Patton in the Korean War

[DesertFox]

Stolen from another board but still a good question I think

 

How would the Korean War have been affected if General Patton had not died and was given command of a US Field Army?

[Marek Tucan]

My guess it won¨t be all that different to MacArthur in overlooking possible Chinese action etc.

[DesertFox]

One item, if I understand correctly, was that Patton was not political like MacArthur?

[Old Tanker]

Patton incharge when ?

ViceRoy of Japan from 1945 on ?

 

As to leading an army in Korea , one would be hard pressed to do a better job than Ridgway did . He ranks as one of the best U.S. field commanders of all time IMHO.

[Ken Estes]

Stolen from another board but still a good question I think

 

How would the Korean War have been affected if General Patton had not died and was given command of a US Field Army?

 

It is an undying US army belief that good units are made by good officers, and the quality, preparation of the troops is somehow secondary. The experience of Korea demonstrated time after time how false this self-serving notion remained. Walton Walker remains one of the most unsung commanders, largely because of his death in a traffic accident [same as Patton] at a time that 8th Army was being routed after its overextension to the Yalu at MacArthur's insistence. Walton H. Walker, then over 60 years old, drew on the experiences of service in the two world wars and had commanded the XX Corps, Third Army, in the European Theater of Operations in 1944-45. One of the several favorites of General George S. Patton in that campaign, Walker had also gained the attention of the supreme commander, General Eisenhower: “[Ranked number] 18 [of all army generals in ETO]Top flight Corps C.G., fighter, cool…he has consistently led his corps with an exemplary boldness ,and success. He is a fighter in every sense of the word, whether in pursuit or in more difficult conditions of attack against a fortified position.”

His orders to 8th Army as it fell behind the Pusan defenses were typically Pattonesque:

“Daily counterattacks will be made by all units. ... Commanders will take immediate and aggressive action to insure that these and previous instructions to this effect are carried out without delay. Counterattack," Walker said, "is a decisive elm [element] of the defense.”

 

So, I suspect that, had Walker's XX Corps or Patton's Third Army fought in Korea, it would have made all the difference. Either commander could ahve managed no better in 1950 with the then-8th Army.

[Tim the Tank Nut]

A "Third Army" under Patton's command would have made SHORT work of the NK forces but Patton's Third Army was a fully operational combat force forged in the fires of combat.

The Eighth Army was an occupation force unprepared for the role it was cast into.

US mixed political signals enhanced the difficulty that the early US forces faced.

 

For the MacArthur haters (I know they're coming) all I can say is

Inchon!!!!!

[Guest aevans]

For the MacArthur haters (I know they're coming) all I can say is

Inchon!!!!!

 

That's what I was thinking -- it's hard to see how Patton could have done any better recovering the South (or been less recklessly bold in invading the North) than MacArthur. After things settled down, it would have been a race to see whether Patton had a heart attack or stroke first over the frustraions of attrition warfare -- if he didn't get fired first for expressing a less than PC opinion.

Edited September 24, 2007 by aevans

[DKTanker]

US mixed political signals enhanced the difficulty that the early US forces faced.

Some things don't change much.

[JOE BRENNAN]

As in many Korea discussions, it's easy to skip past the basic issue of the change in implicit US goal from reversing the invasion of SK (June 1950), to liberating all of Korea (ca. October), back to an explicit goal of draw ~38th parallel (early 1951). MacArthur/Walker's handling of the first phase, taking the poor initial combat readiness of the US (and ROK) forces as a given, looks pretty good. And MacArthur deserves special credit for the Patton-like 'big solution' at Inchon, but there was a clear goal of defeating the KPA. And there was more than adequate means to do it (remember the KPA was outnumbered by the defenders in the Pusan Perimeter after around August 1, more so later, not counting the Inchon force). Likewise under Ridgeway, with commanding general in synch with a clear and achievable, though unsatifying, national goal things worked pretty well. The period of big problem was after the defeat of the KPA in September 1950 when the goal drifted, and MacArthur's plans and action drifted also away from what was achievable, including the huge intelligence failure about Chinese numbers and capability in northern NK.

 

The US and ROK weren't going to establish the border of a unified non-communist Korea at the Yalu-Tumen without nuclear weapons. A general who could have recognized that, and gotten Washington and Seoul onboard, could have done significantly better in Korea. That is, by establishing a line at the narrow of the peninsula approx Pyongyang-Wonsan and shifting to defensive-attrition warfare right then, October 1950. It's even possible the Chinese would have just accepted that smaller NK buffer without a lot more fighting. In any case it's considerably shorter than the DMZ, and if successfuly held would have ended the war with an NK of questionable viability for Kim's purposes, but possibly adequate for Mao's. I don't know if Patton was that general, or if there was one.

 

Joe

[Kensuke]

Stolen from another board but still a good question I think

 

How would the Korean War have been affected if General Patton had not died and was given command of a US Field Army?

 

Probably no discernible effect on the outcome, except that maybe we might have run up against the Chinese border sooner. Mac would still be in overall command. The Chinese still would have pushed us back. Patton might have put up a tougher fight while withdrawing back across the 38th. A rather catastrophic side-theory is that he might have demanded that the 1st MarDiv and elements of the 7th ID hold onto Chosin instead of trying to break out, while he lobbies Mac to get additional forces into the game so they can counterattack. This probably would have resulted in the destruction or surrender of the division. OTOH, the same might be said if the (also very aggressive) Ridgway was in command from the very beginning.

 

The problems in Korea had little to do with the field commanders. It had to do with MacArthur underestimating the Chinese, and the fact that 8th Army wasn't near the quality of 3rd or 1st.

 

- John

Edited September 25, 2007 by Kensuke

[Murph]

Inchon was a 3rd rate landing against piss poor troops, compared to any of the WWII landings. I have never seen why the Big Mac gets so much bloody credit for Inchon. The Big Mac wasted so many opportunities it was pathetic, and Patton would have done a far superior job, at least in troop training...

[Tim the Tank Nut]

because Inchon worked. We didn't have our WW2 grade troops to fight a WW2 defense either.

MacArthur pushed Inchon against the Navy's own recomendations.

It shattered the NK position.

 

One note about the Chinese, WW2 established that they weren't any good at all. It's no suprise they would be underestimated in 1950.

[Guest aevans]

Inchon was a 3rd rate landing against piss poor troops, compared to any of the WWII landings. I have never seen why the Big Mac gets so much bloody credit for Inchon. The Big Mac wasted so many opportunities it was pathetic, and Patton would have done a far superior job, at least in troop training...

 

By that logic, the turning movement employed by the Coalition forces in ODS was a "3rd rate" maneuver against "piss poor troops". Where does it say that one has to win by going toe to toe with the best the enemy has when you don't have to? The Inchon landing was undertaken precisely because it provided an opportunity to place a superior force against an inferior force in the enemy's rear, guaranteeing an NK collapse. That's not cheesy, that's good operational art.

 

As for macArthur missing opportunities, please nominate some cases.

Edited September 25, 2007 by aevans

[JOE BRENNAN]

One note about the Chinese, WW2 established that they weren't any good at all. It's no suprise they would be underestimated in 1950.

That was a belief about WWII common at the time I'd agree, but hard to support wrt to the Communists and perhaps overstated even wrt the Nationalists. The Communists inflicted a notable bloody nose on the Japanese even in the opening campaign of the 1937 war. The Nationalists suffered a string of large military disasters in 1937-38, but many or most of the Japanese campaigns between then and the opening of the Pacific War featured the Japanese further expandng their main territory and various separate bridgeheads in China, and then having to retreat, harried along the way by larger Nationalist forces fighting in semi-conventional style, not totally dissimilar to the US overextension and retreat in northern NK. Once the Pacific War started the Japanese de-emphasized operations in China, until their 1944-45 offensives related to the Pacific War (to take US air bases and capture a continuous rail line from Indochina to north China to get around US sub/air attacks on shipping); and both Chinese forces put strategic emphasis on conserving strength to fight each other once the Japanese lost. That wasn't a matter of troop quality, again especially as regards the Communists.

 

Joe

[Tim the Tank Nut]

I wouldn't give the Chinese so much credit.

We helped them all we could and they still couldn't accomplish enough.

Maybe they did some but comparing China's resources to Japan's makes China look pretty pathetic.

 

If I was MacArthur in 1950 I'd laugh at the Chinese Army as a threat too.

[Junior FO]

...

Edited September 19, 2024 by Junior FO

[Tim the Tank Nut]

I'm not dividing "China". The Chinese nation in WW2 did poorly. For whatever self inflicted reasons they weren't a military powerhouse. It's no wonder US generals didn't take them seriously. There just wasn't a record of serious accomplishment by China that would give a US officer pause in 1950.

[Corinthian]

Inchon was a 3rd rate landing against piss poor troops, compared to any of the WWII landings. I have never seen why the Big Mac gets so much bloody credit for Inchon. The Big Mac wasted so many opportunities it was pathetic, and Patton would have done a far superior job, at least in troop training...

 

What Tony and Tim said. Any other commander might have thought Inchon would not work and so would not push with it, thinking that the tides, the sea wall, and the defended islands all said "MASSACRE". Macarthur, having had his own share of amphib landings, saw instead "OPPORTUNITY" to kick the NoKor bastards. As Tim said, even naval commanders didn't like the idea, because IIRC, it would have been a death trap with the large tide that could have left the navy's precious ships stuck in the mud and open to attack: "Forget the troops and the war, we want our ships safe." That said, even if Nokor troops were outnumbered at the Pusan Perimeter by then, still waging an offensive from that alone without conjunction of an amphibious landing at Inchon, could still have been a harder fight. But faced with an enemy behind their lines at Pusan, Nokor had to pull out as quickly as possible. Such withdrawal resulted to a less effective fighting force (and less casualties for the UN/US) as opposed to a fanatical dug-in force on the defense.

 

The Inchon landing was also important in a symbolic/political way: close to Seoul and making the recapture/liberation of that capital possible earlier, rather than waiting until the US/UN forces in Pusan, plus reinforcements, fight their way north.

 

BTT...

 

IIRC, when news of the German Ardennese offensive reached Patton, he is supposed to have said "Let them continue on to Paris and we'll cut their balls!" I'm thinking, had Patton been at Korea, he might've thought of the same thing - let the Chinese come and cut them from their bases across the Yalu.

Edited September 26, 2007 by TomasCTT

[History Buff]

Hammelburg-ri

[JOE BRENNAN]

I wouldn't give the Chinese so much credit.

We helped them all we could and they still couldn't accomplish enough.

Maybe they did some but comparing China's resources to Japan's makes China look pretty pathetic.

 

If I was MacArthur in 1950 I'd laugh at the Chinese Army as a threat too.

Again it was common to have a low estimation of Chinese military prowess, that I agree. But it wasn't justified and they had reason to know better. The capabilities of the CPV shouldn't have been that big a surprise. And those were pretty impressive intitally, in case we're not in synch on that. The total Chinese force in the late 1950 offensives didn't outnumber the UN one by all that much overall, as official US accounts have long recognized (Army's official history, 'Ebb and Flow' vol. by Mossman), and was a lot weaker in supporting arms. It concentrated superior numbers at key points, as you're supposed to. And by its own accounts it suffered much lower casualties than estimated by the US at the time, although that issue isn't wholly settled.

 

The US gave a lot of aid to the Nationalists (and some to the Communists) during the Pacific War, but the point I made and was repeated was that by that stage both had made a strategic decision to emphasize the coming civil war. Which the Americans familiar with them realized.

 

But before the Pacific War the US didn't give a lot of aid to China, was really only beginning ca. 1941. Despite which the Chinese were not always hopeless v the Japanese. A good pair of books on this is the Nationalist official history, "History of the Sino Japanese War" by Hsu and Chang, and "The Sino-Japanese War 1937-1941, From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor" by Frank Dorn. Dorn was an attache in China at the time and the book is mix of his personal experiences plus basically a critical evaluation of the Hsu/Chang book, skewering its frequent euphemisms but verifying the basic campaign histories, for which the official book has better maps and OOB tables. Again these featured a number of Japanese setbacks in the period 1939-1941, when they tried to expand their hold on China then frequently had to retreat under pressure from outnumbering semi-conventional Chinese units cutting their LOC's, rather resembling Chinese successes in Korea.

 

But the UN didn't face Chiang Kai Shek's army in Korea and knew it. The Communists weren't a large part of the Chinese armies in 1937-45, but even near the start of that war one of the only sizeable victories was theirs, at Pingxingguan Sept '37 where a brigade of the Japanese 5th Division was destroyed. The Chinese CO was Lin Biao. A number of American officers were also familiar with the Communists, Evans Carlson the USMC officer being an example. There was simply no evidence to support the idea that the Chinese Communists were not effective fighters within their means (of limited firepower), and a good deal of contrary evidence.

 

So again MacArthur's command probably did have a dismissive opinion of the Chinese but it wasn't justified or excusable. The other side of that coin was overestimation of the UN army's capabilities, since all such measures are relative. Against an improved UN army that had adapted to the CPV, the CPV didn't do as well later in the Korean War. But the UN army of late 1950 still had a lot of serious weaknesses itself. I know it's cliche to paraphrase Sun Tzu, know the enemy and yourself, but MacArthur really did tend to blind spots on both sides of that equation.

 

Joe

Edited September 26, 2007 by JOE BRENNAN

[ShotMagnet]

Inchon was a 3rd rate landing against piss poor troops, compared to any of the WWII landings. I have never seen why the Big Mac gets so much bloody credit for Inchon.

 

Because he got lucky.

 

As noted previously; the logical, responsible move would have been either to land with more favorable tides, or land somewhere else. The first wave or two landed and was promptly isolated thanks to nothing but hydrology. Had the Northies attacked with some coordination and/or earnest the Marines probably would have been thrown back into the sea.

 

Because that didn't happen, Macarthur was hailed as a genius.

 

 

Shot

[Ken Estes]

Because he got lucky.

 

As noted previously; the logical, responsible move would have been either to land with more favorable tides, or land somewhere else. The first wave or two landed and was promptly isolated thanks to nothing but hydrology. Had the Northies attacked with some coordination and/or earnest the Marines probably would have been thrown back into the sea.

 

Because that didn't happen, Macarthur was hailed as a genius.

Shot

Uh, with what would the NKPA have attacked? The nearest reinforcements were at Seoul [mustering a few tanks and 400 men the next day], and Inchon merely hosted a boot camp for the NKPA, with the exception of the Wolmi-do garrison, which had to be burned or buried in the bunkers they went into to escape the naval bombardment. With the bulk of the effective NKPA at Pusan, any phibop anywhere would have succeeded. It is also true that 8th Army could have done it all out of their perimeter, which they almost managed.

[Ken Estes]

Again it was common to have a low estimation of Chinese military prowess, that I agree. But it wasn't justified and they had reason to know better. .... The other side of that coin was overestimation of the UN army's capabilities, since all such measures are relative. Against an improved UN army that had adapted to the CPV, the CPV didn't do as well later in the Korean War. But the UN army of late 1950 still had a lot of serious weaknesses itself. I know it's cliche to paraphrase Sun Tzu, know the enemy and yourself, but MacArthur really did tend to blind spots on both sides of that equation.

 

Joe

Well put. It remains unconscionable how in plan after plan, the 8th Army overestimated its capability, first to hold and then to counterattack, through mid-September, despite outnumbering the NKPA forces they faced after mid-July. Even Stratemeyer, the FEAF cdr wondered in his diary how so many US/UN ground forces, vastly superior in armor and arty, with complete command of the air, continued to perform so badly in the Pusan Perimeter.

[swerve]

I'm not dividing "China". The Chinese nation in WW2 did poorly. For whatever self inflicted reasons they weren't a military powerhouse. It's no wonder US generals didn't take them seriously. There just wasn't a record of serious accomplishment by China that would give a US officer pause in 1950.

 

But the China of WW2 was not the China of 1950. WW2 China was divided, with both sides lining up for the civil war they expected as soon as Japan was out of the way. It had been weakened in advance by Japanese occupation of prime parts of the country during the late Empire & the warlord period. It had not been unified under a single government since about 1912, & even then Manchuria was outside its control.

 

China in 1950 was unified under the winners of the civil war, who'd beaten an army armed, equipped & directly aided by the USA. The victorious army was still intact, packed with veterans who knew how to fight & defeat technologically superior opponents. The war had been over only a few months.

 

How could any sane US general not know that?

[Tim the Tank Nut]

It just wasn't on the "to do list" to study China. The US was war weary in '50 and political signals were "no fighting" in Korea.

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