No Barbarosa

[Corinthian]

Can't recall if this was discussed before...

 

It's been sometimes attributed that the invasion of the USSR by Nazi Germany caused her eventual defeat, faced with hordes of seemingly inexhaustible Soviet men and material, leaving the West and North Africa campaigns drained with good men and equipment.

 

But what if Hitler didn't order Germany to invade the USSR? What if Germany instead built a line of fortifications ala Siegfried/Maginot line in Poland and other fortifications, redoubts, etc. to defend against any Soviet incursion into Europe. What if the Germans continued their war in the Balkans and Turkey, leaving the USSR and the Caucasus region untouched, and with Rommel's Afrika Korps marching thru Egypt, meet at Palestine and go on at Iraq where they can have the oil, and just let the USSR try go south to stop that from happening. What if Germany supported Finland, sent a lot of troops and tanks to defeat the Soviet invasion in the Winter War?

 

Could it have worked? Could Germany, on the defense, bloody the Soviet war machine enough to stop a Soviet invasion helping the Allies? Or would it spell an earlier defeat for Germany, considering that, with less room to play with in Eastern Europe, the Soviets could have still swept away the German defenses, prepared though they may be, and captured Berlin?

 

I'm thinking...

 

Germany would've bloodied the Soviets very much if they concentrated on the defense. From what I've read so far (which isn't enough), even when faced with overwhelming odds, the Germans still managed to inflict massive losses in Soviet men and materiel when the Soviets started going on the offensive. True, the Germans withdrew in the face of such forces, but they still managed to inflict massive casualties on the Soviets and it seems that German defenses around towns and cities they held was quite effective despite their lower numbers. If the Germans, already on the losing end, were still inflicting so many casualties at such a state, how much more then could they have done to the Soviets had they had prepared defenses or fortifications waiting for a better equipped, better trained Soviet military?

 

This would have led to more men and material being given to Rommel to finish off the Allies in North Africa, Palestine and eventually Iraq. With the Med secure, Italy would still remain in the fight, perhaps draw Franco in, and again making England more vulnerable to invasion or making the prospect of a future Overlord much more daunting.

 

 

No, I'm not smoking, drinking, sniffing or injecting anything into my bloodstream.

[Ken Estes]

This is precisely the thesis of RAdm Walter Ansel writing Hitler and the Middle Sea in 1972. Naturally, it was also a favorite theme of the Kriegsmarine, and Ansel had met many of these officers while part of the naval mission to Europe, and in interrogations postwar.

[Kenneth P. Katz]

Assuming that the UK stayed in the war and the USA entered the war, the Enola Gay and Bockscar would have flown their missions from bases in England.

[Corinthian]

Assuming that the UK stayed in the war and the USA entered the war, the Enola Gay and Bockscar would have flown their missions from bases in England.

 

That's assuming Germany and its scientists didn't have a bomb as warheads for the V-1 and V-2.

[Sailor Lars]

dear TomasCTT

 

Google "Molotov-Ribbentrop pact" and especially the secret agreements at the end of the document. Nazi Germany sold Finland to their dear Soviet friends - thus, no aid, no tanks, no nothing. Except back-stabbing.

 

So, at least that point about digging in Poland is moot.

[swerve]

dear TomasCTT

 

Google "Molotov-Ribbentrop pact" and especially the secret agreements at the end of the document. Nazi Germany sold Finland to their dear Soviet friends - thus, no aid, no tanks, no nothing. Except back-stabbing.

 

So, at least that point about digging in Poland is moot.

 

But Hitler was perfectly prepared to renege on the pact & stab Stalin in the back when it suited him, so why not renege earlier? And the thesis could still stand, even without a German excursion to Finland.

[Sailor Lars]

What a jolly good pair of fellows there were, weren't they?

 

though, earlier Barbarossa would still have been, in my opinion, the better choise for germans, since Stalin was expecting the german invasion coming through Finland. At least one would think so considering how us finns, the whole three million of us, were so threatening to the whole existense of the mighty Soviet Union!

 

<insert tinfoil here>

 

The land-exchange deal Soviets offered was not that bad, to be honest. But let's put this into this perspective. Finland was losing Viipuri/Vyborg on those land-exchanges. Would Soviets been willing to make a deal to sacrifice St Petersburg/Leningrad ( Old, historic town - much like Viipuri being the second biggest city in Finland - not even mentioning the historical value ) in the name of the security, if the tables would have been turned around.

 

This is not meant as an insult to our Russian posters - so please do not take it as such. In the end, Finland is a small country, we came up fine - Soviet Union came up fine - Nazi Germany didn't play it's cards right.

[Redbeard]

IMHO the combination of nazi aggressiveness, urge for lebensraum in the east and the stunning success of Bltizkrieg in the west (as opposed to staying behind fortifications) made anything but attack ASAP unrealistic - pigs might as well fly and hell freeze over.

 

The Germans apparently didn't know about the Soviet expansion plan in progress for the Red Army, they serioulsy believed it was just a matter of kicking in the door and the whole house would come down. But anyway, had they for some reason stayed behind fortifications they would by mid 1942 have faced a +500 Division Red Army with plenty of trained men, officers, T34s, KV1s and modern planes, artillery trucks etc.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[Lav]

It's been sometimes attributed that the invasion of the USSR by Nazi Germany caused her eventual defeat, faced with hordes of seemingly inexhaustible Soviet men and material, leaving the West and North Africa campaigns drained with good men and equipment.

But what if Hitler didn't order Germany to invade the USSR?

Well, from the available German documents and memoirs it seems that Germans expected the military balance to shift into Soviet favour as time passes by. Don't forget that while Germany indeed lost a lot in the early stages of the eastern campaign, USSR lost much more. If there's no war and Germany does not lose what it lost in 1941-42, then USSR will also keep what it lost in the same period.

 

What if Germany instead built a line of fortifications ala Siegfried/Maginot line in Poland and other fortifications, redoubts, etc. to defend against any Soviet incursion into Europe.

This would help a bit until RKKA gained some actual combat experience. After that the defence lines would be broken. Fortifications value in mid-XX century was much lower than during WW1.

 

Besides, if Germany relied on defence, it would leave the strategic initiative in the hands of RKKA. While RKKA in 1942 wouldn't have the skill to make full use of the initiative, the expected losses wouldn't be even close to the Soviet losses of historical 1941. By 1943 the lines would be broken.

 

What if the Germans continued their war in the Balkans and Turkey, leaving the USSR and the Caucasus region untouched, and with Rommel's Afrika Korps marching thru Egypt, meet at Palestine and go on at Iraq where they can have the oil, and just let the USSR try go south to stop that from happening.

If Germany does not mind USSR allying with England/USA while a considerable chunk of German forces are somewhere in Africa and Middle-East then this strategy is feasible. Anyway, USSR can afford to deploy a much larger force in Middle-East/Turkey area than Germany - for purely logistical reasons. And even if RKKA skill would be lower than that of Wehrmacht, numbers still matter a lot.

 

What if Germany supported Finland, sent a lot of troops and tanks to defeat the Soviet invasion in the Winter War?

I do not understand. You speak of Soviet neutrality while Germany attacks England in Med, Africa and Middle-East in 1941-42, yet you assume Germany will break the non-aggression with USSR as early as in 1940? I do not see any consistency here.

 

Could it have worked? Could Germany, on the defense, bloody the Soviet war machine enough to stop a Soviet invasion helping the Allies? Or would it spell an earlier defeat for Germany, considering that, with less room to play with in Eastern Europe, the Soviets could have still swept away the German defenses, prepared though they may be, and captured Berlin?

This all depends on how early the Soviet attack comes. Remember that while Germany indeed suffered noticeable losses in the East in 1941-42, USSR lost MUCH more. If you think that not suffering the historical losses will strengthen Germany, think of how much it will strengthen the RKKA.

 

Besides, without war, USSR will have much better position in the technological competition with Germany. Both on land and in the air. Many projects that were scrapped because of war will be implemented. For Germany, there is no compensatory advantage.

 

Germany would've bloodied the Soviets very much if they concentrated on the defense.

Very, very questionable. No matter how good Germans would be, defence will never bring them the same results as they achieved in 1941, when RKKA lost tens and hundreds of thousands in encirclements.

 

From what I've read so far (which isn't enough), even when faced with overwhelming odds, the Germans still managed to inflict massive losses in Soviet men and materiel when the Soviets started going on the offensive.

Not quite correct. German and Soviet losses were comparable in 1943, starting from 1944 Germany losses were higher than Soviet. By late 1944 and 1945 - much higher.

 

Assuming that RKKA is not crippled by the campaign of 1941, successfully completes the reforms it was undergoing, receives and learns the new weaponry it was getting, takes it time to learn the German tactics - the balance will come much sooner.

 

True, the Germans withdrew in the face of such forces, but they still managed to inflict massive casualties on the Soviets and it seems that German defenses around towns and cities they held was quite effective despite their lower numbers.

While German tactic of "hedgehog" defence was indeed a problem for RKKA in 1942, by 1944 it was no longer the case. True, German defence of towns was usually successful even in 1945 - but only because RKKA no longer cared to attack everything that the enemy chose to protect. And once those garrisons found themselves deep in the Soviet-controlled territory they had no choice but to evacuate - usually with disastrous consequences.

 

At the same time, when RKKA really wanted to take some city, it was taken quite quickly.

 

If the Germans, already on the losing end, were still inflicting so many casualties at such a state, how much more then could they have done to the Soviets had they had prepared defenses or fortifications waiting for a better equipped, better trained Soviet military?

In other words, while Soviets do not suffer the historical losses of 1941 and invest heavily into additional military force, Germany does not suffer the historical losses of 1941 and invests heavily into fortifications. This is a lost battle for Germany.

 

This would have led to more men and material being given to Rommel to finish off the Allies in North Africa, Palestine and eventually Iraq. With the Med secure, Italy would still remain in the fight, perhaps draw Franco in, and again making England more vulnerable to invasion or making the prospect of a future Overlord much more daunting.

Drawing Franco in means defending a long coastline from possible invasions. This requires a serious commitment of German troops because Spanish troops will not be enough for the task. England loses Gibraltar and the entire Med communication line, but this is irrelevant - convoys were sailing around Africa anyway.

 

Overall, it looks like you are preparing the scene for a grand Sovietization of the entire Europe. :-)

[swerve]

...

 

The land-exchange deal Soviets offered was not that bad, to be honest. But let's put this into this perspective. Finland was losing Viipuri/Vyborg on those land-exchanges. Would Soviets been willing to make a deal to sacrifice St Petersburg/Leningrad ( Old, historic town - much like Viipuri being the second biggest city in Finland - not even mentioning the historical value ) in the name of the security, if the tables would have been turned around. ...

 

I thought the original terms would have left Viipuri in Finland, & it was only after the war (the Winter War, not WW2) that it was added to the territory to be ceded, along with a lot more land. The post-war terms were much harsher than pre-war.

 

BTW, I visited Viborg when it was still the USSR.

[Sailor Lars]

I thought the original terms would have left Viipuri in Finland, & it was only after the war (the Winter War, not WW2) that it was added to the territory to be ceded, along with a lot more land. The post-war terms were much harsher than pre-war.

 

BTW, I visited Viborg when it was still the USSR.

 

that was speaking out from my ass, so sorry about that. thanks for correcting. And yes, you're right about the ceded territory. However the infrastructure et cetera on those ceded areas.. well.. that would sure kept us busy for the next few decades. And might have provoked a Nazi Germany attack ( though fat chance in the gulf of Finland, as proven. Scharnhorst, was it? )

 

as I said. the deal was good.. but..

 

I think you know what i mean

 

We're a stubborn nation, and proud of it. Stubborn enough for even Stalin to get fed up with it! ( no, no, don't spoil my gloating about any thing called Berlin! )

 

on another note, these things do come from some dark depths of my mind - it's been 10 years since school and just occasional reading on the topic ( from WWW ) meanwhile. So, prone to mistakes in these ones. I'm more into Airplanes anyways!

Edited September 26, 2007 by Sailor Lars

[Rich]

Not quite correct. German and Soviet losses were comparable in 1943, starting from 1944 Germany losses were higher than Soviet. By late 1944 and 1945 - much higher.

 

I snipped everything else because I pretty much think it's accurate, but this is actually at least partly incorrect. Soviet losses in 1943 were 7,857,503 of which 2,312,426 were irrecoverable. German losses in 1943 were 2,061,508. Of those 339,425 in the last three quarters were irrecoverable (KIA and MIA). I haven't chased down the first quarter, but they can be no more than the 476,142 total casualties for the period. In 1944 the losses were also not really comparable, although the Germans did suffer much more heavily, with total losses through August of 1,078,883. Soviet losses for the year totaled 6,878,641 of which 1,763,891 were irrecoverable

[Ken Estes]

That's assuming Germany and its scientists didn't have a bomb as warheads for the V-1 and V-2.

The miniaturization of nucs remained for the 1950s to be accomplished.

[Ken Estes]

Its not plausible simply because of the mindset of Hitler and Stalin.

....

Indeed, and we cannot overlook the ideological imperative. Quite apart from the military balance - and the Germans attack the USSR

with appalling ignorance in military, political, economic info and intelligence - Hitler is determined to destroy Russia, an unerring

objective of the Nazi ideology and H's Weltanschauung.

[R011]

The miniaturization of nucs remained for the 1950s to be accomplished.

Which is probably when Germany would have got its Bomb - if at all. Their program was well down the wrong path and was more or less given up in 1943.

[DesertFox]

Which is probably when Germany would have got its Bomb - if at all.

 

What, from stealing it from the Unites States.......

[R011]

What, from stealing it from the Unites States.......

As Kenneth pointed out, starting in August 1945, Germany could expect to receive all the nuclear weapons they wanted, and more.

[Gabe]

The Nazi ideology saw the Soviets as it's greatest ideological and racial enemy. Then there's the whole Lebensraum thing.

 

At a practical level, the terrain of Eastern Europe favors offense not defence. Imagine a showdown between the Warsaw Pact and Nato, where Nato compose of Germany and Italy only.

[Lav]

I snipped everything else because I pretty much think it's accurate, but this is actually at least partly incorrect. Soviet losses in 1943 were 7,857,503 of which 2,312,426 were irrecoverable. German losses in 1943 were 2,061,508. Of those 339,425 in the last three quarters were irrecoverable (KIA and MIA). I haven't chased down the first quarter, but they can be no more than the 476,142 total casualties for the period. In 1944 the losses were also not really comparable, although the Germans did suffer much more heavily, with total losses through August of 1,078,883. Soviet losses for the year totaled 6,878,641 of which 1,763,891 were irrecoverable

I won't even touch the issue of German losses reporting methods. But could you please sum up your numbers of German irrecoverable losses for 1939-45 and please demonstrate how well do they match with the simple manpower balance calculations (that is, number in service in 1939 + number of mobilized - number of demobilized).

 

Do your sources include the losses of non-Germans in Wehrmacht and SS? Many German sources do not.

 

Besides, why do you forget the German allies? They fought on the Eastern front too.

[Guest aevans]

Indeed, and we cannot overlook the ideological imperative. Quite apart from the military balance - and the Germans attack the USSR

with appalling ignorance in military, political, economic info and intelligence - Hitler is determined to destroy Russia, an unerring

objective of the Nazi ideology and H's Weltanschauung.

 

Precisely. Without the Nazis in power, it's questionable whether on not Germany would have attacked Poland to begin with. With the Nazis in power, an attempt to forcibly realize Drang nach Osten is inevitable.

Edited September 27, 2007 by aevans

[Rich]

I won't even touch the issue of German losses reporting methods. But could you please sum up your numbers of German irrecoverable losses for 1939-45 and please demonstrate how well do they match with the simple manpower balance calculations (that is, number in service in 1939 + number of mobilized - number of demobilized).

 

Why? They were no different really than any others, and in a pre-laptop world just as accurate - or inaccurate as any others? Where the system fell down was in 1945 - understandably.

 

But I am unsure how total German manpower gains and losses are relative to the manpower losses on the Eastern Front?

 

Do your sources include the losses of non-Germans in Wehrmacht and SS? Many German sources do not.

Not non-Germans in the sense of HiWi, no, do you think they were significant? Do the Soviet losses include losses of the Poles and other "foreigners"?

 

Besides, why do you forget the German allies? They fought on the Eastern front too.

 

Because you stated "German", if you want German and German Allies you might want to say so?

[Yama]

Can't recall if this was discussed before...

 

It's been sometimes attributed that the invasion of the USSR by Nazi Germany caused her eventual defeat, faced with hordes of seemingly inexhaustible Soviet men and material, leaving the West and North Africa campaigns drained with good men and equipment.

 

But what if Hitler didn't order Germany to invade the USSR? What if Germany instead built a line of fortifications ala Siegfried/Maginot line in Poland and other fortifications, redoubts, etc. to defend against any Soviet incursion into Europe. What if the Germans continued their war in the Balkans and Turkey, leaving the USSR and the Caucasus region untouched, and with Rommel's Afrika Korps marching thru Egypt, meet at Palestine and go on at Iraq where they can have the oil, and just let the USSR try go south to stop that from happening. What if Germany supported Finland, sent a lot of troops and tanks to defeat the Soviet invasion in the Winter War?

 

Winter War ended before Battle for Norway and France began. Hence, had Germany sided with Finland during Winter War, it would have meant two-front war and you can probably pretty much forget knocking France out in 1940. Which means that Italy almost certainly stays neutral too. Against both France and USSR, Germany managed to knock out best part of their armies right at the beginning of the campaign, in this scenario it does not happen. Looks pretty grim for Germans, I think.

 

Now, Germany did step in for Finland in November 1940, when USSR planned to "resolve Finnish issue once and for all". Hitler told USSR that they needed Finnish raw material imports and Soviets should keep their hands off. Of course, by then they were already preparing for Barbarossa...

Edited September 27, 2007 by Yama

[Ken Estes]

*

Precisely. Without the Nazis in power, it's questionable whether on not Germany would have attacked Poland to begin with. With the Nazis in power, an attempt to forcibly realize Drang nach Osten is inevitable.

It remains a German theme, however, apart from the Nazi impulses. Years [sorry, decades I fear] I heard a paper read by a Gustav Stresemann scholar, arguing with some effect that had Weimar survived the world economic crisis, Republican* Germany would have sought revision of Versailles limits, the Sudetenland, Danzig corridor, etc.

 

* as in German Republic, not the Rovian variety....

[glenn239]

But what if Hitler didn't order Germany to invade the USSR? What if Germany instead built a line of fortifications ala Siegfried/Maginot line in Poland and other fortifications, redoubts, etc. to defend against any Soviet incursion into Europe.

 

 

Nothing good for the Allies could come of this. Hitler has chosen to risk a continuation of the Nazi-Soviet pact in order to concentrate on defeating the West while appeasing the Soviets where and when necessary. German air and naval forces will be correspondingly far stronger, as will the Russian diplomatic position. Japan’s prospects in the Far East are better.

 

The question is one of Stalin’s intentions. He has the option to launch a massive attack upon Germany in 1943. This will be a disaster for the West because the Russians will conquer much more territory and end the war in a far stronger position than historical (though still weaker than the USA). Alternatively, Stalin could pretend it was 1953 and bolster the Axis powers (including Japan) militarily via trade treaties while pressuring them for concessions diplomatically. This approach, also big trouble for the West, seems more in keeping with Stalin’s style and Soviet interests (after all, if this policy started to fail, Stalin could always attack).

 

After July 1945 the Allies will have the A-bomb. Perhaps the plan in that case would be to resettle the United Kingdom to North America as the opponents devastated one another with weapons of mass destruction. (In the German case, tens of thousands of tons of nerve gas). Overall, the situation looks to be a big frigging mess for the Allies and a dream for Stalin. How Hitler makes out depends on what Stalin decides to do.

[Guest aevans]

*

It remains a German theme, however, apart from the Nazi impulses. Years [sorry, decades I fear] I heard a paper read by a Gustav Stresemann scholar, arguing with some effect that had Weimar survived the world economic crisis, Republican* Germany would have sought revision of Versailles limits, the Sudetenland, Danzig corridor, etc.

 

* as in German Republic, not the Rovian variety....

 

A German theme that nobody had done anything about, even during Bismarck's empire building, when the Russians were so busy with the Turks that Poland was ripe for the taking.