BP Posted August 29, 2007 Posted August 29, 2007 IIRC during the 80s there was COIN training going on in Panama and Honduras, specially for the light forces. And the Army developed the Light divisions for that kind of conflict. Correct, as well as what Tony said. Leaders have to prepare to fight the most dangerous enemy, as well as the most likely threat. Not often are they the same in the real world, hence the balancing act.
Rocky Davis Posted August 29, 2007 Posted August 29, 2007 Correct, as well as what Tony said. Leaders have to prepare to fight the most dangerous enemy, as well as the most likely threat. Not often are they the same in the real world, hence the balancing act. Yet author LTC Yingling writes: Having participated in the deception of the American people during the war, the Army chose after the war to deceive itself. In "Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife," John Nagl argued that instead of learning from defeat, the Army after Vietnam focused its energies on the kind of wars it knew how to win — high-technology conventional wars. An essential contribution to this strategy of denial was the publication of "On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War," by Col. Harry Summers. Summers, a faculty member of the U.S. Army War College, argued that the Army had erred by not focusing enough on conventional warfare in Vietnam, a lesson the Army was happy to hear. Despite having been recently defeated by an insurgency, the Army slashed training and resources devoted to counterinsurgency. He wrote that passage (above) because writing the truth (as echoed by you, I, Tony, COL Summers et al) would not fit into his little tirade of an article.
Jim Martin Posted August 29, 2007 Author Posted August 29, 2007 Except that the US defeated the insurgency in VN. We killed the bulk of the VC in 1968. We failed to carry through with a successful conventional campaign against a neighboring aggressor state.
Gunguy Posted August 29, 2007 Posted August 29, 2007 Except that the US defeated the insurgency in VN. We killed the bulk of the VC in 1968. We failed to carry through with a successful conventional campaign against a neighboring aggressor state. We gave the enemy sanctuaries and they used them to their best advantage. Imagine that! Hmmm.... just like Iraq....luckily, they seem to be cancelling some of the sanctuary areas. If Mosques are off limits, then we are still being way to cautious about upsetting the press (MSM). Good post Jim.
Old Tanker Posted August 29, 2007 Posted August 29, 2007 Except that the US defeated the insurgency in VN. We killed the bulk of the VC in 1968. We failed to carry through with a successful conventional campaign against a neighboring aggressor state. More than that SVN fought well into '73 until Congress cut off the money support in '74. We left '71 the collapse came in '75.
Jim Martin Posted August 29, 2007 Author Posted August 29, 2007 More than that SVN fought well into '73 until Congress cut off the money support in '74. We left '71 the collapse came in '75. Our shame: Dear Excellency and Friend: I thank you very sincerely for your letter and for your offer to transport me towards freedom. I cannot, alas, leave in such a cowardly fashion. As for you, and in particular for your great country, I never believed for a moment that you would have this sentiment of abandoning a people which has chosen liberty. You have refused us your protection, and we can do nothing about it. You leave, and my wish is that you and your country will find happiness under this sky. But, mark it well, that if I shall die here on the spot and in my country that I love, it is no matter, because we all are born and must die. I have only committed this mistake of believing in you [the Americans]. Please accept, Excellency and dear friend, my faithful and friendly sentiments. S/Sirik Matak
Rocky Davis Posted August 29, 2007 Posted August 29, 2007 Except that the US defeated the insurgency in VN. We killed the bulk of the VC in 1968. We failed to carry through with a successful conventional campaign against a neighboring aggressor state. You have nailed part of the point, Jim. Yes - the VC were finished and destroyed as an effective fighting force during Tet 68. BUT, the VC wa a diversion - a gadfly. The main enemy was (and always was) fighting forces from North Vietnam, complete with huge logistical supply to those gadflys, heavy weaponry, regular Army units/uniforms/missions. THAT is one of the things Summers pointed out. We were so busy attacking the branches of the tree, we forgot that the "root" of the problem was (and always was) the tree trunk. Had we stuck to the true tenets and principles of war, we would have gone north and attacked the REAL enemy. More than that SVN fought well into '73 until Congress cut off the money support in '74. We left '71 the collapse came in '75. The ARVN was a corrupt organization, with plenty of "ghost soldiers" (on paper as being in the unit and drawing a paycheck, but I'm the Commander and I've never seen this MoFo! Wher in the hell is that money going?), with plenty of privateering, theft, graft, etc. This does NOT apply to all units, but it was a major problem. So were VC "moles" in the ranks as well. Remind you of anything happening now?
JWB Posted August 30, 2007 Posted August 30, 2007 1. It wasn't their product, it was a Marine Corps publication. Army GOs don't want to use anything from USMC.
Guest aevans Posted August 30, 2007 Posted August 30, 2007 Army GOs don't want to use anything from USMC. And? That doesn't mean there was a concerted effort to "bury" the publication. It just wasn't a priority, just as the entire subject wasn't a priority. I always get in trouble for saying things like this, but they have to be said -- you're really coming across as an agendized crank.
Meyer Posted August 30, 2007 Posted August 30, 2007 (Remember, On War was written as a primer for a prince, by a military academy dean whose entire active service was on staffs.)I think you are a little confused here.. "Principles of War" (the text which Rocky linked btw) was written for the Prince Friedrich Wilhelm... "Vom Kriege" was not, in fact he didn't want to publish it in his life...unfortunately, he also didn't get the chance to finish it... so it remained incomplete, and after his death, the wife compiled all the manuscripts and published it. Yet people invoke Clausewitz as if his work was the ultimate trump card. It's not, and it has to be taken as a whole, because it is so dense in many places that short quotes are almost always out of context. On War is something every serious student of history should read, but not the place to look for simple, cliche answers. Couldn't agree more
JWB Posted August 30, 2007 Posted August 30, 2007 And? That doesn't mean there was a concerted effort to "bury" the publication. It just wasn't a priority, just as the entire subject wasn't a priority. I always get in trouble for saying things like this, but they have to be said -- you're really coming across as an agendized crank.http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Paramet...mer/cassidy.htm
Sardaukar Posted August 30, 2007 Posted August 30, 2007 Very good link, JWB. There are very good observations in that. For example: While delay in the use of force may be interpreted as weakness, the Small Wars Manual maintains, the brutal use of force is not appropriate either. “In small wars, tolerance, sympathy, and kindness should be the keynote to our relationship with the mass of the population.” For small wars, the manual urges US forces to employ as many indigenous troops as practical early on to confer proper responsibility on indigenous agencies for restoring law and order. Moreover, it stresses the importance of focusing on the social, economic, and political development of the people more than on simple material destruction. It also underscores the importance of aggressive patrolling, population security, and the denial of sanctuary to the insurgents. An overarching principle, though, is not to fight small wars with big-war methods—the goal is to gain results with the least application of force and minimum loss of civilian (non-combatant) life.
Guest aevans Posted August 30, 2007 Posted August 30, 2007 http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Paramet...mer/cassidy.htm Where in that article does it say the Army suppressed the Small Wars Manual? Where it does talk about that publication, it makes a general statement that, in the author's opinion, the Army had to learn new each time, while the Marines codified their experience in the Manual. The bigger problem with the article is that asserts that the Army after Vietnam ignored small wars and counterinsurgency, using himself as the authority (footnotes 3-5). Yeah, that's a totally convincing argument...
BP Posted August 30, 2007 Posted August 30, 2007 The bigger problem with the article is that asserts that the Army after Vietnam ignored small wars and counterinsurgency, using himself as the authority (footnotes 3-5). Yeah, that's a totally convincing argument... Amateur hour. Everybody knows that to truly add credence to any argument, one has to cite the Wikipedia entry on oneself.
Old Tanker Posted August 30, 2007 Posted August 30, 2007 Where in that article does it say the Army suppressed the Small Wars Manual? Where it does talk about that publication, it makes a general statement that, in the author's opinion, the Army had to learn new each time, while the Marines codified their experience in the Manual. The bigger problem with the article is that asserts that the Army after Vietnam ignored small wars and counterinsurgency, using himself as the authority (footnotes 3-5). Yeah, that's a totally convincing argument... This subject is covered quite thoroughly in the book Fiasco.
Guest aevans Posted August 30, 2007 Posted August 30, 2007 This subject is covered quite thoroughly in the book Fiasco. Certainly. What I'm arguing is that a lot of people aligned with the Reform/4GW advocacy communities chronically (and IMO knowlingly, in a lot of cases) misidentify motivations.
Paul G. Posted August 30, 2007 Posted August 30, 2007 When I try to explain the different roll of military officers to NCOs and enlisted to those not familier with the military, I use the example of a jobsite. Enlisted soldiers are like construction workers, Sergeants are the foremen, and officers are the architects and designers. Its all in the roles and focus. A combined officer/NCO role would weeken the military overall.
JWB Posted August 31, 2007 Posted August 31, 2007 Certainly. What I'm arguing is that a lot of people aligned with the Reform/4GW advocacy communities chronically (and IMO knowlingly, in a lot of cases) misidentify motivations.Misidentify motivations? Or do you not believe that GOs will ruin campaigns and even wars because of personal ambition?
Guest aevans Posted August 31, 2007 Posted August 31, 2007 Misidentify motivations? Or do you not believe that GOs will ruin campaigns and even wars because of personal ambition? Ri-i-ight... Come back when you have more than innuendo and supposition.
JWB Posted August 31, 2007 Posted August 31, 2007 Chief of Staff of the Army General Peter Schoomaker : “The U.S. Army, predisposed to fight a conventional enemy that fought using conventional tactics, overpowered innovative ideas from within the Army and from outside it. As a result, the U.S. Army was not as effective at learning as it should have been, and its failures in Vietnam had grave implications for both the Army and the nation.” Former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General Jack Keane :“We put an Army on the battlefield that I had been a part of for 37 years. It doesn’t have any doctrine, nor was it educated and trained, to deal with an insurgency . . . After the Vietnam War, we purged ourselves of everything that had to do with irregular warfare or insurgency, because it had to do with how we lost that war. In hindsight, that was a bad decision.” Enough? More herehttp://smallwarsjournal.com/index.php
JWB Posted August 31, 2007 Posted August 31, 2007 Ri-i-ight... Come back when you have more than innuendo and supposition.Ever heard of Clark in Italy or MacArthur in Korea?
nigelfe Posted August 31, 2007 Posted August 31, 2007 Anybody who believe 'killed the bulk of the VC' in Tet 68 is sadly out of touch. The VC proper had undergone significant attrition for years but NVA were in SVN in 1966. There was no shortage of them in May 68 after Tet, hence the second general offensive. Quite a lot of them also dressed as VC. Invading NVN wouldn't have achieved much, except perhaps give Mao the excuse for another attrition war. While I agree 'Unity of Command' was borrowed from German thinking (there is a credible case that their adherrence to it was a significant factor in their WW1 defeat) some other principles were developed by JFC Fuller. Finally, most posts seem to have ignored a key issue, selection processes for officer training. In at least some armies it's not just a matter of academic qualification, there's also the matter of demonstrable aptitude. Interestingly in the first years of WW2 UK effectively ran out of army officers and had very high failure rates in training. They adopted aspects of the German selection system, which solved their problem. Also interesting, reportedly UK army now has 25% 'late entry officers', ie those commissioned from the ranks over the age of 27. There are also some commissioned younger who are therefore not 'LE'. Interestingly the Sword of Honour winner at Sandhurst a few weeks ago was an ex Intelligence Corps NCO (he's commissioned into The Rifles).
Rocky Davis Posted August 31, 2007 Posted August 31, 2007 Anybody who believe 'killed the bulk of the VC' in Tet 68 is sadly out of touch. Uhhh . . . the quote was that the VC ceased to be an effective fighting force because they were decimated during Tet 68. Why . . . I believe it's our own COL Summers that made that quote - former distinguished instructor at the Army War College, veteran, military analyst, military historian: http://www.history.navy.mil/colloquia/cch11b.html Sadly touch that.
Exel Posted August 31, 2007 Posted August 31, 2007 Its all in the roles and focus. A combined officer/NCO role would weeken the military overall. The way I see it, the problem - if there is one - is not about having a distinction between NCOs and officers, but that they are so separated as career paths. I don't see why a person should be chosen for either role before the start of their service (specialist professionals aside, but then they should be enlisted on a warrant for the specific job). Rather, why not have everyone join at the same level, go through the same basic training, and then after a given service time - say, a year - apply to either NCO or Officer training or stay in the Enlisted ranks. That also gives the armed forces more qualifications about the given applicant: the year in service shows if you really have potential to become an officer, or if you best serve the army as NCO or in rank-and-file, so they can better assign you to the career path you are best fit for. What does everyone think about having a common basic service period (say, from 6 to 12 months depending on the service branch) before the Enlisted/NCO/Officer career path selection?
DKTanker Posted August 31, 2007 Posted August 31, 2007 What does everyone think about having a common basic service period (say, from 6 to 12 months depending on the service branch) before the Enlisted/NCO/Officer career path selection?Kind of like having a civil engineer, fresh out of engineer school, dig ditches and drive track-hoes for a year or so before they are allowed to actually use their engineering skills. And of course said young engineer won't mind making $8.50/hr for the first 12 months.
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