Mythbusters: Moody Brook

[BillB]

Originally posted by Grant Whitley:

Not generally, though. In fact, everything I've read has said that the Argentines had immense difficulties mobilizing their reservists(who were merely ex-conscripts).

  This is admittedly a problem with their force, and a serious one at that. In fact, you'd think that they would have seen that there were problems with their plan for mobilizing reservists in 1978/79 during the crisis with Chile....

  I don't think that the Argentines felt that it was appropriate to employ fresh conscripts.  As I've already noted, their plan did initially call for any invasion to take place at a time of the year when the conscripts would have been more seasoned than they were historically.

 

Fair one. According to my info (which is far from extensive) some Argentine Army units were all "new" conscript (Regimiento de Infanteria 3, 4 & 6), while others were a mix of fresh conscripts, conscripts coming toward the end of their service and recalled reservists (Regimiento de Infanteria 7, 8 & 12). I'm not sure about the make up of Regimiento de Infanteria 25, and of the Mrine infantry battalions present, Batallon de Infanteria Marina 3 and 5. A mate of mine who was there told me that he thought the marines and some of the Army troops were volunteer professionals but I have no proof one way or the other. Perhaps Jester might know?

 

Whichever, if the Argentines were experiencing problems as basic as this perhaps they ought to have thought twice. This, I should have thought, supports my contention that they had no real idea of what they were getting into, if they really thought they could fight a full-scale war against a first line opponent hobbled in such a way.

 

Re: your point about the "childlike" expectation of the Argentines that the British wouldn't fight- Hastings paints the British diplomatic wrangling in the UN as a very close run thing and a skillful triumph of British diplomacy.  Given that, it may not have been so silly of the Argentines to expect a non-response.

 

Again, fair comment, but I would argue that it is not very wise to base all your assessments and planning on the best case scenario, and doing so tends not to be the hallmark of first line and experienced militaries. Usually becasue they have done it at some point and it has come back to bite them.

 

As for the Argentines hoarding their forces around Stanley:

 

1)  It was after all the most important point in the archipelago and the only one through which the Argentines could supply themselves.  If they hadn't heavily guarded it the British may well have attempted to capture it directly.

 

True, but safeguarding is one thing, fixation because you expect the enemy to behave in a predicted manner is something else. See also my next comment.

 

2)  The campaign took place during winter, so the Argentines may have reasonably assumed that the British would not be able to land at a distant point such as San Carlos and march across the breadth of East Falkland.

 

This is not an assumption I would call reasonable, it sounds more like one based on wishful thinking to me. Not a good idea to base your assessment of enemy capabilities on those of your own forces, especially if your own are not especially capable in the first place. Especially when it is a matter of public record that British units regularly rotated through Norway as part of the NATO ACE Mobile Force, and were therefore likely to be trained and equipped to operate in winter conditions. Again, surely a hallmark of inexperience at best, and incompetence at worst.

 

3)  More importantly, the Argentines may have realized that they would have been unable to supply their own forces if they had attempted some sort of counterstroke against the British after the landing at San Carlos.

<font size=1>[Edited by Grant Whitley (13 Dec 2004).]

 

Again, fair one, but they also found out that such a course was no worse than ceding the initiative to the enemy by merely sitting still and waiting for him to come to you. Look at the amount of kit and troops the Argentines had in and around Stanley that surrendered without having fired a shot. I know it is hindsight, but a counter-stroke, even one that failed, surely could not have ended any worse than what actually happened. Such a move might well have put the British off their stroke - IIRC Thompson (CO 3 Commando Brigade & senior ground commander until supperseded by General Moore at the end of May) was extremely worried that the Argentines would hit him during the build up phase at San Carlos, which was one reason why he tried to avoid getting involved at Goose Green.

 

Plus the British logistics link was far more tenuous than the Argentine one. I believe Argentine air force Hercs were flying into Stanley virtually right up to the surrender. Had the Argentines exhibited a modicum of aggression they could quite feasibly have forced a draw by inflicting casualties on the British and interfering with their flow of supplies.

 

all the best,

 

BillB

[BillB]

Originally posted by Ox:

Sorry can't resist this one.

Of course the invasion would be the Invasion of the Body Snatchers.

 

Groan!

 

BillB

[Grant Whitley]

Originally posted by BillB:

Fair one. According to my info (which is far from extensive) some Argentine Army units were all "new" conscript (Regimiento de Infanteria 3, 4 & 6), while others were a mix of fresh conscripts, conscripts coming toward the end of their service and recalled reservists (Regimiento de Infanteria 7, 8 & 12). I'm not sure about the make up of Regimiento de Infanteria 25, and of the Mrine infantry battalions present, Batallon de Infanteria Marina 3 and 5. A mate of mine who was there told me that he thought the marines and some of the Army troops were volunteer professionals but I have no proof one way or the other. Perhaps Jester might know?

 

I used to have quite a bit of info on this which seems to have disappeared. I am quite sure, however, that Argentina inducts one class of conscripts per year. The general makeup of each unit should have been more or less the same- green conscripts, with smattering of recalled reservists. NCOs were professionals, and I believe that the Marine units were conscripts who had volunteered for service in those units. RI 25 was on paper a standard line unit, but was unofficially designated as the 25th "Special" Infantry and was based in Patagonia. Apparently they conducted a lot of special forces type training.

 

Whichever, if the Argentines were experiencing problems as basic as this perhaps they ought to have thought twice. This, I should have thought, supports my contention that they had no real idea of what they were getting into, if they really thought they could fight a full-scale war against a first line opponent hobbled in such a way.

Well, they didn't think they could fight it. The assumption coming out of the blocks was that they wouldn't have to.

 

Again, fair comment, but I would argue that it is not very wise to base all your assessments and planning on the best case scenario, and doing so tends not to be the hallmark of first line and experienced militaries. Usually becasue they have done it at some point and it has come back to bite them.

 

The US plan for Iraq seems to have not taken into account the possibility of an insurgency. Is the US military incompetent? To be sure this was a mistake on the part of the Argentines, but not, I think, proof of incompetence.

 

My view is that the war as happened historically was an act of desperation on the part of the Argentine government. This handicapped the Argentines in a variety of ways which their force couldn't overcome. Contingency planning is one thing, but I don't know that one could reasonably expect them to reform their entire conscription system, for example, on the off chance that they might have to fight a war in the Falklands during the winter(which was undesirable for other reasons as well). Especially given that in any forseeable scenario, Argentina would be the agressor and should be able to dictate the conditions under which the campaign would be fought, at least in terms of the time of year.

 

Plus the British logistics link was far more tenuous than the Argentine one. I believe Argentine air force Hercs were flying into Stanley virtually right up to the surrender. Had the Argentines exhibited a modicum of aggression they could quite feasibly have forced a draw by inflicting casualties on the British and interfering with their flow of supplies.

 

Argentina was very conservative with its navy, though this was probably the correct decision. British subs would likely have sunk most of their fleet, and the outdated Argentine ships would not likely have been able to do much damage to the British fleet anyway. Simple bad luck prevented an air attack on the British fleet based from the Veinticinco de Mayo. Otherwise, the Argentine Air Force and naval aviation were pretty aggressive in attacking British vessels. Out of curiousity, what do you feel Argentina could have realistically done to interdict the British supply lines?

[Grant Whitley]

Originally posted by pi:

I've seen a few comments by Brit paras etc. that given the level of training they had they thought the conscripts performed fairly well it was the Argentinian officers who they thought were  incompetent. 

 

 

Poor officer-soldier relationship is oft cited as a cause for the often poor performance of Argentine units.

 

Something I've though, and it would be interesting to hear King Jester's take on it, is whether or not the "Dirty War" had contributed to some sort of social malaise or class tension in Argentina that may have spilled over into the military. IOW, had the reputation of the military already been significantly tarnished to such an extent that the conscripts felt less loyal to their officers and the military as an institution?

[BillB]

Originally posted by Grant Whitley:

I used to have quite a bit of info on this which seems to have disappeared. I am quite sure, however, that Argentina inducts one class of conscripts per year. The general makeup of each unit should have been more or less the same- green conscripts, with smattering of recalled reservists. NCOs were professionals, and I believe that the Marine units were conscripts who had volunteered for service in those units. RI 25 was on paper a standard line unit, but was unofficially designated as the 25th "Special" Infantry and was based in Patagonia. Apparently they conducted a lot of special forces type training.

 

According to van der Bijl's "Argentine Forces in the Falklands", 30 per cent of RI 8 were long term conscripts and recalled reservists, and I suspect the same applied to at least two more RIs. I should think that is a bit more than a "smattering". With ref to RI 25, given the generally low standard of Argentine training, I should be interested to know exactly what they mean by Special Forces type training (van der Bijl refers to techniques rather than training). Somehow I doubt it equates to the generally accepted meaning of the term.

 

Well, they didn't think they could fight it. The assumption coming out of the blocks was that they wouldn't have to.

 

Well, as I said that is an extremely dodgy assumption however you cut it. However, I'm not convinced the Argentine senior command viewed it that way. Anyway, come on. You are going to yank the beard of one of top half dozen militaries on the planet and you assume they are going to roll over and take it quietly...

 

The US plan for Iraq seems to have not taken into account the possibility of an insurgency. Is the US military incompetent? To be sure this was a mistake on the part of the Argentines, but not, I think, proof of incompetence.

 

Depends how you define incompetent, I suppose. If you take it as merely less than competent, then it applies to the Argentines and the situation in Iraq. IMO if you go into a situation with a set of assumptions and they turn out to be wrong, that equates to incompetence at the strategic planning level at least, and quite possibly lower down too.

 

My view is that the war as happened historically was an act of desperation on the part of the Argentine government. This handicapped the Argentines in a variety of ways which their force couldn't overcome. Contingency planning is one thing, but I don't know that one could reasonably expect them to reform their entire conscription system, for example, on the off chance that they might have to fight a war in the Falklands during the winter(which was undesirable for other reasons as well). Especially given that in any forseeable scenario, Argentina would be the agressor and should be able to dictate the conditions under which the campaign would be fought, at least in terms of the time of year.

 

maybe, but your line of argument here seems to me to equate to "we are going to be aggressors so we will only be called upon to fight when the weather and other conditions are favourable, so we can afford have a crap army". Call me old fashioned, but I thought an army or armed forces were supposed to be ready top do their job whenever necessary, and if the conscription system was unable to do that then there were some serious structural problems.

 

Argentina was very conservative with its navy, though this was probably the correct decision.  British subs would likely have sunk most of their fleet, and the outdated Argentine ships would not likely have been able to do much damage to the British fleet anyway.  Simple bad luck prevented an air attack on the British fleet based from the Veinticinco de Mayo.  Otherwise, the Argentine Air Force and naval aviation were pretty aggressive in attacking British vessels.  Out of curiousity, what do you feel Argentina could have realistically done to interdict the British supply lines?

 

AFAIK there was only one Brit sub, but fair point. With ref to your closing question, I don't see why they could not have made better use of what they actually used without risking the navy. The air attacks could have been far more effective with some careful targetting and discipline on the part of the pilots. The latter were undoubtedly courageous, but they had a bad habit of attacking the first thing they saw, which is why the RN vessels acting as perimeter radar warning posts took such a hammering. Look at the problems the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor caused the Task force, and consider what effect a dedicated and focussed effort against the ships carrying supplies.

 

The Argentines could also have made better use of their Pucaras and the Special Forces people they had against the British logistics train once the advance on Stanley began. As I understand it the British logistical operation was run on a shoestring, and it must therefore have been vulnerable to disruption. The Argentines had helos to move observer teams around with, and they could have called in Pucaras, jets and arty too. A heli borne arty raid would have caused havoc I suspect, and a bit of co-ordination with the air force and navy air could have drawn off British air cover to protect the helos.

 

all the best

 

BillB

[King Jester]

BillB wrote :

King Jester, could you confirm that Ox's post covers your side of the argument, or give me a concise rendering before I try and argue my side? Not much point in starting until we are all on the same page.

Yes, he does, in a few bold strokes, cover both sides of the argument with the two first paragraphs of his post.

 

As I already mentioned, we could argue endlessly about ‘why’ the argie landing force would have done one thing or another (that is, attacking ferociously or trying to avoid bloodshed) because the answer to that question is mainly political.

Let us instead stick to the events alone, and what bearing those events had on the military performance of both forces that day.

 

 

BTW, I see with pleasure that a good discussion has come out of this. Kuddos.

 

I will try to adress some the issues for which it was suggested I could bring in a different perspective, as soon as I can.

 

King Jester

 

PS: This one I cannot let go by. I simply love playing the number game.

 

pi wrote:

Some of the islanders might have joined the ranks of the disappeared if Argentina had have been allowed to hang onto the Falklands. 

 

No, not statistically. 8500 * disappeared out of 25.000.000 ** population is roughly 1 every 2900. As there were only 1800 kelpers, then only a 'fraction' of a person would have ‘disappeared’, lets say one leg and one arm. That would be a good solution, indeed, so they cannot run away nor throw rocks at the riot control APCs. Do you imagine 'blond angel' Astiz running behind (as in ´chasing after´) a kelper with a butchers hatched to collect the parts? May be...

Nevertheless I can imagine some whole (as in ´ablebodied´) kelpers leaving for Tenerifa, Miami or London, to join their fellow disappeared comrades, for a more comfortable and tranquil existence.

 

* number of people reported as illegally detained and/or missing during the last military regime in Argentina (1976-1983), according to the investigating tribunal

 

** 1970 census

 

Did some further editing, for clarity

 

<font size=1>[Edited by King Jester (13 Dec 2004).]

 

[Edited by King Jester (14 Dec 2004).]

[FlyingCanOpener]

Bill,

 

The Argies couldn't do anything with their Pucaras, especially after the SAS took care of them at Pebble Island...

[Ox]

KJ

 

Have you read the book Los Chicos De Guerra, I think. I read an English translation many years ago and it contained some bizarre accounts of Gurkha attacking Argentine troops whilst on drugs. It also gave some moving accounts of the conditions the conscripts fou8ght under and their naivety in thinking the British would not fight. Is this book considered accurate in Argentina?

 

Bill.

 

Many moons ago I read accounts, can't remember where now, that there were at least 3 UK subs , The Conqueror, another SSN that briefly made contact with the Argentine carrier maybe Splendid or Supurb and a diesle sub that turned up in Stanley after the war.

[SCFalken]

IIRC,

the Gurkhas were not actually deployed into combat, much to their displeasure, correct?

 

 

Falken

[BillB]

Originally posted by Ox:

KJ

Have you read the book Los Chicos De Guerra, I think. I read an English translation many years ago and it contained some bizarre accounts of Gurkha attacking Argentine troops whilst on drugs. It also gave some moving accounts of the conditions the conscripts fou8ght under and their naivety in thinking the British would not fight. Is this book considered accurate in Argentina?

 

Damn, Ox, I was gonna hit him with that one later! IIRC the book was by a Daniel Con (spelling?), and it had a dramatic description by an alleged eyewitness of a full scale attack by Gurkhas being stopped cold by massed MG fire. The narrator then claimed that examination of the stiffs showed they were all on marijuana, and many were still wearing Sony Walkmans....

 

As Falken rightly points out, the problem with this is that the Gurkhas never actually took part in any set piece attacks, although they did lose some people in a diversionarey attack on the night of 13/14 June near Mount Tumbledown, and IIRC they were all set for a full-scale go at some other feature (Mount William?) when the cease fire came in.

 

Bill.

Many moons ago I read accounts, can't remember where now, that there were at least 3 UK subs , The Conqueror, another SSN that briefly made contact with the Argentine carrier maybe Splendid or Supurb and a diesle sub that turned up in Stanley after the war.

 

I stand corrected Ox, I was just thinking of the Conqueror.

 

all the best

 

BillB

[BillB]

Originally posted by FlyingCanOpener:

Bill,

 

The Argies couldn't do anything with their Pucaras, especially after the SAS took care of them at Pebble Island... 

 

Fair one, mate, although I don't think they were all down there from Goose Green after the Harriers hit the place and the Argentines decided it was too vulnerable to ground raiders. Ironic, that. I think some went to Stanley, and they did strafe 2PARA and dropped napalm on them durng the Battle of Goose Green.

 

all the best

 

BillB

[King Jester]

Ox wrote:

KJ, Have you read the book Los Chicos De Guerra, I think. I read an English translation many years ago and it contained some bizarre accounts of Gurkha attacking Argentine troops whilst on drugs.

We aren´t short on myths this side of the pond either. The gurkhas being source to many myths, i.e. the one BillB mentions, about stoned gurkhas running wildly into MG fire, the other one about gurkhas scalping, slicing the ears or beheading argie corpses (the myth actually saying that gurkhas were paid a a head-price for each argie killed). I think we covered this last time (or was it the time before that ??), anyway the myth about gurkhas beheading the dead or even POWs started as some POWs from Darwin were guarded by gurkhas. One brit officer told them to behave, or the gurkhas would eat their ears. Somehow this turned into a rumor and then into a myth. About the first bit, the stoned gurkhas running beserk, that was mainly war time propaganda, and should be evaluated as such. Same thing about the BBC broadcasts aimed at the kelpers, according to which Argentina had emptied all jails of thiefs and rapists, and send them to the islands to terrorize civilians. War propaganda, which should be evaluated as such.

 

It also gave some moving accounts of the conditions the conscripts fou8ght under and their naivety in thinking the British would not fight.

 

The description of everyday life in the sangers is very lifelike, as confirmed to me by some former conscript veterans.

 

As about the naive hypothesis that the UK could be forced to negotiate, isn´t that the whole flawed rationale by which the Junta retook the islands in the first place?? Conscripts were told in the begining they would not have to fight. Of course after the first brit bombs started to tumble down on May, all that changed.

 

Is this book considered accurate in Argentina?

 

Believe me when I say, I do my best to bust those myths in spanish speaking fora, as well. Sometimes I get laughter, sometimes anger from other fellow posters. I have moved some to read, though.

 

The events described in this particular book you mention are considered accurate by those who have only a shallow knowledge of the war. I hasten to add that this may include the mayority of former conscript veterans as well. As awfull and discrimanatory as it may sound, it depends on the cultural background of the individual and the effort the individual has put on learning about the war. I have done a fair amount of reading, drawn from different sources, most of them by british authors, and consider myself ´versed´ enough to completely disregard such crap. Sadly, way to many argies are willing to believe these and many other myths.

 

I think these kind of myhts (nurtured to the point that they are taken as facts by the uneducated) are simply a natural, unconcious response to what we (Argentina, the side who lost the war) see as a deliverated denying/twisting/hiding of facts that sorround the war on the side of the british. A popular belief is that the UK put a 75 year secrecy seal on the Falklands war files cause you got ´something to hide´.

 

KIng Jester

[Grant Whitley]

Originally posted by BillB:

According to van der Bijl's "Argentine Forces in the Falklands", 30 per cent of RI 8 were long term conscripts and recalled reservists, and I suspect the same applied to at least two more RIs. I should think that is a bit more than a "smattering". With ref to RI 25, given the generally low standard of Argentine training, I should be interested to know exactly what they mean by Special Forces type training (van der Bijl refers to techniques rather than training). Somehow I doubt it equates to the generally accepted meaning of the term.

 

I found my copy of this earlier today, and IIRC what van der Bijl said was merely that the regiment was 70% conscripts. He did not make any statements as to the other 30%. At a minimum, some portion of that 30% is going to be officers and NCOs. Also, wasn’t RI 8 deployed on West Falkland? I think a company or so might have been helicoptered over to East Falkland to fight at Goose Green.

 

Also, van der Bijl’s book seems okay, but I’ve always approached it with caution. It says right in the front of the book that the book was largely compiled from Argentine sources, but given the numerous linguistical errors, it’s obvious that the author does not speak Spanish, or speaks/reads it poorly at best. That leads me to question exactly how accurate some of his information is. I’m at work and unfortunately don’t have the book handy, but I think this is the book which hilariously misspelled Veinticinco de Mayo as Vientrecinco de Mayo- vientre meaning bowels, or womb or uterus in some instances! I believe he had artillería de campaña misspelled as campana, which means bell, rather than campaign. Maybe van der Bijl was trying to make a point about the training of the crews, who quickly pealed out towards the rear when they came under fire.

 

Anyway, come on. You are going to yank the beard of one of top half dozen militaries on the planet and you assume they are going to roll over and take it quietly...

 

That’s just it, though: they were yanking the beard of those in Whitehall, not the military. The decision to retake the Falklands was a political one, and the Argentines had gambled that the British nation would roll over, nevermind the military.

 

maybe, but your line of argument here seems to me to equate to "we are going to be aggressors so we will only be called upon to fight when the weather and other conditions are favourable, so we can afford have a crap army". Call me old fashioned, but I thought an army or armed forces were supposed to be ready top do their job whenever necessary, and if the conscription system was unable to do that then there were some serious structural problems.

 

Argentina’s resources were rather more limited than those of Britain. Admittedly, they probably could have gone to two year conscription terms. It would be interesting to know if they found the one year terms to be advantageous from some standpoint.

 

AFAIK there was only one Brit sub, but fair point. With ref to your closing question, I don't see why they could not have made better use of what they actually used without risking the navy. The air attacks could have been far more effective with some careful targetting and discipline on the part of the pilots. The latter were undoubtedly courageous, but they had a bad habit of attacking the first thing they saw, which is why the RN vessels acting as perimeter radar warning posts took such a hammering. Look at the problems the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor caused the Task force, and consider what effect a dedicated and focussed effort against the ships carrying supplies.

 

I suspect that the problem was finding them. Many of the Argentine planes(the Skyhawks in particular, I believe) lacked modern avionics packages. Also the British were employing tactics to keep the Argentines from using the positions of the Harriers to be able to accurately estimate the locations of the Brit carriers.

 

Also keep in mind that the Argentine pilots were flying from the mainland- I’d bet that their loiter time was somewhat limited, which may have led to the tendency to attack the first thing they sighted, as you say. Additionally, the weather was poor for much of the campaign and this precluded Argentine air operations at times. Incidentally, the Harriers had an all-weather capability, did they not?

 

The Argentines could also have made better use of their Pucaras and the Special Forces people they had against the British logistics train once the advance on Stanley began. As I understand it the British logistical operation was run on a shoestring, and it must therefore have been vulnerable to disruption. The Argentines had helos to move observer teams around with, and they could have called in Pucaras, jets and arty too. A heli borne arty raid would have caused havoc I suspect, and a bit of co-ordination with the air force and navy air could have drawn off British air cover to protect the helos.

 

The Pucaras were obsolete COIN aircraft- they would have suffered heavily at the hands of British MANPADS.

[FlyingCanOpener]

FAA Aircraft did not have long loiter time once they arrived at the Falklands. IIRC, they had about 4 minutes before turning for home, so as soon as they saw a White Ensign, they went after it.

 

As for the Harriers, they were first generation Harriers and did not have all-weather capability...

[Ox]

King Jester said.

 

Same thing about the BBC broadcasts aimed at the kelpers, according to which Argentina had emptied all jails of thiefs and rapists, and send them to the islands to terrorize civilians.

 

 

Where did you hear the BBC broadcast saying this? I remember a lot of British propaganda on the beeb being of the starving ill equipped untrained conscripts up against our super dooper techno marvels and ironmen troops ilk. In the press it was more nazi junta kill them all gotcha etc tripe but I never heard those thiefs and rapists broadcasts. I used to listen to the world service quite avidly during the war and if anything their broadcasts were less pro British than their UK radio, a number of broadcasts said that the Argentine forces were amongst the more proffesional in South America.

[King Jester]

Ox wrote:

Where did you hear the BBC broadcast saying this? ....but I never heard those thiefs and rapists broadcasts. I used to listen to the world service quite avidly during the war and if anything their broadcasts were less pro British than their UK radio, a number of broadcasts said that the Argentine forces were amongst the more proffesional in South America.

There is a book, can´t remember the title or author right now, its called something like ´First person accounts, 80 faces from the Falklands war´. Its a collection of short interviews to veterans of both sides, main political leaders of the time (including Maggy, Nott and others) and three kelpers, IRCC. One of kelpers refers to the BBC broadcast, warning civilians about the alledged rapists and thiefs amongst the argie conscripts.

 

I take is as war propaganda tactic, to avoid any possible fraternization between kelkpers and argies. What I do not know, is if the BBC ever broadcasted, after the war, a dsiclaimer, or if these poor women still believe what they were told back then.

 

 

 

FlyingCanOpener

IIRC, they had about 4 minutes before turning for home, so as soon as they saw a White Ensign, they went after it.

As for the Harriers, they were first generation Harriers and did not have all-weather capability...

 

About 10 minutes over the channel area, 5 over East Falkland is often cited.

Skyhawks (IFR capable) could enjoy some more, but the extra time was often deviated to take longer appproach routes, in order to try avoid Sea Harriers packs. Daggers (ex-israely Neshers) had to take always the same route due to fuel shortage, and relied mostly on speed and low altitude to avoid the CAP.

 

As for the SHARs, the FRS-1 had a radar, Blue Vixen IRCC, but this one was plagued with problems and never worked to full satisfaction. Nevertheless, SHARS flew missions by night. IRCC two SHAR pilots probably collided mid-air and got killed.

 

King Jester

[Ox]

I suspect that the thieves and rapists story may well be along the same lines as the drugged Gurkhas. A local rumour that was quickly taken as fact by the locals, Mrs so and so heard it on the radio , from the beeb you know so it must be true. I am going to have a poke around and see what more I can find out about it. I will post anything I find but it may be a couple of days. To me it doesn't quite fit the nature of BBC broadcasting. Not questioning that the BBC did it's bit in the propaganda war but I would like more info on this. Of course the BBC would also repeat what the MOD said without much thought , goose Green, unfused bombs and 50p phone calls spring to mind. Does anyone know if the Falkland Islanders grow a lot of turnips because I clearly remeber a story on TV about Agrentine conscripts living of stolen turnips, how the hell they knew that beats me another MOD line I guess.

 

Packs of Sea Harriers? I thought they operated in pairs apart from the early stanley bombing missions. As far as I know the two Sea Harriers that collided were lost in fog rather than at night.

 

[Edited by Ox (15 Dec 2004).]

[JOE BRENNAN]

Originally posted by Ox:

Many moons ago I read accounts, can't remember where now, that there were at least 3 UK subs , The Conqueror, another SSN that briefly made contact with the Argentine carrier maybe Splendid or Supurb and a diesle sub that turned up in Stanley after the war.

 

Splendid and Spartan departed for the Falklands even before Conqueror. Valiant and the diesel Onyx arrived in late May. Superb was reported in the press as on its way in early April, but wasn't.

 

On hindsighting the campaign the Argentine concept was untenable once the assumption of no armed British response proved false. I don't think a lot more could have been expected from the Argentine air arms operating from the mainland, they exceeded reasonable objective expectations as it was. The campaign would have to assume unbreakable sea blockade in the time it took nuclear subs to get there. In fact again as it was British restraint in not sinking any Argentine ships found at sea one the subs arrived, they observed a number of them apparently, was better for the Argentine's than might have been expected. A potentially workable concept, needing advance preparation with the campaign in mind, would be massive sea mining while the sub window was open (some minefields were laid) and more critically, rapid airfield construction on the islands suitable for all strike a/c plus an air transport train sufficient to support the force after a well planned surge of shipping (with the stuff for the airfields) got there before the blockade, immediately after the invasion.

 

Viewed through the prism of WWII air/sea/land island campaigns the fighting on the islands themselves were an anti climax, only one outcome once the British were established ashore. Also in view of WWII it's rather amazing the Argentine military was so little inclined in planning and special capabilies useful for such a campaign, say compared to US and Japanese more or less acting out years of plans in the Pacific, far from perfectly in either case, but not as if the mission was to suddenly be asked to land on Mars. The potential threat of Chile isn't really an excuse.

 

This area most of all is where incompetence is the only reasonable verdict, IMO. It's not comparable to a war where things don't go as you plan, so it's rougher than you except. That's 50% of the time in war more or less. It's a different category where fairly forseeable eventualities of one of a few long known potential real world missions for a nation's military lead to 100% defeat and national humiliation with no apparent plan to cover them.

 

Joe

 

 

 

[Edited by JOE BRENNAN (15 Dec 2004).]

[King Jester]

Packs of Sea Harriers?

 

Sorry, lost in translation. CAP equates to PAC (Patrulla Aerea de Combate) in spanish, thus PACs or misstyped packs.

 

I agree on your reading of the BBC broadcast. Probably a scare tactic by the MoD, to originate a rumour, which slowly grew into a myth. As I said, don´t know if this is still today popular believe amongst kelpers, or not.

 

King Jester

[Ox]

Originally posted by King Jester:

.

 

I agree on your reading of the BBC broadcast. Probably a scare tactic by the MoD, to originate a rumour, which slowly grew into a myth. As I said, don´t know if this is still today popular believe amongst kelpers, or not.

 

King Jester

 

sorry I didn't make myself clear. I suspect that the rapist and robbers myth started in the Falklands from the locals and that the BBC did not start it, though I would not rule it out. The problem with it coming from the BBC is that it would not be very effective propaganda. The falklanders were in daily contact with the Argentine troops who by all accounts mostly behaved well, surely the locals would see that most were young conscripts rather than dastardly evil swine. Anyhow I will see what I can find out and let you know, If you can come up with the name of the book and author that would be a help

[Chris Werb]

Joe, I'm not sure how much terrain in the Falklands is suitable for airfield construction (at least for the use of high performance aircraft). The place is pretty hilly and boggy. RAF Mount Pleasant took something like four years to open (officially opened 1st May 1986) though the runway may have been in use sometime in 1984.

 

 

 

[Edited by Chris Werb (16 Dec 2004).]

[FirstOfFoot]

Originally posted by King Jester:

As for the SHARs, the FRS-1 had a radar, Blue Vixen IRCC, but this one was plagued with problems and never worked to full satisfaction.

 

Nope, Blue Fox in the FRS.1 - Blue Vixen didn't go into service until the early 1990s with the FA.2.......

 

As for radar performance, HMS Invincible had no problems at all with Blue Fox; Sharky Ward talks highly of its performance in his book "Sea Harriers over the Falklands". HMS Hermes' squadrons had some issues with it (to do with calibration procedures and equipment).

 

Blue Fox was a very basic radar; it's what the RB could afford at the time, and the claim was that all it needed to do was to look up and see BEAR and BADGER against a clear blue sky....

 

Blue Vixen was a very different beast; the first radar designed to work from the outset with AIM-120 (the AMRAAM), and a rather effective package, if I say so myself It meant that the most capable fighter in Western European hands for a few years couldn't break the speed of sound except in a dive, and wasn't in the hands of the RAF

[JOE BRENNAN]

Originally posted by Chris Werb:

Joe, I'm not sure how much terrain in the Falklands is suitable for airfield construction (at least for the use of high performance aircraft).  The place is pretty hilly and boggy.  RAF Mount Pleasant took something like four years to open (officially opened 1st May 1986) though the runway may have been in use sometime in 1984.

 

I'm not sure it is either, but either you build fields (or extend Port Stanley's field), or are able to sustain sea communications, or very likely you lose such a campaign. I suppose longer range a/c or lots more aerial tankers could be another angle. Anyway still amazing the Argentine military establishment gave apparently such little thought to basic questions of the concept of such a campaign over such a long time before it.

 

Joe

[King Jester]

JOE BRENNAN

I'm not sure it is either, but either you build fields (or extend Port Stanley's field), or are able to sustain sea communications, or very likely you lose such a campaign. I suppose longer range a/c or lots more aerial tankers could be another angle. Anyway still amazing the Argentine military establishment gave apparently such little thought to basic questions of the concept of such a campaign over such a long time before it.

Apparently after the early euforia of a succesfull landing operation, argie military planners (who as already pointed out would have prefered to launch this campaign, if at all, a few years later on and during spring months, rather than fall), had to make contingency desitions.

The original idea was to have some 2000 to 4000 troops stationed on the islands, while 'aggresive' negotations with the UK took place. As the Task Force set sail for Ascension, this plan was rapidly seen as unsufficient, and army units which where not even prepared to deploy on a weekly exercise where regrouped and flown in by commercial airliner. Aerolineas Argentinas, the former argie flag airline flew some 9000 troops to the islands, the sea route already considered to risky and slow for massive personnel movement during these innitial build-up.

 

Much of the heavy equippment was supposed to follow by sea. There where two problems to this, one is that we did not have our best men in the logistics bussines, and second that there simply was no suitable port to clear the cargo on Stanley. Already the limited ammount of heavy stuff, such as M-35s and Unimogs, AML-90s, OTO howitzers, AAA, food, fuel, UH-1 helos, etc, etc had comletely maxed out the navy's own transport capacity. Most of the army stuff was to be transported by ELMA (flag shipping line) and other commercial liners, but logistic problems delayed the departure of most of the cargo. IRCC RI 12, which was based on Darwin, did never get their winter gear, tents, field kitchens, heavy mortars, engineer equipment, etc, which stayed stranded at some port in Argentina.

 

Same about the perforated metal planks for airstrip construction (can't remember how they are named in english), the same kind used extensively in WWII, Korea, Vietnam, etc). IRCC 9000 square meters (about 4 acres) of metal planks had been readied to extend the strip at Stanley (if this was possible at all is questionable, as the old Stanley strip had a huge rock boulder on one end and a boggy area on the other end, which limited potential lengthening of the runway).

Anyhow, by the time the ship was loaded with all the goodies our logisticians had come up with, the priorities had changed, as suddenly there were five times more troops to feed on the islands. The metal planks had to be unloaded again, and wait for the next ship. Long story made short, they ended up as taxing and parking areas on San Julian airfield (a small civilian airfield) where A-4Cs and occasionally Daggers operated.

 

 

 

FirstOfFoot

Nope, Blue Fox in the FRS.1 - Blue Vixen didn't go into service until the early 1990s with the FA.2.......

 

Correct, my mistake about the radar. Anyhow, even if the performance of the Blue Fox was somewhat limited, it can safely be compared with the Cyrano II on the Mirage IIIEs and or the Agave on the Super Etendards (this is in a2a mode). As it turns out, SHARs flew few CAP mission at night, while Mirage IIIs flew only a handfull escort sorties at night, close to the end of the war (a pair of Mirage IIIs from Grupo 8 being the very last argie combat planes to depart for a combat mission, callsign Pluton, at dusk on June, 13th) and SUEs where virtually grounded after the last Exocet had been fired.

Night/all weather capability was therefore not a severe handicap for the RN, as the only argie aircraft (should I say the most likely to show at night?) where Hercs, Canberras and occasionally a lonely Neptune, as most of the fighters, CAS/COIN aircraft and helos were grounded at night anyway.

 

King Jester

[King Jester]

I'm getting my ideas together about a couple of questions posted here, in regards to "fresh" conscripts vs. "seasoned" conscripts, etc, etc.

 

Will post ASAP.

 

King Jester