"Alaska" class large cruisers

[KingSargent]

That's an interesting point. Historically we can point to mid-1941 as the time when the Germans could no longer profitably send warships out for high-seas raiding, but things would be very different for an American ship; and in the Pacific, the Japanese were probably less advanced in the electronics that worked against the Germans on the oterh side of the world.

Lots of what-if's. Probably can't speculate too far without the limb getting too thin.

Once again, I was thinking more in terms of what was known when the CBs were designed rather than what turned out to be the historical case. If we judge solely from historical hindsight and the knowledge that the only role left for the CBs by the time they commissioned was that of overpriced escorts, they were indeed a mistake and a waste of money.

 

If however we judge from the context of 1940 when the CV was an unproven weapon (at least the potency it achieved later was unproven) and, more especially that no one had any conception of the sheer numbers of CVs that would cover the oceans by 1945, the concept of a "suspenders and belt" backup to ensure that the 'raider threat' was handled makes more sense.

 

As to the possibility of an Alaska as a raider, it was by no means considered impossible that the USN would face navies other than the IJN. War with Britain had been in the back of the USN's mind (more to the front in some individuals) for years. The world-wide British merchant marine network would give the USN a lot of scope for commerce raiding. Even if war with the UK was merely an Anglophobe's wet dream, there was the risk that Britain might lose to Germany and the Germans gain control of the RN and the merchant marine (as had happened during the Age of Sail when the French gained control of the Dutch and Spanish Navies) and the USN would be faced with a serious Atlantic threat.

 

Even in the Pacific the possibilities of Alaskas as raiders appeared worthwhile, especially when the deadliness of the IJN land-based air groups was not known (Force Z was the wakeup call there). We know now that for an Alaska to go a-roving in the Japanese mandates without air cover would be suicide, in 1940 the possibility of slaughtering merchantmen in the Central Pacific could not be denied.

 

In a traditional gunfire Jutland-type confrontation the Alaskas would be valuable to fend off or sink surface scouting groups. The USN fully expected a gunfire encounter to occur; Naval War Colleges games and fleet maneuvers had convinced people that the CVs would quickly neutralize each other (which is why the USN emphasized dispersion of CVs and getting the first strike in), leaving the Battle Lines to duke it out in traditional fashion.

 

So the Alaskas made sense when designed. That the situation would change completely by late 1944 was not something the designers and strategists could know.

[KingSargent]

An unreliable main battery may have had something to do with it.

Not to mention that they were very expensive to operate and man, and there was not a lot for them to do. The 6" DP gun loses value when there is no surface threat and the air threat is much faster than envisaged.

[Guest pfcem]

Do you realize that what you have just said is that someone with an understanding of various ship types would prefer to have Exeter rather than Hood when going into battle against Graf Spee?

No but you don't realize that I said nothing of the sort. More like saying that ANYONE with an understanding of various ship types would prefer to hunt commerse raiders (be they heavy cruisers or Deutschland-type) with a fast, relatively fast firing large cruiser with enough armor protection for the task than a slow, relatively slow firing battleship.

 

 

 

It's interesting that you can find pathos in simple chronology.

 

 

 

Choosing to build an inferior design.

Inferior to what? Given what it was intended to do, how could it have been any better?

 

 

 

I encourage you to go back and read the scenario that you yourself laid out.

Don't need to, I know what you said.

 

 

 

If we're using your definition, whereby "better" means "less valuable," then you're correct. Alaska is less valuable than a well designed ship. An even better option would be no ship at all since it would be even less valuable than Alaska.

No, better meaning more capable at doing what it is intended to do.

[Guest pfcem]

the Alaskas also required twice as many men as the Baltimores. the RN doctrine of sending multiple weaker cruisers against the Deutschland raiders to have worked just fine.

The RN sent multiple weaker cruisers against the Deutschland raiders because it HAD to, not because it preferred to.

 

 

 

and would've worked even better against the Japanese CA.

Not. The Japanese heavy cruisers would have eaten any combination of British cruisers for breakfast. Not to mention what would have happened if the met up with a Kongo or two...

 

 

 

the Baltimore been more powerful than RN CA, I think I'll take two Baltimores over one Alaska.

But you couldn't have two Baltimores over one Alaska. The Baltimores were already tasked & you could have built two Baltimores instead one Alaska.

[DesertFox]

If you do, I hope they include comparative pricing on the various CV types....

 

Freidman talks about the problem in US Cruisers, basically the prices of carriers are deceptive because they do not include airwing....

[Ken Estes]

Each of the seven hunter TF formed in the Atlantic, sent against Graf Spee, was designed to be superior to it if encountered. Some included the few RN and French battle cruisers, others were combinations of 8-in or 6-in cruisers, even a carrier. So there was no 'had to' or other forced issue. The RN knew what it was doing, disposed the forces, and Commodore Harwood drew the lucky straw, ironically with the lightest force. Had the Germans wanted a second try, Cumberland had already joined up; game and match. The Pzschiff design remained highly vulnerable to 8-in fire, so the RN simply had to track her down. As already observed, Deutschland/Luetzow lived to return to Germany by staying off the sea lanes, returned before the forces were on her trail.

 

The IJN above all enjoyed superiority in numbers in 41-42, and the RN, having had its worst period of WWII losses in the three months prior to and after PH, could not muster ships to face it. Had RN 8-in cruisers faced an equal number of IJN 8-in cruisers, there would in no way have been an unbalanced fight. IJN cruisers had varied structural and DC problems, to say the least. Close-in, the IJN 24" torpedoes might have made a difference, but nobody should doubt the fighting ability of the RN, especially by 1942. It remains irrelevant how well any 8-in cruiser might do vs. a Kongo class BB, but San Francisco certainly gave as well as she took, and did not go down. No USN CA was sunk by battleship gunfire, and in fact only 7 went down, and only Astoria to gunfire alone.