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Battle of Lake Erie-Sept 10, 1813


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Today is the anniversary of this rather obscure yet decisive battle. After this battle, the British lost any strategic influence on operations west of Niagra Falls.

 

Despite extremely poor and anarchic fleet tactices on the part of the USN, Perry used his superior forces and tactical stubborness to crush the poorly armed RN squadron.

 

Perry's real claim to fame is creating a superior fleet in the middle of the wilderness, trekking large cannon to the building base, and manning his ships in a sparsely populated area.

 

The RN, despite beginning with a sizeable Canadian Provincial Marine squadron, squandered their superiority by dilatory tactics which permitted Perry to build up a squadfron from nothing unmolested by the British.

 

A further criticism would be the reluctance of Sir James Yeo on Lake Ontario to permit heavy guns and prime sailors received from the fleet in Halifax to pass to Barclay on Lake Erie so that the RN squadron was hopelessly outgunned in the decisive battle and except for the fitful winds and poor sqaudron tactics of the USN would have been completely one-sided.

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Today is the anniversary of this rather obscure yet decisive battle. After this battle, the British lost any strategic influence on operations west of Niagra Falls.

 

Despite extremely poor and anarchic fleet tactices on the part of the USN, Perry used his superior forces and tactical stubborness to crush the poorly armed RN squadron.

 

Perry's real claim to fame is creating a superior fleet in the middle of the wilderness, trekking large cannon to the building base, and manning his ships in a sparsely populated area.

 

The RN, despite beginning with a sizeable Canadian Provincial Marine squadron, squandered their superiority by dilatory tactics which permitted Perry to build up a squadfron from nothing unmolested by the British.

 

A further criticism would be the reluctance of Sir James Yeo on Lake Ontario to permit heavy guns and prime sailors received from the fleet in Halifax to pass to Barclay on Lake Erie so that the RN squadron was hopelessly outgunned in the decisive battle and except for the fitful winds and poor sqaudron tactics of the USN would have been completely one-sided.

 

A large shipment of carronade guns were sent by Yeo to Amherstburg and made it as far as Port Dover before being seized by US Forces. Therefore, Barclay was forced to largely arm his ships with guns of many different calibres that were removed from the defenses of Fort Malden.

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I understand there are a number of ships that are in good condition on the bottom. Are there any plans to salvage and preserve these? It would be cool to have an American "Vasa".

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I understand there are a number of ships that are in good condition on the bottom. Are there any plans to salvage and preserve these? It would be cool to have an American "Vasa".

 

The Lake Erie ships were more scattered. On Lake Champlain, the ships were sunk in a more concentrated area. The USN ship Eagle has had a lot of work done on raising her.

 

Niagra was raised on Lake Erie, but in bad shape. The current ship on display is a replica.

 

Most of the ships were sold for salvage and stripped on their metal parts by salvagers before being sunk.

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The Lake Erie ships were more scattered. On Lake Champlain, the ships were sunk in a more concentrated area. The USN ship Eagle has had a lot of work done on raising her.

 

Niagra was raised on Lake Erie, but in bad shape. The current ship on display is a replica.

 

Most of the ships were sold for salvage and stripped on their metal parts by salvagers before being sunk.

 

They were also built of unseasoned wood and would have warped and dryrotted fairly quickly. Perry knew this but the goal was to just get a squadron on the lakes. They had a devil of a time getting the Lawrence and Niagra across the bar.

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They were also built of unseasoned wood and would have warped and dryrotted fairly quickly. Perry knew this but the goal was to just get a squadron on the lakes. They had a devil of a time getting the Lawrence and Niagra across the bar.

 

Barclay's squadron showed up just as Perry was getting the brigs accross the bar at Presque Isle (Erie). Niagra had gotten accross the bar and was in the lake, but had no guns or stores. Lawrence was stuck on the bar without guns or stores. The only armed ships that Perry had were te small schooners and gunboats. Barclay was without his largest ship (Detroit). Barcley sailed off, reluctant to engage without Detroit. Perry got Lawrence accross and was able to rearm and restock Lawrence and Niagra for the final engagement at Put-in-Bay. One of history's great what-ifs.

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Barclay's squadron showed up just as Perry was getting the brigs accross the bar at Presque Isle (Erie). Niagra had gotten accross the bar and was in the lake, but had no guns or stores. Lawrence was stuck on the bar without guns or stores. The only armed ships that Perry had were te small schooners and gunboats. Barclay was without his largest ship (Detroit). Barcley sailed off, reluctant to engage without Detroit. Perry got Lawrence accross and was able to rearm and restock Lawrence and Niagra for the final engagement at Put-in-Bay. One of history's great what-ifs.

 

 

Isn't another question why the heck Barclay took his whole squadron back to resupply to begin with rather than maintaining his blockade of Perry?

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In many ways the War of 1812 is over looked in importance.

 

It established that we would survive as a nation and the Brits painfully came to the same conclusion. :)

The Brits also discovered that trying to blockade the US was a whole different game than blockading Europe from major bases nearby. Trying to do it from British bases was obviously unworkable, and trying to do it from British possessions in the Americas would only work if there there was massive base infrastructure built up. That was both extremely difficult and hideously expensive.

 

The British also determined that the US could overrun Canada any time the Yankees got serious about it. It took them a few years to officially articulate that conclusion in Imperial Defense studies, but the history of the War of 1812 was the source for most of their data aside from rather shocking figures that surfaced as to just exactly what the British Empire could move.

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The Brits also discovered that trying to blockade the US was a whole different game than blockading Europe from major bases nearby. Trying to do it from British bases was obviously unworkable, and trying to do it from British possessions in the Americas would only work if there there was massive base infrastructure built up. That was both extremely difficult and hideously expensive.

 

The British also determined that the US could overrun Canada any time the Yankees got serious about it. It took them a few years to officially articulate that conclusion in Imperial Defense studies, but the history of the War of 1812 was the source for most of their data aside from rather shocking figures that surfaced as to just exactly what the British Empire could move.

 

I've heard this a few times, and it certainly isn't what I've read (for example Kenneth Bourne's Britain and the Balance of Power in North America 1815-1908, which is prettymuch the classic on the subject). I was wondering where the idea came from?

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I've heard this a few times, and it certainly isn't what I've read (for example Kenneth Bourne's Britain and the Balance of Power in North America 1815-1908, which is prettymuch the classic on the subject). I was wondering where the idea came from?

Study of the reports of various Committees on Imperial Defense from 1855 to 1885. The reports were not public information, but they were close examinations of logistical and infrastructure requirements for various war scenarios threatening the Empire. Imperial naval stations and coal stocks were established based on their studies.

 

Had war come over Canada, for example, Canada had too few troops of her own and the disposable assets of the British Army (ie, troops not already committed to other Imperial activities) were not enough to match what a mobilized US could send north. There were not enough munitions, fuel, and stores in Canada to sustain a war, very little local industry, and trying to supply a large war across the Atlantic was not on the cards. Ditto with Naval operations from British American possessions. The British blockade of the US in 1812-14 leaked like a sieve, the Admiral in charge estimated he would need a 300-400% increase in assets (and basing and supply) for a viable blockade, and he already employed more frigates than the RN maintained on active service after 1815. And he didn't have to worry about coal stocks.

 

A successful UK-US war might have been possible with a full-out British mobilization along the lines of WW1 and 2, but that sort of thing was unheard of in the 19th Century. The British couldn't even supply Wellington in the Peninsula from domestic resources during 1809-14 (most of the rations came from the US, even while the War of 1812 was on). Conscription, domestic rationing, and nationalization of industry were nightmares to British politicians in the 1800s.

 

Do not feel too dismayed, the British Governments of the time were less than thrilled as well. They kept appointing new Committees, and always got the same answer.

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I would have to say that the massive European immigration to the US and the develppment of US railroad infrastructure pretty much made the loss of Canada a foregone conclusion in any US-GB confrontation after say 1850.

 

The inadequacies of Halifax and Jamaica as bases for support of a blockade of the US Atlantic coast were made obvious durring the War of 1812. The massive amounts spent on fortifying Bermuda and building up the naval dockyard there are testimony both to the need for a better blockade base and to continuing US-GB tensions during the 19th century. Bermuda is one massive coast artillery fort.

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I think a lot depends on when a UK-US war takes place. The Trent is the most obvious possible, and while Canada (and the maritimes) have barely 5,000 men under arms in November, by late December they've mobilised and equipped over 60,000 men (and had received material for another 40,000). Similarly, the British maintained the men and material for 5 almost complete Army Corps (they lacked enough bridging troops to provide one to each Corps* (having exactly 1, with the treasury trying to disband it), and were short in the established 8 Field Btys per Corps, hence the sudden raising of new batteries in December 61).

 

Not much longer after this, the logistical arms started to take cuts, and 10 years later there was only logistics at home to support a single Corps abroad, despite calls in RUSI to repattern the British Army into 12 regular Corps (5 in the UK, 1 in North America, 1 in the Med and 5 in India).

 

*The standard Corps d'Armee was defined as 12 Inf Bns, 3 Cav Regts, a Brigade of RFA (plus a couple of RHA btys), 3 RE Coys, an RE Bridging Tp and a Military Train Bn. 16,000 all up. Local forces where available were slotted in. Prettymuch every punitive expedition of this period consisted of a single Corps on this pattern.

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I think a lot depends on when a UK-US war takes place. The Trent is the most obvious possible, and while Canada (and the maritimes) have barely 5,000 men under arms in November, by late December they've mobilised and equipped over 60,000 men (and had received material for another 40,000). Similarly, the British maintained the men and material for 5 almost complete Army Corps (they lacked enough bridging troops to provide one to each Corps* (having exactly 1, with the treasury trying to disband it), and were short in the established 8 Field Btys per Corps, hence the sudden raising of new batteries in December 61).

 

Not much longer after this, the logistical arms started to take cuts, and 10 years later there was only logistics at home to support a single Corps abroad, despite calls in RUSI to repattern the British Army into 12 regular Corps (5 in the UK, 1 in North America, 1 in the Med and 5 in India).

 

*The standard Corps d'Armee was defined as 12 Inf Bns, 3 Cav Regts, a Brigade of RFA (plus a couple of RHA btys), 3 RE Coys, an RE Bridging Tp and a Military Train Bn. 16,000 all up. Local forces where available were slotted in. Prettymuch every punitive expedition of this period consisted of a single Corps on this pattern.

So why was the commitment to the Crimean War six years before so much smaller?

 

What were these 60,000 Canadians (presumably) equipped with? When the British Army got to the Crimea only 1/5th of the troops had rifles, the rest had caplock smoothbores of varying vintages.

 

Considering what the Northern US came up with when they got serious about the CSA in 1861-5, I doubt that 60,000 Canadian militia and even whatever British troops could be shipped across could do much.

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So why was the commitment to the Crimean War six years before so much smaller?

 

What were these 60,000 Canadians (presumably) equipped with? When the British Army got to the Crimea only 1/5th of the troops had rifles, the rest had caplock smoothbores of varying vintages.

 

Considering what the Northern US came up with when they got serious about the CSA in 1861-5, I doubt that 60,000 Canadian militia and even whatever British troops could be shipped across could do much.

 

As the Army was much smaller, and more dispersed.

 

When the Crimean kicks off, the British had 42 Battalions in the UK, and sent 37 of them to the Crimean (the ones left were 4 Bns of Guards and the 51st, which had just returned from India and were very understrength), they brought in 15 Bns from elsewhere eventually. These Bns were smaller than in 1861 (they were established for 614 in 1853, 887 in 1854, and almost 2,000 by 1855).

 

In 1861 there are 67 Bns in the UK or already in Canada, and they're larger. In fact, the British infantry available is roughly double that in 1854, i.e. about 10 Divisions (or 5 Corps).

 

The Crimean expedition was almost entirely equipped with Minie Rifles, except the 4th Division (only their Rifle Bn, and flank coys had Minie Rifles). The majority were P1851's rather than P1853 Enfields though.

 

The Canadians were equipped with P1853 Enfields, most of which came from the UK with the reinforcements (100,000 of them). Canada had only 45 modern pieces of field artillery (vs 81 available the Union started with) (and 2,235 larger pieces (mostly seacoast pieces) vs 1,049 pieces in Canada).

 

I know it was thought Canada could repell an invading army of 200,000, which is probably more than the Union could send.

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As the Army was much smaller, and more dispersed.

 

When the Crimean kicks off, the British had 42 Battalions in the UK, and sent 37 of them to the Crimean (the ones left were 4 Bns of Guards and the 51st, which had just returned from India and were very understrength), they brought in 15 Bns from elsewhere eventually. These Bns were smaller than in 1861 (they were established for 614 in 1853, 887 in 1854, and almost 2,000 by 1855).

 

In 1861 there are 67 Bns in the UK or already in Canada, and they're larger. In fact, the British infantry available is roughly double that in 1854, i.e. about 10 Divisions (or 5 Corps).

And how many transports did the British have immediately available? According to the IDC, not enough to get everybody across the Atlantic on short notice. Not to mention feeding them on the trip. How much salt pork do you think the Brits had laying around anyway? Finding stores to move armies to America was a nightmare in 1776-83 and in 1812-14. And then there's coal, although most of the transports would have to be sail anyway (as the ones in the Crimea were).

 

The Crimean expedition was almost entirely equipped with Minie Rifles, except the 4th Division (only their Rifle Bn, and flank coys had Minie Rifles). The majority were P1851's rather than P1853 Enfields though.

IIRC only the Third Division had rifles at the Alma, although they got the army re-equipped PDQ.

 

The Canadians were equipped with P1853 Enfields, most of which came from the UK with the reinforcements (100,000 of them). Canada had only 45 modern pieces of field artillery (vs 81 available the Union started with) (and 2,235 larger pieces (mostly seacoast pieces) vs 1,049 pieces in Canada).

What 100,000 reinforcements?

 

I know it was thought Canada could repell an invading army of 200,000, which is probably more than the Union could send.

Thought by whom? Nobody who examined the logistics involved, that's for sure.

And you are considering only the situation at the time of the Trent Affair. The Union was not going to get really serious about taking Canada during the ACW and mobilizing enough weaponry to do it would be tricky before 1860, but after the ACW? With all the weapons stockpiles.

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And how many transports did the British have immediately available? According to the IDC, not enough to get everybody across the Atlantic on short notice. Not to mention feeding them on the trip. How much salt pork do you think the Brits had laying around anyway? Finding stores to move armies to America was a nightmare in 1776-83 and in 1812-14. And then there's coal, although most of the transports would have to be sail anyway (as the ones in the Crimea were).

 

Admiralty transports? None, they were all at sea bringing troops back from India as part of the post-Mutiny drawdown. However, a lot of steamships are available to be hired by the Admiralty. Indeed, all reinforcements to Canada in 1861 were by hired ships (including Great Eastern's two runs in the summer).

 

Provisioning troops abroad had been down from home for a long time, and it's just a matter of increasing the amount the commisariat purchases, there's plenty available.

 

IIRC only the Third Division had rifles at the Alma, although they got the army re-equipped PDQ.[/b]

 

Most of the army was requipped en route with P1851 Minies. Those that weren't (most of 4th Division) were reequipped with P1853 Enfields in February 1855.

 

What 100,000 reinforcements?

 

I wasn't clear. I meant 100,000 P1853's were shipped to Canada.

 

Thought by whom? Nobody who examined the logistics involved, that's for sure.

And you are considering only the situation at the time of the Trent Affair. The Union was not going to get really serious about taking Canada during the ACW and mobilizing enough weaponry to do it would be tricky before 1860, but after the ACW? With all the weapons stockpiles.

 

Much of that was speculation in the press (by the usual unnamed British officers), the HMG assessment was the Union could mobilise 40-50,000 against Canada.

 

However, from what I can gather, the Union thought their situation was pretty bad. Maj Gen Chester Arthur, who was in charge of organising the defence of New York against an invasion from Canada was skeptical they could stop the British if they decided to come.

 

Certainly, at the time of the Trent, the Union situation is desperate (US Infantry Rifle production for FY61-2 is barely 14,000 arms, fortunately they managed to import 3/4 million infantry rifles and muskets from Europe that year). Later, who knows? The US has to rebuild their army again, as the smaller peacetime army could only really put 20,000 on the frontier (although that might be decisive)

Edited by 67th Tigers
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I missed a point.

 

The British merchant marine had acquired a lot of fast steam transports, if they accepted Royal Mail contracts (hence the term RMS), the British had the right to hire them for military use without question.

 

RMS Trent herself was used as a trooper in 1854, as were all the fast steamers (Trent carried the 23rd Fusiliers to the Crimea). I ought to copile a list of ships used in the move.

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I missed a point.

 

The British merchant marine had acquired a lot of fast steam transports, if they accepted Royal Mail contracts (hence the term RMS), the British had the right to hire them for military use without question.

 

RMS Trent herself was used as a trooper in 1854, as were all the fast steamers (Trent carried the 23rd Fusiliers to the Crimea). I ought to copile a list of ships used in the move.

While you are at it, compile a list of the times it took to assemble them in Blighty and load troops. They weren't sitting around waiting in Southampton or the London Pool, they were all over the world. And they were usually doing something fairly important, like importing food to the UK.

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Admiralty transports? None, they were all at sea bringing troops back from India as part of the post-Mutiny drawdown. However, a lot of steamships are available to be hired by the Admiralty. Indeed, all reinforcements to Canada in 1861 were by hired ships (including Great Eastern's two runs in the summer).

See above on availability.

 

Provisioning troops abroad had been down from home for a long time, and it's just a matter of increasing the amount the commisariat purchases, there's plenty available.

Yes there is, and much of it was imported from the US in the ships you want to use as transports. May I suggest you look at the accounts of the troops the British shipped over during the ARW to see how good the commissariat was on short notice?

 

Most of the army was requipped en route with P1851 Minies. Those that weren't (most of 4th Division) were reequipped with P1853 Enfields in February 1855.

If you say so.

 

I wasn't clear. I meant 100,000 P1853's were shipped to Canada.

What on Earth for? And when? If it was after the replacement of the P1853s with Snider conversions and/or Martinis it is meaningless. The whole US Army and all the militias were equipping with breechloaders by then.

 

Much of that was speculation in the press (by the usual unnamed British officers), the HMG assessment was the Union could mobilise 40-50,000 against Canada.

40-50,000 is not the US getting serious. State militias were largely made up of ACW vets. The Civil War had taught the US how to mobilize, they just had no need for a big army constantly under arms.

 

However, from what I can gather, the Union thought their situation was pretty bad. Maj Gen Chester Arthur, who was in charge of organising the defence of New York against an invasion from Canada was skeptical they could stop the British if they decided to come.

Um, when was this? Arthur was no great shakes anyway. If it was during the ACW a massively-reinforced British Army in Canada might be a threat but Canadian militia aren't going to be. And even during the ACW the Union had lots of people left. USians who didn't want to go beat up on Southerners would have a different attitude to an army invading from Canada. There would have to be considerable lead time for the British to mount a large effort, during which the US couldgather troops without hurting the war effort against the CSA too much. It would be tricky, but I'll bet Lincoln would have gotten a lot more political support for mobilizing against aggression from Canada than he did for fighting the CSA.

BTW, who is going to command this massive army? Cardigan?

 

Certainly, at the time of the Trent, the Union situation is desperate (US Infantry Rifle production for FY61-2 is barely 14,000 arms, fortunately they managed to import 3/4 million infantry rifles and muskets from Europe that year). Later, who knows? The US has to rebuild their army again, as the smaller peacetime army could only really put 20,000 on the frontier (although that might be decisive)

Actually the Army was 25,000, and most of them were at stations in the East or on constabulary duty in the Occupied ex-CSA states. The Frontier Army was quite small.

Mea culpa time: Just having found the book again, I was in error on the dates. The IDCs were from 1868 to 1887, so they were considering a US with a lot of stockpiled weapons and veterans available for service.

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While you are at it, compile a list of the times it took to assemble them in Blighty and load troops. They weren't sitting around waiting in Southampton or the London Pool, they were all over the world. And they were usually doing something fairly important, like importing food to the UK.

 

Wow, seems much quicker than I thought.

 

I've been reading The Times' reports on the war.

 

By the 13 Feb 1854 issue, back when the British were going to send a single large division to Turkey of about 13,000 (actually not too different to what would later be defined as a standard Corps), the ships used for the lift were:

 

Simoon, Bulldog, Vulcan and Dragon (Admiralty Troopers)

Golden Fleece, Jason, Cape of Good Hope, Proponitis (General Screw Co., English branch)

Himalaya, Manilla, Ripon (P&O)

Victoria (Australian Co.)

Queen of the South, Hydaspes, Harbringer (General Screw Co., Irish branch)

 

By the time a larger army was decided to be sent they got upto at least 134 Transports, since reference to No. 134 Transport Ship, the Robert Lowe (Iron screw steamer) was hired on ca 11 Sep 1854 (and carried the 46th and drafts) (Robert Lowe was the largest steamer on the Australia route, and was hired on return to the UK).

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A large shipment of carronade guns were sent by Yeo to Amherstburg and made it as far as Port Dover before being seized by US Forces. Therefore, Barclay was forced to largely arm his ships with guns of many different calibres that were removed from the defenses of Fort Malden.

 

During the Battle of Lake Eire, perhaps one of the greatest disadvantages that the British labored under, besides the wind disadvantage, was to have to sort out each gun round to all of the dissimiliar-sized, artillery pieces aboard their many ships. That couldn't have been easy in the heat of battle.

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During the Battle of Lake Eire, perhaps one of the greatest disadvantages that the British labored under, besides the wind disadvantage, was to have to sort out each gun round to all of the dissimiliar-sized, artillery pieces aboard their many ships. That couldn't have been easy in the heat of battle.

 

 

The wind diadvantage hurt the USN more than the RN. Barclay's squadron was moving in a compact formation. Perry's squadron was scattered in a long line and was trying to close up. Two of Perry's ships never got into action until just as the action was ending. It was really the improvement of the wind late in that action which allowed Perry to manuever the Niagra to completely destroy the Barclay's squadron. Most of the action was fought by the Lawrence, Scorpion, and Ariel against the Barclay's six ships.

 

Agree on the Brit guns.

 

When Detroit was completed, she was armed with anything Barclay could find. 1 X 18pdr, 2 X 24pdr, 6 X 12pdr, 8 X 9pdr, 1 X 24pdr carronade, 1 X 18pdr carronade

 

Queen Charlotte and Lady Prevost were armed conventionally for small ships with uniform batteries of carronades and a couple of long guns for chasers. Hunter was very ineffectually armed with 4 X 6pdr, 2 X 4pdr, 2 X 2pdr, and 2 X 12 pdr carronade.

 

Barclay was badly outgunned for which I blame at Sir James Yeo who did not share any cannon or trained men sent to him from Halifax with Barclay. On the USN side, Chauncey made sure that Perry was supplied with cannon, though Perry had to ship a lot of soldiers to man his squadron.

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Perry's real claim to fame is creating a superior fleet in the middle of the wilderness, trekking large cannon to the building base, and manning his ships in a sparsely populated area.

 

Somewhere I read that one of the remarkable facets of the Great Lakes fleet was that, unlike America's blue water fleet, the fleet in the Lakes was manned primarily by nonsailors. Sort of by legend, a bunch of farmers and frontiersmen. Is that consistent with your readings?

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Somewhere I read that one of the remarkable facets of the Great Lakes fleet was that, unlike America's blue water fleet, the fleet in the Lakes was manned primarily by nonsailors. Sort of by legend, a bunch of farmers and frontiersmen. Is that consistent with your readings?

 

 

 

His "Marines" were from a Penna. Militia company in buckskins and armed with Pennsylvania Rifles. Apparently there were some rather colorful disagreements with the crews as they weren't too particular where they spit. Holy-stoned decks and all. ;)

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