"Alaska" class large cruisers

[Tiornu]

why was the super heavy shell developed only by the USN?

You can't have it all. Let's look at the American 16in/45 gun. After 1936, it fired a 2240-lb shell at a muzzle velocity of 2520f/s. The the new battleships came along with their super-heavy 2700-lb shells. You could, I suppose, try to fire those shells at the same 2520f/s and watch while all sorts of interesting things happen. But let's say you're not so venturesome, deciding instead to keep the muzzle energy constant. A little math...voila, you want a muzzle velocity near 2295f/s. Hey--the SoDak and NC classes used a muzzle velocity of 2300f/s. It makes me think they actually were looking to keep the usual muzzle energy. You'll see that both systems had about the same expected barrel life.

What did the Americans gain with their super-heavies? Mostly they got deck penetration. They actually lost on belt penetration, but I doubt anyone cared. They also lost on Danger Space, which means the hit probability decreased, at least at short to moderate ranges. I suspect the longer shells were more susceptible to base slap, but that's just a guess. You definitely need to take care that the longer shell will hold together, and you may recall that the British adopted "super-light" shells for the Nelsons due to concerns about shells breaking up.

 

what surface raiders were the Alaska suppose to hunt?

Pocket battleships mostly, both German and Japanese. But raider hunting was not the only concern. The ships were intended as escorts. For example, some American carriers might be out conducting a raid in the Mandates somewhere, far away from the main IJN fleet, when a detached force of Japanese cruisers pops up. The Alaskas then are responsible for protecting not chasing, though they might well be able to chase down a heavy cruiser that has ventured far from base (rough bottom) or in stormy conditions.

 

The US pre-war cruisers (CA's at least) compare poorly with the IJN heavies. In light cruisers it was a bit more even.

Really? I think it's pretty close, though Japanese light cruisers clearly can't compare--mostly old and small.

[Yama]

a couple of more questions. why was the super heavy shell developed only by the USN?

 

It wasn't. Russian Obuhov 12"/52 model 1907: shell weight 470.9kg (1038lb) (compare to US 12"/50 Mk7 which had shell weight of 870lb. Most other foreign WW1 era guns were comparable). Very accurate guns too - it sez on NavWeaps.com that Imperatritsa Maria scored a hit on German light cruiser from 21 kilometres. A WW1 record?

Edited July 22, 2007 by Yama

[KingSargent]

a couple of more questions. why was the super heavy shell developed only by the USN? with super heavy shells, the US 12" was almost as powerful as the French 13" guns. I read about the bad experiments that led to the high velocity 16" on the Nelson, but that mistake was already realized by the time KGV class was planned, but still no SHS, why?

The SHS were longer and would not fit in the shell hoists and/or storage racks of older ships. Depending on turret design, conversion could range from costly to impossible. IIRC the USN never did the necessary work to fit the New Yorks with SHS, although that may have been due to age (and their removal from the Battle Line). IIRC (I'm sure I will hear about it if wrong), the KGVs' 14" shells could be classed as SHS compared to other 14" guns, but as the RN had no other 14" guns 'SHS' became 'standard.'

 

another question. what surface raiders were the Alaska suppose to hunt? The Dunkerques were designed to counter the pocket battleships, and they had the firepower and speed advantage. But the Alaska doesn't enjoy a speed advantage over the Japanese CA. and I thought the prewar plans tasked the Japanese CAs with nighttime torpedo attacks against the US battle fleet.

Since the USN knew very little about IJN doctrine pre-war (to its cost), what the IJN intended to do with their CAs was moot. It was possible that the IJN CAs - or some of them - would be employed as raiders. They actually were during the April 1942 Indian Ocean operation.

There was also the possibility that the IJN might not be the (only) enemy faced; RN doctrine was to employ CAs on the trade routes. The IJN and RN had been allies in the past and one can't count on diplomats to keep rival nations friendly...

 

Paper speed advantages are more apparent than real. One reason for the CBs' size was fuel capacity. An IJN CA at full speed would run out of oil quickly, a USN CB could keep the pursuit up.

Maintenance and sea state also affected speed. A dirty bottom could take knots off a ship's speed and size has always proved an advantage in heavy weather.

Finally of course the paper speeds were very often (mostly) not realized in service. The best-known example is the Italian Condottiere CLs - they had a speed advantage of four knots on paper, but British CLs had no problem running them down in wartime.

[Tiornu]

Russian Obuhov 12"/52 model 1907

The Russian 12in gun used the same velocity of the US 12in super-heavy.

 

the KGVs' 14" shells could be classed as SHS

A 14in super-heavy shell would weigh 1810 lbs. The KGV 14in shells was designed to the same proportions as the British 15in shells, the Lion class 16in shells, and the heavy 13.5in shells, not to mention Chile's 14in shells.

[Scott Cunningham]

Jap CL's were pretty poor in comparison with US designs. Most were old and smallish (like destryer leaders, not true CL's) . An exception might be the Mogami's in their 6" configuration, although they were weak-hulled.

 

The US designs were pretty effective, even the AA cruisers (although several of those were sunk).

 

Shell weight and range are great statistics on paper in peacetime, but in a gun battle rate of fire counts for a lot. Thats why both navies really appreciated the rapid fire capability of the CL's.

[Marek Tucan]

I seem to recall that US CL crews referred often to their main weapons as to "6-inch machineguns" and that one Japanese pilot lucky and skilled enough to survive the war described the 5-inch guns as "really large machineguns" Seems the sailors of Sam did put heavy dose of training into rapid loading of main weaponry...

[KingSargent]

I seem to recall that US CL crews referred often to their main weapons as to "6-inch machineguns" and that one Japanese pilot lucky and skilled enough to survive the war described the 5-inch guns as "really large machineguns" Seems the sailors of Sam did put heavy dose of training into rapid loading of main weaponry...

Unfortunately, the rapid-fire 6" seems not to have been as effective in the Solomons as was thought at the time. And without flashless powder they made a helluva target at night. At Kula Gulf, Honolulu and St. Louis had flashless powder for the first few salvoes and Helena didn't; IMHO that difference was why Helena was sunk - the torpedo attacks targeted her and not the ships with flashless powder.

 

Besides the training, there was a lot of development of the mechanisms that permitted the rapid fire.

[Sparviero]

Finally of course the paper speeds were very often (mostly) not realized in service. The best-known example is the Italian Condottiere CLs - they had a speed advantage of four knots on paper, but British CLs had no problem running them down in wartime.

 

Are you referring to Cape Spada? Two light cruisers of the oldest series of Italian Condottiere class in rough seas that hadn't seen a refit in some years. I'll have to check when I get home but I believe at the beginning of the war they were only rated as 30-32 knots. For some reason trial speeds instead of operation speeds always seem to be used for Italian ships and pointed out to as true speeds even though operational speeds are available. If you notice only the oldest and most expendable cruisers were used on missions such as this. I'd love to see what Abruzzi and Garibaldi would have done in such a situation although the weather state and importance of these cruisers would probably have meant they disengaged when the British destroyers tried to drag the Italian cruisers towards the Sydney.

[DesertFox]

In Friedman's US Battleships, there was the discussion of a 35,000 ton (standard load) battleship armed with nine 14 inch guns instead of twelve 14 inch guns. It was planned with a top speed of 30 knots. I am surprised nobody pointed to that concept or use the basic idea and cut down to 12 inch guns.

 

It likely would not have been much more expensive than the Alaska turned to to be

[Guest pfcem]

In Friedman's US Battleships, there was the discussion of a 35,000 ton (standard load) battleship armed with nine 14 inch guns instead of twelve 14 inch guns. It was planned with a top speed of 30 knots. I am surprised nobody pointed to that concept or use the basic idea and cut down to 12 inch guns.

 

It likely would not have been much more expensive than the Alaska turned to to be

Because the Alaskas were scaled up cruisers, not scaled down battleships.

[DesertFox]

Because the Alaskas were scaled up cruisers, not scaled down battleships.

 

I realize that but all someone would have to have said is "Look at how much this thing will cost. For just a bit more, we can build a fast battleship with good armor."

[hojutsuka]

It wasn't a waste until conditions changed:

 

1. The CV proved to be as effective as their fan club prophesied.

 

2. Never before had any of numerous 'wonderweapons' that had been hailed as "the end of the battleship" actually worked, so supplanting of the gunnery ship by the carrier was unproven.

 

3. The IJN had 18 CAs, the USN had 18 CAs. USN doctrine called for the CAs to escort CVs; IJN doctrine left heavy CV escort to Kongos, theoretically freeing their CAs to act as surface raiders.

 

4. The USN had no counter to large (and we knew the IJN ships were over Treaty limits) fast CAs acting as raiders; our CAs were committed to CV escort and most were outclassed by IJN CAs anyway.

 

5. Given the unproven ability of the CV to counter the raider threat, a gunnery-ship solution was needed. We could use Iowas as raider-chasers, or we could build something else so our battle line was not weakened.

 

The CB was a real answer to a real problem. It turned out to be unnecessary. BUT had the war scenario worked as it was expected to work, not having the CBs could have put the USN in a world of hurt.

Well, a lot of perceptive people understood before December 1941 that aircraft and submarines were going to dominate the naval war rather than guns. I believe Fisher said just that after World War I, in spite of the fact that he had in a real sense created the big gun Royal Navy that had just won the Great War.

 

But let us assume for the moment that we are the General Board, entrusted with recommending what the USN should build, and that we do not believe in the untried CV, but feel we need a gunnery-ship. In fact, I will grant all five of your points above, with the exception of two small quibbles.

 

Quibble 1: In your point 3 above, you are wrong about IJN doctrine for the Kongos (I will try to deal with this in another post). However, this is moot because pre-war USN had very little understanding of IJN planning and doctrine, so had to assume that IJN might use their CAs as raiders.

 

Quibble 2: In your point 4 above, you are wrong to say that most USN CAs were outclassed by IJN CAs. Whatever the reality (and I can see the comparison going either way depending on how you weight the probability of various scenarios), the important thing in your argument is how the USN perceived their relative capabilities when the Alaska design was being worked on. Until actual combat, Westerners tended to underestimate Japanese capabilities, the Zero being a notable case. This was so in case of CAs as well. See Norman Friedman, "U.S. Cruisers", page 292, where he discusses the reaction of the CinC U.S. Fleet to proposed designs for the Alaska class:

 

"He [CinC U.S Fleet - Hojutsuka] also feared that Japan would match U.S. super-cruisers, so that any advantage would be fleeting at best. Moreover, the construction of foreign super-cruisers would negate the value of American heavy cruisers, which were considered individually superior to the Japanese."

 

So we as the General Board consider the US CAs as individually superior to the Japanese CAs which might be used as raiders. Is the super-cruiser like the Alaska a good choice to counter this threat?

 

I think not. The basic problem is that the Alaska as an individual ship is halfway between a CA and a fast battleship. In speed it is equal to the Iowa, but it is inferior in everything else including maneuverability. No one given the choice of having an Iowa will take an Alaska. So the only advantage (if any) to building Alaska instead of more Iowa would be cost and possibly speed of construction. Unfortunately, the Alaska uses an entirely new and powerful 12" gun, which must be developed along with a new turret for it. This increases the cost and time for completing the first Alaskas so that there is not much advantage over building a few more Iowas.

 

Of course, if you build large numbers of Alaskas, there will be a cost advantage over building an equal number of Iowas. But a large number of ships means an extended program, so the potential opponent (Japan) has time to react. What if Japan should build super-cruisers of their own as the CinC U.S. Fleet feared, negating the value of U.S. heavy cruisers? The Japanese might even build more powerful super-cruiser than the Alaska (IJN actually did plan a ship to counter Alaska, and changed the armament to 14" guns to overmatch the 12" guns of Alaska, but it was never built). In such a situation, building more Iowas would make more sense.

 

So I think the Alaska class was one possible answer to the problem posed in your 5 points, but not a good one. IMHO it would have been better to build more Iowas. The real life General Board must have reasoned somewhat similarly, because it proposed building two more Iowas instead of ordering the first Alaskas on April 18, 1940 ("U.S. Cruisers", page 293).

 

I am reminded that when Winston Churchill was 1st Lord of the Admiralty during the run-up to WW1, he was trying to get a Naval Appropriation for more BBs passed. I forget who was blocking it, but the individual said the BBs WSC wanted were not needed. Churchill said, "If we build them and do not need them, money will be lost. If we do NOT build them and DO need them, the Empire may be lost."

That was Asquith's Liberal government, trying to cut expenditures. But an argument like the one you quote can be used to justify anything, even longbows and pikes! I wonder who Churchill said that to, given that Fisher apparently criticized Churchill for sailing with those on the 'cutback' side.

 

Anyway, by following the recommendation of the real life General Board, we will have even more powerful ships than the Alaskas. It probably won't cost appreciably more, and if it does, well [insert quote from Churchill here]!

 

Hojutsuka

[Guest pfcem]

I realize that but all someone would have to have said is "Look at how much this thing will cost. For just a bit more, we can build a fast battleship with good armor."

But a "fast battleship with good armor" is not what was wanted (we already had & were getting those). A "Large Cruiser" to defeat enemy heavy cruisers & Deutschland-type raiders was. For what they were intended to do, the Alaskas were better than even the Iowas.

[Bob B]

If they USN hadn't built the Alaskas they probably would have built one of the other super heavy cruiser designs that they had on the drawing board. Check out some of the other proposed designs:

 

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/usnshtp/cru/cb1cl-d.htm

 

They even studied converting the Alaskas hulls into carriers, which would have resulted in a ship the size of an Essex class carrier that was less capable than the purpose built ship. Note that this was a study done in January 1942 when things looked rather gloomy.

[KingSargent]

That was Asquith's Liberal government, trying to cut expenditures. But an argument like the one you quote can be used to justify anything, even longbows and pikes! I wonder who Churchill said that to, given that Fisher apparently criticized Churchill for sailing with those on the 'cutback' side.

 

The quote was said during (but not in the House) the last pre-War program debates. As Churchill said, the BBs that caused such a fuss were cancelled anyway. Fisher was not 1st Sea Lord at the time, he came back in after war was declared. I think the contremps with Fisher was earlier, when Churchill went for the Queen Elizabeths instead of Fisher's pet BCs.

 

Anyway, by following the recommendation of the real life General Board, we will have even more powerful ships than the Alaskas. It probably won't cost appreciably more, and if it does, well [insert quote from Churchill here]!

 

Hojutsuka

Well, they started 12 ships (6 Alaskas and 6 Iowas) and completed half of them - 2/3 of the BBs, 1/3 of the CBs. So the Iowas won out anyway.

 

I'm not sure whether a slip that could build an Alaska could build an Iowa. I haven't detailed info on the BB-CB programs, but I wouldn't be surprised if the CBs were built in slips/yards that couldn't handle the Iowas or Montanas.

[Tiornu]

For what they were intended to do, the Alaskas were better than even the Iowas.

In what way?

[Guest pfcem]

In what way?

By being the "Large Cruisers to defeat enemy heavy cruisers & Deutschland-type raiders" they were intended to be rather than battleships which would have NEVER been alowed to do what they were intended to do. With higher rate of fire 12" guns more than adequite against heavy cruisers & Deutschland-type raiders (in fact studies showed that 10" guns would probably have been the "optimum" choice - IIRC the decision to go with 12" guns was due to the possibility that they may have to face the Kongos) & more than adequite armor to protect against heavy cruisers & Deutschland-type raiders.

[Tiornu]

Well, if "better" means "less valuable," I can agree, though I can't think of a situation in which I'd prefer being aboard Alaska during a duel.

A 12in gun is certainly a better choice for countering Kongos.

[hojutsuka]

IJN doctrine left heavy CV escort to Kongos, theoretically freeing their CAs to act as surface raiders.

This is unfortunately completely wrong. Since this came up in the context of the decision to build Alaska class large cruisers, the doctrine has to be that of the IJN before Pearl Harbor.

 

First, in 1936, the four Kongo class fast battleships formed the Third Sentai (Squadron), which was assigned to assist heavy cruisers in night torpedo attacks as a part of the grand plan to destroy the US Navy in attacks organized in 9 stages. When Yamamoto proposed a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor using aircraft carriers, the Naval General Staff rejected it. It was only in October 1941, when Yamamoto and the entire Combined Fleet staff threatened to resign, that the Naval General Staff reluctantly accepted the Pearl Harbor plan. Thus, there was no pre-war IJN doctrine to use the Kongo class fast battleships as escorts to the heavy CVs.

 

Second, when war did come, the Kongo class fast battleships were often used as part of the Kido Butai (the carrier striking force). But this did not free IJN heavy cruisers, because IJN heavy cruisers were almost always part of the carrier force, while fast battleships were sometimes not present.

 

At Pearl Harbor, only Hiei and Kirishima were present (Kongo and Haruna were part of the Second Fleet, supporting landings in Malaya and Philippines) along with the heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma.

 

For the Indian Ocean operation, the Kido Butai minus Kaga was joined by all the Kongos plus the heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma. The light carrier Ryujo which was also operating in the Indian Ocean was accompanied by no less than 5 heavy cruisers, Chokai (flagship) and Seventh Sentai (the four Mogami class CAs).

 

At Coral Sea, the heavy carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku and the light carrier Shoho were accompanied by 6 heavy cruisers (Myoko, Haguro, Aoba, Kinugasa, Furutaka, and Kako).

 

At Midway, the Kido Butai was escorted by 2 fast battleships (Kirishima and Haruna) and 2 heavy cruisers (Chokai and Atago).

 

At Battle of Eastern Solomons Shokaku and Zuikaku were accompanied by 2 fast battleships (Hiei and Kirishima) and 3 heavy cruisers (Chikuma, Suzuya, and Kumano). The light carrier Ryujo had the heavy cruiser Tone.

 

At Santa Cruz the main force (Third Fleet) had 2 carriers (Shokaku, Zuikaku) and one light carrier (Zuiho), plus 2 fast battleships (Hiei and Kirishima) and 4 heavy cruisers (Tone, Chikuma, Suzuya, and Kumano).

 

As you can see, heavy cruisers were found more often with the carriers than the fast battleships, so that even after the beginning of the war established the carriers as the central force, there was no doctrine assigning the Kongos to carrier forces.

 

Hojutsuka

[JOE BRENNAN]

For the Indian Ocean operation, the Kido Butai minus Kaga was joined by all the Kongos plus the heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma. The light carrier Ryujo which was also operating in the Indian Ocean was accompanied by no less than 5 heavy cruisers, Chokai (flagship) and Seventh Sentai (the four Mogami class CAs).

 

At Midway, the Kido Butai was escorted by 2 fast battleships (Kirishima and Haruna) and 2 heavy cruisers (Chokai and Atago).

Two quibbles I have with that list are second one first: Tone and Chikuma were also part of the carrier striking force at Midway, Chokai and Atago were part of the Midway occupation force. One relative constant was the use of Tone and Chikuma with carriers because of their seaplane capacity; one doctrinal difference was the IJN use of floatplanes to reconnoiter for carrier strikes during the war, which the USN didn't do.

 

And, in the Indian Ocean op the cruisers w/ Ryujo *were* acting as commerce raiders, rarely and with unmatched success, and Ryujo was supporting them as much as the other way around. In addition to finding and attacking merchant ships with her a/c at sea and in port, the survivors of the SS Taksang said they'd been sunk by Ryujo herself (guns, though many sources credit the immediately accompanying CL Yura and DD Yugiri, the rest of the force having fanned out), unique in the history of carrier operations.

 

Otherwise I generally agree, in the late '30's after their second reconstruction the Kongo's main role was to be in the Night Battle Force in support of cruiser torpedo attacks. It fit naturally to also use them as CV escorts by the time of WWII, and they represented a capability the USN didn't have right at the strt of the war, capital ships which would not excessively slow down carrier operations; but it wasn't to the exclusion of using CA's w/ CV's also even in any theory AFAIK. But in general the use of surface ships in air-sea battles was fluid in the period as the importance of a/c grew so fast.

 

Joe

[Scott Cunningham]

I think the Alaskas would have done OK against the Kongos. The Weight of fire and armor goes to the Kongos (by statistics), but I think the modern Alaskas would have been able to hit early and often to even things up.

 

From what it sounds like, the heavy US 12" was about as lethal as a standard IJN 14".

 

Its too bad there isn't a decent WWII surface combat simulation game out there. I'd love to wargame some of the scenarios put forward here.

[FITZ]

For what they were intended to do, the Alaskas were better than even the Iowas.

 

Except that they were a monumental waste of resources.

 

1. The threat the Alaska's were supposed to deal with was largely imaginary.

2. The Alaska's cost about 75% as much to build as an Iowa and nearly as much to operate but offered dramatically less protection and firepower

[Guest pfcem]

Except that they were a monumental waste of resources.

One can make that argument now but in the late 30's-early 40's you could not.

 

 

 

1. The threat the Alaska's were supposed to deal with was largely imaginary.

The IJN heavy cruisers were very much real. And in the late 30's-early 40's it was not unrealistic to think that Japan could have been working on Deutschland-type raiders.

 

 

 

2. The Alaska's cost about 75% as much to build as an Iowa and nearly as much to operate but offered dramatically less protection and firepower

Yes they ended up being very expensive but that was not the original intent (they actually ended up being larger/more powerful/more expensive than originally intended when it was decided they they should be capable of engaging the Kongos).

 

They were NEVER intended to have the protection & firepower of a battleship. They were Large Cruisers, not battleships! You don't need (or want) battleship protection & firepower in a Large Cruiser intended to defeat enemy heavy cruisers & Deutschland-type raiders.

[KingSargent]

Except that they were a monumental waste of resources.

 

1. The threat the Alaska's were supposed to deal with was largely imaginary.

Not at all. In the 1930s surface raiders were held to be the #1 threat to merchant traffic. Submarine warfare against merchant shipping had been effectively "outlawed" by international treaties. There were repeated efforts to ban submarines altogether - according to Brown the RN attitude to developing ASW weapons and tactics BTW was "Why bother? Submarines are about to be banned."

 

The effectiveness of the CV was unproven, and their weren't enough of them in any navy to waste their attack and fleet protection abilities chasing merchantmen. Battleships were not going to be detached from the Battle Line (unless they were obsolete and used for escort purposes).

 

That left cruisers, which meant speed - even if the raider was slow, speed was required to respond to reports of raiders. Some cruisers were big and fast, which meant the cruiser hunter should be bigger and effectively faster.

 

That meant something like an Alaska. Even the RN planned very large 9.2"-gunned cruisers, but the US was the only country with the industrial capacity and the wealth to build them.

 

So we should not build Alaskas just because we were the only ones who could afford them?

 

 

2. The Alaska's cost about 75% as much to build as an Iowa and nearly as much to operate but offered dramatically less protection and firepower

PFCEM has dealt with this quite handily, but I will add: Would YOU care to be the one explaining to the surviving family of those sunk by surface raiders why you had neglected a counter to the threat because it was "too expensive?"

 

And please do not argue that Iowas could be built instead. Even if they were (and Montanas were the next class) BBs belonged in the Battle Line. They were not going to be detached to hunt raiding cruisers as long as an enemy Battle Line was in existence. The cruiser's traditional role was raiding or chasing raiders, not the BBs - regardless of size.

[DesertFox]

And please do not argue that Iowas could be built instead. Even if they were (and Montanas were the next class) BBs belonged in the Battle Line. They were not going to be detached to hunt raiding cruisers as long as an enemy Battle Line was in existence. The cruiser's traditional role was raiding or chasing raiders, not the BBs - regardless of size.

 

I have to ask about this. This assumes all the Montana class gets built. The other battle line ships, the North Carolinas, the South Dakota II class, and the Montana class have a top speed of 27 or 28 knots.

 

We have these six Iowa class with a top speed of 32 or so knots. Their simple speed puts them into a different class. Some people have liked to call them battlecruisers for that reason. Just their speed seems to mean that they will be deployed differently or you are not using them to their greatest advantage.

 

They had to know that when they were designed