

Even had this crisis passed, and war occurred as a result of the Emancipation Proclamation, the forts still hadn't been anything like fully armed. Indeed, it's summer 1864 before the defences are in any state to resist a cruising squadron.

[Rich]

From the upper peninsula of Michigan, moved via Canada.

 

Er, no, moved via ship over the lakes. What is the point of moving tons of copper ore via Canada?

 

In fact, this was acquired during the Mexican War, and had sat in armories ever since.

And your point is?

 

The various small arms factories in the Union were working as fast as they could, but simply didn't have the capability in 1861-2. The machine tools to ramp up production were imported (want to guess from where?), and by FY1863-4 a reasonable number of rifle-muskets are being churned out. Even so, large numbers of smoothbores continued to be used by the Union Armies until well in 1864.

 

I see? So referencing Ripley's report for the purchases through June 1862 is okay, but using the same reference to show capacity in June 1862 is false, since that capacity "really" didn't exist until "FY1863-4"? What a wonderfully selective use of sources.

 

BTW, do you have some eveidence for the supposed importation of British machine-tools for US arsenal production?

 

see: MP Claussen, Peace Factors in Anglo-American Relations 1861-5, Mississippi Valley Historical Review; Vol 26 No 4 pgs 511-522

 

The British didn't need to buy US grain, but the US needed to sell grain to the UK. "King Corn" is not even mentioned in the copious state papers on Anglo-American Relations, or the Mark Lane Express (the Journal of the Grain Trade), but it is discussed a lot in the Union (as in, who else will buy our grain?).

Thanks for the source, I'll comment when I read it. I'm already curious whether or not that it is a 1940 article by a southerner may have had an influence on it?

 

Even had this crisis passed, and war occurred as a result of the Emancipation Proclamation, the forts still hadn't been anything like fully armed. Indeed, it's summer 1864 before the defences are in any state to resist a cruising squadron.

 

Huh? The only reason the Trent crisis could have led to war was because the British people had no interest in the then avowed Union objective of "restoring the Union", which had zero meaning for them compared to their general abhorence for slavery, and if Lincoln had been an idiot, which he was not. OTOH, the only way the Emancipation Proclomation could have led to war was if the British people had reversed their opinion in the space of a year, and now favored slavery?

 

And by the time Milne's fleet began to assemble, the crisis had already past, and it had begun to disperse. So I remain curious as to where this war comes from and have never seen a good answer for it?

 

BTW, it was the abatement of the crisis that resulted in the slowdown of work on the coastal defenses and in fact most of them were at best only partly completed at the end of the war. So that is simply no measure of how quickly those defenses would have been mobilized against an actual threat.

[Darth Stalin]

And we should think very carefully, WHY the UK would EVER help the Confederacy and declare the war on US?

What would then the France do? Join the war in order to make some profits in Mexico? What with Austria (also involved in Mexican "adventure")? And, finally, what with Russia? Of course, then the Russian fleet was almost nothing to cope with the Royal Navy... yet a Russian squadron stationed in San Francisco at least for some time, right?

At the same time we have a Polish Insurrection (started in 1863) against Russia, and subsequent Russian cooperation with Prussia ruled by Bismarck that led to signing the Alvensleben Convention on common dealing with Polish insurgents... maybe then the Poles could play something on that war, hoping for some help from UK and France?

 

Yet I'm not sure what number of forces could the British effectively muster and send into America at the time? And what about their command capabilities? (similar to those during Crimean War? These were not very impressive, even considering the final victory...).

 

And the British involvement in CW means that they are unable to respond in any way in Europe - thus leaving the field for Russia to cope with Turkey (something they did only in 1877-78, yet not finally due to engagement of other powers). This could lead to another world war, similar to Seven Years war 100 years before...

 

Which could also give the Northeners a feeling of again fighting another War of Independence...

IMHO too much risk for UK, and also a mark of being a "global hypocryte", first fighting against slavery and then joining the war on the side of the true-slavery-state...

[Old Tanker]

And we should think very carefully, WHY the UK would EVER help the Confederacy and declare the war on US?

 

A good read on this subject is The Cousins' Wars.

 

Kin , economic , class , religious and political ties between the ruling Elites in the U.K. and the ruling Elites in the South were quite strong.

The same is true of the Middling class of the North and the U.K.

A CSA victory would ensure the economic powerhouse of the Southern Plantation economy married to the U.K. industrial economy and boxing out the rapidly growing Northern economy competing with the Brits.

Some historians call the ACW the last battle of the ECW.

At that time over 60% of the U.S. population had kin or ancestorial ties to the U.K where as today it's probably between 25-30%.

[swerve]

By PC GDP, the Southern states were richer, by a considerable margin...

 

Not by 1860. The best estimates I've found put the south behind by then, though the difference wasn't great.

[swerve]

You're forgetting that -- depending on the particular estimate of productivity you choose to accept -- 25-50% of the South's "capital" account was based on the legal fiction that a black man was property. Move the slave from the "property" to the "people" column, and the South is a not very affluent place.

Actually, by 1865 the future had already arrived. The war stimulated industrial development to an enormous degree. While there was considerable growth in absolute terms during the period 1865-1895, the post-war years were a de facto recession compared to the intra-war boom.

...

 

He's talking about production, not wealth - though I believe he's mistaken, & product per head was a little higher in the north than the south in 1860. But production in the South collapsed as soon as the Union blockade took effect (not exactly unexpected, given the nature of the economy), while it boomed in the North, as you say, & was certainly far higher in the north than south by wars end.

[KingSargent]

The Pacific Squadron, the Northern Division at Esquimault to be precise.

Uh-huh. And where does Esquimault get its rations? Hint, it ain't Canada....

 

 

Ironclad? I think you're living about 20 years past the ACW.

Ten actually. And if the RN on the Pacific Station was dependent of USian coal in 1880, what do you think they were burning in 1862?

And the RN in the Pacific remained dependent on American coal at least through the Pacific War in South America in the late 19C.

 

Maitland's flag was Bacchante, and she had a very active career...

Under sail...

 

http://www.pdavis.nl/ShowShip.php?id=75

Nova Scotia, or from coiliers,

WHAT Nova Scotian Production and WHAT colliers and from where? The British were not really in a position to shut down all the commerce of the entire Empire to blockade the US.

The RN could not maintain a blockade in 1814 under SAIL, how do you expect them to maintain one in 1862 under steam?

 

and the disease question is not particularly relevent, since annual disease loses of ships on the the NA&WI station is ca 0.5% pa, this isn't the 18th century...

Loss on the "NA&WI station" is not germane. NA&WI encompassed the whole eastern seaboard. Ships left the Caribbean during disease season. The regiments stationed in the West Indies still died like flies and the RN would have too if they had based there year-round to maintain a blockade.

[67th Tigers]

Ten actually. And if the RN on the Pacific Station was dependent of USian coal in 1880, what do you think they were burning in 1862?

And the RN in the Pacific remained dependent on American coal at least through the Pacific War in South America in the late 19C.[/b]

 

During this period the RN coaled from Vancouver Island or Acapulco, no Californian coal was involved, as it was of very poor quality. Even the USN coaled from these sources. It was only when the RN switched to fuel oil they started to draw from California.

 

Maitland's flag was Bacchante, and she had a very active career...Under sail...

 

Nope, due to barnacles, all screw ships kept steam up constantly (even if only a fraction of full power), even if the sails were deployed as an auxiliary.

 

WHAT Nova Scotian Production and WHAT colliers and from where? The British were not really in a position to shut down all the commerce of the entire Empire to blockade the US.

Nova Scotia had an output of 2 million tons of coal in 1862, this is bitumous coal, and not as good as Welsh anthracite, which was shipped out for some of the cruisers.

 

The RN could not maintain a blockade in 1814 under SAIL, how do you expect them to maintain one in 1862 under steam?[/b]

 

They could, where they chose to, but in 1862 the task is easier. The RN have fast steamers against US sailing vessels, and a smaller section of coast to blockade.

 

Loss on the "NA&WI station" is not germane. NA&WI encompassed the whole eastern seaboard. Ships left the Caribbean during disease season. The regiments stationed in the West Indies still died like flies and the RN would have too if they had based there year-round to maintain a blockade.[/b]

 

As I've said, loses in the West Indies at this time were ca 5 in 1,000 pa. The result of the improved healthcare (it was 10 times this 15 years previously).

[67th Tigers]

Not by 1860. The best estimates I've found put the south behind by then, though the difference wasn't great.

 

For production, southern agriculture was slightly over 50% more efficient than northern. There's a lot of deliberate skewing done by some, counting Cotton exports against a general US account, and ignoring large quantities of food production consumed on the farms they were raised on.

 

Of course, southern manufactures* only account for 10% of the US total....

[swerve]

What's your source for the Nova Scotia coal production figures?

 

Interesting thing on Google books - collection of historical documents on Vancouver. Discusses local coal from page 371. Seems the RN was using it from the 1850s, & was pleased with its quality. Exported to San Francisco.

 

http://books.google.com/books?id=X22tP6TyS...A1-PA369&dq

[Guest aevans]

He's talking about production, not wealth - though I believe he's mistaken, & product per head was a little higher in the north than the south in 1860. But production in the South collapsed as soon as the Union blockade took effect (not exactly unexpected, given the nature of the economy), while it boomed in the North, as you say, & was certainly far higher in the north than south by wars end.

 

I understand that -- but GDP is a measure of ends, not means. I'll be that if Tigger gives a source, it will turn out that the people counted in "per capita" doesn't include the slaves.

[Guest aevans]

For production, southern agriculture was slightly over 50% more efficient than northern. There's a lot of deliberate skewing done by some, counting Cotton exports against a general US account, and ignoring large quantities of food production consumed on the farms they were raised on.

 

Of course, southern manufactures* only account for 10% of the US total....

 

That efficiency, as you call it (and if it really existed), came at the expense of plantation agribusiness built on slave labor. Got any efficiency numbers based on apples to apples comparisons, like non-slave holding Southern farmers vs. Northern free labor farming?

[Rich]

For production, southern agriculture was slightly over 50% more efficient than northern. There's a lot of deliberate skewing done by some, counting Cotton exports against a general US account, and ignoring large quantities of food production consumed on the farms they were raised on.

 

Of course, southern manufactures* only account for 10% of the US total....

 

Er, no, the per capita valuation of farms in the eleven southern states was higher, because included was the value of the property and its production, which included the slaves. That does not make them more "efficient", it makes them more valuable because it assesses the "value" of human beings as "property."

 

Value of farms and farm production in the south averaged about $203.30 per capita, per annum. In the north it was about $133.41. (Border states of Missouri and Kentucky excluded.) I will calculate the value of farm output later.

 

And manufacturing in the southern eleven states accounted for about 8.3 percent of the total; only if Missouri and Kentucky are included does it approach 10 percent, since they between them equaled more than half the manufacturing output of the entire eleven.

[Grant Whitley]

Why should the economic value of slaves not be counted when looking at these figures? Slavery was not a "legal fiction"; it was the law of the land, and an economic reality. The fact that slavery has been been outlawed and that we now find it morally repugnant has little to do with the issue here. Would you ignore the value of corn to the economy of Iowa if we banned it?